P1 修复面收口: /clear 全链路根治(前端清空联动 DB messages+摘要游标+TRACE 快照, IPC 语义改"操作完成"; 流式中拒绝); web_browser open 补 SSRF 校验(Chromium 旁路关闭, 与 web_fetch/http_request 同源 validateSSRF); MCP 工具结果纳入注入扫描(mcp_* 前缀 按网络来源同级 full 模式, 收敛 resolveScanMode 单点); Trace 落库/入 store 双重瘦身 (tool_result base64/超长字段剥离, metadata 防 MB 级膨胀); 文本附件 512KB 闸门 (file.slice 首段读取+truncated 标志随消息持久化+主进程附件提示感知截断); 单实例锁(requestSingleInstanceLock + second-instance 聚焦已有窗口) P2 安全纵深: ConfirmationHook 多窗口化(确认请求/超时提示改全窗口广播, getAllWindows 空时回退 mainWindow, fail-closed 判定升级双通道); mcp_servers.headers 全链路接线(safeParseHeaders 容错解析+SSE/StreamableHTTP requestInit 注入+IPC 逐项 校验+设置页 JSON 输入, 远程 MCP 鉴权头可用) P3 断链接线: llm:listModels IPC(六家 adapter 动态模型发现首次接线, 配置完整性 前置校验); Ollama pullModel IPC+设置页下载卡片(进度/取消/能力徽标, v0.7.0 死代码 激活); 后台会话运行指示(sessionRunStates 图+Sidebar 状态点, 多会话并发可见); IR 卫生(移除 THINKING_START/END 死枚举, constraints 标注预留) P4 质量与文档: i18n 第二阶段(确认弹框/侧栏/状态栏/AgentMonitor/终止原因出层, 外观设置 zh-CN/en-US 切换, ui.locale 持久化, 渲染时求值规避异步注册); README/D1 文档对齐(http_request 风险等级/用例数/实现状态注记); 版本号 0.7.2 测试: 507 → 737 用例(+230, 11 个新文件)。覆盖补齐: context-builder/consolidator/ orchestrator/workspace.service/session-recorder/config-layering/secure-config/ network-proxy + IPC mcp/tasks/memory/app/data 域 + 渲染层 store 与流事件管线纯函数。 测试驱动修复: workspace.appendMemory 中文分区 \b 词边界失效(JS \b 不含 CJK), 固化条目恒追加文件末尾产生重复分区头 → (?=\n|$) 前瞻断言根治 回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; 系统 Node 687 通过 50 跳过; Electron ABI 全量 737/737 零跳过
238 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
238 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* MCP 命令安全面 + SLO 监控契约测试(v0.7.0 覆盖补齐)
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*
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* mcp-manager 的三个安全纯函数此前零测试(命令白名单/参数元字符检测/
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* env 敏感变量剥离),是 MCP 攻击面的第一道防线 —— 逐条表测锁定。
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* HealthChecker/SLOMonitor 此前为"活代码无契约",本文件锁定其健康判定与
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* SLO 指标计算(percentile/burnRate/violated/窗口淘汰)。
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
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vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
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default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
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}));
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import {
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safeParseArgs,
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safeParseHeaders,
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validateMcpCommand,
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buildSafeEnv,
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} from '../mcp-manager.service';
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import { SLOMonitor, HealthChecker } from '../../utils/slo';
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// better-sqlite3 的 ABI 可用性在模块顶层探测(describe.skipIf 在注册期求值)
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let dbAvailable = false;
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try {
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
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const DatabaseProbe = require('better-sqlite3');
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const p = new DatabaseProbe(':memory:');
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p.close();
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dbAvailable = true;
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} catch {
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dbAvailable = false;
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}
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// ===== MCP:safeParseArgs =====
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describe('safeParseArgs — JSON args 解析', () => {
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it('合法 JSON 数组 → string[]', () => {
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expect(safeParseArgs('["--flag","value"]')).toEqual(['--flag', 'value']);
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});
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it('非数组/坏 JSON/空输入 → 空数组兜底', () => {
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expect(safeParseArgs('{"a":1}')).toEqual([]);
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expect(safeParseArgs('not json')).toEqual([]);
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expect(safeParseArgs('')).toEqual([]);
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});
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});
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// ===== MCP:safeParseHeaders(v0.7.2 P2-8 headers 列接线) =====
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describe('safeParseHeaders — headers 列解析', () => {
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it('合法 JSON 对象(键值均为字符串)→ Record<string,string>', () => {
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expect(safeParseHeaders('{"Authorization":"Bearer t1","X-Route":"a"}')).toEqual({
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Authorization: 'Bearer t1',
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'X-Route': 'a',
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});
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});
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it('空输入(null/undefined/空串)→ undefined(匿名连接)', () => {
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expect(safeParseHeaders(null)).toBeUndefined();
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expect(safeParseHeaders(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
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expect(safeParseHeaders('')).toBeUndefined();
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});
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it('非对象/数组/坏 JSON → undefined(不阻断 server 连接)', () => {
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expect(safeParseHeaders('["a","b"]')).toBeUndefined();
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expect(safeParseHeaders('"plain"')).toBeUndefined();
