feat: v0.7.3 成本收口 · 状态一致 · 死账清理 — Prompt Cache 根治 + SSRF DNS Pinning + 87 用例扩充全量回归

P1 修复面收口: Prompt Cache 根治(日期/记忆/附件三类易变内容出 system 入用户消息
  前置块 user-context.ts, system 跨 run 字节级稳定; Anthropic system 块数组化 +
  cache_control ephemeral 断言, DeepSeek 自动缓存前缀命中 — 多轮对话输入 token
  成本降数量级); 编辑重发/重新生成幽灵 Trace 双侧根治(DB truncateMessagesAfter
  同步过滤 metadata.traceSteps + 前端 trimTraceStepsByAnchor 镜像, 严格小于锚点
  时间戳, 同毫秒等值判废); sessions:deleteMessage 死通道全链路删除(渲染层零调用
  + message_count 漂移面); Ollama vision 能力门控全链路(MetonaModelInfo
  .supportsVision 贯穿 adapter/IPC/store/UI, model-capabilities.ts 三道判定纯函数,
  未知保守放行); 记忆固化节流(consolidation-policy 纯函数: 总开关 + 内容门控
  [回答>=200字符或存在成功工具调用] + 会话级 10 分钟频率窗口, 三 memory.* 配置键)

P2 安全纵深: SSRF DNS Pinning 关闭 rebinding 窗口(ssrf-guard 重构
  resolvePublicAddresses 单源; ssrf-dispatcher 以 undici Agent.connect.lookup
  钉死校验 IP, TLS SNI 保持原域名, 一次性 dispatcher 用后即毁; 代理激活显式
  退化为仅入口校验); web_fetch 重写手动逐跳重定向循环(每跳先校验后连接,
  替代 redirect:follow 内核跟跳的中间跳裸奔, 上限 5 跳); http_request 换用
  pinned fetch; web_search 可达性预检加固(私有 URL 零请求 + 不跟跳, 3xx 视为
  可达); Agent 浏览器 CORS 通配收紧为 Origin 回显 + Vary: Origin;
  ConfirmationHook.forgetSession 会话终态清理(会话删除/abort 联动/SubAgent
  终结三处接线, 根治 rememberedDecisions 泄漏)

P3 架构还债: agent.enableReflection 死配置全链路接线(main→shared→引擎→
  Orchestrator→设置开关, REFLECTING 状态真实可达); AgentLoopConfig.timeoutMs
  死字段删除; MemoryManager.cleanupExpired 挂入健康检查周期(expires_at 回收
  管道真实化); buildSafeEnv 收敛 utils/safe-env.ts 单源(run_command 与 MCP
  stdio 共用, 终结双实现漂移); Trace 生命周期治理(metadata 只保留最近 20 个
  run — keepRecentRuns 纯函数; JSONL 录制启动自动清理保留 200 个 + 设置页
  手动清理); SLO/健康快照可视化(app:healthSnapshot IPC + 设置页只读卡片 +
  审计链一键校验)

P4 能力演进: 会话标题 LLM 自动生成(TitleGenerator — 每会话幂等/并发重入复用
  同一 Promise/自定义标题不覆盖/失败静默回退, Sidebar 经 config:changed 实时
  刷新); MCP 自动重连(5s/15s/60s 退避最多 3 次, reconnecting 状态机,
  teardownConnection 内部拆除保留簿记 — 用户断开/开关关闭即时取消, 设置页
  显示第 N/3 次); 死循环检测 ABAB 乒乓模式(最近4轮 A→B→A→B 交替判定, 补齐
  docs 第五章"两状态反复切换"检测契约); i18n 第三阶段(ChatInput/LLMSettings/
  OnboardingWizard/MemoryViewer 主链路文案出层, zh-CN + en-US 双字典补齐)

