/** * Sandbox Manager — 沙箱执行环境 * * 四层纵深防御:进程隔离、路径白名单、网络策略、资源限制。 * * @see docs/生产级通用 AI Agent 智能体桌面应用:完整设计与构建指南.html — 第五章 */ import { resolve, sep } from 'path'; import { existsSync, realpathSync } from 'fs'; export interface SandboxConfig { allowedPaths?: string[]; networkPolicy?: 'allowall' | 'deny-all' | 'allowlist'; resourceLimits?: Partial; } export interface ResourceLimits { maxMemoryMB: number; maxCpuSeconds: number; maxExecutionMs: number; maxOutputSizeKB: number; } export interface SandboxExecutionResult { success: boolean; output?: string; stderr?: string; exitCode?: number; error?: string; durationMs: number; } export class SandboxManager { private allowedPaths: Set = new Set(); private networkPolicy: 'allowall' | 'deny-all' | 'allowlist' = 'deny-all'; private resourceLimits: ResourceLimits = { maxMemoryMB: 512, maxCpuSeconds: 30, maxExecutionMs: 60_000, maxOutputSizeKB: 1024, }; constructor(private config: SandboxConfig) { this.allowedPaths = new Set(config.allowedPaths ?? []); this.networkPolicy = config.networkPolicy ?? 'allowlist'; } /** * 校验文件路径是否在白名单内 * * 安全策略:fail-closed — 如果未配置任何白名单路径,拒绝所有访问。 * 同时解析符号链接,防止通过 symlink 逃逸白名单。 */ validatePath(requestedPath: string): { allowed: boolean; resolvedPath: string; reason?: string } { const resolved = resolve(requestedPath); if (this.allowedPaths.size === 0) { return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'No allowed paths configured (fail-closed)' }; } // 先做字符串级白名单校验 const isAllowed = Array.from(this.allowedPaths).some( (allowed) => resolved === allowed || resolved.startsWith(allowed + sep), ); if (!isAllowed) { return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'Path not in allowed list' }; } // 解析符号链接(如果路径存在) if (existsSync(resolved)) { try { const realPath = realpathSync(resolved); const realAllowed = Array.from(this.allowedPaths).some( (allowed) => realPath === allowed || realPath.startsWith(allowed + sep), ); if (!realAllowed) { return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: realPath, reason: 'Symlink escape detected' }; } return { allowed: true, resolvedPath: realPath }; } catch { // realpath 解析失败(权限问题等),保守拒绝 return { allowed: false, resolvedPath: resolved, reason: 'Path resolution failed' }; } } return { allowed: true, resolvedPath: resolved }; } /** * 静态代码安全扫描 * * 检测危险模块导入、代码执行、路径遍历、危险命令、反向 shell、 * fork bomb、PowerShell 编码执行、环境变量窃取、编码绕过等。 */ scanCode(code: string): { safe: boolean; reason?: string } { const dangerousPatterns = [ // 危险模块导入 /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/i, /import\s+.*from\s+['"]fs['"]/i, /import\s+.*from\s+['"]child_process['"]/i, // 代码执行 /\beval\s*\(/i, /process\.exit/i, /Function\s*\(/i, // 路径遍历 /\.\.\//i, /\\\.\.\\/i, // Windows ..\ // 危险命令 /\brm\s+-rf\b/i, /\bkillall\s+-9\b/i, /\bchown\s+-R\s+\//i, // 重定向到系统目录 />\s*\/dev\/null/i, />\s*\/etc\//i, // 管道执行 /\bcurl\b.*\|\s*(bash|sh|zsh)\b/i, /\bwget\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i, // 反向 shell /\/bin\/(bash|sh)\s+-i/i, /\bnc\s+-e\b/i, /\bbash\s+-i\b/i, // Fork bomb /:\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|:\s*&\s*\};:/i, // PowerShell 编码执行 /powershell.*-enc(odedCommand)?\s+/i, // 环境变量窃取 /env\b.*\b(GITHUB_TOKEN|API_KEY|SECRET|PASSWORD)\b/i, // 编码绕过检测 /\bbase64\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i, /\batob\s*\(/i, /\bprintf\s+['"]\\x[0-9a-f]/i, // 命令替换 /\$\([^)]*(rm|kill|del|format|mkfs)\b/i, // heredoc 执行 /<<\s*(EOF|END)\s*[\s\S]*?\b(rm|kill|del|format|mkfs)\b/i, ]; for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) { if (pattern.test(code)) { // 不暴露 pattern.source,使用通用错误信息 return { safe: false, reason: 'Command blocked by security policy' }; } } return { safe: true }; } }