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metona-ai-desktop/electron/harness/tools/built-in/__tests__/view-image.test.ts
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CI / 类型检查 + Lint + 单元测试 (push) Failing after 6m27s
CI / 产物编译验证 (push) Successful in 9m57s
CI / 全量测试 (Electron ABI) (push) Failing after 5m19s
feat: v0.7.4 时序语义修正 · 防线实效补漏 · 全量测试翻倍 — 2406 用例 + jsdom 组件测试全量回归
P1 修复面收口:
- 超时三态区分(aborted→USER_INTERRUPT / ETIMEDOUT→TIMEOUT / 其余→ERROR),
  根治"真实网络超时被误报为用户中断"
- 流空闲超时统一(SSE/Ollama/Anthropic 读循环 60s 无数据抛 504 进重试通道)
- 同会话并发 sendMessage 防重入(isRunning 守卫)+ 会话存在性预检 +
  前置调用移入 try(ERROR+DONE 双事件保证,根治 isStreaming 假死)
- 清空审计后 resetChainCache(根治 verifyChain 误报 TAMPERED)
- DONE 不再提前清理 TRACE(TERMINATED 统一收尾,补全最终迭代录制)
- IME 合成回车不发送(普通 Enter + Cmd/Ctrl+Enter 双分支)+ handleSend 闭包修复

P2 安全纵深:
- preload 移除原始 electronAPI 暴露(渲染层零使用,关掉 XSS invoke 任意通道单点风险)
- CORS 同源回显根治(仅当前浏览页面 Origin,did-navigate 同步)
- MEMORY.md 命令保护正则扩展(括号/$/反引号/< 重定向边界 + 前导路径)
- write_file append TOCTOU 统一(open 后 realpath 校验,新文件分支补漏)
- 敏感键归一化(authKey 驼峰/连字符命中)+ MCP headers 鉴权值加密落库
- ReDoS 检测共享化(search_files/file_editor 统一拦截)
- run_tests/lint_code 升风险 + 需确认 + npx --no-install(执行边界对齐 run_command)
- MCP/SearXNG/llm.baseURL/updateFeedUrl 配置类 URL 高危目标校验(IPv6 去括号 +
  十六进制映射解析 + 尾点剥离)

P3 架构还债:
- temperature/maxTokens 热生效(引擎/编排器/SubAgent 三处接线)+ setBatch 单事务落盘
- SessionRecorder flush 竞态根治(flushPromise 等待 + 超限内联落盘 + stopRecording async)
- 内存收口(lastConsolidationBySession LRU / subTraces 清理 / 会话删除 disposeEngine)
- i18n 全量收口(28 组件 + 353 key 双字典,状态标签改渲染时函数)
- 死代码清理(updateTraceStep/HEADER_HEIGHT/void preA/失实注释)
- 斜杠菜单 MUI 化 + 删除逻辑收敛 resetSessionState + Blob URL 统一释放 +
  用户消息"仅保存"落库(saveMessage 透传前端 id 修复 id 错位)

P4 能力演进:
- 死循环检测拆分(驻留前置 + 乒乓后置带进度信号,合法交替不误报)
- run-lock 30s 超时强制 abort(旧 run 卡死不无限排队)
- RETRY 双通道 stream_reset(前端按 run 归属精确清空,根治重试文本重复)
- FTS5 trigram 中文子串搜索(迁移 9 版本化 SCHEMA_VERSION=2,≤2 字符 LIKE 回退)
- getContextWindow 兜底 1M→128K(未知模型防 413)

测试:
- 855 → 2406 用例(+1551,2.8 倍):服务层 +325(含 MemoryManager 51 新用例)、
  工具实体 +483、IPC/适配器 +390(含 OpenAI/Anthropic/Ollama 独立套件)、
  纯函数表格化 +330;引入 jsdom + @testing-library(14 组件测试文件 249 用例)
- 修复 R1(saveMessage id 透传)/ R2(stream_reset 精确归属)两个回归缺陷
- 遗留低危项清零:git-tools 顺序耦合 / web-fetch 真实时间退避 / slo 内存断言 /
  mcp-security 多余 skipIf / deepseek-balance 命名误导 / 组件 mock 注入脆弱性

版本: 0.7.4; README 同步(工具风险表/版本徽章); 依赖: 移除 @electron-toolkit/preload,
新增 jsdom/@testing-library(devDependencies 不打包)

回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; Electron ABI 全量 2406/2406 零跳过;
系统 Node 2110 通过 296 跳过(better-sqlite3 ABI)
2026-08-30 19:19:07 +08:00

