feat: v0.7.3 成本收口 · 状态一致 · 死账清理 — Prompt Cache 根治 + SSRF DNS Pinning + 87 用例扩充全量回归
P1 修复面收口: Prompt Cache 根治(日期/记忆/附件三类易变内容出 system 入用户消息 前置块 user-context.ts, system 跨 run 字节级稳定; Anthropic system 块数组化 + cache_control ephemeral 断言, DeepSeek 自动缓存前缀命中 — 多轮对话输入 token 成本降数量级); 编辑重发/重新生成幽灵 Trace 双侧根治(DB truncateMessagesAfter 同步过滤 metadata.traceSteps + 前端 trimTraceStepsByAnchor 镜像, 严格小于锚点 时间戳, 同毫秒等值判废); sessions:deleteMessage 死通道全链路删除(渲染层零调用 + message_count 漂移面); Ollama vision 能力门控全链路(MetonaModelInfo .supportsVision 贯穿 adapter/IPC/store/UI, model-capabilities.ts 三道判定纯函数, 未知保守放行); 记忆固化节流(consolidation-policy 纯函数: 总开关 + 内容门控 [回答>=200字符或存在成功工具调用] + 会话级 10 分钟频率窗口, 三 memory.* 配置键) P2 安全纵深: SSRF DNS Pinning 关闭 rebinding 窗口(ssrf-guard 重构 resolvePublicAddresses 单源; ssrf-dispatcher 以 undici Agent.connect.lookup 钉死校验 IP, TLS SNI 保持原域名, 一次性 dispatcher 用后即毁; 代理激活显式 退化为仅入口校验); web_fetch 重写手动逐跳重定向循环(每跳先校验后连接, 替代 redirect:follow 内核跟跳的中间跳裸奔, 上限 5 跳); http_request 换用 pinned fetch; web_search 可达性预检加固(私有 URL 零请求 + 不跟跳, 3xx 视为 可达); Agent 浏览器 CORS 通配收紧为 Origin 回显 + Vary: Origin; ConfirmationHook.forgetSession 会话终态清理(会话删除/abort 联动/SubAgent 终结三处接线, 根治 rememberedDecisions 泄漏) P3 架构还债: agent.enableReflection 死配置全链路接线(main→shared→引擎→ Orchestrator→设置开关, REFLECTING 状态真实可达); AgentLoopConfig.timeoutMs 死字段删除; MemoryManager.cleanupExpired 挂入健康检查周期(expires_at 回收 管道真实化); buildSafeEnv 收敛 utils/safe-env.ts 单源(run_command 与 MCP stdio 共用, 终结双实现漂移); Trace 生命周期治理(metadata 只保留最近 20 个 run — keepRecentRuns 纯函数; JSONL 录制启动自动清理保留 200 个 + 设置页 手动清理); SLO/健康快照可视化(app:healthSnapshot IPC + 设置页只读卡片 + 审计链一键校验) P4 能力演进: 会话标题 LLM 自动生成(TitleGenerator — 每会话幂等/并发重入复用 同一 Promise/自定义标题不覆盖/失败静默回退, Sidebar 经 config:changed 实时 刷新); MCP 自动重连(5s/15s/60s 退避最多 3 次, reconnecting 状态机, teardownConnection 内部拆除保留簿记 — 用户断开/开关关闭即时取消, 设置页 显示第 N/3 次); 死循环检测 ABAB 乒乓模式(最近4轮 A→B→A→B 交替判定, 补齐 docs 第五章"两状态反复切换"检测契约); i18n 第三阶段(ChatInput/LLMSettings/ OnboardingWizard/MemoryViewer 主链路文案出层, zh-CN + en-US 双字典补齐) 测试: 737 → 824 用例(+87, 新增 8 个测试文件 + 扩展 3 个)。新覆盖: user-context 分组/空值收缩/拼接契约、context-builder 字节级稳定性、Anthropic cache_control 四态、consolidation-policy 九路判定矩阵、ssrf-dispatcher(pinned lookup/重定向 解析/IP 校验)、forget-session 会话隔离、trace-lifecycle run 淘汰、 trace-trim 严格小于边界、safe-env 净化矩阵、mcp-reconnect 退避状态机 (fake timers)、title-generator 并发重入、SQLite 侧 truncate×TRACE 联动 (Electron ABI)。测试驱动修复: GIT_*/ 注释终止块注释、重连计数被自身重试 前置断开重置(拆 teardownConnection 保留簿记)、TitleGenerator 幂等占位与 并发去重的检查顺序竞态(去重先于幂等) 版本: 0.7.3; README 同步(配置表新增 agent.enableReflection/memory.*/mcp.autoReconnect) 回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; 系统 Node 771 通过 53 跳过 (better-sqlite3 ABI); Electron ABI 全量 824/824 零跳过
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@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
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/**
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* Anthropic system cache_control 断言测试（v0.7.3 P1-1）
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*
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* Anthropic 缓存按"内容块前缀"命中：system 必须以块数组传递并在块上打
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* cache_control 才可缓存。本文件锁定：
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* C1 非空 system → 块数组 + {type:'ephemeral'}；
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* C2 空 system → 保持空字符串（不发空块）；
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* C3 thinking 模式下断言仍然存在（cache 与 thinking 不互斥）；
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* C4 system 块文本为四分区完整拼接（roleDefinition/outputConstraints/
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* safetyGuidelines/dynamicReminders）。
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from 'vitest';
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vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
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default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
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}));
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import { AnthropicAdapter } from '../anthropic.adapter';
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import type { MetonaRequest } from '../../types';
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function captureFetch(): { bodies: Array<Record<string, unknown>> } {
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const bodies: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
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const genericBody = {
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content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'ok' }],
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usage: { input_tokens: 3, output_tokens: 2 },
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stop_reason: 'end_turn',
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};
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const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (_url: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
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bodies.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body ?? '{}')) as Record<string, unknown>);
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return new Response(JSON.stringify(genericBody), {
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status: 200,
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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});
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});
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vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
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return { bodies };
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}
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afterEach(() => {
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vi.unstubAllGlobals();
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});
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function makeAdapter(): AnthropicAdapter {
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return new AnthropicAdapter({
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provider: 'anthropic',
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baseURL: 'http://a.test',
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apiKey: 'k',
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defaultModel: 'claude-sonnet-4-5',
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});
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}
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function makeRequest(overrides?: Partial<MetonaRequest>): MetonaRequest {
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return {
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meta: {
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sessionId: 's1',
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iteration: 1,
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requestId: 'r1',
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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agentVersion: 'test',
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},
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systemPrompt: {
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roleDefinition: 'You are Metona.',
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outputConstraints: 'Be concise.',
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safetyGuidelines: 'Stay safe.',
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dynamicReminders: '## Current Workspace\n`/ws`',
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},
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messages: [{ role: 'user', content: 'hi', timestamp: Date.now() }],
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params: { maxTokens: 63_488, temperature: 0, stream: false },
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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describe('AnthropicAdapter — system cache_control（P1-1）', () => {
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it('C1: 非空 system → 单 text 块 + cache_control ephemeral', async () => {
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const adapter = makeAdapter();
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(makeRequest());
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const system = bodies[0].system as Array<{
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type: string;
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text: string;
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cache_control: { type: string };
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}>;
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expect(Array.isArray(system)).toBe(true);
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expect(system).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(system[0].type).toBe('text');
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expect(system[0].cache_control).toEqual({ type: 'ephemeral' });
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});
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it('C2: 空 system → 保持空字符串（不发空块）', async () => {
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const adapter = makeAdapter();
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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systemPrompt: { roleDefinition: '', outputConstraints: '', safetyGuidelines: '' },
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}),
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);
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expect(bodies[0].system).toBe('');
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});
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it('C3: thinking 模式下 cache_control 断言仍然存在', async () => {
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const adapter = makeAdapter();
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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params: {
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maxTokens: 8192,
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temperature: 0,
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stream: false,
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thinkingEnabled: true,
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thinkingEffort: 'high',
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},
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}),
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);
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const system = bodies[0].system as Array<{ cache_control: { type: string } }>;
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expect(system[0].cache_control).toEqual({ type: 'ephemeral' });
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// thinking 与 cache 共存：thinking 块也在请求体中
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expect(bodies[0].thinking).toMatchObject({ type: 'enabled' });
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});
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it('C4: system 块文本为四分区完整拼接', async () => {
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const adapter = makeAdapter();
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(makeRequest());
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const system = bodies[0].system as Array<{ text: string }>;
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expect(system[0].text).toContain('You are Metona.');
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expect(system[0].text).toContain('Be concise.');
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expect(system[0].text).toContain('Stay safe.');
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expect(system[0].text).toContain('## Current Workspace');
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});
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});
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@@ -109,29 +109,69 @@ describe('AnthropicAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
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role: 'assistant',
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content: null,
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toolCalls: [
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{ id: 'tc_1', name: 'read_file', args: { path: 'a.txt' }, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
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{
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id: 'tc_1',
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name: 'read_file',
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args: { path: 'a.txt' },
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iteration: 1,
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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},
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],
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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},
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{ role: 'tool', content: null, toolResult: { toolCallId: 'tc_1', toolName: 'read_file', result: 'data', success: true, durationMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() }, timestamp: Date.now() },
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{
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role: 'tool',
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content: null,
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toolResult: {
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toolCallId: 'tc_1',
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toolName: 'read_file',
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result: 'data',
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success: true,
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durationMs: 1,
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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},
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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},
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// 孤立 tool_result（前面没有对应 tool_use）应被过滤
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{ role: 'tool', content: null, toolResult: { toolCallId: 'tc_orphan', toolName: 'x', result: '', success: true, durationMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() }, timestamp: Date.now() },
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{
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role: 'tool',
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content: null,
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toolResult: {
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toolCallId: 'tc_orphan',
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toolName: 'x',
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result: '',
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success: true,
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durationMs: 1,
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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},
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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},
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{ role: 'user', content: 'next?', timestamp: Date.now() },
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],
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}),
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);
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const body = bodies[0];
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expect(body.system).toContain('You are Metona.');
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// v0.7.3 P1-1: system 转为块数组并打 cache_control 断言（稳定前缀 prompt cache）
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const system = body.system as Array<{
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type: string;
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text: string;
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cache_control: { type: string };
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}>;
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expect(Array.isArray(system)).toBe(true);
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expect(system[0].text).toContain('You are Metona.');
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expect(system[0].cache_control).toEqual({ type: 'ephemeral' });
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expect(Array.isArray(body.messages)).toBe(true);
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const msgs = body.messages as Array<{ role: string; content: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }>;
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// tool_use 的 assistant 消息存在且携带 id/name
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const assistantToolMsg = msgs.find((m) => m.role === 'assistant');
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expect(assistantToolMsg?.content[0]).toMatchObject({ type: 'tool_use', id: 'tc_1', name: 'read_file' });
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expect(assistantToolMsg?.content[0]).toMatchObject({
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type: 'tool_use',
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id: 'tc_1',
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name: 'read_file',
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});
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// tool 结果以 user 角色 tool_result 形态出现且配对 id 正确；孤立者被丢弃
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const toolResultBlocks = msgs.flatMap((m) =>
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m.content.filter((c) => c.type === 'tool_result'),
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);
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const toolResultBlocks = msgs.flatMap((m) => m.content.filter((c) => c.type === 'tool_result'));
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expect(toolResultBlocks).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(toolResultBlocks[0].tool_use_id).toBe('tc_1');
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});
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@@ -166,7 +206,15 @@ describe('AnthropicAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
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});
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 1500, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'low' } }),
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makeRequest({
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params: {
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maxTokens: 1500,
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temperature: 0,
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stream: false,
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thinkingEnabled: true,
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thinkingEffort: 'low',