测试: 737 → 824 用例(+87, 新增 8 个测试文件 + 扩展 3 个)。新覆盖: user-context
  分组/空值收缩/拼接契约、context-builder 字节级稳定性、Anthropic cache_control
  四态、consolidation-policy 九路判定矩阵、ssrf-dispatcher(pinned lookup/重定向
  解析/IP 校验)、forget-session 会话隔离、trace-lifecycle run 淘汰、
  trace-trim 严格小于边界、safe-env 净化矩阵、mcp-reconnect 退避状态机
  (fake timers)、title-generator 并发重入、SQLite 侧 truncate×TRACE 联动
  (Electron ABI)。测试驱动修复: GIT_*/ 注释终止块注释、重连计数被自身重试
  前置断开重置(拆 teardownConnection 保留簿记)、TitleGenerator 幂等占位与
  并发去重的检查顺序竞态(去重先于幂等)

版本: 0.7.3; README 同步(配置表新增 agent.enableReflection/memory.*/mcp.autoReconnect)

回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; 系统 Node 771 通过 53 跳过
  (better-sqlite3 ABI); Electron ABI 全量 824/824 零跳过

electron/harness/adapters/__tests__/anthropic-cache-control.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/**
+ * Anthropic system cache_control 断言测试（v0.7.3 P1-1）
+ *
+ * Anthropic 缓存按"内容块前缀"命中：system 必须以块数组传递并在块上打
+ * cache_control 才可缓存。本文件锁定：
+ * C1 非空 system → 块数组 + {type:'ephemeral'}；
+ * C2 空 system → 保持空字符串（不发空块）；
+ * C3 thinking 模式下断言仍然存在（cache 与 thinking 不互斥）；
+ * C4 system 块文本为四分区完整拼接（roleDefinition/outputConstraints/
+ *    safetyGuidelines/dynamicReminders）。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+
+vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
+  default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
+}));
+
+import { AnthropicAdapter } from '../anthropic.adapter';
+import type { MetonaRequest } from '../../types';
+
+function captureFetch(): { bodies: Array<Record<string, unknown>> } {
+  const bodies: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
+  const genericBody = {
+    content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'ok' }],
+    usage: { input_tokens: 3, output_tokens: 2 },
+    stop_reason: 'end_turn',
+  };
+  const fetchMock = vi.fn(async (_url: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    bodies.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body ?? '{}')) as Record<string, unknown>);
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify(genericBody), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    });
+  });
+  vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
+  return { bodies };
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+});
+
+function makeAdapter(): AnthropicAdapter {
+  return new AnthropicAdapter({
+    provider: 'anthropic',
+    baseURL: 'http://a.test',
+    apiKey: 'k',
+    defaultModel: 'claude-sonnet-4-5',
+  });
+}
+
+function makeRequest(overrides?: Partial<MetonaRequest>): MetonaRequest {
+  return {
+    meta: {
+      sessionId: 's1',
+      iteration: 1,
+      requestId: 'r1',
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
+      agentVersion: 'test',
+    },
+    systemPrompt: {
+      roleDefinition: 'You are Metona.',
+      outputConstraints: 'Be concise.',
+      safetyGuidelines: 'Stay safe.',
+      dynamicReminders: '## Current Workspace\n`/ws`',
+    },
+    messages: [{ role: 'user', content: 'hi', timestamp: Date.now() }],
+    params: { maxTokens: 63_488, temperature: 0, stream: false },
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+describe('AnthropicAdapter — system cache_control（P1-1）', () => {
+  it('C1: 非空 system → 单 text 块 + cache_control ephemeral', async () => {
+    const adapter = makeAdapter();
+    const { bodies } = captureFetch();
+    await adapter.send(makeRequest());
+
+    const system = bodies[0].system as Array<{
+      type: string;
+      text: string;
+      cache_control: { type: string };
+    }>;
+    expect(Array.isArray(system)).toBe(true);
+    expect(system).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(system[0].type).toBe('text');
+    expect(system[0].cache_control).toEqual({ type: 'ephemeral' });
+  });
+
+  it('C2: 空 system → 保持空字符串（不发空块）', async () => {
+    const adapter = makeAdapter();
+    const { bodies } = captureFetch();
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        systemPrompt: { roleDefinition: '', outputConstraints: '', safetyGuidelines: '' },
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(bodies[0].system).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('C3: thinking 模式下 cache_control 断言仍然存在', async () => {
+    const adapter = makeAdapter();
+    const { bodies } = captureFetch();
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        params: {
+          maxTokens: 8192,
+          temperature: 0,
+          stream: false,
+          thinkingEnabled: true,
+          thinkingEffort: 'high',
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+    const system = bodies[0].system as Array<{ cache_control: { type: string } }>;
+    expect(system[0].cache_control).toEqual({ type: 'ephemeral' });
+    // thinking 与 cache 共存：thinking 块也在请求体中
+    expect(bodies[0].thinking).toMatchObject({ type: 'enabled' });
+  });
+
+  it('C4: system 块文本为四分区完整拼接', async () => {
+    const adapter = makeAdapter();
+    const { bodies } = captureFetch();
+    await adapter.send(makeRequest());
+
+    const system = bodies[0].system as Array<{ text: string }>;
+    expect(system[0].text).toContain('You are Metona.');
+    expect(system[0].text).toContain('Be concise.');
+    expect(system[0].text).toContain('Stay safe.');
+    expect(system[0].text).toContain('## Current Workspace');
+  });
+});

