Files
metona-ai-desktop/electron/harness/tools/built-in/__tests__/http-request.test.ts
T
thzxx 99d0c54129
CI / 类型检查 + Lint + 单元测试 (push) Failing after 6m27s
CI / 产物编译验证 (push) Successful in 9m57s
CI / 全量测试 (Electron ABI) (push) Failing after 5m19s
feat: v0.7.4 时序语义修正 · 防线实效补漏 · 全量测试翻倍 — 2406 用例 + jsdom 组件测试全量回归
P1 修复面收口:
- 超时三态区分(aborted→USER_INTERRUPT / ETIMEDOUT→TIMEOUT / 其余→ERROR),
  根治"真实网络超时被误报为用户中断"
- 流空闲超时统一(SSE/Ollama/Anthropic 读循环 60s 无数据抛 504 进重试通道)
- 同会话并发 sendMessage 防重入(isRunning 守卫)+ 会话存在性预检 +
  前置调用移入 try(ERROR+DONE 双事件保证,根治 isStreaming 假死)
- 清空审计后 resetChainCache(根治 verifyChain 误报 TAMPERED)
- DONE 不再提前清理 TRACE(TERMINATED 统一收尾,补全最终迭代录制)
- IME 合成回车不发送(普通 Enter + Cmd/Ctrl+Enter 双分支)+ handleSend 闭包修复

P2 安全纵深:
- preload 移除原始 electronAPI 暴露(渲染层零使用,关掉 XSS invoke 任意通道单点风险)
- CORS 同源回显根治(仅当前浏览页面 Origin,did-navigate 同步)
- MEMORY.md 命令保护正则扩展(括号/$/反引号/< 重定向边界 + 前导路径)
- write_file append TOCTOU 统一(open 后 realpath 校验,新文件分支补漏)
- 敏感键归一化(authKey 驼峰/连字符命中)+ MCP headers 鉴权值加密落库
- ReDoS 检测共享化(search_files/file_editor 统一拦截)
- run_tests/lint_code 升风险 + 需确认 + npx --no-install(执行边界对齐 run_command)
- MCP/SearXNG/llm.baseURL/updateFeedUrl 配置类 URL 高危目标校验(IPv6 去括号 +
  十六进制映射解析 + 尾点剥离)

P3 架构还债:
- temperature/maxTokens 热生效(引擎/编排器/SubAgent 三处接线)+ setBatch 单事务落盘
- SessionRecorder flush 竞态根治(flushPromise 等待 + 超限内联落盘 + stopRecording async)
- 内存收口(lastConsolidationBySession LRU / subTraces 清理 / 会话删除 disposeEngine)
- i18n 全量收口(28 组件 + 353 key 双字典,状态标签改渲染时函数)
- 死代码清理(updateTraceStep/HEADER_HEIGHT/void preA/失实注释)
- 斜杠菜单 MUI 化 + 删除逻辑收敛 resetSessionState + Blob URL 统一释放 +
  用户消息"仅保存"落库(saveMessage 透传前端 id 修复 id 错位)

P4 能力演进:
- 死循环检测拆分(驻留前置 + 乒乓后置带进度信号,合法交替不误报)
- run-lock 30s 超时强制 abort(旧 run 卡死不无限排队)
- RETRY 双通道 stream_reset(前端按 run 归属精确清空,根治重试文本重复)
- FTS5 trigram 中文子串搜索(迁移 9 版本化 SCHEMA_VERSION=2,≤2 字符 LIKE 回退)
- getContextWindow 兜底 1M→128K(未知模型防 413)

测试:
- 855 → 2406 用例(+1551,2.8 倍):服务层 +325(含 MemoryManager 51 新用例)、
  工具实体 +483、IPC/适配器 +390(含 OpenAI/Anthropic/Ollama 独立套件)、
  纯函数表格化 +330;引入 jsdom + @testing-library(14 组件测试文件 249 用例)
- 修复 R1(saveMessage id 透传)/ R2(stream_reset 精确归属)两个回归缺陷
- 遗留低危项清零:git-tools 顺序耦合 / web-fetch 真实时间退避 / slo 内存断言 /
  mcp-security 多余 skipIf / deepseek-balance 命名误导 / 组件 mock 注入脆弱性