205 lines
7.6 KiB
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/**
* view_image 工具实体夹具套件(v0.7.5 覆盖补齐)
*
* 以真实临时目录为夹具,锁定:
* - path 必填 / 工作空间越界拒绝 / 扩展名白名单(png/jpg/jpeg/gif/webp/bmp/svg
* - 5MB 大小闸门 / 文件不存在 / MIME 映射 / dataUrl 载荷形态
* - 大小写扩展名归一 / 子目录路径
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'os';
import { join } from 'path';
import { ViewImageTool } from '../view-image';
import type { ToolExecutionContext } from '../../../types/metona-tool';
const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
interface ViewResult {
success: boolean;
error?: string;
path?: string;
size?: number;
mimeType?: string;
dataUrl?: string;
supportedFormats?: string[];
}
describe('view_image', () => {
let ws: string;
let tool: ViewImageTool;
const ctx = (): ToolExecutionContext => ({
sessionId: 't',
workspacePath: ws,
iteration: 1,
requestId: 'r',
});
beforeAll(() => {
ws = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'metona-img-'));
tool = new ViewImageTool();
// 最小合法 PNG 载荷(8 字节签名 + 少量内容)
writeFileSync(
join(ws, 'pic.png'),
Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02]),
);
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'photo.JPG'), Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x10]));
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'anim.gif'), Buffer.from([0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61]));
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'vector.svg'), '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>');
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'bits.webp'), 'RIFF\x00\x00\x00\x00WEBPVP8 ');
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'bitmap.bmp'), 'BM\x00\x00');
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'doc.txt'), 'plain text');
mkdirSync(join(ws, 'sub'), { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(
join(ws, 'sub', 'nested.png'),
Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]),
);
// 超限文件(> 5MB
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'huge.png'), Buffer.alloc(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + 5, 0x61));
});
afterAll(() => {
try {
rmSync(ws, { recursive: true, force: true });
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
});
it('path 缺失 → 失败并提示 path is required', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({}, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('path is required');
});
it('path 为 null → 同样失败', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: null }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
});
it('工作空间外绝对路径 → Path outside workspace', async () => {
const outside = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'C:\\Windows\\notepad.exe' : '/etc/passwd';
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: outside }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('Path outside workspace');
});
it('路径遍历(../ 跳出)→ 拒绝', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: '../outside.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
});
it('不支持扩展名(.txt)→ Unsupported image format 且列出支持列表', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'doc.txt' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('Unsupported image format');
expect(Array.isArray(r.supportedFormats)).toBe(true);
expect(r.supportedFormats).toContain('.png');
expect(r.supportedFormats).toContain('.svg');
});
it('无扩展名文件 → 不支持格式', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'noext' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
});
it('支持格式中不存在的文件 → File not found', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'missing.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('File not found');
});
it('超过 5MB → Image too large (max 5MB) 且回传 size', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'huge.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
expect(String(r.error)).toContain('Image too large');
expect(Number(r.size)).toBe(MAX_IMAGE_BYTES + 5);
});
it('PNG 成功:mimeType=image/png、dataUrl 前缀正确', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'pic.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/png');
expect(r.size).toBe(10);
expect(String(r.dataUrl)).toMatch(/^data:image\/png;base64,/);
});
it('dataUrl 载荷解码后与源文件字节一致', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'pic.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
const b64 = String(r.dataUrl).slice('data:image/png;base64,'.length);
const decoded = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
expect([...decoded]).toEqual([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02]);
});
it('大写扩展名 .JPG 归一为 image/jpeg', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'photo.JPG' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
it('.jpeg 与 .jpg 共用 image/jpeg(同名映射)', async () => {
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'dual.jpeg'), Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff]));
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'dual.jpeg' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/jpeg');
});
it('GIF → image/gif', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'anim.gif' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/gif');
});
it('WEBP → image/webp', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'bits.webp' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/webp');
});
it('BMP → image/bmp', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'bitmap.bmp' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/bmp');
});
it('SVG → image/svg+xml', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'vector.svg' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.mimeType).toBe('image/svg+xml');
expect(String(r.dataUrl)).toMatch(/^data:image\/svg\+xml;base64,/);
});
it('子目录路径可读取(仍在校验边界内)', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'sub/nested.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.size).toBe(8);
});
it('空文件(0 字节)可正常读取', async () => {
writeFileSync(join(ws, 'empty.png'), Buffer.alloc(0));
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'empty.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.size).toBe(0);
});
it('相对路径带 ./ 前缀可读', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: './pic.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
});
it('目录路径(扩展名为 .png 的目录)→ 读取失败(stat 非文件)', async () => {
mkdirSync(join(ws, 'dir.png'), { recursive: true });
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'dir.png' }, ctx())) as ViewResult;
expect(r.success).toBe(false);
});
it('返回值不含 dataUrl 之外的泄露字段(path/size/mimeType 齐全)', async () => {
const r = (await tool.execute({ path: 'pic.png' }, ctx())) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(r.success).toBe(true);
expect(r.path).toBe('pic.png');
expect(typeof r.dataUrl).toBe('string');
});
});