electron/harness/adapters/__tests__/provider-request-shapes.test.ts

@@ -109,29 +109,69 @@ describe('AnthropicAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
             role: 'assistant',
             content: null,
             toolCalls: [
-              { id: 'tc_1', name: 'read_file', args: { path: 'a.txt' }, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
+              {
+                id: 'tc_1',
+                name: 'read_file',
+                args: { path: 'a.txt' },
+                iteration: 1,
+                timestamp: Date.now(),
+              },
             ],
             timestamp: Date.now(),
           },
-          { role: 'tool', content: null, toolResult: { toolCallId: 'tc_1', toolName: 'read_file', result: 'data', success: true, durationMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() }, timestamp: Date.now() },
+          {
+            role: 'tool',
+            content: null,
+            toolResult: {
+              toolCallId: 'tc_1',
+              toolName: 'read_file',
+              result: 'data',
+              success: true,
+              durationMs: 1,
+              timestamp: Date.now(),
+            },
+            timestamp: Date.now(),
+          },
           // 孤立 tool_result（前面没有对应 tool_use）应被过滤
-          { role: 'tool', content: null, toolResult: { toolCallId: 'tc_orphan', toolName: 'x', result: '', success: true, durationMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() }, timestamp: Date.now() },
+          {
+            role: 'tool',
+            content: null,
+            toolResult: {
+              toolCallId: 'tc_orphan',
+              toolName: 'x',
+              result: '',
+              success: true,
+              durationMs: 1,
+              timestamp: Date.now(),
+            },
+            timestamp: Date.now(),
+          },
           { role: 'user', content: 'next?', timestamp: Date.now() },
         ],
       }),
     );
 