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expect(safeParseHeaders('not json')).toBeUndefined();
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expect(safeParseHeaders('{}')).toBeUndefined(); // 空对象等价匿名
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});
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it('非字符串值逐项丢弃,字符串项保留(部分损坏只损失损坏项)', () => {
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expect(safeParseHeaders('{"ok":"v1","bad":123,"worse":{"x":1}}')).toEqual({ ok: 'v1' });
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});
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});
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// ===== MCP:validateMcpCommand =====
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describe('validateMcpCommand — stdio 命令白名单防线', () => {
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it('白名单内命令正常放行;目录前缀剥除后匹配 basename,但扩展名不剥除', () => {
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for (const cmd of ['npx', 'node', 'npm', 'python', 'python3', 'uv', 'uvx', 'bun', 'deno']) {
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand(cmd, [])).not.toThrow();
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}
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// 目录前缀被剥除 → basename 命中白名单
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expect(() =>
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validateMcpCommand('/usr/local/bin/npx', ['-y', '@modelcontextprotocol/server']),
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).not.toThrow();
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// 现状锁定(比预期更严):扩展名不参与剥除 —— 'npx.cmd' 不在名单,直接拒绝。
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// 这是当前安全基线的一部分:宁可收紧也不放过任何可执行变体。
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('C:\tools\npx.cmd', [])).toThrow(/allowed list/);
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});
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it('白名单外命令直接拒绝', () => {
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for (const cmd of ['curl', 'bash', 'sh', 'pwsh', 'cmd', 'powershell.exe', './unknown-server']) {
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand(cmd, [])).toThrow(/not in the allowed list/);
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}
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});
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it('args 中携带 shell 元字符(; & | 反引号 $ 等)拒绝;普通参数放行', () => {
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const evil: Array<string[]> = [
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[';whoami'],
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['a&b'],
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['x|cat'],
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['`id`'],
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['$HOME'],
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['<in'],
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['>out'],
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['line\nbreak'],
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];
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for (const args of evil) {
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('node', ['server.js', ...args])).toThrow();
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}
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('node', ['server.js', '--port', '3000'])).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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// ===== MCP:buildSafeEnv =====
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describe('buildSafeEnv — 子进程环境净化', () => {
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it('命中后缀黑名单的敏感键被剔除,其余保留', () => {
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const baseEnv = {
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PATH: '/usr/bin',
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HOME: '/home/u',
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MY_API_KEY: 'sk-secret',
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ACCESS_TOKEN: 'tok',
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DB_PASSWORD: 'p@ss',
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AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY2: 'k',
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DEPLOY_PRIVATE_KEY: '----', // 后缀 _PRIVATE_KEY 命中
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GITEA_CREDENTIALS: '{"u":"x"}', // 后缀 _CREDENTIALS 命中(真实 CI/部署泄漏形态)
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SAFE_NAME: 'keepme',
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};
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vi.stubGlobal('process', { ...process, env: baseEnv as NodeJS.ProcessEnv });
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const env = buildSafeEnv();
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expect(env.PATH).toBe('/usr/bin');
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expect(env.SAFE_NAME).toBe('keepme');
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expect(env.MY_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.ACCESS_TOKEN).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.DB_PASSWORD).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.DEPLOY_PRIVATE_KEY).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.GITEA_CREDENTIALS).toBeUndefined();
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vi.unstubAllGlobals();
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});
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});
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// ===== SLOMonitor =====
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describe('SLOMonitor — 窗口指标 / 分位数 / 燃烧率', () => {
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function makeMonitor(): SLOMonitor {
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return new SLOMonitor({
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target: 0.99,
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windowMs: 60_000,
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latencyPercentiles: [0.5, 0.95],
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latencyThresholdMs: 5_000,
