feat: v0.7.3 成本收口 · 状态一致 · 死账清理 — Prompt Cache 根治 + SSRF DNS Pinning + 87 用例扩充全量回归
P1 修复面收口: Prompt Cache 根治(日期/记忆/附件三类易变内容出 system 入用户消息 前置块 user-context.ts, system 跨 run 字节级稳定; Anthropic system 块数组化 + cache_control ephemeral 断言, DeepSeek 自动缓存前缀命中 — 多轮对话输入 token 成本降数量级); 编辑重发/重新生成幽灵 Trace 双侧根治(DB truncateMessagesAfter 同步过滤 metadata.traceSteps + 前端 trimTraceStepsByAnchor 镜像, 严格小于锚点 时间戳, 同毫秒等值判废); sessions:deleteMessage 死通道全链路删除(渲染层零调用 + message_count 漂移面); Ollama vision 能力门控全链路(MetonaModelInfo .supportsVision 贯穿 adapter/IPC/store/UI, model-capabilities.ts 三道判定纯函数, 未知保守放行); 记忆固化节流(consolidation-policy 纯函数: 总开关 + 内容门控 [回答>=200字符或存在成功工具调用] + 会话级 10 分钟频率窗口, 三 memory.* 配置键) P2 安全纵深: SSRF DNS Pinning 关闭 rebinding 窗口(ssrf-guard 重构 resolvePublicAddresses 单源; ssrf-dispatcher 以 undici Agent.connect.lookup 钉死校验 IP, TLS SNI 保持原域名, 一次性 dispatcher 用后即毁; 代理激活显式 退化为仅入口校验); web_fetch 重写手动逐跳重定向循环(每跳先校验后连接, 替代 redirect:follow 内核跟跳的中间跳裸奔, 上限 5 跳); http_request 换用 pinned fetch; web_search 可达性预检加固(私有 URL 零请求 + 不跟跳, 3xx 视为 可达); Agent 浏览器 CORS 通配收紧为 Origin 回显 + Vary: Origin; ConfirmationHook.forgetSession 会话终态清理(会话删除/abort 联动/SubAgent 终结三处接线, 根治 rememberedDecisions 泄漏) P3 架构还债: agent.enableReflection 死配置全链路接线(main→shared→引擎→ Orchestrator→设置开关, REFLECTING 状态真实可达); AgentLoopConfig.timeoutMs 死字段删除; MemoryManager.cleanupExpired 挂入健康检查周期(expires_at 回收 管道真实化); buildSafeEnv 收敛 utils/safe-env.ts 单源(run_command 与 MCP stdio 共用, 终结双实现漂移); Trace 生命周期治理(metadata 只保留最近 20 个 run — keepRecentRuns 纯函数; JSONL 录制启动自动清理保留 200 个 + 设置页 手动清理); SLO/健康快照可视化(app:healthSnapshot IPC + 设置页只读卡片 + 审计链一键校验) P4 能力演进: 会话标题 LLM 自动生成(TitleGenerator — 每会话幂等/并发重入复用 同一 Promise/自定义标题不覆盖/失败静默回退, Sidebar 经 config:changed 实时 刷新); MCP 自动重连(5s/15s/60s 退避最多 3 次, reconnecting 状态机, teardownConnection 内部拆除保留簿记 — 用户断开/开关关闭即时取消, 设置页 显示第 N/3 次); 死循环检测 ABAB 乒乓模式(最近4轮 A→B→A→B 交替判定, 补齐 docs 第五章"两状态反复切换"检测契约); i18n 第三阶段(ChatInput/LLMSettings/ OnboardingWizard/MemoryViewer 主链路文案出层, zh-CN + en-US 双字典补齐) 测试: 737 → 824 用例(+87, 新增 8 个测试文件 + 扩展 3 个)。新覆盖: user-context 分组/空值收缩/拼接契约、context-builder 字节级稳定性、Anthropic cache_control 四态、consolidation-policy 九路判定矩阵、ssrf-dispatcher(pinned lookup/重定向 解析/IP 校验)、forget-session 会话隔离、trace-lifecycle run 淘汰、 trace-trim 严格小于边界、safe-env 净化矩阵、mcp-reconnect 退避状态机 (fake timers)、title-generator 并发重入、SQLite 侧 truncate×TRACE 联动 (Electron ABI)。测试驱动修复: GIT_*/ 注释终止块注释、重连计数被自身重试 前置断开重置(拆 teardownConnection 保留簿记)、TitleGenerator 幂等占位与 并发去重的检查顺序竞态(去重先于幂等) 版本: 0.7.3; README 同步(配置表新增 agent.enableReflection/memory.*/mcp.autoReconnect) 回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; 系统 Node 771 通过 53 跳过 (better-sqlite3 ABI); Electron ABI 全量 824/824 零跳过
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/**
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* SSRF DNS Pinning 测试（v0.7.3 P2-1）
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*
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* 锁定三个单元：
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* D1 createPinnedLookup —— 只返回校验阶段锁定的 IP 集合（过滤非法 family），
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* 空集合返回 ENOTFOUND（防御）。
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* D2 resolveRedirectTarget —— 重定向状态识别 + 相对 Location 解析 +
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* 非法/缺失 Location 返回 null。
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* D3 resolvePinnedIps —— IP 直连与私网拒绝（走 ssrf-guard 单一事实来源；
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* 域名解析路径由 ssrf-guard 表测覆盖，此处不重复触网）。
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import { createPinnedLookup, resolveRedirectTarget, resolvePinnedIps } from '../ssrf-dispatcher';
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import type { LookupCallback } from '../ssrf-dispatcher';
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describe('createPinnedLookup', () => {
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it('D1: 仅返回钉死的 IP 集合（忽略 hostname），family 正确标注', async () => {
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const lookup = createPinnedLookup(['93.184.216.34', '2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946']);
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const result = await new Promise<{ address: string; family: number }[]>((resolve, reject) => {
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const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses!));
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lookup('attacker.example', {}, cb);
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});
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expect(result).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(result[0]).toEqual({ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 });
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expect(result[1].family).toBe(6);
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});
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it('D1: 非法 family（非 IPv4/IPv6 字符串）被过滤', async () => {
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const lookup = createPinnedLookup(['not-an-ip']);
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await expect(
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new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses));
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lookup('h', {}, cb as never);
