流式渲染修复: - runId 机制防止 abort 后旧流事件污染新 run - run lock 防止并发 run 污染引擎状态 - abort race 提前退出工具执行等待 - TERMINATED 状态通过 stateChange 发射 - tool_call_delta 流式参数拼接 + pending 占位替换 - 首轮卡片创建路径统一,traceStep 按 ID 精确匹配 - compressed 事件转发为 toast 通知 安全增强: - ConfirmationHook 支持持久化自动执行(跨会话) - 设置面板新增自动执行工具管理 UI - SandboxManager 双重安全校验 fail-closed - 审计日志链式哈希防篡改 - PromptInjectionDefender 中文注入标记清理 - scanCode 28 模式 + base64/$() 检测 - validatePath realpathSync 防符号链接逃逸 - code-search 使用 execFile 防命令注入 新增工具: - file_editor、code_search、task_manager、diff_viewer 其他: - Agent Loop 加 PARSING/REFLECTING 状态 + 指数退避重试 - MemoryManager TF-IDF 语义检索 - run_command Windows 中文编码修复(chcp 65001) - 版本号 0.2.0 → 0.2.1
149 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
149 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Sandbox Manager — 沙箱执行环境
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*
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* 四层纵深防御:进程隔离、路径白名单、网络策略、资源限制。
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*
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* @see docs/生产级通用 AI Agent 智能体桌面应用:完整设计与构建指南.html — 第五章
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*/
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import { resolve, sep } from 'path';
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import { existsSync, realpathSync } from 'fs';
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export interface SandboxConfig {
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allowedPaths?: string[];
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networkPolicy?: 'allowall' | 'deny-all' | 'allowlist';
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resourceLimits?: Partial<ResourceLimits>;
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}
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export interface ResourceLimits {
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maxMemoryMB: number;
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maxCpuSeconds: number;
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maxExecutionMs: number;
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maxOutputSizeKB: number;
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}
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export interface SandboxExecutionResult {
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success: boolean;
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output?: string;
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stderr?: string;
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exitCode?: number;
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error?: string;
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durationMs: number;
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}
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export class SandboxManager {
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private allowedPaths: Set<string> = new Set();
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private networkPolicy: 'allowall' | 'deny-all' | 'allowlist' = 'deny-all';
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private resourceLimits: ResourceLimits = {
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maxMemoryMB: 512,
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maxCpuSeconds: 30,
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maxExecutionMs: 60_000,
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maxOutputSizeKB: 1024,
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};
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constructor(private config: SandboxConfig) {
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this.allowedPaths = new Set(config.allowedPaths ?? []);
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this.networkPolicy = config.networkPolicy ?? 'allowlist';
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}
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/**
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* 校验文件路径是否在白名单内
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*
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* 安全策略:fail-closed — 如果未配置任何白名单路径,拒绝所有访问。
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* 同时解析符号链接,防止通过 symlink 逃逸白名单。
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*/
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validatePath(requestedPath: string): { allowed: boolean; resolvedPath: string; reason?: string } {
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const resolved = resolve(requestedPath);
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if (this.allowedPaths.size === 0) {
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return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'No allowed paths configured (fail-closed)' };
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}
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// 先做字符串级白名单校验
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const isAllowed = Array.from(this.allowedPaths).some(
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(allowed) => resolved === allowed || resolved.startsWith(allowed + sep),
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);
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if (!isAllowed) {
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return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'Path not in allowed list' };
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}
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// 解析符号链接(如果路径存在)
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if (existsSync(resolved)) {
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try {
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const realPath = realpathSync(resolved);
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const realAllowed = Array.from(this.allowedPaths).some(
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(allowed) => realPath === allowed || realPath.startsWith(allowed + sep),
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);
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if (!realAllowed) {
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return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: realPath, reason: 'Symlink escape detected' };
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}
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return { allowed: true, resolvedPath: realPath };
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} catch {
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// realpath 解析失败(权限问题等),保守拒绝
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return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'Path resolution failed' };
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}
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}
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return { allowed: true, resolvedPath: resolved };
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}
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/**
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* 静态代码安全扫描
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*
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* 检测危险模块导入、代码执行、路径遍历、危险命令、反向 shell、
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* fork bomb、PowerShell 编码执行、环境变量窃取、编码绕过等。
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*/
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scanCode(code: string): { safe: boolean; reason?: string } {
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const dangerousPatterns = [
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// 危险模块导入
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/require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/i,
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/import\s+.*from\s+['"]fs['"]/i,
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/import\s+.*from\s+['"]child_process['"]/i,
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// 代码执行
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/\beval\s*\(/i,
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/process\.exit/i,
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/Function\s*\(/i,
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// 路径遍历
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/\.\.\//i,
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/\\\.\.\\/i, // Windows ..\
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// 危险命令
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/\brm\s+-rf\b/i,
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/\bkillall\s+-9\b/i,
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/\bchown\s+-R\s+\//i,
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// 重定向到系统目录
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/>\s*\/dev\/null/i,
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/>\s*\/etc\//i,
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// 管道执行
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/\bcurl\b.*\|\s*(bash|sh|zsh)\b/i,
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/\bwget\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i,
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// 反向 shell
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/\/bin\/(bash|sh)\s+-i/i,
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/\bnc\s+-e\b/i,
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/\bbash\s+-i\b/i,
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// Fork bomb
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/:\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|:\s*&\s*\};:/i,
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// PowerShell 编码执行
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/powershell.*-enc(odedCommand)?\s+/i,
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// 环境变量窃取
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/env\b.*\b(GITHUB_TOKEN|API_KEY|SECRET|PASSWORD)\b/i,
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// 编码绕过检测
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/\bbase64\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i,
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/\batob\s*\(/i,
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/\bprintf\s+['"]\\x[0-9a-f]/i,
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// 命令替换
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/\$\([^)]*(rm|kill|del|format|mkfs)\b/i,
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// heredoc 执行
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/<<\s*(EOF|END)\s*[\s\S]*?\b(rm|kill|del|format|mkfs)\b/i,
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];
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for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
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if (pattern.test(code)) {
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// 不暴露 pattern.source,使用通用错误信息
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return { safe: false, reason: 'Command blocked by security policy' };
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}
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}
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return { safe: true };
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}
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}
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