metona-ai-desktop/electron/harness/tools/built-in/__tests__/ssrf-guard.test.ts

/**
 * ssrf-guard 共享模块测试（v0.6.4 P2-2）
 *
 * 背景：SSRF 校验此前是 http_request 内部私有实现，web_fetch/浏览器回退完全无校验。
 * 收敛到单一模块后，本文件以表格化用例锁定私有段判定与 DNS 解析行为；
 * 另验证 WebFetchTool 对内网 URL 在发出任何网络请求前即被拒绝，
 * 且不进入浏览器回退通道（否则等于借 Chromium 绕过）。
 */

import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';

vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
  default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
}));

// DNS lookup 按域名返回表驱动结果（validateSSRF 内部使用 all: true）
const dnsTable: Record<string, Array<{ address: string; family: number }>> = {
  'public.example.com': [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }],
  'mixed.example.com': [
    { address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 },
    { address: '192.168.1.10', family: 4 },
    { address: '2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946', family: 6 },
  ],
  'v4mapped.example.com': [{ address: '::ffff:127.0.0.1', family: 6 }],
  localhost: [{ address: '127.0.0.1', family: 4 }],
  'nx.example.com': [],
};

vi.mock('node:dns/promises', () => ({
  lookup: vi.fn(async (hostname: string) => {
    if (!(hostname in dnsTable)) {
      throw Object.assign(new Error(`ENOTFOUND ${hostname}`), { code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
    }
    return dnsTable[hostname];
  }),
}));

import { isPrivateIP, validateSSRF } from '../ssrf-guard';
import { WebFetchTool } from '../web-fetch';
import { WebBrowserTool } from '../browser';
import type { ToolExecutionContext } from '../../../types/metona-tool';

describe('isPrivateIP 表格化判定', () => {
  const privateCases = [
    '127.0.0.1',
    '127.9.9.9', // 整个 127/8 都是回环
    '10.1.2.3',
    '192.168.0.1',
    '172.16.0.1',
    '172.31.255.255',
    '169.254.169.254', // 云元数据
    '0.0.0.0',
    '224.0.0.5', // 组播
    '240.0.0.1', // 保留
    '::1',
    'fe80::a',
    'fc00::a',
    'fd12::a',
    '::ffff:10.0.0.5', // v4 映射递归检测
  ];
  const publicCases = [
    '8.8.8.8',
    '93.184.216.34',
    '172.32.0.1', // 刚好超出 172.16-31
    '::ffff:8.8.8.8',
    '2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946',
  ];

  it.each(privateCases)('%s → 私有（拒绝）', (ip) => {
    expect(isPrivateIP(ip)).toBe(true);
  });
  it.each(publicCases)('%s → 公网（放行）', (ip) => {
    expect(isPrivateIP(ip)).toBe(false);
  });
});

describe('validateSSRF', () => {
  it('协议白名单：非 http(s) 直接拒绝', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('ftp://example.com')).rejects.toThrow('Blocked SSRF');
    await expect(validateSSRF('file:///etc/passwd')).rejects.toThrow('Blocked SSRF');
  });

  it('hostname 为 IP 时直接判定，不做 DNS', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin')).rejects.toThrow(
      'private/loopback address',
    );
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data')).rejects.toThrow(
      'private/loopback address',
    );
  });

  it('域名解析出任一私有 IP 即拒绝（防 rebinding 只查首个 IP）', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://mixed.example.com/')).rejects.toThrow(
      /resolves to private IP/,
    );
  });

  it('::ffff: 映射的回环地址同样拒绝', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://v4mapped.example.com/')).rejects.toThrow(
      /resolves to private IP/,
    );
  });

  it('纯公网域名正常通过', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://public.example.com/page')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
  });

  it('DNS 解析为空（无记录）即拒绝（fail-closed）', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://nx.example.com/')).rejects.toThrow('no DNS records');
  });

  it('DNS 查询异常（ENOTFOUND 等）同样拒绝', async () => {
    await expect(validateSSRF('http://not-in-table.invalid/')).rejects.toThrow(
      'DNS resolution failed',
    );
  });
});

describe('WebFetchTool — SSRF 入口拦截（v0.6.4 安全不对称根治）', () => {
  const context: ToolExecutionContext = {
    sessionId: 't',
    workspacePath: process.cwd(),
    iteration: 1,
    requestId: 'r',
  };

  it('拒绝回环地址且不发起任何网络请求、不进入浏览器回退', async () => {
    const fetchSpy = vi.fn();
    vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchSpy);

    const tool = new WebFetchTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute({ url: 'http://127.0.0.1:4567/internal' }, context)) as {
      success?: boolean;
      error?: string;
    };

    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
    // 关键契约：零网络请求（HTTP 与浏览器两个通道都不允许触达内网）
    expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
    vi.unstubAllGlobals();
  });

  it('拒绝云元数据地址', async () => {
    const tool = new WebFetchTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute(
      { url: 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/' },
      context,
    )) as {
      success?: boolean;
      error?: string;
    };
    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
  });

  it('拒绝解析为内网的域名（如 localhost）', async () => {
    const tool = new WebFetchTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute({ url: 'http://localhost/api' }, context)) as {
      success?: boolean;
      error?: string;
    };
    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
  });
});

describe('WebBrowserTool — open 动作 SSRF 入口拦截（v0.7.2 A2）', () => {
  const context: ToolExecutionContext = {
    sessionId: 't',
    workspacePath: process.cwd(),
    iteration: 1,
    requestId: 'r',
  };

  /**
   * 契约背景：隐藏浏览器（Chromium 网络栈）此前是 SSRF 防线的唯一旁路 ——
   * web_fetch/http_request 均有校验，而 web_browser open 可直接导航内网。
   * 根治后 open 必须在创建任何 BrowserWindow 之前完成校验；
   * 以下用例断言私有地址在触达 getManager()（首个 Electron API 调用点）前即被拒绝。
   */
  it('拒绝回环地址且不创建任何浏览器窗口', async () => {
    const tool = new WebBrowserTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute(
      { action: 'open', url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9222/devtools' },
      context,
    )) as { success?: boolean; action?: string; error?: string };
    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.action).toBe('open');
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
  });

  it('拒绝云元数据地址', async () => {
    const tool = new WebBrowserTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute(
      { action: 'open', url: 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/' },
      context,
    )) as { success?: boolean; error?: string };
    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
  });

  it('拒绝解析为内网的域名（如 localhost）', async () => {
    const tool = new WebBrowserTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute(
      { action: 'open', url: 'http://localhost/admin' },
      context,
    )) as { success?: boolean; error?: string };
    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
  });

  it('拒绝内网 IP 段（192.168/10/172.16-31）', async () => {
    const tool = new WebBrowserTool();
    for (const url of ['http://192.168.1.1/', 'http://10.0.0.2/', 'http://172.20.0.5/']) {
      const result = (await tool.execute({ action: 'open', url }, context)) as {
        success?: boolean;
        error?: string;
      };
      expect(result.success).toBe(false);
      expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('Blocked SSRF');
    }
  });

  it('非法协议仍走原有协议白名单拒绝（错误信息不变）', async () => {
    const tool = new WebBrowserTool();
    const result = (await tool.execute({ action: 'open', url: 'file:///etc/passwd' }, context)) as {
      success?: boolean;
      error?: string;
    };
    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
    expect(result.error ?? '').toContain('URL must start with');
  });
});