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},
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}),
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);
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const body = bodies[0];
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const thinking = body.thinking as { type: string; budget_tokens: number };
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@@ -185,13 +233,17 @@ describe('AnthropicAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
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});
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true } }),
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makeRequest({
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params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true },
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}),
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);
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expect(bodies[0].temperature).toBeUndefined();
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expect(bodies[0].thinking).toBeDefined();
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false } }),
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makeRequest({
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params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false },
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}),
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);
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expect(bodies[1].temperature).toBe(0.7);
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expect(bodies[1].thinking).toBeUndefined();
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@@ -236,13 +288,37 @@ describe('OllamaAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
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const adapter = makeOllama();
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'low' } }));
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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params: {
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maxTokens: 4096,
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temperature: 0,
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stream: false,
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thinkingEnabled: true,
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thinkingEffort: 'low',
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},
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}),
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);
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expect(bodies[0].think).toBe('low');
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await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'max' } }));
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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params: {
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maxTokens: 4096,
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temperature: 0,
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stream: false,
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thinkingEnabled: true,
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thinkingEffort: 'max',
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},
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}),
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);
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expect(bodies[1].think).toBe(true);
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await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false } }));
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false },
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}),
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);
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expect(bodies[2].think).toBeUndefined();
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});
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@@ -319,12 +395,26 @@ describe('AgnesAdapter — 思考模式对称性（v0.6.4）', () => {
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});
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const { bodies } = captureFetch();
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await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'high' } }));
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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params: {
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maxTokens: 4096,
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temperature: 0,
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stream: false,
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thinkingEnabled: true,
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thinkingEffort: 'high',
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},
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}),
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);
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expect(
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((bodies[0].chat_template_kwargs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {}).enable_thinking,
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).toBe(true);
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await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false } }));
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await adapter.send(
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makeRequest({
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params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false },
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}),
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);
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expect(
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((bodies[1].chat_template_kwargs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {}).enable_thinking,
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).toBe(false);
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@@ -248,8 +248,7 @@ export class AnthropicAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
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usage: {
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inputTokens: messageStartInputTokens,
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outputTokens: (usage.output_tokens as number) ?? 0,
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totalTokens:
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messageStartInputTokens + ((usage.output_tokens as number) ?? 0),
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totalTokens: messageStartInputTokens + ((usage.output_tokens as number) ?? 0),
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// v0.6.4: 补采 Anthropic 自己的缓存字段（其他 provider 均已采集，
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// cache_read/creation_input_tokens 与 output_tokens 同在 usage 内）
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cacheHitTokens: (usage.cache_read_input_tokens as number) ?? undefined,
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@@ -343,10 +342,7 @@ export class AnthropicAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
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try {
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args = block.argsBuffer ? JSON.parse(block.argsBuffer) : {};
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} catch (err) {
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args = truncatedArgumentsPayload(
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(err as Error).message,
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block.argsBuffer.slice(-120),
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);
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args = truncatedArgumentsPayload((err as Error).message, block.argsBuffer.slice(-120));
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}
|
||||
yield {
|
||||
type: MetonaStreamEventType.TOOL_CALL_COMPLETE,
|
||||
@@ -506,11 +502,22 @@ export class AnthropicAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
|
||||
model: this.config.defaultModel,
|
||||
max_tokens: maxTokensForRequest,
|
||||
system,
|
||||
messages: merged,
|
||||
stream,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P1-1: system 稳定前缀打 prompt cache 断言。
|
||||
// Anthropic 缓存按"内容块前缀"命中 —— system 以字符串传递时无法附加
|
||||
// cache_control，必须转为块数组并在最后一个块上打 {type:'ephemeral'}。
|
||||
// 缓存前缀覆盖 tools + system（请求组装顺序 tools 在前）：system 稳定后，
|
||||
// 多轮对话/多轮迭代复用同一前缀，输入 token 计费按缓存读价（约 1/10）。
|
||||
// 前缀稳定性由 P1-1 保证：易变内容（日期/记忆/附件提示）已迁入用户消息。
|
||||
if (system) {
|
||||
body.system = [{ type: 'text', text: system, cache_control: { type: 'ephemeral' } }];
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
body.system = system;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 工具定义（input_schema 命名）
|
||||
if (request.tools?.length) {
|
||||
body.tools = request.tools.map((t) => ({
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -59,17 +59,21 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
const nativeRequest = await this.toNativeRequest(request);
|
||||
|
||||
// #24 修复: 使用 fetchWithTimeout 替代 getFetchSignal + fetch，确保 timer 清理
|
||||
const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(`${this.baseURL}/api/chat`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: false }),
|
||||
}, this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000);
|
||||
const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(
|
||||
`${this.baseURL}/api/chat`,
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: false }),
|
||||
},
|
||||
this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) {
|
||||
await this.throwHttpError(response, 'Ollama API error');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
return this.toMetonaResponse(data, request.meta.requestId, request.meta.iteration);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,11 +83,15 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
const nativeRequest = await this.toNativeRequest(request);
|
||||
|
||||
// #24 修复: 使用 fetchWithTimeout 替代 getFetchSignal + fetch，确保 timer 清理
|
||||
const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(`${this.baseURL}/api/chat`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: true }),
|
||||
}, this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000);
|
||||
const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(
|
||||
`${this.baseURL}/api/chat`,
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: true }),
|
||||
},
|
||||
this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok || !response.body) {
|
||||
await this.throwHttpError(response, 'Ollama stream error');
|
||||
@@ -209,7 +217,10 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (parseErr) {
|
||||
// P2-8 修复: 与 sse-stream.ts 一致，记录解析失败行便于诊断
|
||||
log.warn(`[Ollama] Failed to parse NDJSON line: ${(parseErr as Error).message}`, trimmed.slice(0, 200));
|
||||
log.warn(
|
||||
`[Ollama] Failed to parse NDJSON line: ${(parseErr as Error).message}`,
|
||||
trimmed.slice(0, 200),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -239,7 +250,13 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
format?: string | object;
|
||||
images?: string[];
|
||||
options?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
}): Promise<{ response: string; thinking?: string; done: boolean; totalDuration: number; evalCount: number }> {
|
||||
}): Promise<{
|
||||
response: string;
|
||||
thinking?: string;
|
||||
done: boolean;
|
||||
totalDuration: number;
|
||||
evalCount: number;
|
||||
}> {
|
||||
const response = await fetch(`${this.baseURL}/api/generate`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
||||
@@ -248,9 +265,12 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Ollama generate error: ${response.status}`);
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as {
|
||||
response?: string; thinking?: string; done?: boolean;
|
||||
total_duration?: number; eval_count?: number;
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as {
|
||||
response?: string;
|
||||
thinking?: string;
|
||||
done?: boolean;
|
||||
total_duration?: number;
|
||||
eval_count?: number;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +297,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Ollama embed error: ${response.status}`);
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as { embeddings?: number[][]; total_duration?: number };
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as { embeddings?: number[][]; total_duration?: number };
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
embeddings: data.embeddings ?? [],
|
||||
@@ -299,7 +319,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (response.ok) {
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as {
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as {
|
||||
models?: Array<{
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
size?: number;
|
||||
@@ -309,6 +329,8 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
if (data.models?.length) {
|
||||
// v0.6.4 P4-1: 能力标志改为逐模型 /api/show 实测探测；单个探测失败
|
||||
// 该模型回退保守 true（不可用时行为与旧实现一致，fail-open 保可用性）
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P1-4: supportsVision 随探测结果透出（undefined = 未知 → 前端保守放行），
|
||||
// 供上传入口拒绝不支持图片的本地语言模型
|
||||
const enriched = await Promise.all(
|
||||
data.models.map(async (m) => {
|
||||
const caps = await this.probeCapabilities(m.name);
|
||||
@@ -319,6 +341,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
contextWindow: OllamaAdapter.DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WINDOW,
|
||||
supportsToolCalling: caps ? caps.supportsTools : true,
|
||||
supportsThinking: caps ? caps.supportsThinking : true,
|
||||
supportsVision: caps ? caps.supportsVision : undefined,
|
||||
description: m.details
|
||||
? `${m.details.family ?? 'unknown'} / ${m.details.parameter_size ?? '?'} / ${m.details.quantization_level ?? '?'}`
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
@@ -403,7 +426,9 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== POST /api/show =====
|
||||
|
||||
async showModel(model: string): Promise<{ parameters: string; template: string; capabilities: string[] } | null> {
|
||||
async showModel(
|
||||
model: string,
|
||||
): Promise<{ parameters: string; template: string; capabilities: string[] } | null> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const response = await fetch(`${this.baseURL}/api/show`, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
@@ -412,7 +437,11 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (!response.ok) return null;
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as { parameters?: string; template?: string; capabilities?: string[] };
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as {
|
||||
parameters?: string;
|
||||
template?: string;
|
||||
capabilities?: string[];
|
||||
};
|
||||
return {
|
||||
parameters: data.parameters ?? '',
|
||||
template: data.template ?? '',
|
||||
@@ -470,13 +499,22 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== GET /api/ps =====
|
||||
|
||||
async listRunning(): Promise<Array<{ name: string; size: number; sizeVram: number; contextLength: number }>> {
|
||||
async listRunning(): Promise<
|
||||
Array<{ name: string; size: number; sizeVram: number; contextLength: number }>
|
||||
> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const response = await fetch(`${this.baseURL}/api/ps`, {
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (!response.ok) return [];
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as { models?: Array<{ name: string; size?: number; size_vram?: number; context_length?: number }> };
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as {
|
||||
models?: Array<{
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
size?: number;
|
||||
size_vram?: number;
|
||||
context_length?: number;
|
||||
}>;
|
||||
};
|
||||
return (data.models ?? []).map((m) => ({
|
||||
name: m.name ?? '',
|
||||
size: m.size ?? 0,
|
||||
@@ -496,7 +534,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000),
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (!response.ok) return 'unknown';
|
||||
const data = await response.json() as { version?: string };
|
||||
const data = (await response.json()) as { version?: string };
|
||||
return data.version ?? 'unknown';
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return 'unknown';
|
||||
@@ -525,7 +563,9 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
const buf = Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer());
|
||||
return buf.toString('base64');
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
log.warn(`[Ollama] Failed to download image ${url.slice(0, 100)}: ${(error as Error).message}`);
|
||||
log.warn(
|
||||
`[Ollama] Failed to download image ${url.slice(0, 100)}: ${(error as Error).message}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
return '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -539,58 +579,60 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
request.systemPrompt.outputConstraints,
|
||||
request.systemPrompt.safetyGuidelines,
|
||||
request.systemPrompt.dynamicReminders,
|
||||
].filter(Boolean).join('\n\n'),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.filter(Boolean)
|
||||
.join('\n\n'),
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// #2 修复: 改为 for 循环以支持 async 图片下载（map 回调无法 await）
|
||||
for (const m of request.messages) {
|
||||
if (m.role === 'system') continue;
|
||||
// C-6 修复: Ollama API 不支持 null content，assistant 仅有 tool_calls 时转为空字符串
|
||||
const msg: Record<string, unknown> = { role: m.role, content: m.content ?? '' };
|
||||
// Ollama 图片使用 images 字段（纯 base64 数组，不含 data: 前缀）
|
||||
if (m.images?.length) {
|
||||
// #2 修复: 支持公网 URL 图片，下载后转为纯 base64
|
||||
// 之前直接将 URL 字符串传给 Ollama，导致 base64 解码错误
|
||||
const resolvedImages: string[] = [];
|
||||
for (const img of m.images) {
|
||||
const url = img.url;
|
||||
if (url.startsWith('data:')) {
|
||||
// ... → iVBOR...
|
||||
const base64Part = url.split(',')[1];
|
||||
resolvedImages.push(base64Part ?? url);
|
||||
} else if (url.startsWith('http://') || url.startsWith('https://')) {
|
||||
// #2 修复: 公网 URL → 下载 → 纯 base64
|
||||
const base64 = await this.resolveImageToBase64(url);
|
||||
if (base64) resolvedImages.push(base64);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// 已是纯 base64 字符串（无 data: 前缀）
|
||||
resolvedImages.push(url);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// C-6 修复: Ollama API 不支持 null content，assistant 仅有 tool_calls 时转为空字符串
|
||||
const msg: Record<string, unknown> = { role: m.role, content: m.content ?? '' };
|
||||
// Ollama 图片使用 images 字段（纯 base64 数组，不含 data: 前缀）
|
||||
if (m.images?.length) {
|
||||
// #2 修复: 支持公网 URL 图片，下载后转为纯 base64
|
||||
// 之前直接将 URL 字符串传给 Ollama，导致 base64 解码错误
|
||||
const resolvedImages: string[] = [];
|
||||
for (const img of m.images) {
|
||||
const url = img.url;
|
||||
if (url.startsWith('data:')) {
|
||||
// ... → iVBOR...