     const body = bodies[0];
-    expect(body.system).toContain('You are Metona.');
+    // v0.7.3 P1-1: system 转为块数组并打 cache_control 断言（稳定前缀 prompt cache）
+    const system = body.system as Array<{
+      type: string;
+      text: string;
+      cache_control: { type: string };
+    }>;
+    expect(Array.isArray(system)).toBe(true);
+    expect(system[0].text).toContain('You are Metona.');
+    expect(system[0].cache_control).toEqual({ type: 'ephemeral' });
     expect(Array.isArray(body.messages)).toBe(true);
     const msgs = body.messages as Array<{ role: string; content: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }>;
     // tool_use 的 assistant 消息存在且携带 id/name
     const assistantToolMsg = msgs.find((m) => m.role === 'assistant');
-    expect(assistantToolMsg?.content[0]).toMatchObject({ type: 'tool_use', id: 'tc_1', name: 'read_file' });
+    expect(assistantToolMsg?.content[0]).toMatchObject({
+      type: 'tool_use',
+      id: 'tc_1',
+      name: 'read_file',
+    });
     // tool 结果以 user 角色 tool_result 形态出现且配对 id 正确；孤立者被丢弃
-    const toolResultBlocks = msgs.flatMap((m) =>
-      m.content.filter((c) => c.type === 'tool_result'),
-    );
+    const toolResultBlocks = msgs.flatMap((m) => m.content.filter((c) => c.type === 'tool_result'));
     expect(toolResultBlocks).toHaveLength(1);
     expect(toolResultBlocks[0].tool_use_id).toBe('tc_1');
   });
@@ -166,7 +206,15 @@ describe('AnthropicAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
     });
     const { bodies } = captureFetch();
     await adapter.send(
-      makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 1500, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'low' } }),
+      makeRequest({
+        params: {
+          maxTokens: 1500,
+          temperature: 0,
+          stream: false,
+          thinkingEnabled: true,
+          thinkingEffort: 'low',
+        },
+      }),
     );
     const body = bodies[0];
     const thinking = body.thinking as { type: string; budget_tokens: number };
@@ -185,13 +233,17 @@ describe('AnthropicAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
     });
     const { bodies } = captureFetch();
     await adapter.send(
-      makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true } }),
+      makeRequest({
+        params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true },
+      }),
     );
     expect(bodies[0].temperature).toBeUndefined();
     expect(bodies[0].thinking).toBeDefined();
 
     await adapter.send(
-      makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false } }),
+      makeRequest({
+        params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0.7, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false },
+      }),
     );
     expect(bodies[1].temperature).toBe(0.7);
     expect(bodies[1].thinking).toBeUndefined();
@@ -236,13 +288,37 @@ describe('OllamaAdapter — 请求体契约', () => {
     const adapter = makeOllama();
     const { bodies } = captureFetch();
 
-    await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'low' } }));
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        params: {
+          maxTokens: 4096,
+          temperature: 0,
+          stream: false,
+          thinkingEnabled: true,
+          thinkingEffort: 'low',
+        },
+      }),
+    );
     expect(bodies[0].think).toBe('low');
 
-    await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'max' } }));
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        params: {
+          maxTokens: 4096,
+          temperature: 0,
+          stream: false,
+          thinkingEnabled: true,
+          thinkingEffort: 'max',
+        },
+      }),
+    );
     expect(bodies[1].think).toBe(true);
 
-    await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false } }));
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false },
+      }),
+    );
     expect(bodies[2].think).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
@@ -319,12 +395,26 @@ describe('AgnesAdapter — 思考模式对称性（v0.6.4）', () => {
     });
     const { bodies } = captureFetch();
 
-    await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: true, thinkingEffort: 'high' } }));
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        params: {
+          maxTokens: 4096,
+          temperature: 0,
+          stream: false,
+          thinkingEnabled: true,
+          thinkingEffort: 'high',
+        },
+      }),
+    );
     expect(
       ((bodies[0].chat_template_kwargs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {}).enable_thinking,
     ).toBe(true);
 
-    await adapter.send(makeRequest({ params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false } }));
+    await adapter.send(
+      makeRequest({
+        params: { maxTokens: 4096, temperature: 0, stream: false, thinkingEnabled: false },
+      }),
+    );
     expect(
       ((bodies[1].chat_template_kwargs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {}).enable_thinking,
     ).toBe(false);