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}),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
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});
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it('D1: 空集合 → ENOTFOUND（防御：调用方不应构造空 pin dispatcher）', async () => {
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const lookup = createPinnedLookup([]);
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await expect(
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new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses));
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lookup('h', {}, cb as never);
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}),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
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});
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});
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describe('resolveRedirectTarget', () => {
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const makeResponse = (status: number, location?: string) => ({
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status,
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headers: {
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get: (name: string) => (name.toLowerCase() === 'location' ? (location ?? null) : null),
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},
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});
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it('D2: 301/302/303/307/308 识别并解析绝对 Location', () => {
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for (const status of [301, 302, 303, 307, 308]) {
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expect(
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resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(status, 'https://cdn.example.com/x'), 'https://a.test/'),
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).toBe('https://cdn.example.com/x');
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}
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});
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it('D2: 相对 Location 以当前 URL 为基解析（RFC 7231）', () => {
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expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, '/next?a=1'), 'https://a.test/dir/page')).toBe(
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'https://a.test/next?a=1',
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);
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});
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it('D2: 非 3xx 状态 → null（终态）', () => {
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expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(200), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
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expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(404), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
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});
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it('D2: 缺失/非法 Location → null', () => {
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expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
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expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, ''), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
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expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, 'http://[::bad'), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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describe('resolvePinnedIps', () => {
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it('D3: IP 直连 URL —— 公网 IP 直接返回', async () => {
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const ips = await resolvePinnedIps('https://93.184.216.34/x');
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expect(ips).toEqual(['93.184.216.34']);
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});
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it('D3: 私有/回环 IP 直连被拒（单一事实来源 ssrf-guard）', async () => {
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for (const host of ['127.0.0.1', '10.0.0.5', '169.254.169.254', '192.168.1.1', '[::1]']) {
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await expect(resolvePinnedIps(`http://${host}/latest`)).rejects.toThrow(/Blocked SSRF/);
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}
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});
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it('D3: 非 http/https 协议被拒', async () => {
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await expect(resolvePinnedIps('ftp://example.com')).rejects.toThrow(/not allowed/);
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});
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it('D3: 非法 URL 被拒', async () => {
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await expect(resolvePinnedIps('not a url')).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid URL/);
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});
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});
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