|
||||
const base64Part = url.split(',')[1];
|
||||
resolvedImages.push(base64Part ?? url);
|
||||
} else if (url.startsWith('http://') || url.startsWith('https://')) {
|
||||
// #2 修复: 公网 URL → 下载 → 纯 base64
|
||||
const base64 = await this.resolveImageToBase64(url);
|
||||
if (base64) resolvedImages.push(base64);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// 已是纯 base64 字符串（无 data: 前缀）
|
||||
resolvedImages.push(url);
|
||||
}
|
||||
msg.images = resolvedImages;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 工具结果
|
||||
if (m.role === 'tool' && m.toolResult) {
|
||||
msg.tool_call_id = m.toolResult.toolCallId;
|
||||
// CE-2 修复: 工具失败时 result 为 null，优先用 error 字段作为 content
|
||||
msg.content = m.toolResult.error
|
||||
? m.toolResult.error
|
||||
: (typeof m.toolResult.result === 'string'
|
||||
? m.toolResult.result
|
||||
: JSON.stringify(m.toolResult.result));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// assistant 工具调用（Ollama REST API 要求 arguments 为 JSON 字符串）
|
||||
if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.toolCalls?.length) {
|
||||
msg.tool_calls = m.toolCalls.map((tc) => ({
|
||||
function: { name: tc.name, arguments: JSON.stringify(tc.args) },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 推理内容回传（保持多轮推理链完整）
|
||||
if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.reasoningContent) {
|
||||
(msg as Record<string, unknown>).reasoning_content = m.reasoningContent;
|
||||
}
|
||||
messages.push(msg);
|
||||
msg.images = resolvedImages;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 工具结果
|
||||
if (m.role === 'tool' && m.toolResult) {
|
||||
msg.tool_call_id = m.toolResult.toolCallId;
|
||||
// CE-2 修复: 工具失败时 result 为 null，优先用 error 字段作为 content
|
||||
msg.content = m.toolResult.error
|
||||
? m.toolResult.error
|
||||
: typeof m.toolResult.result === 'string'
|
||||
? m.toolResult.result
|
||||
: JSON.stringify(m.toolResult.result);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// assistant 工具调用（Ollama REST API 要求 arguments 为 JSON 字符串）
|
||||
if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.toolCalls?.length) {
|
||||
msg.tool_calls = m.toolCalls.map((tc) => ({
|
||||
function: { name: tc.name, arguments: JSON.stringify(tc.args) },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 推理内容回传（保持多轮推理链完整）
|
||||
if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.reasoningContent) {
|
||||
(msg as Record<string, unknown>).reasoning_content = m.reasoningContent;
|
||||
}
|
||||
messages.push(msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
|
||||
@@ -619,14 +661,23 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
|
||||
// Thinking 模式
|
||||
if (request.params.thinkingEnabled) {
|
||||
const effortMap: Record<string, string | boolean> = { low: 'low', medium: 'medium', high: 'high', max: true };
|
||||
const effortMap: Record<string, string | boolean> = {
|
||||
low: 'low',
|
||||
medium: 'medium',
|
||||
high: 'high',
|
||||
max: true,
|
||||
};
|
||||
body.think = effortMap[request.params.thinkingEffort ?? 'high'] ?? true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return body;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private toMetonaResponse(data: Record<string, unknown>, requestId: string, iteration: number = 0): MetonaResponse {
|
||||
private toMetonaResponse(
|
||||
data: Record<string, unknown>,
|
||||
requestId: string,
|
||||
iteration: number = 0,
|
||||
): MetonaResponse {
|
||||
const message = data.message as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
||||
const toolCalls = message?.tool_calls as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
|
||||
return {
|
||||
@@ -638,11 +689,14 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
perfStats: {
|
||||
loadDurationMs: data.load_duration ? (data.load_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
|
||||
promptEvalDurationMs: data.prompt_eval_duration ? (data.prompt_eval_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
|
||||
evalDurationMs: data.eval_duration ? (data.eval_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
|
||||
tokensPerSecond: data.eval_count && data.eval_duration
|
||||
? ((data.eval_count as number) / ((data.eval_duration as number) / 1e9))
|
||||
promptEvalDurationMs: data.prompt_eval_duration
|
||||
? (data.prompt_eval_duration as number) / 1e6
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
evalDurationMs: data.eval_duration ? (data.eval_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
|
||||
tokensPerSecond:
|
||||
data.eval_count && data.eval_duration
|
||||
? (data.eval_count as number) / ((data.eval_duration as number) / 1e9)
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
content: (message?.content as string) ?? '',
|
||||
@@ -652,7 +706,10 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
const rawArgs = fn?.arguments;
|
||||
let args: Record<string, unknown> = {};
|
||||
try {
|
||||
args = typeof rawArgs === 'string' ? JSON.parse(rawArgs) : (rawArgs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {};
|
||||
args =
|
||||
typeof rawArgs === 'string'
|
||||
? JSON.parse(rawArgs)
|
||||
: ((rawArgs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {});
|
||||
} catch (parseErr) {
|
||||
// v0.6.4: 非流式路径截断自愈对齐 —— 原 catch 静默降级 {}，与流式修复后的
|
||||
// 行为不一致。统一转为 _truncatedArguments 错误参数。
|
||||
@@ -677,7 +734,10 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
|
||||
outputTokens: (data.eval_count as number) ?? 0,
|
||||
totalTokens: ((data.prompt_eval_count as number) ?? 0) + ((data.eval_count as number) ?? 0),
|
||||
},
|
||||
finishReason: mapOllamaDoneReason(data.done_reason as string | undefined, !!message?.tool_calls),
|
||||
finishReason: mapOllamaDoneReason(
|
||||
data.done_reason as string | undefined,
|
||||
!!message?.tool_calls,
|
||||
),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -693,10 +753,15 @@ function mapOllamaDoneReason(
|
||||
): MetonaFinishReason {
|
||||
if (hasToolCalls) return MetonaFinishReason.TOOL_CALLS;
|
||||
switch (reason) {
|
||||
case 'stop': return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
|
||||
case 'length': return MetonaFinishReason.LENGTH;
|
||||
case 'load': return MetonaFinishReason.STOP; // 冷启动加载完成，非错误
|
||||
case 'unload': return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
|
||||
default: return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
|
||||
case 'stop':
|
||||
return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
|
||||
case 'length':
|
||||
return MetonaFinishReason.LENGTH;
|
||||
case 'load':
|
||||
return MetonaFinishReason.STOP; // 冷启动加载完成，非错误
|
||||
case 'unload':
|
||||
return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ import type { IMetonaProviderAdapter, MetonaResponse, MetonaStreamEvent } from '
|
||||
import { MetonaStreamEventType } from '../../types';
|
||||
|
||||
/** 构造 Mock Adapter：sendStream 按脚本产出事件 */
|
||||
function createMockAdapter(scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][], opts?: { failWith?: Error }): IMetonaProviderAdapter {
|
||||
function createMockAdapter(
|
||||
scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][],
|
||||
opts?: { failWith?: Error },
|
||||
): IMetonaProviderAdapter {
|
||||
let call = 0;
|
||||
return {
|
||||
providerId: 'mock',
|
||||
@@ -23,12 +26,20 @@ function createMockAdapter(scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][], opts?: { failWith?: E
|
||||
supportsToolCalling: true,
|
||||
supportsThinking: false,
|
||||
getContextWindow: () => 1_000_000,
|
||||
send: vi.fn(async (): Promise<MetonaResponse> => ({
|
||||
meta: { requestId: 'r_test', provider: 'mock', model: 'mock-model', latencyMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
|
||||
content: 'ok',
|
||||
usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 5, totalTokens: 15 },
|
||||
finishReason: 'stop' as never,
|
||||
})),
|
||||
send: vi.fn(
|
||||
async (): Promise<MetonaResponse> => ({
|
||||
meta: {
|
||||
requestId: 'r_test',
|
||||
provider: 'mock',
|
||||
model: 'mock-model',
|
||||
latencyMs: 1,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
content: 'ok',
|
||||
usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 5, totalTokens: 15 },
|
||||
finishReason: 'stop' as never,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
),
|
||||
sendStream: vi.fn(async function* (): AsyncIterable<MetonaStreamEvent> {
|
||||
if (opts?.failWith) throw opts.failWith;
|
||||
const script = scripts[call % scripts.length];
|
||||
@@ -42,8 +53,23 @@ function createMockAdapter(scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][], opts?: { failWith?: E
|
||||
|
||||
function textDoneEvent(text: string): MetonaStreamEvent[] {
|
||||
return [
|
||||
{ type: MetonaStreamEventType.TEXT_DELTA, requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 0, timestamp: Date.now(), delta: text },
|
||||
{ type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE, requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: MetonaStreamEventType.TEXT_DELTA,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
sessionId: 's1',
|
||||
iteration: 1,
|
||||
seq: 0,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
delta: text,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
sessionId: 's1',
|
||||
iteration: 1,
|
||||
seq: 1,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -51,10 +77,21 @@ function toolCallEvent(name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>): MetonaStrea
|
||||
return [
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: MetonaStreamEventType.TOOL_CALL_COMPLETE,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 0, timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
sessionId: 's1',
|
||||
iteration: 1,
|
||||
seq: 0,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
toolCall: { id: 'tc_test', name, args, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
|
||||
},
|
||||
{ type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE, requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
sessionId: 's1',
|
||||
iteration: 1,
|
||||
seq: 1,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +158,9 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('不可重试错误直接 ERROR（无 fallback 时）', async () => {
|
||||
const adapter = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 unauthorized'), { status: 401 }) });
|
||||
const adapter = createMockAdapter([], {
|
||||
failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 unauthorized'), { status: 401 }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ retryCount: 0 }, adapter);
|
||||
const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
|
||||
expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.ERROR);
|
||||
@@ -129,7 +168,9 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
|
||||
|
||||
it('P1 故障转移：主 Provider 失败后切换到 fallback Provider', async () => {
|
||||
// 主 adapter 每次都失败（401 不可重试）
|
||||
const primary = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 invalid key'), { status: 401 }) });
|
||||
const primary = createMockAdapter([], {
|
||||
failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 invalid key'), { status: 401 }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
// fallback 正常返回
|
||||
const fallback = createMockAdapter([textDoneEvent('fallback answer')]);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -151,8 +192,12 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('P1 故障转移仅触发一次（fallback 也失败不回切）', async () => {
|
||||
const primary = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401'), { status: 401 }) });
|
||||
const fallback = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('500'), { status: 500 }) });
|
||||
const primary = createMockAdapter([], {
|
||||
failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401'), { status: 401 }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const fallback = createMockAdapter([], {
|
||||
failWith: Object.assign(new Error('500'), { status: 500 }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ retryCount: 0 }, primary);
|
||||
engine.setFallbackAdapter(fallback);
|
||||
@@ -162,3 +207,72 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
|
||||
expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.ERROR);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== v0.7.3 P4-4 / P3-1: 死循环乒乓检测 + REFLECTING 状态接线 =====
|
||||
|
||||
describe('AgentLoopEngine — 死循环乒乓检测（ABAB，P4-4）', () => {
|
||||
it('最近 4 轮 A→B→A→B 交替（A≠B）触发 DEAD_LOOP（驻留模式抓不住的乒乓）', async () => {
|
||||
const readScript = toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
|
||||
const writeScript = toolCallEvent('write_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
|
||||
// 1:read 2:write 3:read 4:write ← 第 4 轮 PARSING 时滑窗构成 ABAB
|
||||
const adapter = createMockAdapter([readScript, writeScript, readScript, writeScript]);
|
||||
const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ maxIterations: 6 }, adapter);
|
||||
const deadLoopEvents: unknown[] = [];
|
||||
engine.on('deadLoop', (d) => deadLoopEvents.push(d));
|
||||
|
||||
const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
|
||||
expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.DEAD_LOOP);
|
||||
expect(deadLoopEvents.length).toBe(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('A→B→C 交替（无重复模式）不误报，按 MAX_ITERATIONS 终止', async () => {
|
||||
const scripts = [
|
||||
toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'a.ts' }),
|
||||
toolCallEvent('write_file', { file_path: 'a.ts' }),
|
||||
toolCallEvent('lint_code', {}),
|
||||
];
|
||||
const adapter = createMockAdapter(scripts);
|
||||
const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ maxIterations: 4 }, adapter);
|
||||
const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
|
||||
expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.MAX_ITERATIONS);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('A→B→B→B 前缀不构成 ABAB（A≠B 约束），由驻留模式在 3 连 B 时接管', async () => {
|
||||
const readScript = toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
|
||||
const writeScript = toolCallEvent('write_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
|
||||
// 1:read 2:write 3:write 4:write —— 第 4 轮时 ABAB 不成立，但 3 连 write 命中驻留模式
|
||||
const adapter = createMockAdapter([readScript, writeScript, writeScript, writeScript]);
|
||||
const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ maxIterations: 6 }, adapter);
|
