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metona-ai-desktop/electron/utils/__tests__/pinned-proxy.test.ts
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CI / 类型检查 + Lint + 单元测试 (push) Failing after 9m16s
CI / 全量测试 (Electron ABI) (push) Failing after 6m4s
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feat: v0.8.0 流语义补全 · 会话可靠 · 恢复力 — finish_reason 全链路贯通根治"思考中停止" · 2445 用例全量回归
P0 会话可靠性收口(根治"模型思考着会话就停止"):
- P0-1 finish_reason 全链路贯通:DONE 事件与 IterationStep 新增 finishReason,OpenAI 共享 SSE / Anthropic message_delta.stop_reason / Ollama done_reason 三路采集,TRACE 层弃用硬编码 'stop' 记录真值
- P0-2 空响应守卫 + 降级重试:零产出流→可重试错误走退避;思考耗尽输出预算(reasoning-only + length)→自动关闭思考降级重试一次;仍失败→OUTPUT_LENGTH_EXCEEDED 结构化错误 + 故障转移;附带根治 abort 恰逢零工具调用轮被 COMPLETED 抢占的真实缺陷
- P0-3 思考×能力×预算三对齐:DeepSeek/MiMo/Agnes/Ollama 四家 supportsThinking=false 强制不发思考参数;小输出预算告警;设置页联动提示
- P0-4 渲染层可见性:截断/空完成/友好错误三类提示,i18n 全部出层
- P0-5 回归四件套:reasoning-only 终止判定、集成级空闲超时、504 引擎重试归类、思考中 abort→USER_INTERRUPT、P4-2 强制收尾路径

FEAT-1:LLM 设置新增「最大输出上限」——Provider 支持矩阵显隐 + 模型上限钳制提示 + 超限保存警告 + llm.maxTokens 热生效

P1 修复面收口:
- 渲染层三缺陷根治:后台会话回放缓冲(2000 条/4MB 有界 + agent:getReplayState + 事件总线)+ abort 双层自愈 + sendMessage 收尾兜底 + 中断卡片清扫
- 工具 abort 信号全覆盖:web_search/web_fetch/http_request/code_search/git 系列/delegate_task 全部接入引擎中断;web_search 时间预算收敛(720s→≤240s);移除伪造 ToolExecutionContext 与死代码
- 安全:本地 Pinned CONNECT 代理根治浏览器通道 DNS rebinding(校验期 IP pinning,可注入 resolver 表测);配置 URL 域名解析深校验(DeepCheckSoftFailure 软失败);SSE 空 error 帧防御修复;Ollama generate/embed AbortSignal.any 合并
- 缺陷清单:UTF-16 BOM 读取、tmp 同毫秒碰撞(nanoid 后缀)、code_search JS 回退参数对称(case_sensitive/前后文独立)、list_directory include_node_modules、崩溃自愈退避(60s 窗 ≥3 次停 reload)、MemoryViewer/Sidebar i18n 收口

P2 能力演进:
- 会话回收站:SCHEMA_VERSION 3 + 迁移 10(deleted_at,存在性守卫),软删除/恢复/彻底删除/30 天自动清理(启动+24h),searchMessages 聚合剔除,Sidebar 回收站面板
- 会话回放播放器:sessions:listRecordings/readRecording(白名单+目录边界+20MB 上限),SessionReplayPlayer 时间轴/步进/变速,Trace 面板入口
- electron-updater 自动更新:双轨(手动 feed 比对保留),生产环境启动静默检查 + update:status 广播 + app:updateInstall + LogsSettings UpdatePanel + builder publish 配置
- @ 文件提及:workspace.listFiles/readFileClip(边界/512KB/NUL 拒绝/MEMORY.md 保护),ChatInput Fuse 联想+键盘导航+附件管线注入
- MCP Resources/Prompts 发现:可选能力 try/catch 降级,mcp:listServerContents,MCPSettings 展开视图
- 文档对齐:内部 API 标准 HTML(Adapter 清单补 MiMo/已实现注记/STREAM_RESET/DONE.finishReason/ repetition_truncation 映射);README v0.8.0 亮点表

P3 测试基建:
- 新增 4 个测试文件:engine-stream-contract(6)、engine-stream-reliability(4:集成空闲超时/504 重试/思考中 abort/P4-2 强制收尾)、thinking-capability-gate(7)、pinned-proxy(9,含深校验 5)、session-trash(5,DB 域)、use-agent-stream hook 级(5)、agent.test 回放缓冲(2)
- 契约更新:orchestrator 被中断 SubAgent success=false(abort 优先级修复语义)、SSE 空 error 帧、UTF-16 正常读取、DeepSeek 未配置思考显式 disabled、迁移矩阵 v2→3
- 弱断言根治:registry WEBP 单向断言、hooks-contracts 自比恒真、memory 空 token 补强

全量验证:typecheck 0 错误 / lint 0 问题 / 系统 Node 2144 通过(301 DB 用例按 ABI 跳过)/ Electron ABI 2445/2445 全量通过 0 跳过
2026-09-05 20:06:26 +08:00