版本: 0.7.4; README 同步(工具风险表/版本徽章); 依赖: 移除 @electron-toolkit/preload,
新增 jsdom/@testing-library(devDependencies 不打包)

回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; Electron ABI 全量 2406/2406 零跳过;
系统 Node 2110 通过 296 跳过(better-sqlite3 ABI)
2026-08-30 19:19:07 +08:00

283 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
/**
* http_request 工具测试(v0.7.5 新建覆盖)
*
* 通过 mock ssrf-guardvalidateSSRF)与 ssrf-dispatcherssrfPinnedFetch)锁定:
* - 6 方法白名单 / 非法方法拒绝
* - GET/HEAD 不携带 bodyPOST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE 携带
* - SSRF 拦截 / 非法 URL
* - 响应截断 50KB / 头部过滤(仅 content-type/content-length/location
* - 超时转译(AbortError/ETIMEDOUT → Request timeout
* - redirect manual 语义
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
}));
const ssrfMock = vi.hoisted(() => ({
validateSSRF: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
}));
vi.mock('../ssrf-guard', () => ({
validateSSRF: ssrfMock.validateSSRF,
}));
const dispatcherMock = vi.hoisted(() => ({
ssrfPinnedFetch: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('../ssrf-dispatcher', () => ({
ssrfPinnedFetch: dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch,
}));
import { HttpRequestTool } from '../http-request';
import type { ToolExecutionContext } from '../../../types/metona-tool';
const context: ToolExecutionContext = {
sessionId: 't',
workspacePath: process.cwd(),
iteration: 1,
requestId: 'r',
};
interface HttpResult {
success: boolean;
error?: string;
status?: number;
statusText?: string;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
body?: string;
truncated?: boolean;
ok?: boolean;
}
function makeResponse(
body: string,
init?: { status?: number; statusText?: string; headers?: Record<string, string> },
): Response {
return new Response(body, init);
}
describe('http_request — 入口校验', () => {
let tool: HttpRequestTool;
beforeEach(() => {
tool = new HttpRequestTool();
vi.clearAllMocks();
ssrfMock.validateSSRF.mockReset().mockImplementation(async () => undefined);
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockReset();
});
afterEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
it('非法 URL(非 http/https)→ Invalid URL', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'file:///etc/passwd' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(r.error).toBe('Invalid URL');
});
it('缺 url → Invalid URL', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({}, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(r.error).toBe('Invalid URL');
});
it('SSRF 校验失败 → 拒绝', async () => {
ssrfMock.validateSSRF.mockRejectedValueOnce(
new Error('Blocked SSRF: private/loopback address'),
);
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/x' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('Blocked SSRF');
expect(dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('非法 method(大写归一后仍不在白名单)→ 拒绝', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute(
{ url: 'https://a.test/', method: 'OPTIONS' },
context,
)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('Invalid method');
});
it('method 小写自动归一为大写(post → POST 合法)', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('ok', { status: 200 }));
const r = (await tool.execute(
{ url: 'https://a.test/', method: 'post' },
context,
)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('6 个白名单方法全部放行', async () => {
// 每次调用生成全新 Response(避免 body 消费后复用报错)
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockImplementation(async () =>
makeResponse('ok', { status: 200 }),
);
for (const method of ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE', 'HEAD']) {
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/', method }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success, `method ${method}`).toBe(true);
}
});
it('缺省 method 为 GET', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('get-default', { status: 200 }));
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.body).toBe('get-default');
});
});
describe('http_request — 请求构造与响应处理', () => {
let tool: HttpRequestTool;
beforeEach(() => {
tool = new HttpRequestTool();
vi.clearAllMocks();
ssrfMock.validateSSRF.mockReset().mockImplementation(async () => undefined);
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockReset();
});
afterEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
it('POST 携带 bodyGET/HEAD 不携带 body', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('ok'));
await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/', method: 'POST', body: 'payload' }, context);
const postInit = dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
expect(postInit.body).toBe('payload');