||||
const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
|
||||
expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.DEAD_LOOP);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('AgentLoopEngine — REFLECTING 状态接线（P3-1 enableReflection）', () => {
|
||||
const collectStates = async (config: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string[]> => {
|
||||
const adapter = createMockAdapter([
|
||||
toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'a.ts' }),
|
||||
textDoneEvent('done'),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const engine = new AgentLoopEngine(config as never, adapter);
|
||||
const states: string[] = [];
|
||||
engine.on('stateChange', (d: { state?: string; current?: string }) => {
|
||||
const s = d.state ?? d.current ?? '';
|
||||
if (!states.includes(s)) states.push(s);
|
||||
});
|
||||
await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
|
||||
return states;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
it('enableReflection=true 时工具执行后进入 REFLECTING 状态', async () => {
|
||||
const states = await collectStates({ maxIterations: 2, enableReflection: true });
|
||||
expect(states).toContain('REFLECTING');
|
||||
expect(states).toContain('EXECUTING');
|
||||
expect(states).toContain('OBSERVING');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('enableReflection=false（默认）时不进入 REFLECTING', async () => {
|
||||
const states = await collectStates({ maxIterations: 2, enableReflection: false });
|
||||
expect(states).not.toContain('REFLECTING');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ class DeadLoopError extends Error {
|
||||
|
||||
const DEFAULT_CONFIG: AgentLoopConfig = {
|
||||
maxIterations: 20,
|
||||
timeoutMs: 120_000,
|
||||
totalTimeoutMs: 600_000,
|
||||
enableReflection: false,
|
||||
compressionThreshold: 0.8,
|
||||
@@ -563,7 +562,7 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
|
||||
});
|
||||
// 抛出特殊错误，主循环捕获后以 DEAD_LOOP 原因终止
|
||||
throw new DeadLoopError(
|
||||
`Detected a potential infinite loop: the same tool calls were repeated for 3 consecutive iterations. Please refine the approach or provide more specific instructions.`,
|
||||
`Detected a potential infinite loop: the same tool calls were repeated for 3 consecutive iterations, or two alternating call patterns kept cycling (A→B→A→B) without progress. Please refine the approach or provide more specific instructions.`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -620,7 +619,11 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
|
||||
await this.transitionTo(AgentLoopState.OBSERVING);
|
||||
|
||||
// === v0.2.0: REFLECTING 状态 — 观察工具结果，决定是否继续 ===
|
||||
// 如果有工具调用且需要后续推理，进入 REFLECTING 状态
|
||||
// v0.7.3 接线说明：REFLECTING 分支此前依赖 enableReflection 配置，但该配置
|
||||
// 全链路无任何置 true 的路径（死配置）。现由 agent.enableReflection 配置
|
||||
// 真实驱动（main.ts baseConfig → updateConfigAll → 本分支），启用后每轮
|
||||
// 工具执行完毕会经过 REFLECTING 状态：工具结果存在失败时记录告警日志，
|
||||
// 供 SLO 与排障观察（不阻断循环——错误结果已由 CE-2 路径回传模型自愈）。
|
||||
if (this.config.enableReflection && step.toolCalls && step.toolCalls.length > 0) {
|
||||
await this.transitionTo(AgentLoopState.REFLECTING);
|
||||
// 检查工具执行是否有错误，如果有严重错误可以提前终止
|
||||
@@ -1087,9 +1090,13 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* v0.3.0: 死循环检测
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 检测策略：
|
||||
* 将每轮的工具调用序列化为签名字符串，检查最近3轮的签名是否完全相同。
|
||||
* 如果连续3轮使用完全相同的参数调用相同的工具，判定为死循环。
|
||||
* 检测策略（v0.7.3 起双模式）：
|
||||
* 1. 驻留模式 — 将每轮的工具调用序列化为签名字符串，检查最近3轮的签名是否完全相同。
|
||||
* 如果连续3轮使用完全相同的参数调用相同的工具，判定为死循环。
|
||||
* 2. 乒乓模式（v0.7.3 新增）— 最近4轮构成 ABAB 交替（r1===r3 && r2===r4 && r1!==r2）。
|
||||
* 典型场景：模型在"读文件 A → 写文件 B"两步之间无限往返（每次读完又改回），
|
||||
* 单步签名各不相同，驻留模式永不命中；docs/Agentic-Loop详解.md 第五章将
|
||||
* "两种状态间反复来回切换、毫无进展"列为必须检测的停滞模式。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* v0.3.0 修复：
|
||||
* - 对 args 的键进行排序，避免 JSON.stringify 键顺序不一致导致漏报
|
||||
@@ -1123,21 +1130,31 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
|
||||
|
||||
this.toolCallHistory.push(signature);
|
||||
|
||||
// 只保留最近5轮的记录（足够检测3轮重复，同时避免内存增长）
|
||||
// 只保留最近5轮的记录（足够检测3轮重复与4轮乒乓，同时避免内存增长）
|
||||
if (this.toolCallHistory.length > 5) {
|
||||
this.toolCallHistory.shift();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 需要至少3轮数据才能检测
|
||||
if (this.toolCallHistory.length < 3) return false;
|
||||
|
||||
const len = this.toolCallHistory.length;
|
||||
const r1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 1]; // 当前轮
|
||||
const r2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 2]; // 上一轮
|
||||
const r3 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 3]; // 上上一轮
|
||||
|
||||
// 连续3轮完全相同 → 死循环
|
||||
return r1 === r2 && r2 === r3;
|
||||
// 模式 1：连续3轮完全相同 → 死循环
|
||||
if (len >= 3) {
|
||||
const r1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 1]; // 当前轮
|
||||
const r2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 2]; // 上一轮
|
||||
const r3 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 3]; // 上上一轮
|
||||
if (r1 === r2 && r2 === r3) return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 模式 2（v0.7.3）：最近4轮 ABAB 交替（A≠B）→ 乒乓死循环
|
||||
if (len >= 4) {
|
||||
const a1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 4];
|
||||
const b1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 3];
|
||||
const a2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 2];
|
||||
const b2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 1];
|
||||
if (a1 === a2 && b1 === b2 && a1 !== b1) return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ export interface TokenUsage {
|
||||
|
||||
export interface AgentLoopConfig {
|
||||
maxIterations: number;
|
||||
timeoutMs: number;
|
||||
totalTimeoutMs: number;
|
||||
enableReflection: boolean;
|
||||
compressionThreshold: number;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* ConfirmationHook forgetSession 测试（v0.7.3 P2-3）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 锁定会话终态清理契约：
|
||||
* F1 forgetSession 清空该会话的决策记忆（拒绝记忆不再残留）；
|
||||
* F2 forgetSession 同时拒绝该会话等待中的确认（clearPending 语义）；
|
||||
* F3 会话隔离：清理 A 不影响 B；
|
||||
* F4 空/未知 sessionId 幂等无副作用。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
|
||||
|
||||
// 模拟一个存活窗口 —— beforeExecute 的 hasAvailableWindow 守卫需要它，
|
||||
// 否则确认请求在创建 pending 之前即被短路（测不到记忆/pending 路径）
|
||||
const fakeWindow = {
|
||||
isDestroyed: () => false,
|
||||
webContents: { send: vi.fn() },
|
||||
};
|
||||
vi.mock('electron', () => ({
|
||||
BrowserWindow: { getAllWindows: vi.fn(() => [fakeWindow]) },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
import { ConfirmationHook } from '../confirmation-hook';
|
||||
import type { MetonaToolCall, MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
import { MetonaRiskLevel, MetonaToolCategory } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
|
||||
function makeToolCall(name: string, id = `tc_${name}`): MetonaToolCall {
|
||||
return { id, name, args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const NEEDS_CONFIRM_DEF: MetonaToolDef = {
|
||||
name: 'run_command',
|
||||
description: 'test',
|
||||
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {}, required: [] },
|
||||
category: MetonaToolCategory.CODE_EXECUTION,
|
||||
riskLevel: MetonaRiskLevel.HIGH,
|
||||
requiresPermission: true,
|
||||
timeoutMs: 1000,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe('ConfirmationHook — forgetSession（P2-3）', () => {
|
||||
let hook: ConfirmationHook;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.useFakeTimers();
|
||||
hook = new ConfirmationHook(null, null);
|
||||
hook.setToolDefs([NEEDS_CONFIRM_DEF]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('F1: 会话删除后决策记忆被清空（拒绝记忆不再跨生命周期残留）', async () => {
|
||||
const pending = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command'), 'sess-A');
|
||||
hook.resolveConfirmation(`tc_run_command`, false, true); // 记住拒绝
|
||||
await pending;
|
||||
|
||||
expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-A')).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
hook.forgetSession('sess-A');
|
||||
expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-A')).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('F2: forgetSession 拒绝该会话等待中的确认（clearPending 语义）', async () => {
|
||||
const p1 = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command'), 'sess-A');
|
||||
// resolve pending（拒绝）后走记忆清理路径
|
||||
hook.forgetSession('sess-A');
|
||||
await expect(p1).resolves.toMatchObject({ blocked: true });
|
||||
// pending 已清空 —— getPendingConfirmations 无残留
|
||||
expect(hook.getPendingConfirmations()).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('F3: 会话隔离 —— 清理 A 不影响 B 的决策记忆', async () => {
|
||||
const p1 = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command', 'tc_A'), 'sess-A');
|
||||
hook.resolveConfirmation('tc_A', false, true);
|
||||
await p1;
|
||||
|
||||
const p2 = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command', 'tc_B'), 'sess-B');
|
||||
hook.resolveConfirmation('tc_B', false, true);
|
||||
await p2;
|
||||
|
||||
hook.forgetSession('sess-A');
|
||||
expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-A')).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-B')).toHaveLength(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('F4: 空 sessionId 幂等无副作用；未知会话不抛错', () => {
|
||||
expect(() => hook.forgetSession('')).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(() => hook.forgetSession('nonexistent')).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(hook.getRememberedDenials()).toHaveLength(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -550,6 +550,22 @@ export class ConfirmationHook implements PreToolHook {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* v0.7.3 P2-3: 会话生命周期终态清理（会话删除 / SubAgent 终结时调用）。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 此前 rememberedDecisions 两级 Map 只增不减 —— 会话删除/子任务终结后其
|
||||
* 决策记忆永久残留，长期运行实例随会话数缓慢泄漏。本方法与 clearPending
|
||||
* 的区别：clearPending 只处理等待中的确认（会话中断时用，会话本身仍存活），
|
||||
* 本方法面向"会话已终结"的终态，同时清空 pending 与决策记忆。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param sessionId 会话 ID（主会话或 SubAgent taskId）
|
||||
*/
|
||||
forgetSession(sessionId: string): void {
|
||||
if (!sessionId) return;
|
||||
this.clearPending(sessionId);
|
||||
this.rememberedDecisions.delete(sessionId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 私有辅助（v0.5.0: 会话隔离） =====
|
||||
|
||||
/** 获取（或创建）指定会话的决策记忆表 */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 记忆固化触发决策测试（v0.7.3 P1-5）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 锁定 shouldConsolidate 的四类判定：总开关 / 内容门控（回答长度 ∨ 成功工具调用）/
|
||||
* 频率窗口（含首次不限）/ 配置兜底（非法数值回退安全下限）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
shouldConsolidate,
|
||||
MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS,
|
||||
MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS,
|
||||
} from '../consolidation-policy';
|
||||
|
||||
const BASE = {
|
||||
enabled: true,
|
||||
answerChars: 500,
|
||||
minChars: 200,
|
||||
hadSuccessfulToolCall: false,
|
||||
lastConsolidationAt: 0,
|
||||
now: 1_000_000,
|
||||
intervalMs: 600_000,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe('shouldConsolidate', () => {
|
||||
it('总开关显式关闭 → disabled', () => {
|
||||
expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, enabled: false })).toEqual({
|
||||
consolidate: false,
|
||||
reason: 'disabled',
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('回答够长且首次固化 → 允许（lastConsolidationAt=0 不受频率限制）', () => {
|
||||
expect(shouldConsolidate(BASE)).toEqual({
|
||||
consolidate: true,
|
||||
reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass',
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('回答过短且无成功工具调用 → below-threshold（短寒暄不触发固化）', () => {
|
||||
expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, answerChars: 50, hadSuccessfulToolCall: false })).toEqual({
|
||||
consolidate: false,
|
||||
reason: 'below-threshold',
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('回答过短但存在成功工具调用 → 允许（事实性上下文可沉淀）', () => {
|
||||
expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, answerChars: 50, hadSuccessfulToolCall: true })).toEqual({
|
||||
consolidate: true,
|
||||
reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass',
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('频率窗口内重复触发 → throttled', () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
shouldConsolidate({
|
||||
...BASE,
|
||||
lastConsolidationAt: BASE.now - 60_000, // 1 分钟前刚固化过
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).toEqual({ consolidate: false, reason: 'throttled' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('频率窗口已过 → 允许', () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
shouldConsolidate({
|
||||
...BASE,
|
||||
lastConsolidationAt: BASE.now - 600_001,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).toEqual({ consolidate: true, reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('配置兜底：minChars=0 不会让纯寒暄触发（安全下限生效）', () => {
|
||||
expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, minChars: 0, answerChars: 10 })).toEqual({
|
||||
consolidate: false,
|
||||
reason: 'below-threshold',
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS).toBeGreaterThan(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('配置兜底：intervalMs=0 不会退化为每条消息固化（安全下限生效）', () => {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
shouldConsolidate({
|
||||
...BASE,
|
||||
intervalMs: 0,
|
||||
lastConsolidationAt: BASE.now - 30_000, // 30 秒前刚固化
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).toEqual({ consolidate: false, reason: 'throttled' });
|
||||
expect(MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(60_000);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('配置兜底：minChars/intervalMs 为 NaN 时按默认值处理', () => {
|
||||
expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, minChars: Number.NaN, intervalMs: Number.NaN })).toEqual({
|
||||
consolidate: true,
|
||||
reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass',
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Consolidation Policy — 记忆固化触发决策（v0.7.3 P1-5）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 背景：MemoryConsolidator 在每次 run 完成后无条件发起一次非流式 LLM 请求
|
||||
* （30s 超时）判断本次对话是否有值得持久化的记忆。短寒暄/单轮问答同样触发，
|
||||
* 纯成本浪费且对 Provider 构成无意义请求压力。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 本模块把触发决策收敛为纯函数（可表测），决策输入：
|
||||
* - 总开关 memory.consolidationEnabled（fail-secure：仅显式 false 才关闭）
|
||||
* - 内容门控：本次回答 ≥ minChars 字符 **或** 本次 run 存在成功的工具调用
