Files
metona-ai-desktop/electron/services/__tests__/mcp-security-and-slo.test.ts
T
thzxx 26169b7be4
CI / 类型检查 + Lint + 单元测试 (push) Failing after 5m43s
CI / 全量测试 (Electron ABI) (push) Failing after 5m25s
CI / 产物编译验证 (push) Successful in 10m1s
feat: v0.7.2 安全收口 · 断链接线 · 观测补洞 — 230 用例扩充与全量回归
P1 修复面收口: /clear 全链路根治(前端清空联动 DB messages+摘要游标+TRACE 快照,
IPC 语义改"操作完成"; 流式中拒绝); web_browser open 补 SSRF 校验(Chromium 旁路关闭,
与 web_fetch/http_request 同源 validateSSRF); MCP 工具结果纳入注入扫描(mcp_* 前缀
按网络来源同级 full 模式, 收敛 resolveScanMode 单点); Trace 落库/入 store 双重瘦身
(tool_result base64/超长字段剥离, metadata 防 MB 级膨胀); 文本附件 512KB 闸门
(file.slice 首段读取+truncated 标志随消息持久化+主进程附件提示感知截断);
单实例锁(requestSingleInstanceLock + second-instance 聚焦已有窗口)

P2 安全纵深: ConfirmationHook 多窗口化(确认请求/超时提示改全窗口广播,
getAllWindows 空时回退 mainWindow, fail-closed 判定升级双通道); mcp_servers.headers
全链路接线(safeParseHeaders 容错解析+SSE/StreamableHTTP requestInit 注入+IPC 逐项
校验+设置页 JSON 输入, 远程 MCP 鉴权头可用)

P3 断链接线: llm:listModels IPC(六家 adapter 动态模型发现首次接线, 配置完整性
前置校验); Ollama pullModel IPC+设置页下载卡片(进度/取消/能力徽标, v0.7.0 死代码
激活); 后台会话运行指示(sessionRunStates 图+Sidebar 状态点, 多会话并发可见);
IR 卫生(移除 THINKING_START/END 死枚举, constraints 标注预留)

P4 质量与文档: i18n 第二阶段(确认弹框/侧栏/状态栏/AgentMonitor/终止原因出层,
外观设置 zh-CN/en-US 切换, ui.locale 持久化, 渲染时求值规避异步注册); README/D1
文档对齐(http_request 风险等级/用例数/实现状态注记); 版本号 0.7.2

测试: 507 → 737 用例(+230, 11 个新文件)。覆盖补齐: context-builder/consolidator/
orchestrator/workspace.service/session-recorder/config-layering/secure-config/
network-proxy + IPC mcp/tasks/memory/app/data 域 + 渲染层 store 与流事件管线纯函数。
测试驱动修复: workspace.appendMemory 中文分区 \b 词边界失效(JS \b 不含 CJK),
固化条目恒追加文件末尾产生重复分区头 → (?=\n|$) 前瞻断言根治

回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; 系统 Node 687 通过 50 跳过;
Electron ABI 全量 737/737 零跳过
2026-08-30 00:09:25 +08:00