await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/', method: 'GET', body: 'should-drop' }, context);
const getInit = dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[1][1] as RequestInit;
expect(getInit.body).toBeUndefined();
await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/', method: 'HEAD', body: 'should-drop' }, context);
const headInit = dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[2][1] as RequestInit;
expect(headInit.body).toBeUndefined();
});
it('redirect 固定为 manual(防重定向绕过 SSRF', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('ok'));
await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context);
const init = dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
expect(init.redirect).toBe('manual');
});
it('自定义 headers 透传', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('ok'));
await tool.execute(
{ url: 'https://a.test/', headers: { 'X-Custom': 'v1', Authorization: 'Bearer t' } },
context,
);
const init = dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[0][1] as RequestInit;
expect(init.headers).toEqual({ 'X-Custom': 'v1', Authorization: 'Bearer t' });
});
it('响应截断到 50KB 并标记 truncated', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('y'.repeat(100_000)));
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.truncated).toBe(true);
expect(r.body?.length).toBe(50 * 1024);
});
it('小响应不截断', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('small'));
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.truncated).toBe(false);
expect(r.body).toBe('small');
});
it('头部过滤:仅保留 content-type/content-length/location', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(
makeResponse('body', {
status: 200,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': '4',
Location: 'https://next.test/',
'X-Secret': 'leak',
'Set-Cookie': 'sess=1',
},
}),
);
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.headers).toEqual({
'content-type': 'application/json',
'content-length': '4',
location: 'https://next.test/',
});
});
it('无额外头时只回传自动生成的 content-type(无 X-* 泄露)', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockImplementation(async () =>
makeResponse('x', { status: 200 }),
);
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
// Response 构造器自动生成 text/plain content-type;其余自定义头一律不泄露
expect(r.headers?.['content-type']).toBeDefined();
expect(Object.keys(r.headers ?? {}).every((k) => !k.toLowerCase().startsWith('x-'))).toBe(true);
});
it('3xx 重定向状态透传 + location 头部', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(
makeResponse('', {
status: 302,
statusText: 'Found',
headers: { Location: 'https://n.test/' },
}),
);
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.status).toBe(302);
expect(r.statusText).toBe('Found');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.headers?.location).toBe('https://n.test/');
});
it('超时(AbortError)→ Request timeout', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockRejectedValue(
Object.assign(new Error('aborted'), { name: 'AbortError' }),
);
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(r.error).toBe('Request timeout');
});
it('超时(ETIMEDOUT)→ Request timeout', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockRejectedValue(
Object.assign(new Error('Request timed out after 30000ms'), { code: 'ETIMEDOUT' }),
);
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(r.error).toBe('Request timeout');
});
it('其他网络错误原样回传', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockRejectedValue(new Error('ECONNREFUSED'));
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(r.error).toBe('ECONNREFUSED');
});
it('timeout 参数钳制(>60s 压到 60s<1ms 抬到 1ms', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('ok'));
await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/', timeout: 999_999 }, context);
expect(dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[0][2]).toBe(60_000);
await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/', timeout: 0 }, context);
expect(dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mock.calls[1][2]).toBe(1);
});
it('非 2xx 状态仍返回 success=true(透传状态码,语义:请求本身成功)', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse('err-body', { status: 500 }));
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.status).toBe(500);
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
it('空 body 响应正常返回空串', async () => {
dispatcherMock.ssrfPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 204 }));
const r = (await tool.execute({ url: 'https://a.test/' }, context)) as HttpResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.body).toBe('');
});
});