Files
metona-ai-desktop/electron/harness/sandbox/sandbox.ts
T
thzxx 3c5aea8fb7 feat: 升级至 v0.2.1 — 流式渲染修复、安全增强、工具自动执行
流式渲染修复:
- runId 机制防止 abort 后旧流事件污染新 run
- run lock 防止并发 run 污染引擎状态
- abort race 提前退出工具执行等待
- TERMINATED 状态通过 stateChange 发射
- tool_call_delta 流式参数拼接 + pending 占位替换
- 首轮卡片创建路径统一,traceStep 按 ID 精确匹配
- compressed 事件转发为 toast 通知

安全增强:
- ConfirmationHook 支持持久化自动执行(跨会话)
- 设置面板新增自动执行工具管理 UI
- SandboxManager 双重安全校验 fail-closed
- 审计日志链式哈希防篡改
- PromptInjectionDefender 中文注入标记清理
- scanCode 28 模式 + base64/$() 检测
- validatePath realpathSync 防符号链接逃逸
- code-search 使用 execFile 防命令注入

新增工具:
- file_editor、code_search、task_manager、diff_viewer

其他:
- Agent Loop 加 PARSING/REFLECTING 状态 + 指数退避重试
- MemoryManager TF-IDF 语义检索
- run_command Windows 中文编码修复(chcp 65001)
- 版本号 0.2.0 → 0.2.1
2026-07-12 12:54:52 +08:00

149 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Sandbox Manager — 沙箱执行环境
*
* 四层纵深防御:进程隔离、路径白名单、网络策略、资源限制。
*
* @see docs/生产级通用 AI Agent 智能体桌面应用:完整设计与构建指南.html — 第五章
*/
import { resolve, sep } from 'path';
import { existsSync, realpathSync } from 'fs';
export interface SandboxConfig {
allowedPaths?: string[];
networkPolicy?: 'allowall' | 'deny-all' | 'allowlist';
resourceLimits?: Partial<ResourceLimits>;
}
export interface ResourceLimits {
maxMemoryMB: number;
maxCpuSeconds: number;
maxExecutionMs: number;
maxOutputSizeKB: number;
}
export interface SandboxExecutionResult {
success: boolean;
output?: string;
stderr?: string;
exitCode?: number;
error?: string;
durationMs: number;
}
export class SandboxManager {
private allowedPaths: Set<string> = new Set();
private networkPolicy: 'allowall' | 'deny-all' | 'allowlist' = 'deny-all';
private resourceLimits: ResourceLimits = {
maxMemoryMB: 512,
maxCpuSeconds: 30,
maxExecutionMs: 60_000,
maxOutputSizeKB: 1024,
};
constructor(private config: SandboxConfig) {
this.allowedPaths = new Set(config.allowedPaths ?? []);
this.networkPolicy = config.networkPolicy ?? 'allowlist';
}
/**
* 校验文件路径是否在白名单内
*
* 安全策略:fail-closed — 如果未配置任何白名单路径,拒绝所有访问。
* 同时解析符号链接,防止通过 symlink 逃逸白名单。
*/
validatePath(requestedPath: string): { allowed: boolean; resolvedPath: string; reason?: string } {
const resolved = resolve(requestedPath);
if (this.allowedPaths.size === 0) {
return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'No allowed paths configured (fail-closed)' };
}
// 先做字符串级白名单校验
const isAllowed = Array.from(this.allowedPaths).some(
(allowed) => resolved === allowed || resolved.startsWith(allowed + sep),
);
if (!isAllowed) {
return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'Path not in allowed list' };
}
// 解析符号链接(如果路径存在)
if (existsSync(resolved)) {
try {
const realPath = realpathSync(resolved);
const realAllowed = Array.from(this.allowedPaths).some(
(allowed) => realPath === allowed || realPath.startsWith(allowed + sep),
);
if (!realAllowed) {
return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: realPath, reason: 'Symlink escape detected' };
}
return { allowed: true, resolvedPath: realPath };
} catch {
// realpath 解析失败(权限问题等),保守拒绝
return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'Path resolution failed' };
}
}
return { allowed: true, resolvedPath: resolved };
}
/**
* 静态代码安全扫描
*
* 检测危险模块导入、代码执行、路径遍历、危险命令、反向 shell、
* fork bomb、PowerShell 编码执行、环境变量窃取、编码绕过等。
*/
scanCode(code: string): { safe: boolean; reason?: string } {
const dangerousPatterns = [
// 危险模块导入
/require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/i,
/import\s+.*from\s+['"]fs['"]/i,
/import\s+.*from\s+['"]child_process['"]/i,
// 代码执行
/\beval\s*\(/i,
/process\.exit/i,
/Function\s*\(/i,
// 路径遍历
/\.\.\//i,
/\\\.\.\\/i, // Windows ..\
// 危险命令
/\brm\s+-rf\b/i,
/\bkillall\s+-9\b/i,
/\bchown\s+-R\s+\//i,
// 重定向到系统目录
/>\s*\/dev\/null/i,
/>\s*\/etc\//i,
// 管道执行
/\bcurl\b.*\|\s*(bash|sh|zsh)\b/i,
/\bwget\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i,
// 反向 shell
/\/bin\/(bash|sh)\s+-i/i,
/\bnc\s+-e\b/i,
/\bbash\s+-i\b/i,
// Fork bomb
/:\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|:\s*&\s*\};:/i,
// PowerShell 编码执行
/powershell.*-enc(odedCommand)?\s+/i,
// 环境变量窃取
/env\b.*\b(GITHUB_TOKEN|API_KEY|SECRET|PASSWORD)\b/i,
// 编码绕过检测
/\bbase64\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i,
/\batob\s*\(/i,
/\bprintf\s+['"]\\x[0-9a-f]/i,
// 命令替换
/\$\([^)]*(rm|kill|del|format|mkfs)\b/i,
// heredoc 执行
/<<\s*(EOF|END)\s*[\s\S]*?\b(rm|kill|del|format|mkfs)\b/i,
];
for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
if (pattern.test(code)) {
// 不暴露 pattern.source,使用通用错误信息
return { safe: false, reason: 'Command blocked by security policy' };
}
}
return { safe: true };
}
}