P1 修复面收口: - 超时三态区分(aborted→USER_INTERRUPT / ETIMEDOUT→TIMEOUT / 其余→ERROR), 根治"真实网络超时被误报为用户中断" - 流空闲超时统一(SSE/Ollama/Anthropic 读循环 60s 无数据抛 504 进重试通道) - 同会话并发 sendMessage 防重入(isRunning 守卫)+ 会话存在性预检 + 前置调用移入 try(ERROR+DONE 双事件保证,根治 isStreaming 假死) - 清空审计后 resetChainCache(根治 verifyChain 误报 TAMPERED) - DONE 不再提前清理 TRACE(TERMINATED 统一收尾,补全最终迭代录制) - IME 合成回车不发送(普通 Enter + Cmd/Ctrl+Enter 双分支)+ handleSend 闭包修复 P2 安全纵深: - preload 移除原始 electronAPI 暴露(渲染层零使用,关掉 XSS invoke 任意通道单点风险) - CORS 同源回显根治(仅当前浏览页面 Origin,did-navigate 同步) - MEMORY.md 命令保护正则扩展(括号/$/反引号/< 重定向边界 + 前导路径) - write_file append TOCTOU 统一(open 后 realpath 校验,新文件分支补漏) - 敏感键归一化(authKey 驼峰/连字符命中)+ MCP headers 鉴权值加密落库 - ReDoS 检测共享化(search_files/file_editor 统一拦截) - run_tests/lint_code 升风险 + 需确认 + npx --no-install(执行边界对齐 run_command) - MCP/SearXNG/llm.baseURL/updateFeedUrl 配置类 URL 高危目标校验(IPv6 去括号 + 十六进制映射解析 + 尾点剥离) P3 架构还债: - temperature/maxTokens 热生效(引擎/编排器/SubAgent 三处接线)+ setBatch 单事务落盘 - SessionRecorder flush 竞态根治(flushPromise 等待 + 超限内联落盘 + stopRecording async) - 内存收口(lastConsolidationBySession LRU / subTraces 清理 / 会话删除 disposeEngine) - i18n 全量收口(28 组件 + 353 key 双字典,状态标签改渲染时函数) - 死代码清理(updateTraceStep/HEADER_HEIGHT/void preA/失实注释) - 斜杠菜单 MUI 化 + 删除逻辑收敛 resetSessionState + Blob URL 统一释放 + 用户消息"仅保存"落库(saveMessage 透传前端 id 修复 id 错位) P4 能力演进: - 死循环检测拆分(驻留前置 + 乒乓后置带进度信号,合法交替不误报) - run-lock 30s 超时强制 abort(旧 run 卡死不无限排队) - RETRY 双通道 stream_reset(前端按 run 归属精确清空,根治重试文本重复) - FTS5 trigram 中文子串搜索(迁移 9 版本化 SCHEMA_VERSION=2,≤2 字符 LIKE 回退) - getContextWindow 兜底 1M→128K(未知模型防 413) 测试: - 855 → 2406 用例(+1551,2.8 倍):服务层 +325(含 MemoryManager 51 新用例)、 工具实体 +483、IPC/适配器 +390(含 OpenAI/Anthropic/Ollama 独立套件)、 纯函数表格化 +330;引入 jsdom + @testing-library(14 组件测试文件 249 用例) - 修复 R1(saveMessage id 透传)/ R2(stream_reset 精确归属)两个回归缺陷 - 遗留低危项清零:git-tools 顺序耦合 / web-fetch 真实时间退避 / slo 内存断言 / mcp-security 多余 skipIf / deepseek-balance 命名误导 / 组件 mock 注入脆弱性 版本: 0.7.4; README 同步(工具风险表/版本徽章); 依赖: 移除 @electron-toolkit/preload, 新增 jsdom/@testing-library(devDependencies 不打包) 回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; Electron ABI 全量 2406/2406 零跳过; 系统 Node 2110 通过 296 跳过(better-sqlite3 ABI)
184 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript
184 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Secure Config 测试(v0.7.2 覆盖补齐 —— 此前零测试)
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*
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* 锁定敏感配置加密存储契约(P0-1 的回归防线):
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* 1. 敏感 key 判定模式(apikey/token/secret/password/auth_key)
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* 2. safeStorage 可用 → 加密前缀格式 + 解密还原
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* 3. safeStorage 不可用 → 明文降级(可用性优先)+ WARN
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* 4. 解密失败(跨机器/重装)→ 返回空串(引导重录而非崩溃)
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* 5. 加密幂等(已加密值不二次加密)与非字符串透传
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
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// 可控的 safeStorage 桩:可逆 fake 加密(enc: 前缀),可用性开关可编程
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const mockState = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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encryptionAvailable: true,
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failDecrypt: false,
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}));
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vi.mock('electron', () => ({
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safeStorage: {
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isEncryptionAvailable: () => mockState.encryptionAvailable,
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encryptString: (value: string) => Buffer.from(`enc:${value}`, 'utf-8'),
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decryptString: (buffer: Buffer) => {
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const raw = buffer.toString('utf-8');
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if (mockState.failDecrypt || !raw.startsWith('enc:')) {
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throw new Error('decryption failed');
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}
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return raw.slice(4);
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},
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},
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}));
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vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
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default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
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}));
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import {
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isSensitiveConfigKey,
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isEncryptedValue,
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encryptConfigValue,
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decryptConfigValue,
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} from '../secure-config';
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beforeEach(() => {
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mockState.encryptionAvailable = true;
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mockState.failDecrypt = false;
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});
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describe('isSensitiveConfigKey — 敏感 key 判定', () => {
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it.each([
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['llm.apiKey', true],
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['llm.api_key', true],
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['searxng.auth_key', true],
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// v0.7.4 P2-5: 驼峰/连字符/点分隔的 authKey 类命名全部命中(去分隔符归一化)
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['searxng.authKey', true],
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['searxng.auth-key', true],
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['mcp.server.authToken', true],
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['db.api-key', true],
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['llm.fallbackApiKey', true],
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['proxy.token', true],
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['db.secret', true],
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['GITHUB_PASSWORD', true],
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['ui.theme', false],
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['llm.model', false],
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['agent.maxIterations', false],
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['network.proxyUrl', false],
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['searxng.language', false],
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])('%s → %j', (key, expected) => {
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey(key)).toBe(expected);
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});
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});
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describe('encrypt/decrypt — 加密回环', () => {
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it('加密值带版本化前缀(metona-enc:v1:),解密还原原文', () => {
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const encrypted = encryptConfigValue('sk-my-secret-key');
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expect(typeof encrypted).toBe('string');
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expect(isEncryptedValue(encrypted)).toBe(true);