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});
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}
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it('空窗口:totalRequests=0、errorRate=0、violated=false、burnRate=0', () => {
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const s = makeMonitor().getStatus();
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expect(s.totalRequests).toBe(0);
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expect(s.errorRate).toBe(0);
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expect(s.violated).toBe(false);
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expect(s.burnRate).toBe(0);
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});
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it('统计请求成功率/平均延迟/吞吐量、分位数字段齐全且单调', async () => {
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const m = makeMonitor();
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const t0 = Date.now();
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const latencies = [100, 200, 400, 800, 1600]; // 全成功
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latencies.forEach((ms, i) => {
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m.recordRequest(ms, true);
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void i;
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});
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void t0;
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const s = m.getStatus();
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expect(s.totalRequests).toBe(5);
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expect(s.errorRequests).toBe(0);
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expect(s.avgLatencyMs).toBe(620);
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expect(Object.keys(s.percentiles)).toEqual(['P50', 'P95']);
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expect(s.percentiles['P50']).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(200);
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expect(s.percentiles['P95']).toBeLessThanOrEqual(1600);
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expect(s.burnRate).toBe(0);
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expect(s.target).toBeCloseTo(0.99);
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expect(s.errorBudget).toBeCloseTo(0.01);
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});
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it('错误率超预算 → burnRate>1 且 violated=true(全错样本:burnRate=100)', async () => {
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const m = new SLOMonitor({
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target: 0.99,
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windowMs: 60_000,
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latencyPercentiles: [0.5],
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latencyThresholdMs: 10_000,
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});
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) m.recordRequest(50 + i, false);
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const s = m.getStatus();
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expect(s.errorRate).toBe(1);
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expect(s.burnRate).toBeGreaterThan(1);
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expect(s.violated).toBe(true);
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});
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it('窗口外记录被淘汰:回到基线 totalRequests=0(真实短窗口计时)', async () => {
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const m = new SLOMonitor({
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target: 0.99,
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windowMs: 50,
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latencyPercentiles: [0.5],
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latencyThresholdMs: 10_000,
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});
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m.recordRequest(100, true);
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m.recordRequest(120, false);
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expect(m.getStatus().totalRequests).toBe(2);
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// 越过 50ms 窗口后读取
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 70));
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expect(m.getStatus().totalRequests).toBe(0);
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});
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});
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// ===== HealthChecker =====
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describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('HealthChecker — 三项健康检查', () => {
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// 注:真实库连通性由 database-migration.test.ts(PRAGMA user_version 套件)以
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// 完整 DatabaseService.initialize() 覆盖;此处仅保留纯依赖注入的确定性用例。
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it('DB ping 失败 → database check 不健康、healthy=false', async () => {
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const broken = {
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prepare: () => {
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throw new Error('disk I/O error');
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},
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} as unknown as import('better-sqlite3').Database;
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const hc = new HealthChecker(() => broken, ':memory:');
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const report = await hc.check();
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const dbCheck = report.checks.find((c) => c.name === 'database');
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expect(dbCheck?.healthy).toBe(false);
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expect(String(dbCheck?.error ?? '')).toContain('I/O');
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expect(report.healthy).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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