electron/harness/adapters/anthropic.adapter.ts

@@ -248,8 +248,7 @@ export class AnthropicAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
               usage: {
                 inputTokens: messageStartInputTokens,
                 outputTokens: (usage.output_tokens as number) ?? 0,
-                totalTokens:
-                  messageStartInputTokens + ((usage.output_tokens as number) ?? 0),
+                totalTokens: messageStartInputTokens + ((usage.output_tokens as number) ?? 0),
                 // v0.6.4: 补采 Anthropic 自己的缓存字段（其他 provider 均已采集，
                 // cache_read/creation_input_tokens 与 output_tokens 同在 usage 内）
                 cacheHitTokens: (usage.cache_read_input_tokens as number) ?? undefined,
@@ -343,10 +342,7 @@ export class AnthropicAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
           try {
             args = block.argsBuffer ? JSON.parse(block.argsBuffer) : {};
           } catch (err) {
-            args = truncatedArgumentsPayload(
-              (err as Error).message,
-              block.argsBuffer.slice(-120),
-            );
+            args = truncatedArgumentsPayload((err as Error).message, block.argsBuffer.slice(-120));
           }
           yield {
             type: MetonaStreamEventType.TOOL_CALL_COMPLETE,
@@ -506,11 +502,22 @@ export class AnthropicAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
     const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
       model: this.config.defaultModel,
       max_tokens: maxTokensForRequest,
-      system,
       messages: merged,
       stream,
     };
 
+    // v0.7.3 P1-1: system 稳定前缀打 prompt cache 断言。
+    // Anthropic 缓存按"内容块前缀"命中 —— system 以字符串传递时无法附加
+    // cache_control，必须转为块数组并在最后一个块上打 {type:'ephemeral'}。
+    // 缓存前缀覆盖 tools + system（请求组装顺序 tools 在前）：system 稳定后，
+    // 多轮对话/多轮迭代复用同一前缀，输入 token 计费按缓存读价（约 1/10）。
+    // 前缀稳定性由 P1-1 保证：易变内容（日期/记忆/附件提示）已迁入用户消息。
+    if (system) {
+      body.system = [{ type: 'text', text: system, cache_control: { type: 'ephemeral' } }];
+    } else {
+      body.system = system;
+    }
+
     // 工具定义（input_schema 命名）
     if (request.tools?.length) {
       body.tools = request.tools.map((t) => ({

electron/harness/adapters/ollama.adapter.ts

@@ -59,17 +59,21 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
     const nativeRequest = await this.toNativeRequest(request);
 
     // #24 修复: 使用 fetchWithTimeout 替代 getFetchSignal + fetch，确保 timer 清理
-    const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(`${this.baseURL}/api/chat`, {
-      method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: false }),
-    }, this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000);
+    const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(
+      `${this.baseURL}/api/chat`,
+      {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: false }),
+      },
+      this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000,
+    );
 
     if (!response.ok) {
       await this.throwHttpError(response, 'Ollama API error');
     }
 
-    const data = await response.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
+    const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;
     return this.toMetonaResponse(data, request.meta.requestId, request.meta.iteration);
   }
 
@@ -79,11 +83,15 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
     const nativeRequest = await this.toNativeRequest(request);
 
     // #24 修复: 使用 fetchWithTimeout 替代 getFetchSignal + fetch，确保 timer 清理
-    const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(`${this.baseURL}/api/chat`, {
-      method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: true }),
-    }, this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000);
+    const response = await this.fetchWithTimeout(
+      `${this.baseURL}/api/chat`,
+      {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ ...nativeRequest, stream: true }),
+      },
+      this.config.timeoutMs ?? 300_000,
+    );
 
     if (!response.ok || !response.body) {
       await this.throwHttpError(response, 'Ollama stream error');
@@ -209,7 +217,10 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
           }
         } catch (parseErr) {
           // P2-8 修复: 与 sse-stream.ts 一致，记录解析失败行便于诊断
-          log.warn(`[Ollama] Failed to parse NDJSON line: ${(parseErr as Error).message}`, trimmed.slice(0, 200));
+          log.warn(
+            `[Ollama] Failed to parse NDJSON line: ${(parseErr as Error).message}`,
+            trimmed.slice(0, 200),
+          );
         }
       }
     }
@@ -239,7 +250,13 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
     format?: string | object;
     images?: string[];
     options?: Record<string, unknown>;
-  }): Promise<{ response: string; thinking?: string; done: boolean; totalDuration: number; evalCount: number }> {
+  }): Promise<{
+    response: string;
+    thinking?: string;
+    done: boolean;
+    totalDuration: number;
+    evalCount: number;
+  }> {
     const response = await fetch(`${this.baseURL}/api/generate`, {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
@@ -248,9 +265,12 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
     });
 
