Files
metona-ai-desktop/electron/ipc/data.ts
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CI / 类型检查 + Lint + 单元测试 (push) Failing after 6m27s
CI / 产物编译验证 (push) Successful in 9m57s
CI / 全量测试 (Electron ABI) (push) Failing after 5m19s
feat: v0.7.4 时序语义修正 · 防线实效补漏 · 全量测试翻倍 — 2406 用例 + jsdom 组件测试全量回归
P1 修复面收口:
- 超时三态区分(aborted→USER_INTERRUPT / ETIMEDOUT→TIMEOUT / 其余→ERROR),
  根治"真实网络超时被误报为用户中断"
- 流空闲超时统一(SSE/Ollama/Anthropic 读循环 60s 无数据抛 504 进重试通道)
- 同会话并发 sendMessage 防重入(isRunning 守卫)+ 会话存在性预检 +
  前置调用移入 try(ERROR+DONE 双事件保证,根治 isStreaming 假死)
- 清空审计后 resetChainCache(根治 verifyChain 误报 TAMPERED)
- DONE 不再提前清理 TRACE(TERMINATED 统一收尾,补全最终迭代录制)
- IME 合成回车不发送(普通 Enter + Cmd/Ctrl+Enter 双分支)+ handleSend 闭包修复

P2 安全纵深:
- preload 移除原始 electronAPI 暴露(渲染层零使用,关掉 XSS invoke 任意通道单点风险)
- CORS 同源回显根治(仅当前浏览页面 Origin,did-navigate 同步)
- MEMORY.md 命令保护正则扩展(括号/$/反引号/< 重定向边界 + 前导路径)
- write_file append TOCTOU 统一(open 后 realpath 校验,新文件分支补漏)
- 敏感键归一化(authKey 驼峰/连字符命中)+ MCP headers 鉴权值加密落库
- ReDoS 检测共享化(search_files/file_editor 统一拦截)
- run_tests/lint_code 升风险 + 需确认 + npx --no-install(执行边界对齐 run_command)
- MCP/SearXNG/llm.baseURL/updateFeedUrl 配置类 URL 高危目标校验(IPv6 去括号 +
  十六进制映射解析 + 尾点剥离)

P3 架构还债:
- temperature/maxTokens 热生效(引擎/编排器/SubAgent 三处接线)+ setBatch 单事务落盘
- SessionRecorder flush 竞态根治(flushPromise 等待 + 超限内联落盘 + stopRecording async)
- 内存收口(lastConsolidationBySession LRU / subTraces 清理 / 会话删除 disposeEngine)
- i18n 全量收口(28 组件 + 353 key 双字典,状态标签改渲染时函数)
- 死代码清理(updateTraceStep/HEADER_HEIGHT/void preA/失实注释)
- 斜杠菜单 MUI 化 + 删除逻辑收敛 resetSessionState + Blob URL 统一释放 +
  用户消息"仅保存"落库(saveMessage 透传前端 id 修复 id 错位)

P4 能力演进:
- 死循环检测拆分(驻留前置 + 乒乓后置带进度信号,合法交替不误报)
- run-lock 30s 超时强制 abort(旧 run 卡死不无限排队)
- RETRY 双通道 stream_reset(前端按 run 归属精确清空,根治重试文本重复)
- FTS5 trigram 中文子串搜索(迁移 9 版本化 SCHEMA_VERSION=2,≤2 字符 LIKE 回退)
- getContextWindow 兜底 1M→128K(未知模型防 413)

测试:
- 855 → 2406 用例(+1551,2.8 倍):服务层 +325(含 MemoryManager 51 新用例)、
  工具实体 +483、IPC/适配器 +390(含 OpenAI/Anthropic/Ollama 独立套件)、
  纯函数表格化 +330;引入 jsdom + @testing-library(14 组件测试文件 249 用例)
- 修复 R1(saveMessage id 透传)/ R2(stream_reset 精确归属)两个回归缺陷
- 遗留低危项清零:git-tools 顺序耦合 / web-fetch 真实时间退避 / slo 内存断言 /
  mcp-security 多余 skipIf / deepseek-balance 命名误导 / 组件 mock 注入脆弱性

版本: 0.7.4; README 同步(工具风险表/版本徽章); 依赖: 移除 @electron-toolkit/preload,
新增 jsdom/@testing-library(devDependencies 不打包)

回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; Electron ABI 全量 2406/2406 零跳过;
系统 Node 2110 通过 296 跳过(better-sqlite3 ABI)
2026-08-30 19:19:07 +08:00