238 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
/**
* MCP 命令安全面 + SLO 监控契约测试(v0.7.0 覆盖补齐)
*
* mcp-manager 的三个安全纯函数此前零测试(命令白名单/参数元字符检测/
* env 敏感变量剥离),是 MCP 攻击面的第一道防线 —— 逐条表测锁定。
* HealthChecker/SLOMonitor 此前为"活代码无契约",本文件锁定其健康判定与
* SLO 指标计算(percentile/burnRate/violated/窗口淘汰)。
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
}));
import {
safeParseArgs,
safeParseHeaders,
validateMcpCommand,
buildSafeEnv,
} from '../mcp-manager.service';
import { SLOMonitor, HealthChecker } from '../../utils/slo';
// better-sqlite3 的 ABI 可用性在模块顶层探测(describe.skipIf 在注册期求值)
let dbAvailable = false;
try {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
const DatabaseProbe = require('better-sqlite3');
const p = new DatabaseProbe(':memory:');
p.close();
dbAvailable = true;
} catch {
dbAvailable = false;
}
// ===== MCPsafeParseArgs =====
describe('safeParseArgs — JSON args 解析', () => {
it('合法 JSON 数组 → string[]', () => {
expect(safeParseArgs('["--flag","value"]')).toEqual(['--flag', 'value']);
});
it('非数组/坏 JSON/空输入 → 空数组兜底', () => {
expect(safeParseArgs('{"a":1}')).toEqual([]);
expect(safeParseArgs('not json')).toEqual([]);
expect(safeParseArgs('')).toEqual([]);
});
});
// ===== MCPsafeParseHeadersv0.7.2 P2-8 headers 列接线) =====
describe('safeParseHeaders — headers 列解析', () => {
it('合法 JSON 对象(键值均为字符串)→ Record<string,string>', () => {
expect(safeParseHeaders('{"Authorization":"Bearer t1","X-Route":"a"}')).toEqual({
Authorization: 'Bearer t1',
'X-Route': 'a',
});
});
it('空输入(null/undefined/空串)→ undefined(匿名连接)', () => {
expect(safeParseHeaders(null)).toBeUndefined();
expect(safeParseHeaders(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
expect(safeParseHeaders('')).toBeUndefined();
});
it('非对象/数组/坏 JSON → undefined(不阻断 server 连接)', () => {
expect(safeParseHeaders('["a","b"]')).toBeUndefined();
expect(safeParseHeaders('"plain"')).toBeUndefined();
expect(safeParseHeaders('not json')).toBeUndefined();
expect(safeParseHeaders('{}')).toBeUndefined(); // 空对象等价匿名
});
it('非字符串值逐项丢弃,字符串项保留(部分损坏只损失损坏项)', () => {
expect(safeParseHeaders('{"ok":"v1","bad":123,"worse":{"x":1}}')).toEqual({ ok: 'v1' });
});
});
// ===== MCPvalidateMcpCommand =====
describe('validateMcpCommand — stdio 命令白名单防线', () => {
it('白名单内命令正常放行;目录前缀剥除后匹配 basename,但扩展名不剥除', () => {
for (const cmd of ['npx', 'node', 'npm', 'python', 'python3', 'uv', 'uvx', 'bun', 'deno']) {
expect(() => validateMcpCommand(cmd, [])).not.toThrow();
}
// 目录前缀被剥除 → basename 命中白名单
expect(() =>
validateMcpCommand('/usr/local/bin/npx', ['-y', '@modelcontextprotocol/server']),
).not.toThrow();
// 现状锁定(比预期更严):扩展名不参与剥除 —— 'npx.cmd' 不在名单,直接拒绝。
// 这是当前安全基线的一部分:宁可收紧也不放过任何可执行变体。
expect(() => validateMcpCommand('C:\tools\npx.cmd', [])).toThrow(/allowed list/);
});
it('白名单外命令直接拒绝', () => {
for (const cmd of ['curl', 'bash', 'sh', 'pwsh', 'cmd', 'powershell.exe', './unknown-server']) {
expect(() => validateMcpCommand(cmd, [])).toThrow(/not in the allowed list/);
}
});
it('args 中携带 shell 元字符(; & | 反引号 $ 等)拒绝;普通参数放行', () => {
const evil: Array<string[]> = [
[';whoami'],
['a&b'],
['x|cat'],
['`id`'],
['$HOME'],
['<in'],
['>out'],
['line\nbreak'],
];
for (const args of evil) {
expect(() => validateMcpCommand('node', ['server.js', ...args])).toThrow();
}
expect(() => validateMcpCommand('node', ['server.js', '--port', '3000'])).not.toThrow();
});
});
// ===== MCPbuildSafeEnv =====
describe('buildSafeEnv — 子进程环境净化', () => {
it('命中后缀黑名单的敏感键被剔除,其余保留', () => {
const baseEnv = {
PATH: '/usr/bin',
HOME: '/home/u',