     if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Ollama generate error: ${response.status}`);
-    const data = await response.json() as {
-      response?: string; thinking?: string; done?: boolean;
-      total_duration?: number; eval_count?: number;
+    const data = (await response.json()) as {
+      response?: string;
+      thinking?: string;
+      done?: boolean;
+      total_duration?: number;
+      eval_count?: number;
     };
 
     return {
@@ -277,7 +297,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
     });
 
     if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`Ollama embed error: ${response.status}`);
-    const data = await response.json() as { embeddings?: number[][]; total_duration?: number };
+    const data = (await response.json()) as { embeddings?: number[][]; total_duration?: number };
 
     return {
       embeddings: data.embeddings ?? [],
@@ -299,7 +319,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
       });
       if (response.ok) {
-        const data = await response.json() as {
+        const data = (await response.json()) as {
           models?: Array<{
             name: string;
             size?: number;
@@ -309,6 +329,8 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         if (data.models?.length) {
           // v0.6.4 P4-1: 能力标志改为逐模型 /api/show 实测探测；单个探测失败
           // 该模型回退保守 true（不可用时行为与旧实现一致，fail-open 保可用性）
+          // v0.7.3 P1-4: supportsVision 随探测结果透出（undefined = 未知 → 前端保守放行），
+          // 供上传入口拒绝不支持图片的本地语言模型
           const enriched = await Promise.all(
             data.models.map(async (m) => {
               const caps = await this.probeCapabilities(m.name);
@@ -319,6 +341,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
                 contextWindow: OllamaAdapter.DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WINDOW,
                 supportsToolCalling: caps ? caps.supportsTools : true,
                 supportsThinking: caps ? caps.supportsThinking : true,
+                supportsVision: caps ? caps.supportsVision : undefined,
                 description: m.details
                   ? `${m.details.family ?? 'unknown'} / ${m.details.parameter_size ?? '?'} / ${m.details.quantization_level ?? '?'}`
                   : undefined,
@@ -403,7 +426,9 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
 
   // ===== POST /api/show =====
 
-  async showModel(model: string): Promise<{ parameters: string; template: string; capabilities: string[] } | null> {
+  async showModel(
+    model: string,
+  ): Promise<{ parameters: string; template: string; capabilities: string[] } | null> {
     try {
       const response = await fetch(`${this.baseURL}/api/show`, {
         method: 'POST',
@@ -412,7 +437,11 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
       });
       if (!response.ok) return null;
-      const data = await response.json() as { parameters?: string; template?: string; capabilities?: string[] };
+      const data = (await response.json()) as {
+        parameters?: string;
+        template?: string;
+        capabilities?: string[];
+      };
       return {
         parameters: data.parameters ?? '',
         template: data.template ?? '',
@@ -470,13 +499,22 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
 
   // ===== GET /api/ps =====
 
-  async listRunning(): Promise<Array<{ name: string; size: number; sizeVram: number; contextLength: number }>> {
+  async listRunning(): Promise<
+    Array<{ name: string; size: number; sizeVram: number; contextLength: number }>
+  > {
     try {
       const response = await fetch(`${this.baseURL}/api/ps`, {
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
       });
       if (!response.ok) return [];
-      const data = await response.json() as { models?: Array<{ name: string; size?: number; size_vram?: number; context_length?: number }> };
+      const data = (await response.json()) as {
+        models?: Array<{
+          name: string;
+          size?: number;
+          size_vram?: number;
+          context_length?: number;
+        }>;
+      };
       return (data.models ?? []).map((m) => ({
         name: m.name ?? '',
         size: m.size ?? 0,
@@ -496,7 +534,7 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000),
       });
       if (!response.ok) return 'unknown';
-      const data = await response.json() as { version?: string };
+      const data = (await response.json()) as { version?: string };
       return data.version ?? 'unknown';
     } catch {
       return 'unknown';
@@ -525,7 +563,9 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
       const buf = Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer());
       return buf.toString('base64');
     } catch (error) {
-      log.warn(`[Ollama] Failed to download image ${url.slice(0, 100)}: ${(error as Error).message}`);
+      log.warn(
+        `[Ollama] Failed to download image ${url.slice(0, 100)}: ${(error as Error).message}`,
+      );
       return '';
     }
   }
@@ -539,58 +579,60 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
           request.systemPrompt.outputConstraints,
           request.systemPrompt.safetyGuidelines,
           request.systemPrompt.dynamicReminders,
-        ].filter(Boolean).join('\n\n'),
+        ]
+          .filter(Boolean)
+          .join('\n\n'),
       },
     ];
 
