P0 安全修复: - API Key 加密存储(safeStorage 密钥链,版本化前缀,历史明文平滑兼容) - 间接提示注入防护(SecurityScanHook 工具结果深扫描,网络工具脱敏/本地工具警示分级) - error:report IPC 断链修复(渲染进程错误上报落 electron-log + 审计) - abort 信号贯通工具层(run_command/dev-tools 子进程随会话中断终止) - run_command 沙箱加固(cd 系统目录/敏感文件读取拦截 + chcp 前缀剥离防解析退化) - .env 真实生效(dotenv 回退加载,应用内配置优先) P1 工程基础: - ESLint 9 flat config + 全部 34 条存量 warnings 清零(零容忍基线) - 测试基线 118 用例 11 文件(token/文件防护/权限/沙箱/注入/命令/引擎/注册表/审计链/摘要分层) - test:electron 双模式(ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE 跑 Electron ABI,SQLite 套件全执行) - SessionRecorder 多会话隔离 + 9 种 TRACE 事件补全(含最终轮 iteration_end) - Provider 故障转移(重试耗尽/不可重试一次性切换 fallback + 前端通知) - MCP 真就绪(等待全部连接完成再广播 tools:ready) - SLO/HealthChecker 真实接入(60s 巡检 + 托盘状态) - CONFIG_DEFAULTS 单一来源(消除 SEED 双源漂移) P2 架构升级: - handlers.ts 1940 行拆分为 13 个 IPC 域模块(防重入注册 + 多窗口广播) - AgentEngineManager 每会话独立引擎(LRU 30 + adapter 工厂隔离 abort 信号) - TaskOrchestrator EngineProvider 改造 + abortByParent 联动中断 SubAgent - 会话摘要分层上下文(session_summaries 滚动摘要 + 截断游标清理防因果污染) - 消息编辑重发/重新生成(truncateAfter IPC + store 动作 + UI) - Markdown 导出 / WebSearch 并行抓取(并发 3)/ 记忆 TF 缓存 / 版本构建期注入 P3 能力扩展: - OpenAI Adapter(o 系列推理模型 reasoning_effort/max_completion_tokens) - Anthropic Adapter(原生 Messages API:tool_use 块/角色合并/thinking budget/图片 base64/SSE 事件机) - 设置页/Onboarding 六 Provider 全链路接入
118 lines
4.0 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
4.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* AuditService 单元测试(P1-14 测试基线)
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* 覆盖:链式哈希生成与验证、篡改检测
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*
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* 注意:better-sqlite3 为原生模块——若本机安装的构建与系统 Node ABI 不匹配,
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* 测试自动跳过(skipIf),避免误报失败。
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'fs';
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import { tmpdir } from 'os';
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import { join } from 'path';
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import log from 'electron-log';
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// better-sqlite3 加载失败时(ABI 不匹配)自动跳过整个套件
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// 注意:require 成功不代表原生绑定可用(Electron ABI vs 系统 Node ABI),
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// 需实际构造一次内存库验证
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let dbAvailable = true;
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let Database: typeof import('better-sqlite3');
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try {
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
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Database = require('better-sqlite3');
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const probe = new Database(':memory:');
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probe.close();
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} catch {
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dbAvailable = false;
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}
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// electron-log 在纯 Node 环境静默(false = 禁用该 transport)
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log.transports.console.level = false;
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log.transports.file.level = false;
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describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('AuditService 链式哈希', () => {
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let dir: string;
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// eslint-disable 是失效指令(测试文件 overrides 已关闭 no-explicit-any),已移除
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let db: any;
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let service: any;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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const { AuditService } = await import('../../services/audit.service');
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dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'metona-audit-'));
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// 手动建库(绕过 DatabaseService 的 electron 依赖)
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db = new Database(join(dir, 'test.db'));
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db.exec(`
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_logs (
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id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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session_id TEXT,
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iteration INTEGER,
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event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
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actor TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'system',
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target TEXT NOT NULL,
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details TEXT,
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outcome TEXT,
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duration_ms INTEGER,
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created_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch() * 1000),
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prev_hash TEXT,
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current_hash TEXT
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);
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CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS audit_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON audit_logs
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BEGIN
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SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'Audit logs are INSERT-ONLY.');
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END;
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`);
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service = new AuditService(() => db);
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});
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afterAll(() => {
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try { db?.close(); } catch { /* ignore */ }
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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it('写入审计日志并生成链式哈希', () => {
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service.log({
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sessionId: 's1',
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eventType: 'tool_call',
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actor: 'agent',
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target: 'read_file',
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details: { file: 'a.ts' },
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outcome: 'success',
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});
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const rows = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM audit_logs').all();
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expect(rows.length).toBe(1);
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expect(rows[0].current_hash).toBeTruthy();
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// 首条 prev_hash 为 64 个 0 的创世哨兵(getLastHash 空表回退值)
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expect(rows[0].prev_hash).toBe('0'.repeat(64));
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});
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it('第二条记录的 prev_hash 链接前一条', () => {
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service.log({
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sessionId: 's1',
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eventType: 'tool_call',
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actor: 'agent',
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target: 'write_file',
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details: { file: 'b.ts' },
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outcome: 'success',
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});
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const rows = db.prepare('SELECT * FROM audit_logs ORDER BY id').all();
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expect(rows.length).toBe(2);
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expect(rows[1].prev_hash).toBe(rows[0].current_hash);
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});
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it('verifyChain 对完整链返回 valid', () => {
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const result = service.verifyChain();
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expect(result.valid).toBe(true);
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expect(result.totalRecords).toBe(2);
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});
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it('篡改记录后 verifyChain 检测到 tampered', () => {
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// 需要先 drop 触发器才能 UPDATE(INSERT-ONLY 约束)
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db.exec('DROP TRIGGER audit_no_delete');
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db.prepare('UPDATE audit_logs SET details = ? WHERE id = 1').run('{"tampered": true}');
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db.exec(`CREATE TRIGGER audit_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON audit_logs
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BEGIN SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'Audit logs are INSERT-ONLY.'); END`);
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const result = service.verifyChain();
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expect(result.valid).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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