Files
metona-ai-desktop/electron/harness/security/prompt-injection-defense.ts
T
thzxx 97a3d3d53b fix: 全面修复审计问题并优化系统提示词
**崩溃/挂死修复 (5):**
- 统一 TrayManager.isQuitting 变量,修复 Cmd+Q 无法退出
- useAgentStream 闭包过期快照 → 每次 getState()
- Agnes chatStream 添加 AbortSignal.timeout
- SSE JSON.parse 添加 try-catch 保护
- Orchestrator setTools 污染 → save/restore 模式

**功能修复 (14):**
- 上下文压缩实现 (每5轮 COMPRESSING 状态)
- 修复 requestId 硬编码空串
- ConfigService.set() 保留已有 category
- MemoryManager 新增 working 类型搜索
- PromptInjectionDefender 补全 sanitize()
- Ollama: 补全 dynamicReminders + reasoningContent
- openai-format: 所有 assistant 消息保留 reasoningContent
- SSE: finish_reason 时提前 flush tool_calls
- DeepSeek thinking effort 映射注释
- Ollama done_reason load→stop
- RateLimitHook >= 边界修复
- WorkspaceService isValid 首次启动修复
- sessions:archive IPC handler
- 托盘/窗口图标路径生产环境修复

**系统提示词优化:**
- SOUL.md 存在时不显示兜底身份,原文放最前
- 兜底身份改为中文 (MetonaAI 自身描述)
- 用户文本在前,附件内容在后

**文件上传:**
- 非图片文件不再 base64 编码,保留 JSON 结构
- 用户文本优先于文件内容

**UI 修复:**
- 首页 Logo 路径修复 (public/ + 相对路径)
- TokenUsage contextWindow 动态计算 (Provider 感知)
- 切换 Provider 同步 contextWindow
- 托盘图标始终显示 Logo (状态由右键菜单展示)
2026-06-30 23:17:38 +08:00

103 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Prompt Injection Defense — 提示注入防护系统
*
* 三层防御:
* 1. 正则快速过滤
* 2. 语义级检测(可选)
* 3. 指令隔离标记
*
* @see docs/生产级通用 AI Agent 智能体桌面应用:完整设计与构建指南.html — 第十章
*/
export interface InjectionDetectionResult {
isInjection: boolean;
riskScore: number; // 0-10
findings: InjectionFinding[];
recommendation: string;
}
export interface InjectionFinding {
pattern: string;
matched: string;
severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high';
}
export class PromptInjectionDefender {
private static INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
/ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|above|prior)\s+(instructions|commands|directives)/i,
/forget\s+(everything|all\s+(of\s+)?(the|your)|above)/i,
/you\s+are\s+now/i,
/new\s+(instructions|directive|role|persona)/i,
/override\s+your\s+/i,
/(show|display|print|output|reveal|tell\s+me)\s+(your|the)\s+(system\s+)?(prompt|instruction|directive)/i,
/(dump|echo|log|expose)\s+(your|the)\s+(context|memory|history)/i,
/-{3,}\s*(system|user|assistant|instruction)/i,
/<{3,}(system|instruction|prompt)/i,
/\[{3,}(system|instruction|prompt)/i,
/base64\s*:?\s*[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}/i,
/pretend\s+(you\s+are|to\s+be)/i,
/act\s+as\s+(if\s+you\s+were|you're)/i,
/DAN\s*[:\[]/i,
/JAILBREAK/i,
];
detect(input: string): InjectionDetectionResult {
const findings: InjectionFinding[] = [];
let riskScore = 0;
for (const pattern of PromptInjectionDefender.INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
const matches = input.match(pattern);
if (matches) {
findings.push({
pattern: pattern.source,
matched: matches[0],
severity: this.classifySeverity(pattern.source),
});
riskScore += this.classifySeverity(pattern.source) === 'high' ? 3 :
this.classifySeverity(pattern.source) === 'medium' ? 2 : 1;
}
}
return {
isInjection: findings.length > 0,
riskScore: Math.min(10, riskScore),
findings,
recommendation: this.getRecommendation(riskScore),
};
}
private classifySeverity(pattern: string): 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' {
const highRiskKeywords = ['ignore', 'forget', 'jailbreak', 'DAN', 'override', 'new\\s+instruction'];
const mediumRiskKeywords = ['reveal', 'dump', 'pretend', 'act\\s+as'];
for (const kw of highRiskKeywords) {
if (new RegExp(kw, 'i').test(pattern)) return 'high';
}
for (const kw of mediumRiskKeywords) {
if (new RegExp(kw, 'i').test(pattern)) return 'medium';
}
return 'low';
}
/**
* 清理输入内容(移除明显的注入分隔符)
*/
sanitize(input: string): string {
let cleaned = input;
// 移除明显的分隔符注入
cleaned = cleaned.replace(/-{3,}\s*(system|user|assistant|instruction).*$/gim, '[REMOVED]');
cleaned = cleaned.replace(/<{3,}(system|instruction|prompt).*$/gim, '[REMOVED]');
cleaned = cleaned.replace(/\[{3,}(system|instruction|prompt).*$/gim, '[REMOVED]');
return cleaned.trim();
}
private getRecommendation(score: number): string {
if (score >= 7) return 'BLOCK: High-risk injection detected';
if (score >= 4) return 'WARN: Suspicious patterns found';
if (score >= 1) return 'LOG: Minor suspicious patterns detected';
return 'PASS: No injection patterns detected';
}
}