196 lines
7.5 KiB
TypeScript
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/**
* IPC Data Handlers — 数据导出与清理域(P2-9 从 handlers.ts 拆分)
*/
import { ipcMain } from 'electron';
import type { IPCContext } from './context';
import log from 'electron-log';
import { sanitizeExportConfig } from './shared';
/**
* 导出限流常量:单会话导出的最大消息条数。
*
* 背景:导出会把所有会话×所有消息×完整 toolResult 一次性 JSON.stringify 成单个 Blob
* 传到渲染进程。含 view_image 的会话单条 tool_result 就有 ~6.7MB base64 dataUrl
* 全量导出会直接撑爆渲染进程堆导致 OOM 崩溃。
*
* 双重防护:
* 1. 剥离每条 tool 消息中的 dataUrl 等超大 base64sanitizeExportMessage
* 2. 全量导出时按会话限制消息条数(MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION
*/
const MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION = 2000;
/**
* 剥离导出消息中的超大 base64 字段(如 view_image 的 dataUrl)。
* 仅用于导出快照——原数据库数据不受影响。
*/
const sanitizeExportMessage = (msg: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> => {
const toolResult = msg.toolResult as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (toolResult && typeof toolResult === 'object' && 'result' in toolResult) {
const result = toolResult.result;
// result 含 dataUrlview_image 等图片结果):剥离 dataUrl,保留 path/size/mimeType 等小字段
if (result && typeof result === 'object' && !Array.isArray(result) && 'dataUrl' in result) {
const { dataUrl: _omit, ...rest } = result as Record<string, unknown>;
void _omit;
return {
...msg,
toolResult: {
...toolResult,
result: { ...rest, _displayNote: '[image base64 omitted in export]' },
},
};
}
}
// attachments[].preview(用户上传图片的 base64 缩略图)也一并剥离,避免导出文件膨胀
const attachments = msg.attachments;
if (Array.isArray(attachments)) {
const sanitized = attachments.map((att) => {
if (att && typeof att === 'object' && 'preview' in att) {
const { preview: _omit, ...rest } = att as Record<string, unknown>;
void _omit;
return { ...rest, _displayNote: '[preview omitted in export]' };
}
return att;
});
return { ...msg, attachments: sanitized };
}
return msg;
};
export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
const { sessionService, configService, auditService } = ctx;
ipcMain.handle('data:export', async (_event, sessionId?: string) => {
try {
if (sessionId) {
// 导出单个会话:剥离超大 base64 后返回
const messages = sessionService.getMessages(sessionId);
const sanitized = messages.map((m) =>
sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
);
return { success: true, data: sanitized };
}
// 导出所有会话:剥离 dataUrl + 每会话限条数,防渲染进程 Blob 序列化 OOM
// S-1 修复:config 走 sanitizeExportConfig 脱敏 —— getAll() 对敏感 key
// 解密返回明文,直接透传会把明文 API Key 写入用户下载的导出文件
const sessions = sessionService.list();
const allData: Record<string, unknown> = {
sessions: [],
config: sanitizeExportConfig(configService.getAll()),
};
for (const session of sessions) {
const rawMessages = sessionService.getMessages(session.id, {
limit: MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION,
});
const sanitizedMessages = rawMessages.map((m) =>
sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
);
(allData.sessions as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).push({
...session,
messages: sanitizedMessages,
truncated: rawMessages.length >= MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION,
});
}
return { success: true, data: allData };
} catch (error) {
return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
}
});
ipcMain.handle('data:clearSessions', async () => {
// M-40 修复: 危险操作审计日志,便于追踪异常调用
log.warn('[DATA] DANGER: clearSessions invoked — all sessions and messages will be deleted');
const db = sessionService.getDB();
try {
db.exec('BEGIN');
const msgCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM messages').get() as { c: number };
const sessCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM sessions').get() as { c: number };
db.exec('DELETE FROM messages');
db.exec('DELETE FROM sessions');
db.exec('COMMIT');
log.info(
`[DATA] All sessions cleared: ${sessCount.c} sessions, ${msgCount.c} messages deleted`,
);
return { success: true, deletedSessions: sessCount.c, deletedMessages: msgCount.c };
} catch (error) {
try {
db.exec('ROLLBACK');
} catch {
/* 忽略回滚错误 */
}
log.error('[DATA] clearSessions failed:', (error as Error).message);
return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
}
});
ipcMain.handle('data:clearMemories', async () => {
// M-40 修复: 危险操作审计日志
log.warn('[DATA] DANGER: clearMemories invoked — all memories will be deleted');
const db = sessionService.getDB();
try {
// M-41 修复: 三个 DELETE 操作用事务包裹,防止部分失败导致三类记忆数据不一致
const epiCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM episodic_memories').get() as {
c: number;
};
const semCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM semantic_memories').get() as {
c: number;
};
const workCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM working_memories').get() as {
c: number;
};
db.exec('BEGIN');
db.exec('DELETE FROM episodic_memories');
db.exec('DELETE FROM semantic_memories');
db.exec('DELETE FROM working_memories');
db.exec('COMMIT');
log.info(
`[DATA] All memories cleared: ${epiCount.c} episodic, ${semCount.c} semantic, ${workCount.c} working memories deleted`,
);
return {
success: true,
deletedEpisodic: epiCount.c,
deletedSemantic: semCount.c,
deletedWorking: workCount.c,
};
} catch (error) {
// M-41 修复: 失败时回滚事务,确保数据一致性
try {
db.exec('ROLLBACK');
} catch {
/* 忽略回滚错误 */
}
log.error('[DATA] clearMemories failed:', (error as Error).message);
return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
}
});
ipcMain.handle('data:clearAuditLogs', async () => {
// 审计日志是 INSERT-ONLY,需要先禁用触发器
const db = sessionService.getDB();
try {
db.exec('BEGIN');
db.exec('DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS audit_no_delete');
db.exec('DELETE FROM audit_logs');
db.exec(`
CREATE TRIGGER audit_no_delete BEFORE DELETE ON audit_logs
BEGIN
SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'Audit logs are INSERT-ONLY. Deletion is not allowed.');
END
`);
db.exec('COMMIT');
// v0.7.4 P1-5: 清空后重置链式哈希缓存 —— 否则下一条 log() 的 prev_hash
// 引用已删除的末行,audit:verifyChain 会误报 TAMPERED
auditService.resetChainCache();
log.info('[DATA] Audit logs cleared');
return { success: true };
} catch (error) {
try {
db.exec('ROLLBACK');
} catch {
/* 忽略回滚错误 */
}
return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
}
});
}