MY_API_KEY: 'sk-secret',
ACCESS_TOKEN: 'tok',
DB_PASSWORD: 'p@ss',
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY2: 'k',
DEPLOY_PRIVATE_KEY: '----', // 后缀 _PRIVATE_KEY 命中
GITEA_CREDENTIALS: '{"u":"x"}', // 后缀 _CREDENTIALS 命中(真实 CI/部署泄漏形态)
SAFE_NAME: 'keepme',
};
vi.stubGlobal('process', { ...process, env: baseEnv as NodeJS.ProcessEnv });
const env = buildSafeEnv();
expect(env.PATH).toBe('/usr/bin');
expect(env.SAFE_NAME).toBe('keepme');
expect(env.MY_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.ACCESS_TOKEN).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.DB_PASSWORD).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.DEPLOY_PRIVATE_KEY).toBeUndefined();
expect(env.GITEA_CREDENTIALS).toBeUndefined();
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
});
});
// ===== SLOMonitor =====
describe('SLOMonitor — 窗口指标 / 分位数 / 燃烧率', () => {
function makeMonitor(): SLOMonitor {
return new SLOMonitor({
target: 0.99,
windowMs: 60_000,
latencyPercentiles: [0.5, 0.95],
latencyThresholdMs: 5_000,
});
}
it('空窗口:totalRequests=0、errorRate=0、violated=false、burnRate=0', () => {
const s = makeMonitor().getStatus();
expect(s.totalRequests).toBe(0);
expect(s.errorRate).toBe(0);
expect(s.violated).toBe(false);
expect(s.burnRate).toBe(0);
});
it('统计请求成功率/平均延迟/吞吐量、分位数字段齐全且单调', async () => {
const m = makeMonitor();
const t0 = Date.now();
const latencies = [100, 200, 400, 800, 1600]; // 全成功
latencies.forEach((ms, i) => {
m.recordRequest(ms, true);
void i;
});
void t0;
const s = m.getStatus();
expect(s.totalRequests).toBe(5);
expect(s.errorRequests).toBe(0);
expect(s.avgLatencyMs).toBe(620);
expect(Object.keys(s.percentiles)).toEqual(['P50', 'P95']);
expect(s.percentiles['P50']).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(200);
expect(s.percentiles['P95']).toBeLessThanOrEqual(1600);
expect(s.burnRate).toBe(0);
expect(s.target).toBeCloseTo(0.99);
expect(s.errorBudget).toBeCloseTo(0.01);
});
it('错误率超预算 → burnRate>1 且 violated=true(全错样本:burnRate=100', async () => {
const m = new SLOMonitor({
target: 0.99,
windowMs: 60_000,
latencyPercentiles: [0.5],
latencyThresholdMs: 10_000,
});
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) m.recordRequest(50 + i, false);
const s = m.getStatus();
expect(s.errorRate).toBe(1);
expect(s.burnRate).toBeGreaterThan(1);
expect(s.violated).toBe(true);
});
it('窗口外记录被淘汰:回到基线 totalRequests=0(真实短窗口计时)', async () => {
const m = new SLOMonitor({
target: 0.99,
windowMs: 50,
latencyPercentiles: [0.5],
latencyThresholdMs: 10_000,
});
m.recordRequest(100, true);
m.recordRequest(120, false);
expect(m.getStatus().totalRequests).toBe(2);
// 越过 50ms 窗口后读取
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 70));
expect(m.getStatus().totalRequests).toBe(0);
});
});
// ===== HealthChecker =====
describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('HealthChecker — 三项健康检查', () => {
// 注:真实库连通性由 database-migration.test.tsPRAGMA user_version 套件)以
// 完整 DatabaseService.initialize() 覆盖;此处仅保留纯依赖注入的确定性用例。
it('DB ping 失败 → database check 不健康、healthy=false', async () => {
const broken = {
prepare: () => {
throw new Error('disk I/O error');
},
} as unknown as import('better-sqlite3').Database;
const hc = new HealthChecker(() => broken, ':memory:');
const report = await hc.check();
const dbCheck = report.checks.find((c) => c.name === 'database');
expect(dbCheck?.healthy).toBe(false);
expect(String(dbCheck?.error ?? '')).toContain('I/O');
expect(report.healthy).toBe(false);
});
});