|
||||
* （工具调用意味着产生了可沉淀的事实性上下文）
|
||||
* - 频率门控：距该会话上次固化 ≥ intervalMs（首次不设限，但仍受内容门控约束）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 决策与执行解耦：本模块不做 IO，调用方（ipc/agent.ts）持有会话级
|
||||
* lastConsolidationAt 状态并执行 consolidate。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ConsolidationDecisionInput {
|
||||
/** 总开关（memory.consolidationEnabled；undefined/null 视为开启） */
|
||||
enabled: boolean | null | undefined;
|
||||
/** 本次 Agent 最终回答的字符数 */
|
||||
answerChars: number;
|
||||
/** 内容门控阈值（memory.consolidationMinChars，默认 200） */
|
||||
minChars: number;
|
||||
/** 本次 run 是否存在成功的工具调用 */
|
||||
hadSuccessfulToolCall: boolean;
|
||||
/** 该会话上次固化的时间戳（0 = 从未固化） */
|
||||
lastConsolidationAt: number;
|
||||
/** 当前时间戳 */
|
||||
now: number;
|
||||
/** 频率门控窗口（memory.consolidationIntervalMs，默认 600000） */
|
||||
intervalMs: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export type ConsolidationDecision =
|
||||
| { consolidate: true; reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass' }
|
||||
| { consolidate: false; reason: 'disabled' | 'below-threshold' | 'throttled' };
|
||||
|
||||
/** 频率窗口合法下限（防误配 0/负值导致门控失效——0 等价于每条消息都固化） */
|
||||
export const MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;
|
||||
|
||||
/** 内容门控合法下限（防误配 0 导致纯寒暄也固化） */
|
||||
export const MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS = 20;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 判定本次 run 是否应触发记忆固化。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function shouldConsolidate(input: ConsolidationDecisionInput): ConsolidationDecision {
|
||||
// 1. 总开关 —— fail-secure 语义由调用方负责（!== false 才视为开启后传入布尔）
|
||||
if (input.enabled === false) {
|
||||
return { consolidate: false, reason: 'disabled' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. 内容门控：回答够长 或 有成功的工具调用（事实性上下文）
|
||||
const minChars = Math.max(
|
||||
MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS,
|
||||
Number.isFinite(input.minChars) ? input.minChars : 200,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const contentWorthy = input.answerChars >= minChars || input.hadSuccessfulToolCall;
|
||||
if (!contentWorthy) {
|
||||
return { consolidate: false, reason: 'below-threshold' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. 频率门控：上次固化距今不足窗口 → 跳过（首次 lastConsolidationAt=0 不受限）
|
||||
const intervalMs = Math.max(
|
||||
MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS,
|
||||
Number.isFinite(input.intervalMs) ? input.intervalMs : 600_000,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (input.lastConsolidationAt > 0 && input.now - input.lastConsolidationAt < intervalMs) {
|
||||
return { consolidate: false, reason: 'throttled' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { consolidate: true, reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ export class TaskOrchestrator extends EventEmitter {
|
||||
thinkingEffort: this.defaultConfig?.thinkingEffort ?? 'medium',
|
||||
contextLength: this.defaultConfig?.contextLength,
|
||||
contextWindow: this.defaultConfig?.contextWindow ?? 128_000,
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P3-1: SubAgent 与主引擎同源消费 enableReflection（REFLECTING 状态开关）
|
||||
enableReflection: this.defaultConfig?.enableReflection ?? false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
this.engines.createAdapter(),
|
||||
this.toolRegistry,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -64,11 +64,23 @@ describe('ContextBuilder — isUsingFallbackRole 首次降级通知语义', () =
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('ContextBuilder — 动态区注入', () => {
|
||||
it('注入当前日期时间（含本地时区）', () => {
|
||||
it('v0.7.3 P1-1: 不再注入日期时间（prompt cache 前缀稳定性）', () => {
|
||||
const cb = new ContextBuilder();
|
||||
const prompt = cb.buildSystemPrompt({ soul: 'x', memory: '' });
|
||||
expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).toContain('## Current Date & Time');
|
||||
expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).toMatch(/UTC[+-]/);
|
||||
expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).not.toContain('## Current Date & Time');
|
||||
expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).not.toMatch(/UTC[+-]/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('v0.7.3 P1-1: system 输出跨调用字节级稳定（同输入 → 同字节）', () => {
|
||||
const cb = new ContextBuilder();
|
||||
const files = { soul: 'x', memory: '## 用户偏好\n- 偏好深色主题' };
|
||||
const a = cb.buildSystemPrompt(files, '/tmp/ws-demo');
|
||||
const b = cb.buildSystemPrompt(files, '/tmp/ws-demo');
|
||||
// 跨 run 缓存命中的前提：四分区逐字节一致（日期时间已移入用户消息前置块）
|
||||
expect(a.roleDefinition).toBe(b.roleDefinition);
|
||||
expect(a.outputConstraints).toBe(b.outputConstraints);
|
||||
expect(a.safetyGuidelines).toBe(b.safetyGuidelines);
|
||||
expect(a.dynamicReminders).toBe(b.dynamicReminders);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('注入工作空间路径（动态区，路径可切换）', () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 用户上下文前置块测试（v0.7.3 P1-1）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 锁定三类动态内容（日期时间 / 记忆 / 附件提示）在用户消息前置块的
|
||||
* 分组结构与空值收缩行为 —— 它们从 system prompt 迁出的契约面。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
|
||||
import { buildUserContextPrefix, withUserContextPrefix } from '../user-context';
|
||||
|
||||
describe('buildUserContextPrefix', () => {
|
||||
it('恒含头部说明与日期时间分区（唯一无条件分区）', () => {
|
||||
const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({ now: Date.UTC(2026, 7, 30, 6, 30) });
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('[Contextual information for this message');
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('## Current Date & Time');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('无记忆/附件时不产出对应分区（空值收缩）', () => {
|
||||
const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({ now: Date.now() });
|
||||
expect(prefix).not.toContain('## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)');
|
||||
expect(prefix).not.toContain('## User Attachments (Direct Upload)');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('记忆分区：条目格式与截断口径（沿用原 system 注入契约）', () => {
|
||||
const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
|
||||
now: Date.now(),
|
||||
memories: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'm1',
|
||||
type: 'semantic',
|
||||
content: 'x'.repeat(500),
|
||||
source: 'agent_thought',
|
||||
importance: 0.9,
|
||||
score: 0.8,
|
||||
createdAt: Date.now(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)');
|
||||
expect(prefix).toMatch(/\[1\] \(semantic, 重要度: 0\.9\)/);
|
||||
// 内容截断到 200 字符
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('x'.repeat(200));
|
||||
expect(prefix).not.toContain('x'.repeat(201));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('附件分区：图片提示禁止重复读图；文本截断标记透传', () => {
|
||||
const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
|
||||
now: Date.now(),
|
||||
attachments: [
|
||||
{ name: 'shot.png', type: 'image' },
|
||||
{ name: 'big.log', type: 'text', truncated: true },
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('## User Attachments (Direct Upload)');
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('1. [image] shot.png');
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('do NOT call view_image');
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('2. [text file] big.log');
|
||||
expect(prefix).toContain('TRUNCATED — only the first 512KB is included');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('分区以 --- 分隔且以前缀分隔符收尾（调用方可直接拼接用户内容）', () => {
|
||||
const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
|
||||
now: Date.now(),
|
||||
memories: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'm',
|
||||
type: 'episodic',
|
||||
content: 'c',
|
||||
source: 'user_input',
|
||||
importance: 0.5,
|
||||
score: 0.5,
|
||||
createdAt: Date.now(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
attachments: [{ name: 'a.txt', type: 'text' }],
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(prefix).toMatch(/---\s*$/);
|
||||
// 三个分区恰好两个内部 --- + 收尾 1 个 ---（共 3 个独立行）
|
||||
expect(prefix.match(/^---$/gm)?.length ?? 0).toBe(3);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('withUserContextPrefix', () => {
|
||||
it('前置块与用户内容拼接（前置块自带收尾分隔符）', () => {
|
||||
const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({ now: Date.now() });
|
||||
const out = withUserContextPrefix(prefix, '你好，帮我写个脚本');
|
||||
expect(out.startsWith(prefix)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(out.endsWith('你好，帮我写个脚本')).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('空前缀原样返回（契约防御）', () => {
|
||||
expect(withUserContextPrefix('', 'hello')).toBe('hello');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ export class ContextBuilder {
|
||||
*
|
||||
* v0.3.14: 移除 AGENTS.md 和 USERS.md 的读取，SOUL.md 仅做角色定义
|
||||
*/
|
||||
buildSystemPrompt(workspaceFiles?: WorkspaceFiles, workspacePath?: string): {
|
||||
buildSystemPrompt(
|
||||
workspaceFiles?: WorkspaceFiles,
|
||||
workspacePath?: string,
|
||||
): {
|
||||
roleDefinition: string;
|
||||
outputConstraints: string;
|
||||
safetyGuidelines: string;
|
||||
@@ -76,23 +79,19 @@ export class ContextBuilder {
|
||||
// ===== 动态区：记忆 =====
|
||||
const dynamicParts: string[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
// v0.3.14: 注入当前系统日期时间（每次构建时获取最新时间）
|
||||
// 用于让 AI 准确理解"今天"、"昨天"等相对时间表达
|
||||
// #43 修复: 时区硬编码 Asia/Shanghai 改为使用系统本地时区，跨时区用户显示正确
|
||||
const now = new Date();
|
||||
const localTimezone = Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone ?? 'Asia/Shanghai';
|
||||
// 审查修复: 恢复 UTC 偏移显示，在时区名后附加 UTC 偏移，避免丢失时区偏移信息
|
||||
const offset = -now.getTimezoneOffset() / 60;
|
||||
const offsetStr = offset >= 0 ? `UTC+${offset}` : `UTC${offset}`;
|
||||
const dateTimeStr = now.toLocaleString('zh-CN', {
|
||||
timeZone: localTimezone,
|
||||
hour12: false,
|
||||
});
|
||||
dynamicParts.push(`## Current Date & Time\n${dateTimeStr} (${localTimezone}, ${offsetStr})`);
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P1-1 根治: 当前日期时间不再注入 system prompt —— 此前每次构建都
|
||||
// 产生不同字节（秒级时间戳 + 时区），导致跨 run 的 system 前缀永不一致，
|
||||
// DeepSeek 自动上下文缓存 / Anthropic 显式缓存全部 miss。现移入用户消息
|
||||
// 前置块（@see user-context.ts），system 保持跨 run 字节级稳定。
|
||||
// MEMORY.md 的 `> 创建时间/最后更新` 元数据行由 extractContent 剥离，
|
||||
// 正文提取不受时间戳更新影响 —— 此处无需额外处理。
|
||||
|
||||
// 注入当前工作空间路径（动态区，路径可能切换故不放入静态区）
|
||||
// 注入当前工作空间路径（动态区，路径可能切换故不放入静态区；
|
||||
// 会话期间路径恒定，不破坏缓存）
|
||||
if (workspacePath) {
|
||||
dynamicParts.push(`## Current Workspace\nWorkspace root path: \`${workspacePath}\`\n\nAll relative paths in tool calls are resolved against this workspace root. Use this path when absolute paths are required (e.g., in run_command).`);
|
||||
dynamicParts.push(
|
||||
`## Current Workspace\nWorkspace root path: \`${workspacePath}\`\n\nAll relative paths in tool calls are resolved against this workspace root. Use this path when absolute paths are required (e.g., in run_command).`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (workspaceFiles?.memory) {
|
||||
@@ -138,7 +137,9 @@ export class ContextBuilder {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// v0.3.18 修复: 降级时打 WARN 日志 + 设置标志，供 IPC 层读取后发 toast
|
||||
this.lastUsedFallbackRole = true;
|
||||
log.warn('[ContextBuilder] SOUL.md is missing or empty, falling back to default Metona identity');
|
||||
log.warn(
|
||||
'[ContextBuilder] SOUL.md is missing or empty, falling back to default Metona identity',
|
||||
);
|
||||
// 兜底身份定义（Metona 灵魂定义）
|
||||
parts.push(`# Metona — 灵魂定义
|
||||
> "想清楚再动手，做对比做快重要"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* User Context Prefix — 每条用户消息的系统上下文前置块（v0.7.3 P1-1 根治）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 背景（Prompt Cache 被打穿的根因）：
|
||||
* 此前「当前日期时间」「检索到的相关记忆」「附件提示」三类**每条消息都在变**
|
||||
* 的内容被追加进 systemPrompt.dynamicReminders —— OpenAI 兼容系将其拼进首条
|
||||
* system 消息、Anthropic 写入顶层 system 字段。任何一次变化都会使整个 system
|
||||
* 前缀失配，DeepSeek 自动上下文缓存 / Anthropic 显式缓存全部 miss。长 system
|
||||
* （SOUL + 安全准则 + MEMORY.md）× 每 run 最多 20 轮迭代 × 全量重算输入 token，
|
||||
* 成本与首字延迟被系统性放大。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 现契约（单一事实来源）：
|
||||
* - system prompt 只保留跨 run 字节级稳定的内容（SOUL / 约束 / 安全准则 /
|
||||
* 工作空间路径 / MEMORY.md 正文——其易变的 `> 最后更新` 元数据行本就被
|
||||
* extractContent 剥离）；Anthropic 侧对该稳定前缀打 cache_control 断言；
|
||||
* - 易变内容（日期时间 / 记忆 / 附件提示）由本模块构建为**用户消息前置块**，
|
||||
* 随当次请求注入首条 user 消息（LLM 语义等价：Claude Code 同款上下文注入位）；
|
||||
* - DB 持久化 / 前端展示 / 记忆固化 / 注入检测均使用**原始干净内容**，
|
||||
* 前置块只存在于发给引擎的副本上。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 纯函数、零副作用：可在 node vitest 下直接表测（稳定性/分组/空值收缩）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import type { SearchResult } from '../memory/manager';
|
||||
|
||||
/** 附件提示所需的元信息子集（与 agent-store AttachmentInfo 对齐的渲染端子集） */
|
||||
export interface AttachmentHint {
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
type: string;
|
||||
truncated?: boolean;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface UserContextPrefixInput {
|
||||
/** 当前时间戳（前置块内降精度到分钟，减少无意义抖动） */
|
||||
now?: number;
|
||||
/** 检索到的相关记忆（空数组时不产出记忆分区） */
|
||||
memories?: SearchResult[];
|
||||
/** 用户附件元信息（空数组/undefined 时不产出附件分区） */
|
||||
attachments?: AttachmentHint[];
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 时区标签（如 "Asia/Shanghai (UTC+8)"）。
|
||||
* 由调用方计算（Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone）——
|
||||
* 本模块保持纯函数语义，不做 Electron/Intl 环境依赖。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
timezoneLabel?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** 记忆注入条目的内容截断（与原 dynamicReminders 注入口径一致） */
|
||||
const MEMORY_EXCERPT_CHARS = 200;
|
||||
/** 附件提示上限（与输入侧 5 个附件的硬上限对齐） */
|
||||
const MAX_ATTACHMENT_HINTS = 8;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 构建用户消息上下文前置块。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 输出形态（各分区以 `\n\n---\n\n` 分隔，整体以分隔符结尾，
|
||||
* 调用方直接 `${prefix}${userContent}` 拼接）：
|
||||
* ```
|
||||
* [Contextual information for this message — system-generated metadata, not part of the user's request.]
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ## Current Date & Time
|
||||
* 2026/8/30 14:30:00 (Asia/Shanghai, UTC+8)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ---
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)
|
||||
* [1] (semantic, 重要度: 0.9) ...
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ---
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ## User Attachments (Direct Upload)
|
||||
* ...