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expect(String(encrypted)).toMatch(/^metona-enc:v1:/);
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const decrypted = decryptConfigValue(encrypted);
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expect(decrypted).toBe('sk-my-secret-key');
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});
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it('非字符串值原样透传(number/boolean/null 不加密)', () => {
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expect(encryptConfigValue(42)).toBe(42);
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expect(encryptConfigValue(true)).toBe(true);
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expect(encryptConfigValue(null)).toBe(null);
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expect(decryptConfigValue(42)).toBe(42);
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});
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it('空字符串不加密(避免无意义前缀包裹)', () => {
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expect(encryptConfigValue('')).toBe('');
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});
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it('已加密值幂等 —— 二次加密不再包裹前缀', () => {
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const once = encryptConfigValue('sk-key') as string;
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const twice = encryptConfigValue(once);
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expect(twice).toBe(once);
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expect(decryptConfigValue(twice)).toBe('sk-key');
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});
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it('非加密格式的值解密时原样返回(历史明文平滑兼容)', () => {
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expect(decryptConfigValue('plain-old-key')).toBe('plain-old-key');
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});
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});
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describe('加密降级与失败语义', () => {
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it('safeStorage 不可用 → 明文存储(可用性优先 + WARN)', () => {
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mockState.encryptionAvailable = false;
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const value = encryptConfigValue('sk-plaintext-fallback');
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expect(value).toBe('sk-plaintext-fallback');
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expect(isEncryptedValue(value)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('加密过程抛错 → 回退明文存储(不阻断配置保存)', () => {
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// decryptString 抛错不影响 encrypt;此处验证 decrypt 失败语义
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mockState.failDecrypt = true;
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const encrypted = encryptConfigValue('sk-x') as string;
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expect(decryptConfigValue(encrypted)).toBe(''); // 失败 → 空串(createAdapter 判定未配置,引导重录)
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});
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it('safeStorage 不可用时已加密值仍可识别且不被二次"加密"', () => {
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const once = encryptConfigValue('sk-again') as string;
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mockState.encryptionAvailable = false;
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// 已加密值幂等:不重新走明文降级
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expect(encryptConfigValue(once)).toBe(once);
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});
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it('前缀残缺的加密值(metona-enc:v1: 后无 base64)解密返回空串', () => {
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expect(decryptConfigValue('metona-enc:v1:')).toBe('');
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});
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it('非 base64 内容的加密值解密失败返回空串(不抛错)', () => {
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expect(decryptConfigValue('metona-enc:v1:@@@not-base64@@@')).toBe('');
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});
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it('不同版本前缀(metona-enc:v2:)不被识别为加密值(原样返回)', () => {
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expect(isEncryptedValue('metona-enc:v2:abc')).toBe(false);
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expect(decryptConfigValue('metona-enc:v2:abc')).toBe('metona-enc:v2:abc');
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});
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it('含非敏感子串的 key 不加密(大写化归一后仍不命中)', () => {
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('ui.theme')).toBe(false);
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('network.proxyUrl')).toBe(false);
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('logging.traceEnabled')).toBe(false);
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});
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it('敏感 key 判定覆盖 token 类与 secret 类更多形态', () => {
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('mcp.githubToken')).toBe(true);
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('db.clientSecret')).toBe(true);
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('registry.authToken')).toBe(true);
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('SMTP_PASSWORD')).toBe(true);
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('sshPrivateKey')).toBe(false); // 无分隔符且不含模式
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expect(isSensitiveConfigKey('keyboard.layout')).toBe(false);
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});
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it('encrypt/decrypt 往返多种敏感字符串(含特殊字符/中文/emoji)', () => {
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const samples = [
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'sk-hello world',
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'含中文密钥值',
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'with,comma"quotes"',
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'emoji-🔑-key',
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'a'.repeat(5000),
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];
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for (const s of samples) {
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const encrypted = encryptConfigValue(s) as string;
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expect(isEncryptedValue(encrypted)).toBe(true);
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expect(decryptConfigValue(encrypted)).toBe(s);
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}
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});
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it('decrypt 对 undefined/null 原样透传', () => {
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expect(decryptConfigValue(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
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expect(decryptConfigValue(null)).toBeNull();
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});
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it('encrypt 对 0/空串/false 等 falsy 非字符串原样透传', () => {
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expect(encryptConfigValue(0)).toBe(0);
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expect(encryptConfigValue('')).toBe('');
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expect(encryptConfigValue(false)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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