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/**
* v0.8.0 P1-4/P1-5: Pinned CONNECT 代理 + 配置 URL 深校验测试。
*
* - pinned-proxy:公网/私网目标的 CONNECT 校验分流(resolver 注入 mock
* 不触网);端口分配与幂等启动。
* - assertSafeConfigTargetDeep:域名解析到云元数据 IP → 拒绝;DNS 失败 →
* DeepCheckSoftFailure(软失败放行);IP 字面量高危段 → 拒绝。
*/
import { describe, it, expect, afterAll } from 'vitest';
import * as net from 'net';
import {
createPinnedProxy,
ensurePinnedProxy,
isPinnedProxyActive,
} from '../../utils/pinned-proxy';
import {
assertSafeConfigTargetDeep,
DeepCheckSoftFailure,
__dnsLookup,
} from '../../harness/tools/built-in/ssrf-guard';
// ===== Pinned CONNECT 代理 =====
describe('pinned CONNECT proxy (P1-4)', () => {
const keepAlive: Array<net.Server> = [];
it('public target → CONNECT tunnel established (200), traffic pinned to resolved IP', async () => {
// 本地 echo 服务器充当"上游"mock resolver 把域名 pin 到 127.0.0.1
// 验证隧道建立后字节双向透传(不触公网)
const echo = net.createServer((socket) => {
socket.pipe(socket);
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => echo.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r));
const echoPort = (echo.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
keepAlive.push(echo);
const proxy = await createPinnedProxy(async () => {
// 校验通过 → 返回校验期锁定的 IP(pinning 语义:连接用同一批 IP)
return ['127.0.0.1'];
});
keepAlive.push(proxy as unknown as net.Server);
const target = net.connect({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxy.port });
const result = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), 3_000);
let buf = '';
target.on('data', (d) => {
buf += d.toString();
if (buf.includes('\r\n\r\n')) {
// 200 已到 → 隧道建立,写 payload 验证透传
target.write(`ping-to-${echoPort}`);
}
if (buf.includes(`ping-to-${echoPort}`)) {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve(buf.split('\r\n')[0]);
}
});
target.on('error', (e) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(e);
});
target.write(`CONNECT example.com:${echoPort} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n`);
});
expect(result).toContain('200');
target.destroy();
echo.close();
await proxy.close();
});
it('private/metadata target → 403 rejected (fail-closed)', async () => {
const proxy = await createPinnedProxy(async () => {
throw new Error('Blocked SSRF: resolves to private IP');
});
const target = net.connect({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxy.port });
const response = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), 2_000);
let buf = '';
target.on('data', (d) => {
buf += d.toString();
if (buf.includes('\r\n\r\n')) {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve(buf.split('\r\n')[0]);
}
});
target.on('error', (e) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(e);
});
target.write('CONNECT 169.254.169.254:80 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\n\r\n');
});
expect(response).toContain('403');
target.destroy();
await proxy.close();
});
it('invalid CONNECT target → 400', async () => {
const proxy = await createPinnedProxy(async () => ['1.2.3.4']);
const target = net.connect({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxy.port });
const response = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), 2_000);
let buf = '';
target.on('data', (d) => {
buf += d.toString();
if (buf.includes('\r\n\r\n')) {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve(buf.split('\r\n')[0]);
}
});
target.on('error', (e) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(e);
});
target.write('CONNECT no-port-target HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n');
});
expect(response).toContain('400');
target.destroy();
await proxy.close();
});
it('ensurePinnedProxy: idempotent start + active flag', async () => {
const port1 = await ensurePinnedProxy();
const port2 = await ensurePinnedProxy();
expect(port1).not.toBeNull();
expect(port2).toBe(port1);
expect(isPinnedProxyActive()).toBe(true);
}, 10_000);
afterAll(() => {
for (const s of keepAlive) {
try {
s.close();
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
}
});
});
// ===== 配置 URL 深校验 =====
describe('assertSafeConfigTargetDeep (P1-5)', () => {
it('hostname resolving to metadata IP → rejected', async () => {
const original = __dnsLookup.current;
__dnsLookup.current = (async () => [
{ address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 },
]) as unknown as typeof __dnsLookup.current;
try {
await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('https://attacker.example/search')).rejects.toThrow(
/high-risk/,
);
} finally {
__dnsLookup.current = original;
}
});
it('hostname resolving to public IP → allowed', async () => {
const original = __dnsLookup.current;
__dnsLookup.current = (async () => [
{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 },
]) as unknown as typeof __dnsLookup.current;
try {
await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('https://example.com')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
} finally {
__dnsLookup.current = original;
}
});
it('DNS failure → DeepCheckSoftFailure (soft-fail allow, caller logs)', async () => {
const original = __dnsLookup.current;
__dnsLookup.current = (async () => {
throw new Error('ENOTFOUND');
}) as unknown as typeof __dnsLookup.current;
try {
await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('https://offline.example')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
DeepCheckSoftFailure,
);
} finally {
__dnsLookup.current = original;
}
});
it('IP-literal link-local target → rejected without DNS', async () => {
await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('http://169.254.169.254/latest')).rejects.toThrow(
/link-local|metadata/,
);
});
it('loopback target → allowed (local SearXNG/MCP legit)', async () => {
await expect(
assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('http://127.0.0.1:8080/search'),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
});