|
||||
* ```
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function buildUserContextPrefix(input: UserContextPrefixInput): string {
|
||||
const parts: string[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 分区 1：当前日期时间（降精度到分钟） =====
|
||||
const now = input.now ?? Date.now();
|
||||
const timezoneLabel = input.timezoneLabel ?? 'UTC';
|
||||
const dateStr = new Date(now).toLocaleString('sv-SE', {
|
||||
timeZone: undefined,
|
||||
hour12: false,
|
||||
}); // sv-SE 给出 ISO 形态 "2026-08-30 14:30:00"
|
||||
parts.push(`## Current Date & Time\n${dateStr} (${timezoneLabel})`);
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 分区 2：相关记忆注入（沿用原 system 注入的展示口径） =====
|
||||
const memories = (input.memories ?? []).slice(0, 5);
|
||||
if (memories.length > 0) {
|
||||
const memorySection = memories
|
||||
.map(
|
||||
(m, i) =>
|
||||
`[${i + 1}] (${m.type}, 重要度: ${m.importance.toFixed(1)}) ${m.content.slice(0, MEMORY_EXCERPT_CHARS)}`,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.join('\n');
|
||||
parts.push(`## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)\n${memorySection}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 分区 3：附件提示（沿用原 system 注入的语义与文案契约） =====
|
||||
const attachments = (input.attachments ?? []).slice(0, MAX_ATTACHMENT_HINTS);
|
||||
if (attachments.length > 0) {
|
||||
const attachmentList = attachments
|
||||
.map((att, i) => {
|
||||
const typeLabel =
|
||||
att.type === 'image' ? 'image' : att.type === 'text' ? 'text file' : 'file';
|
||||
// 文本附件被上传入口截断（512KB 上限）时，明确告知 LLM 内容不完整，
|
||||
// 防止模型把残缺内容当作完整文件事实（v0.7.2 A5 契约延续）
|
||||
const truncatedNote =
|
||||
att.truncated === true
|
||||
? ' (TRUNCATED — only the first 512KB is included; the full content is NOT available)'
|
||||
: '';
|
||||
const note =
|
||||
att.type === 'image'
|
||||
? 'already provided to you via vision capability — you can SEE it directly, do NOT call view_image or any tool to read it again'
|
||||
: att.type === 'text'
|
||||
? `content${truncatedNote} already inlined in the user message, do NOT search in workspace or read it again`
|
||||
: 'uploaded directly by user, do NOT search in workspace';
|
||||
return `${i + 1}. [${typeLabel}] ${att.name} — ${note}`;
|
||||
})
|
||||
.join('\n');
|
||||
|
||||
parts.push(
|
||||
`## User Attachments (Direct Upload)\nThe following files were uploaded directly by the user to this conversation. They are inline attachments, NOT workspace files:\n${attachmentList}\n\n**IMPORTANT**: Images listed above are already visible to you in this conversation. Do NOT call \`view_image\`, \`read_file\`, or any file tool to read them — doing so wastes a tool call and may fail (they are not workspace files).`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const header =
|
||||
"[Contextual information for this message — system-generated metadata, not part of the user's request.]";
|
||||
|
||||
return `${header}\n\n${parts.join('\n\n---\n\n')}\n\n---\n\n`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 将前置块与用户原始内容拼装为发送给引擎的消息内容。
|
||||
* 空前缀（理论上不会发生——日期分区恒存在，但契约上防御）时原样返回。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function withUserContextPrefix(prefix: string, userContent: string): string {
|
||||
if (!prefix) return userContent;
|
||||
return `${prefix}${userContent}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* SSRF DNS Pinning 测试（v0.7.3 P2-1）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 锁定三个单元：
|
||||
* D1 createPinnedLookup —— 只返回校验阶段锁定的 IP 集合（过滤非法 family），
|
||||
* 空集合返回 ENOTFOUND（防御）。
|
||||
* D2 resolveRedirectTarget —— 重定向状态识别 + 相对 Location 解析 +
|
||||
* 非法/缺失 Location 返回 null。
|
||||
* D3 resolvePinnedIps —— IP 直连与私网拒绝（走 ssrf-guard 单一事实来源；
|
||||
* 域名解析路径由 ssrf-guard 表测覆盖，此处不重复触网）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
|
||||
import { createPinnedLookup, resolveRedirectTarget, resolvePinnedIps } from '../ssrf-dispatcher';
|
||||
import type { LookupCallback } from '../ssrf-dispatcher';
|
||||
|
||||
describe('createPinnedLookup', () => {
|
||||
it('D1: 仅返回钉死的 IP 集合（忽略 hostname），family 正确标注', async () => {
|
||||
const lookup = createPinnedLookup(['93.184.216.34', '2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946']);
|
||||
const result = await new Promise<{ address: string; family: number }[]>((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses!));
|
||||
lookup('attacker.example', {}, cb);
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(result).toHaveLength(2);
|
||||
expect(result[0]).toEqual({ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 });
|
||||
expect(result[1].family).toBe(6);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D1: 非法 family（非 IPv4/IPv6 字符串）被过滤', async () => {
|
||||
const lookup = createPinnedLookup(['not-an-ip']);
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses));
|
||||
lookup('h', {}, cb as never);
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D1: 空集合 → ENOTFOUND（防御：调用方不应构造空 pin dispatcher）', async () => {
|
||||
const lookup = createPinnedLookup([]);
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses));
|
||||
lookup('h', {}, cb as never);
|
||||
}),
|
||||
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resolveRedirectTarget', () => {
|
||||
const makeResponse = (status: number, location?: string) => ({
|
||||
status,
|
||||
headers: {
|
||||
get: (name: string) => (name.toLowerCase() === 'location' ? (location ?? null) : null),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D2: 301/302/303/307/308 识别并解析绝对 Location', () => {
|
||||
for (const status of [301, 302, 303, 307, 308]) {
|
||||
expect(
|
||||
resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(status, 'https://cdn.example.com/x'), 'https://a.test/'),
|
||||
).toBe('https://cdn.example.com/x');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D2: 相对 Location 以当前 URL 为基解析（RFC 7231）', () => {
|
||||
expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, '/next?a=1'), 'https://a.test/dir/page')).toBe(
|
||||
'https://a.test/next?a=1',
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D2: 非 3xx 状态 → null（终态）', () => {
|
||||
expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(200), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(404), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D2: 缺失/非法 Location → null', () => {
|
||||
expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, ''), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
|
||||
expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, 'http://[::bad'), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resolvePinnedIps', () => {
|
||||
it('D3: IP 直连 URL —— 公网 IP 直接返回', async () => {
|
||||
const ips = await resolvePinnedIps('https://93.184.216.34/x');
|
||||
expect(ips).toEqual(['93.184.216.34']);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D3: 私有/回环 IP 直连被拒（单一事实来源 ssrf-guard）', async () => {
|
||||
for (const host of ['127.0.0.1', '10.0.0.5', '169.254.169.254', '192.168.1.1', '[::1]']) {
|
||||
await expect(resolvePinnedIps(`http://${host}/latest`)).rejects.toThrow(/Blocked SSRF/);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D3: 非 http/https 协议被拒', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(resolvePinnedIps('ftp://example.com')).rejects.toThrow(/not allowed/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('D3: 非法 URL 被拒', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(resolvePinnedIps('not a url')).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid URL/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
import { BrowserWindow, session } from 'electron';
|
||||
import log from 'electron-log';
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-2: CORS Origin 回显（纯函数在 network-utils，可表测）
|
||||
import { corsAllowOrigin, extractOriginHeader } from './network-utils';
|
||||
|
||||
/** Agent 浏览器专用 session partition — 与主应用 default session 完全隔离 */
|
||||
const AGENT_PARTITION = 'persist:metona-agent-browser';
|
||||
@@ -128,12 +130,22 @@ export class BrowserWindowManager {
|
||||
|
||||
// v0.3.0 修复: 使用 CORS 放行替代 webSecurity: false
|
||||
// 仅对 agent session 放行 CORS，不影响主应用
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-2 收紧: ACAO 从通配 '*' 改为回显请求 Origin —— 通配值让任意
|
||||
// 第三方页面都能借该分区跨域读取；回显等价保留截图/页面自身跨域能力，
|
||||
// 并附加 Vary: Origin 防止共享缓存把定向值串到其他 Origin。
|
||||
const agentSession = session.fromPartition(AGENT_PARTITION);
|
||||
agentSession.webRequest.onHeadersReceived((details, callback) => {
|
||||
// Electron 类型在此版本的 OnHeadersReceivedListenerDetails 上不暴露
|
||||
// requestHeaders —— 显式声明读取面（Origin 大小写不敏感提取）
|
||||
const requestHeaders = (
|
||||
details as unknown as { requestHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> }
|
||||
).requestHeaders;
|
||||
const originHeader = extractOriginHeader(requestHeaders);
|
||||
callback({
|
||||
responseHeaders: {
|
||||
...details.responseHeaders,
|
||||
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': ['*'],
|
||||
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': corsAllowOrigin(originHeader),
|
||||
Vary: [...(details.responseHeaders?.Vary ?? []), 'Origin'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ import type { MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
import { commandTouchesProtectedFile, isPathWithinWorkspace } from './file-guard';
|
||||
import type { SandboxManager } from '../../sandbox/sandbox';
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P3-2: 子进程环境净化收敛到 utils/safe-env.ts 单源
|
||||
// （与 MCP stdio 启动共用同一黑名单，历史双实现已漂移过一次）
|
||||
import { buildSafeChildEnv } from '../../../utils/safe-env';
|
||||
|
||||
const execAsync = promisify(exec);
|
||||
const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
|
||||
@@ -52,47 +55,22 @@ function decodeBuffer(buf: Buffer): string {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* #9 修复 + 审查修复: 构建安全的子进程环境变量
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 审查修复: 原白名单方案遗漏了 GIT_* / PYTHONPATH / HTTP_PROXY 等常用变量，导致子进程功能破坏。
|
||||
* 改为黑名单方案：剔除包含敏感后缀的变量，保留其余。
|
||||
* v0.7.3 P3-2: 实现收敛到 utils/safe-env.ts（buildSafeChildEnv）——
|
||||
* 与 MCP stdio 启动共用同一黑名单，本文件仅保留 run_command 的运行时差异注入
|
||||
* （Windows 中文编码变量）。黑名单方案的设计原因见 safe-env.ts 模块注释：
|
||||
* 白名单方案会遗漏 GIT_* / PYTHONPATH / HTTP_PROXY 等常用变量导致子进程功能破坏。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function buildSafeCommandEnv(isWindows: boolean): Record<string, string> {
|
||||
// 敏感变量后缀黑名单
|
||||
const SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES = [
|
||||
'_API_KEY',
|
||||
'_TOKEN',
|
||||
'_SECRET',
|
||||
'_PASSWORD',
|
||||
'_PASSWD',
|
||||
'_CREDENTIAL',
|
||||
'_CREDENTIALS',
|
||||
'_PRIVATE_KEY',
|
||||
];
|
||||
// 敏感变量名黑名单（精确匹配）
|
||||
const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set([
|
||||
'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY',
|
||||
'AGNES_API_KEY',
|
||||
'MIMO_API_KEY',
|
||||
'GITEA_PASSWORD',
|
||||
'DATABASE_PASSWORD',
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
const env: Record<string, string> = {};
|
||||
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
|
||||
if (!val) continue;
|
||||
if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key)) continue;
|
||||
if (SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => key.toUpperCase().endsWith(suffix))) continue;
|
||||
env[key] = val;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 添加必要的运行时变量
|
||||
env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
|
||||
if (isWindows) {
|
||||
env.PYTHONIOENCODING = 'utf-8';
|
||||
env.LANG = 'zh_CN.UTF-8';
|
||||
env.LC_ALL = 'zh_CN.UTF-8';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return env;
|
||||
return buildSafeChildEnv({
|
||||
runtime: isWindows
|
||||
? {
|
||||
NODE_ENV: 'production',
|
||||
PYTHONIOENCODING: 'utf-8',
|
||||
LANG: 'zh_CN.UTF-8',
|
||||
LC_ALL: 'zh_CN.UTF-8',
|
||||
}
|
||||
: { NODE_ENV: 'production' },
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@ import type { MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
// v0.6.4 P2-2: SSRF 校验收敛到共享模块 ssrf-guard.ts —— 原实现是本文件私有逻辑，
|
||||
// web_fetch 无校验造成工具层最大的安全不对称。单源后所有网络工具行为一致。
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-1 根治: 请求层升级为 ssrfPinnedFetch —— 校验通过的 IP 集合 pin 到
|
||||
// 连接层（undici connect.lookup），校验与连接共用同一批 IP，DNS rebinding
|
||||
// 窗口（M7 已知限制）就此关闭；代理激活时自动退化为仅入口校验（见模块注释）。
|
||||
import { validateSSRF } from './ssrf-guard';
|
||||
import { ssrfPinnedFetch } from './ssrf-dispatcher';
|
||||
|
||||
const ALLOWED_METHODS = ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE', 'HEAD'] as const;
|
||||
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 50 * 1024; // 50KB
|
||||
@@ -52,7 +56,8 @@ const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 50 * 1024; // 50KB
|
||||
export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
readonly definition: MetonaToolDef = {
|
||||
name: 'http_request',
|
||||
description: 'Send an HTTP/REST API request. Supports GET/POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE/HEAD methods with custom headers and body. Response body is truncated to 50KB.',
|
||||
description:
|
||||
'Send an HTTP/REST API request. Supports GET/POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE/HEAD methods with custom headers and body. Response body is truncated to 50KB.',
|
||||
parameters: {
|
||||
type: 'object',
|
||||
properties: {
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +69,10 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
},
|
||||
headers: { type: 'object', description: 'Request headers as key-value pairs' },
|
||||
body: { type: 'string', description: 'Request body (string)' },
|
||||
timeout: { type: 'number', description: 'Timeout in milliseconds (default 30000, max 60000)' },
|
||||
timeout: {
|
||||
type: 'number',
|
||||
description: 'Timeout in milliseconds (default 30000, max 60000)',
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
required: ['url'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -102,15 +110,12 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 超时控制
|
||||
const controller = new AbortController();
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeout);
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// 超时控制由 ssrfPinnedFetch 内部管理（超时 → ETIMEDOUT；
|
||||
// 工具执行层的 abort signal 经 context 传入 registry 兜底）
|
||||
{
|
||||
const fetchOptions: RequestInit = {
|
||||
method,
|
||||
headers,
|
||||
signal: controller.signal,
|
||||
// #10 修复: 禁用自动重定向跟随 — 防止重定向到内网地址绕过 SSRF 校验
|
||||
// 重定向后的 URL 由用户自行处理（响应中会包含 Location 头）
|
||||
redirect: 'manual',
|
||||
@@ -120,7 +125,9 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
fetchOptions.body = body;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetch(url, fetchOptions);
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-1: pinned fetch —— 校验通过的 IP pin 到连接层，
|
||||
// 关闭校验-连接之间的 DNS rebinding 窗口
|
||||
const response = await ssrfPinnedFetch(url, fetchOptions, timeout);
|
||||
const text = await response.text();
|
||||
|
||||
// 截断到 50KB
|
||||
@@ -144,14 +151,14 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
body: safeBody,
|
||||
truncated,
|
||||
ok: response.ok,
|
||||
success: true, // v0.3.1 修复 WARN-4: 成功路径添加 success 字段
|
||||
success: true, // v0.3.1 修复 WARN-4: 成功路径添加 success 字段
|
||||
};
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
// 区分超时（AbortError）与其他网络错误
|
||||
if (error instanceof Error && error.name === 'AbortError') {
|
||||
// 区分超时与其他网络错误：AbortError（外部中断）与
|
||||
// ETIMEDOUT（ssrfPinnedFetch 超时转译，v0.7.3 P2-1）均归为超时语义
|
||||
const err = error as Error & { code?: string };
|
||||
if (err?.name === 'AbortError' || err?.code === 'ETIMEDOUT') {
|
||||
return { error: 'Request timeout', success: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
const errMsg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ export const UA_POOL = [
|
||||
'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:133.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/133.0',
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
export const MOBILE_UA = 'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 17_5 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/17.5 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1';
|
||||
export const MOBILE_UA =
|
||||
'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 17_5 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/17.5 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1';
|
||||
|
||||
export const ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_POOL = [
|
||||
'zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8',
|
||||
@@ -54,21 +55,25 @@ export function buildAntiCrawlHeaders(
|
||||
const userAgent = mobileUA ? MOBILE_UA : UA_POOL[uaIdx];
|
||||
|
||||
let origin = '';
|
||||
try { origin = new URL(url).origin; } catch { /* ignore */ }
|
||||
try {
|
||||
origin = new URL(url).origin;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
/* ignore */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
'User-Agent': userAgent,
|
||||
'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8',
|
||||
Accept: 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8',
|
||||
'Accept-Language': ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_POOL[langIdx],
|
||||
'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, br',
|
||||
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
|
||||
'DNT': '1',
|
||||
'Referer': origin || '',
|
||||
DNT: '1',
|
||||
Referer: origin || '',
|
||||
'Sec-Fetch-Dest': 'document',
|
||||
'Sec-Fetch-Mode': 'navigate',
|
||||
'Sec-Fetch-Site': 'none',
|
||||
'Sec-Fetch-User': '?1',
|
||||
'Pragma': 'no-cache',
|
||||
Pragma: 'no-cache',
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -107,7 +112,15 @@ export function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
|
||||
const u = new URL(url);
|
||||
|
||||
// 去除追踪参数
|
||||
const trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content', 'gclid', 'fbclid'];
|
||||
const trackingParams = [
|
||||
'utm_source',
|
||||
'utm_medium',
|
||||
'utm_campaign',
|
||||
'utm_term',
|
||||
'utm_content',
|
||||
'gclid',
|
||||
'fbclid',
|
||||
];
|
||||
for (const p of trackingParams) u.searchParams.delete(p);
|
||||
|
||||
// H-6 增强: 排序查询参数（确保参数顺序一致，便于去重）
|
||||
@@ -125,7 +138,7 @@ export function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
|
||||
(u.protocol === 'https:' && u.port === '443') ||
|
||||
(u.protocol === 'ws:' && u.port === '80') ||
|
||||
(u.protocol === 'wss:' && u.port === '443');
|
||||
const portSuffix = isDefaultPort ? '' : (u.port ? `:${u.port}` : '');
|
||||
const portSuffix = isDefaultPort ? '' : u.port ? `:${u.port}` : '';
|
||||
|
||||
// 强制小写 host
|
||||
return `${u.protocol}//${u.hostname.toLowerCase()}${portSuffix}${path}${u.search}${u.hash}`;
|
||||
@@ -158,47 +171,68 @@ export function isInterceptedPage(html: string): boolean {
|
||||
// ===== HTML → 纯文本转换 =====
|
||||
|
||||
const HTML_ENTITY_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
' ': ' ', '<': '<', '>': '>', '&': '&', '"': '"',
|
||||
''': "'", '…': '…', '—': '—', '–': '–',
|
||||
'«': '«', '»': '»', '×': '×', '÷': '÷',
|
||||
'©': '©', '®': '®', '™': '™', '€': '€',
|
||||
'£': '£', '¥': '¥', '¢': '¢', '°': '°',
|
||||
' ': ' ',
|
||||
'<': '<',
|
||||
'>': '>',
|
||||
'&': '&',
|
||||
'"': '"',
|
||||
''': "'",
|
||||
'…': '…',
|
||||
'—': '—',
|
||||
'–': '–',
|
||||
'«': '«',
|
||||
'»': '»',
|
||||
'×': '×',
|
||||
'÷': '÷',
|
||||
'©': '©',
|
||||
'®': '®',
|
||||
'™': '™',
|
||||
'€': '€',
|
||||
'£': '£',
|
||||
'¥': '¥',
|
||||
'¢': '¢',
|
||||
'°': '°',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export function htmlToText(html: string): string {
|
||||
return html
|
||||
// 移除噪声标签及内容
|
||||
.replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<noscript[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/noscript>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<nav[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/nav>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<header[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/header>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<footer[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/footer>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<aside[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/aside>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<iframe[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/iframe>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<svg[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/svg>/gi, '')
|
||||
// 移除 HTML 注释
|
||||
.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '')
|
||||
// 块级标签转换行
|
||||
.replace(/<\/?(p|div|h[1-6]|li|tr|blockquote|section|article|pre|br|hr)[^>]*>/gi, '\n')
|
||||
// 表格单元格转制表符
|
||||
.replace(/<\/?(td|th)[^>]*>/gi, '\t')
|
||||
// 移除剩余标签
|
||||
.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, '')
|
||||
// 解码 HTML 实体
|
||||
.replace(/&#(\d+);/g, (_, n) => String.fromCharCode(Number(n)))
|
||||
.replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, (_, h) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(h, 16)))
|
||||
.replace(/&[a-z]+;/gi, (m) => HTML_ENTITY_MAP[m.toLowerCase()] ?? m)
|
||||
// 清理空白
|
||||
.replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n')
|
||||
.replace(/[ \t]+/g, ' ')
|
||||
.replace(/^[ \t]+/gm, '')
|
||||
.trim();
|
||||
return (
|
||||
html
|
||||
// 移除噪声标签及内容
|
||||
.replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<noscript[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/noscript>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<nav[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/nav>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<header[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/header>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<footer[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/footer>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<aside[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/aside>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<iframe[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/iframe>/gi, '')
|
||||
.replace(/<svg[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/svg>/gi, '')
|
||||
// 移除 HTML 注释
|
||||
.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '')
|
||||
// 块级标签转换行
|
||||
.replace(/<\/?(p|div|h[1-6]|li|tr|blockquote|section|article|pre|br|hr)[^>]*>/gi, '\n')
|
||||
// 表格单元格转制表符
|
||||
.replace(/<\/?(td|th)[^>]*>/gi, '\t')
|
||||
// 移除剩余标签
|
||||
.replace(/<[^>]+>/g, '')
|
||||
// 解码 HTML 实体
|
||||
.replace(/&#(\d+);/g, (_, n) => String.fromCharCode(Number(n)))
|
||||
.replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, (_, h) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(h, 16)))
|
||||
.replace(/&[a-z]+;/gi, (m) => HTML_ENTITY_MAP[m.toLowerCase()] ?? m)
|
||||
// 清理空白
|
||||
.replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n')
|
||||
.replace(/[ \t]+/g, ' ')
|
||||
.replace(/^[ \t]+/gm, '')
|
||||
.trim()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 流式读取（大文件保护，10MB 上限） =====
|
||||
|
||||
export async function readBodyWithLimit(response: Response, maxBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024): Promise<string> {
|
||||
export async function readBodyWithLimit(
|
||||
response: Response,
|
||||
maxBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024,
|
||||
): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const contentLength = response.headers.get('content-length');
|
||||
if (contentLength && parseInt(contentLength) > maxBytes) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Response too large: ${contentLength} bytes (limit: ${maxBytes})`);
|
||||
@@ -249,6 +283,40 @@ export function logTool(toolName: string, message: string): void {
|
||||
log.info(`[Tool:${toolName}] ${message}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== v0.7.3 P2-2: Agent 浏览器 CORS Origin 回显 =====
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 计算响应应携带的 Access-Control-Allow-Origin 值（纯函数，表测锁定）。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 背景：Agent 浏览器专用 session 此前对所有响应注入 ACAO:* —— 任意被 Agent
|
||||
* 打开的第三方页面都能借该分区无差别跨域读取。改为回显请求 Origin（等价能力：
|
||||
* 页面对自己的 Origin 仍可跨域读，如截图所需），无 Origin（同源导航/非浏览器
|
||||
* 客户端）回退 '*' 保持既有能力不回退。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param requestOrigin 请求头 Origin（可能为 undefined / 任意字符串）
|
||||
* @returns 应写入响应的 ACAO 值（单元素数组，供 Electron responseHeaders 使用）
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function corsAllowOrigin(requestOrigin: string | undefined | null): string[] {
|
||||
const origin = requestOrigin?.trim();
|
||||
if (origin && /^https?:\/\//i.test(origin)) {
|
||||
return [origin];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ['*'];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** 从请求头集合中大小写不敏感地提取 Origin 值 */
|
||||
export function extractOriginHeader(
|
||||
requestHeaders: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined,
|
||||
): string | undefined {
|
||||
if (!requestHeaders) return undefined;
|
||||
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(requestHeaders)) {
|
||||
if (key.toLowerCase() === 'origin') {
|
||||
return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return undefined;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== v0.6.4 P4-4: HTML → Markdown 转换（web_fetch extract_mode='markdown'） =====
|
||||
//
|
||||
// v0.6.4 收尾：私有 npm 凭据解锁后，按开发规范第一铁律把第一轮的临时自写实现
|
||||
@@ -285,11 +353,9 @@ const LIST_LINE = /^\s*(?:- |\d+\. )/;
|
||||
* 2. 仅当"空行两侧都是同一列表的条目行"时移除该空行（绝不吞条目、不影响段落间距）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function collapseListGaps(markdown: string): string {
|
||||
const lines = markdown.split('\n').map((line) =>
|
||||
line
|
||||
.replace(/^(\s*)- {2,}/, '$1- ')
|
||||
.replace(/^(\s*\d+\.)\s{2,}/, '$1 '),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const lines = markdown
|
||||
.split('\n')
|
||||
.map((line) => line.replace(/^(\s*)- {2,}/, '$1- ').replace(/^(\s*\d+\.)\s{2,}/, '$1 '));
|
||||
|
||||
const isListItem = (l: string | undefined): boolean => (l ?? '').length > 0 && LIST_LINE.test(l!);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -321,5 +387,7 @@ export function htmlToMarkdown(html: string): string {
|
||||
return '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return collapseListGaps(md).replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n').trim();
|
||||
return collapseListGaps(md)
|
||||
.replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n')
|
||||
.trim();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* SSRF DNS Pinning Dispatcher（v0.7.3 P2-1）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 关闭 M7 审查确认的 DNS rebinding 窗口：此前 validateSSRF 在校验阶段解析一次
|
||||
* DNS，fetch 实际连接时 undici 再次解析 —— 两次解析之间攻击者可切换 DNS 记录
|
||||
* （TTL=0）把连接导向内网。原注释断言"Node fetch 下无法彻底关闭"，该结论只对
|
||||
* 全局 fetch 成立；主进程已依赖 undici（network-proxy 的 setGlobalDispatcher），
|
||||
* undici 的 Agent 支持 connect.lookup 自定义 —— 校验通过的 IP 集合可精确 pin 到
|
||||
* 连接层，TLS SNI/证书校验仍基于原始域名（undici 将 servername 保持为 hostname）。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 契约：
|
||||
* - resolvePublicAddresses（ssrf-guard）是校验与地址解析的唯一事实来源，
|
||||
* 本模块 pin 的就是它返回的那批 IP —— 校验与连接同源，无双解析窗口；
|
||||
* - 代理激活（network-proxy.isProxyActive()）时 pinning 不可实现（DNS 在代理端
|
||||
* 解析）且 per-request dispatcher 会旁路用户代理 —— 退化为"仅入口校验"，
|
||||
* 走全局 dispatcher（保持既有语义与代理兼容）；
|
||||
* - fetchWithTimeoutPinned 合并外部 abort signal 与超时控制，语义对齐
|
||||
* BaseAdapter.fetchWithTimeout（超时 → ETIMEDOUT 可重试；外部中断原样抛出）；
|
||||
* - 每次 pinned 请求构造一次性 Agent 并在 finally 中 close（连接池即用即毁，
|
||||
* 防止把"上一请求的 pin 集合"泄漏给后续请求）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { Agent, fetch as undiciFetch } from 'undici';
|
||||
import { isIP } from 'node:net';
|
||||
import { resolvePublicAddresses } from './ssrf-guard';
|
||||
import { fetchWithTimeout } from './network-utils';
|
||||
import { isProxyActive } from '../../../utils/network-proxy';
|
||||
import log from 'electron-log';
|
||||
|
||||
/** 标准 dns.lookup 回调签名（undici connect.lookup 消费） */
|
||||
export type LookupCallback = (
|
||||
err: NodeJS.ErrnoException | null,
|
||||
addresses?: Array<{ address: string; family: number }>,
|
||||
) => void;
|
||||
|
||||
/** undici connect.lookup 的函数签名形态 */
|
||||
export type PinnedLookup = (hostname: string, options: unknown, callback: LookupCallback) => void;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 构造"钉死 IP 集合"的 lookup 函数：无论传入什么 hostname，都只返回校验阶段
|
||||
* 锁定的公网地址（过滤非法 family）。集合为空时返回 ENOTFOUND（防御性——
|
||||
* 调用方在集合为空时不应构造 dispatcher）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function createPinnedLookup(allowedIps: string[]): PinnedLookup {
|
||||
return (_hostname, _options, callback) => {
|
||||
process.nextTick(() => {
|
||||
const addresses = allowedIps
|
||||
.map((ip) => ({ address: ip, family: isIP(ip) }))
|
||||
.filter((a): a is { address: string; family: number } => a.family === 4 || a.family === 6);
|
||||
if (addresses.length === 0) {
|
||||
const err: NodeJS.ErrnoException = new Error('pinned lookup: no allowed addresses');
|
||||
err.code = 'ENOTFOUND';
|
||||
callback(err, undefined);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
callback(null, addresses);
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 校验 URL 并返回 pinning 用的公网 IP 集合。
|
||||
* 校验失败原样抛出（调用方按 SSRF 阻断处理）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function resolvePinnedIps(url: string): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||
return resolvePublicAddresses(url);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 带 SSRF pinning 的 fetch（http_request / web_fetch Phase1 / 可达性预检共用）。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 行为：
|
||||
* 1. 代理激活 → 退化为普通 fetchWithTimeout（仅入口校验语义，见模块注释）；
|
||||
* 2. 否则 → 解析并校验公网 IP → 一次性 undici Agent（pinned lookup）发起请求；
|
||||
* 3. 超时/外部中断语义与 fetchWithTimeout 对齐；
|
||||
* 4. 返回 Response 与全局 fetch 兼容（status/ok/headers/text/url/body）。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param url 目标 URL（调用方已保证 http/https；本函数再做一次全量 SSRF 校验）
|
||||
* @param init RequestInit（redirect 等由调用方决定）
|
||||
* @param timeoutMs 请求超时
|
||||
* @param externalSignal 外部 abort 信号（引擎中断透传，可选）
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function ssrfPinnedFetch(
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
init: RequestInit,
|
||||
timeoutMs: number,
|
||||
externalSignal?: AbortSignal,
|
||||
): Promise<Response> {
|
||||
const ips = await resolvePublicAddresses(url);
|
||||
|
||||
// 代理激活：DNS 在代理端解析，pinning 不可实现；走全局 dispatcher 保持代理语义
|
||||
if (isProxyActive()) {
|
||||
return fetchWithTimeout(url, init, timeoutMs);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 外部信号已中止 → 直接抛 AbortError（对齐 fetchWithTimeout 行为）
|
||||
if (externalSignal?.aborted) {
|
||||
const err = new Error('Aborted');
|
||||
err.name = 'AbortError';
|
||||
throw err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const controller = new AbortController();
|
||||
let timedOut = false;
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
timedOut = true;
|
||||
controller.abort();
|
||||
}, timeoutMs);
|
||||
|
||||
const onExternalAbort = () => controller.abort();
|
||||
if (externalSignal) {
|
||||
externalSignal.addEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort, { once: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 一次性 pinned Agent（connect 超时对齐 network-proxy 的 15s 连接上限）
|
||||
const dispatcher = new Agent({
|
||||
connect: { timeout: 15_000, lookup: createPinnedLookup(ips) as never },
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const response = await undiciFetch(url, {
|
||||
...(init as Record<string, unknown>),
|
||||
signal: controller.signal,
|
||||
dispatcher,
|
||||
} as never);
|
||||
return response as unknown as Response;
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
const externalAborted = externalSignal?.aborted === true;
|
||||
if (timedOut && !externalAborted) {
|
||||
const timeoutError = new Error(
|
||||
`Request timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms (url=${String(url).slice(0, 120)})`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
(timeoutError as Error & { code: string }).code = 'ETIMEDOUT';
|
||||
throw timeoutError;
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw err;
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
clearTimeout(timer);
|
||||
if (externalSignal) {
|
||||
externalSignal.removeEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 一次性 dispatcher 用后即毁（连接池不跨请求复用，防止 pin 集合泄漏）
|
||||
void dispatcher.close().catch((closeErr) => {
|
||||
log.debug(`[SSRFDispatcher] dispatcher close failed: ${(closeErr as Error).message}`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const REDIRECT_STATUS = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308]);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 解析重定向目标（纯函数，表测锁定）。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns 下一跳绝对 URL；非重定向状态/缺失/非法 Location 返回 null
|
||||
* （表示当前响应即终态或无法跟随，由调用方按既有语义处理）。
|
||||
* 相对 Location 以 currentUrl 为基解析（RFC 7231）。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function resolveRedirectTarget(
|
||||
response: { status: number; headers: { get(name: string): string | null } },
|
||||
currentUrl: string,
|
||||
): string | null {
|
||||
if (!REDIRECT_STATUS.has(response.status)) return null;
|
||||
const location = response.headers.get('location');
|
||||
if (!location) return null;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return new URL(location, currentUrl).toString();
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -30,21 +30,21 @@ export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
|
||||
// IPv4 直接检测
|
||||
if (isIP(ip) === 4) {
|
||||
const parts = ip.split('.').map(Number);
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 127) return true; // 回环
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 10) return true; // 内网
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 127) return true; // 回环
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 10) return true; // 内网
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 192 && parts[1] === 168) return true; // 内网
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 172 && parts[1] >= 16 && parts[1] <= 31) return true; // 内网
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 169 && parts[1] === 254) return true; // 链路本地（含云元数据）
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8
|
||||
if (parts[0] >= 224) return true; // 组播 + 保留
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 169 && parts[1] === 254) return true; // 链路本地（含云元数据）
|
||||
if (parts[0] === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8
|
||||
if (parts[0] >= 224) return true; // 组播 + 保留
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// IPv6 检测
|
||||
if (isIP(ip) === 6) {
|
||||
const lower = ip.toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (lower === '::1') return true; // 回环
|
||||
if (lower.startsWith('fe80:')) return true; // 链路本地
|
||||
if (lower === '::1') return true; // 回环
|
||||
if (lower.startsWith('fe80:')) return true; // 链路本地
|
||||
if (lower.startsWith('fc') || lower.startsWith('fd')) return true; // 唯一本地
|
||||
// ::ffff: 映射的 IPv4 — 提取 IPv4 部分递归检测
|
||||
const v4MappedMatch = lower.match(/::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
|
||||
@@ -57,16 +57,22 @@ export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* SSRF 校验 — 解析 URL 域名并校验 IP
|
||||
* SSRF 校验 + 公网地址解析（单一事实来源）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* v0.7.3 P2-1 重构：resolvePublicAddresses 承载全部校验逻辑并返回解析出的
|
||||
* 公网 IP 集合；validateSSRF 成为它的"只要不抛错"薄包装。这样 pinning 层
|
||||
* （ssrf-dispatcher）能拿到与校验完全同一批 IP，避免"校验一次解析、连接
|
||||
* 再解析一次"的双解析不一致。
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. 协议白名单：仅允许 http/https
|
||||
* 2. hostname 为 IP 时直接检测
|
||||
* 3. 域名 — DNS 解析后检测所有 IP；任意一个 IP 为私有即拒绝
|
||||
* （防止 DNS rebinding 中只校验第一个 IP 的绕过）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns 校验通过的全部公网 IP（供 DNS pinning 使用）
|
||||
* @throws 如果 URL 指向私有/内网/回环地址或协议不被允许
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
export async function resolvePublicAddresses(url: string): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||
let parsed: URL;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
parsed = new URL(url);
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +92,7 @@ export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
if (isPrivateIP(hostname)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: ${hostname} is a private/loopback address`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return;
|
||||
return [hostname];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 域名 — DNS 解析后检测所有 IP
|
||||
@@ -94,22 +100,39 @@ export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
addresses = await lookup(hostname, { all: true });
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: DNS resolution failed for ${hostname}: ${(err as Error).message}`);
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
`Blocked SSRF: DNS resolution failed for ${hostname}: ${(err as Error).message}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (addresses.length === 0) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: no DNS records for ${hostname}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const publicIps: string[] = [];
|
||||
for (const { address } of addresses) {
|
||||
if (isPrivateIP(address)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: ${hostname} resolves to private IP ${address}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
publicIps.push(address);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return publicIps;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* SSRF 校验 — 解析 URL 域名并校验 IP（v0.7.3 起为 resolvePublicAddresses 的
|
||||
* "仅校验不取值"包装，校验逻辑单一来源在后者）
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @throws 如果 URL 指向私有/内网/回环地址或协议不被允许
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
await resolvePublicAddresses(url);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** validateSSRF 的不抛错包装：返回结构化结果供工具 execute 直接 return */
|
||||
export async function safeValidateSSRF(url: string): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
|
||||
export async function safeValidateSSRF(
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await validateSSRF(url);
|
||||
return { ok: true };
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../../../harness/types';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
fetchCache,
|
||||
buildAntiCrawlHeaders,
|
||||
fetchWithTimeout,
|
||||
htmlToText,
|
||||
isInterceptedPage,
|
||||
readBodyWithLimit,
|
||||
@@ -30,14 +29,21 @@ import { getBrowserManager } from './browser';
|
||||
// v0.6.4 P2-2 根治安全不对称：web_fetch 此前完全没有 SSRF 校验（仅协议检查）且
|
||||
// requiresPermission:false —— LLM 可直接抓取 http://127.0.0.1:<port>、
|
||||
// http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data 等内网/云元数据地址，浏览器回退通道
|
||||
// 同样可达内网。现复用共享 ssrf-guard 模块（与 http_request 同源同行为）：
|
||||
// 入口校验 + HTTP 重定向终态 URL 复检（堵 redirect:'follow' 绕道内网的口子）。
|
||||
// 同样可达内网。现复用共享 ssrf-guard 模块（与 http_request 同源同行为）。
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-1 根治: 抓取层升级为 ssrfPinnedFetch —— 校验通过的 IP 集合 pin 到
|
||||
// 连接层（undici connect.lookup），关闭校验-连接之间的 DNS rebinding 窗口；
|
||||
// 重定向改为逐跳手动跟随，每一跳都先校验后连接（原 redirect:'follow' 下
|
||||
// 中间跳转在"终态复检"之前已真实发出，可触达内网）。
|
||||
import { validateSSRF } from './ssrf-guard';
|
||||
import { resolveRedirectTarget, ssrfPinnedFetch } from './ssrf-dispatcher';
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 跳过重试的状态码 =====
|
||||
|
||||
const SKIP_RETRY_STATUS = new Set([403, 429, 502, 503]);
|
||||
|
||||
/** v0.7.3 P2-1: 单次抓取允许的最大重定向跳数（每跳均经校验 + pinning） */
|
||||
const MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS = 5;
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== WebFetchTool =====
|
||||
|
||||
export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
@@ -188,25 +194,55 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxRetries; attempt++) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const headers = buildAntiCrawlHeaders(url, attempt, mobileUA);
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithTimeout(url, { headers, redirect: 'follow' }, 20_000);
|
||||
|
||||
// v0.6.4 P2-2: 重定向终态复检 —— redirect:'follow' 下 fetch 可能跟随跳转
|
||||
// 到与入口校验不同的目标；SSRF 校验 initial URL 后再对 response.url（终态）
|
||||
// 复检，堵住"外网跳内网"绕道。终态指向私有地址时按拦截处理转入浏览器通道
|
||||
// 也会被浏览器侧域名校验拒绝。
|
||||
if (response.url && response.url !== url) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await validateSSRF(response.url);
|
||||
} catch (ssrfErr) {
|
||||
// ===== v0.7.3 P2-1 根治: 手动逐跳重定向 + 每跳 SSRF 校验 + DNS pinning =====
|
||||
// 原 redirect:'follow' 下 undici 在内核自动跟跳：跳转目标仅在"终态复检"
|
||||
// 时被校验，中间跳转的请求已经真实发出（可触达内网/元数据地址）。
|
||||
// 现改为逐跳手动跟随：每跳由 ssrfPinnedFetch 发出（校验通过 IP pin 到
|
||||
// 连接层），Location 目标显式校验通过后才允许下一跳；私有地址/非法
|
||||
// 协议目标按 blocked 语义立即终止（禁止重试与浏览器回退）。
|
||||
let currentUrl = url;
|
||||
let response: Response | null = null;
|
||||
let redirectBlocked: string | null = null;
|
||||
|
||||
for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS; hop++) {
|
||||
response = await ssrfPinnedFetch(currentUrl, { headers, redirect: 'manual' }, 20_000);
|
||||
const next = resolveRedirectTarget(response, currentUrl);
|
||||
if (next === null) break; // 非重定向（或无/非法 Location）—— 当前响应即终态
|
||||
if (hop === MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
success: false,
|
||||
html: '',
|
||||
text: '',
|
||||
intercepted: false,
|
||||
blocked: true,
|
||||
reason: `Redirect target blocked by SSRF guard: ${(ssrfErr as Error).message}`,
|
||||
reason: `Too many redirects (>${MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS})`,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 下一跳目标显式校验（ssrfPinnedFetch 内部还会再次校验+pinning；
|
||||
// 这里提前拦截以保证 blocked 语义：不重试、不进浏览器回退）
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await validateSSRF(next);
|
||||
} catch (ssrfErr) {
|
||||
redirectBlocked = `Redirect target blocked by SSRF guard: ${(ssrfErr as Error).message}`;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
currentUrl = next;
|
||||
response = null; // 丢弃中间跳转响应，下一跳重新抓取
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (redirectBlocked) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
success: false,
|
||||
html: '',
|
||||
text: '',
|
||||
intercepted: false,
|
||||
blocked: true,
|
||||
reason: redirectBlocked,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!response) {
|
||||
// 防御性：循环正常结束必然携带终态响应
|
||||
return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: false, reason: 'No response' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 跳过重试的状态码 → 直接进入浏览器回退
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ import {
|
||||
buildSearXNGAuthHeaders,
|
||||
logTool,
|
||||
} from './network-utils';
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-1: 可达性预检经 SSRF 校验 + DNS pinning（结果 URL 是不可信外部输入）
|
||||
import { safeValidateSSRF } from './ssrf-guard';
|
||||
import { ssrfPinnedFetch } from './ssrf-dispatcher';
|
||||
import type { WebFetchTool } from './web-fetch';
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 类型定义 =====
|
||||
@@ -330,6 +333,10 @@ function parse360Regex(html: string): SearchResult[] {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 可达性预检 =====
|
||||
// v0.7.3 P2-1: 可达性预检的 URL 来自不可信的搜索结果 —— HEAD 探测同样不得
|
||||
// 触达内网/元数据地址。校验失败的 URL 直接标记不可达（不发起任何请求）；
|
||||
// 探测经 ssrfPinnedFetch（DNS pinning），重定向不自动跟随（3xx 即视为可达 ——
|
||||
// 链接活性已证明，且跟跳目标不再绕过校验）。
|
||||
|
||||
async function checkReachability(urls: string[], concurrency = 5): Promise<Map<string, boolean>> {
|
||||
const result = new Map<string, boolean>();
|
||||
@@ -337,8 +344,13 @@ async function checkReachability(urls: string[], concurrency = 5): Promise<Map<s
|
||||
const batch = urls.slice(i, i + concurrency);
|
||||
const checks = batch.map(async (url) => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const resp = await fetchWithTimeout(url, { method: 'HEAD', redirect: 'follow' }, 3_000);
|
||||
result.set(url, resp.ok);
|
||||
const ssrf = await safeValidateSSRF(url);
|
||||
if (!ssrf.ok) {
|
||||
result.set(url, false);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const resp = await ssrfPinnedFetch(url, { method: 'HEAD', redirect: 'manual' }, 3_000);
|
||||
result.set(url, resp.ok || (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400));
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
result.set(url, false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ export interface MetonaModelInfo {
|
||||
supportsToolCalling?: boolean;
|
||||
/** 是否支持 Thinking / Reasoning */
|
||||
supportsThinking?: boolean;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 是否支持视觉（图片输入）— v0.7.3 P1-4。
|
||||
* undefined 表示未知（调用方保守放行，保持可用性）；
|
||||
* Ollama /api/show capabilities 探测成功时为真实布尔值，
|
||||
* 供前端上传入口拒绝不支持图片的本地语言模型。
|
||||
*/
|
||||
supportsVision?: boolean;
|
||||
/** 模型描述 */
|
||||
description?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user