     // #2 修复: 改为 for 循环以支持 async 图片下载（map 回调无法 await）
     for (const m of request.messages) {
       if (m.role === 'system') continue;
-        // C-6 修复: Ollama API 不支持 null content，assistant 仅有 tool_calls 时转为空字符串
-        const msg: Record<string, unknown> = { role: m.role, content: m.content ?? '' };
-        // Ollama 图片使用 images 字段（纯 base64 数组，不含 data: 前缀）
-        if (m.images?.length) {
-          // #2 修复: 支持公网 URL 图片，下载后转为纯 base64
-          // 之前直接将 URL 字符串传给 Ollama，导致 base64 解码错误
-          const resolvedImages: string[] = [];
-          for (const img of m.images) {
-            const url = img.url;
-            if (url.startsWith('data:')) {
-              // ... → iVBOR...
-              const base64Part = url.split(',')[1];
-              resolvedImages.push(base64Part ?? url);
-            } else if (url.startsWith('http://') || url.startsWith('https://')) {
-              // #2 修复: 公网 URL → 下载 → 纯 base64
-              const base64 = await this.resolveImageToBase64(url);
-              if (base64) resolvedImages.push(base64);
-            } else {
-              // 已是纯 base64 字符串（无 data: 前缀）
-              resolvedImages.push(url);
-            }
+      // C-6 修复: Ollama API 不支持 null content，assistant 仅有 tool_calls 时转为空字符串
+      const msg: Record<string, unknown> = { role: m.role, content: m.content ?? '' };
+      // Ollama 图片使用 images 字段（纯 base64 数组，不含 data: 前缀）
+      if (m.images?.length) {
+        // #2 修复: 支持公网 URL 图片，下载后转为纯 base64
+        // 之前直接将 URL 字符串传给 Ollama，导致 base64 解码错误
+        const resolvedImages: string[] = [];
+        for (const img of m.images) {
+          const url = img.url;
+          if (url.startsWith('data:')) {
+            // ... → iVBOR...
+            const base64Part = url.split(',')[1];
+            resolvedImages.push(base64Part ?? url);
+          } else if (url.startsWith('http://') || url.startsWith('https://')) {
+            // #2 修复: 公网 URL → 下载 → 纯 base64
+            const base64 = await this.resolveImageToBase64(url);
+            if (base64) resolvedImages.push(base64);
+          } else {
+            // 已是纯 base64 字符串（无 data: 前缀）
+            resolvedImages.push(url);
           }
-          msg.images = resolvedImages;
         }
-        // 工具结果
-        if (m.role === 'tool' && m.toolResult) {
-          msg.tool_call_id = m.toolResult.toolCallId;
-          // CE-2 修复: 工具失败时 result 为 null，优先用 error 字段作为 content
-          msg.content = m.toolResult.error
-            ? m.toolResult.error
-            : (typeof m.toolResult.result === 'string'
-              ? m.toolResult.result
-              : JSON.stringify(m.toolResult.result));
-        }
-        // assistant 工具调用（Ollama REST API 要求 arguments 为 JSON 字符串）
-        if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.toolCalls?.length) {
-          msg.tool_calls = m.toolCalls.map((tc) => ({
-            function: { name: tc.name, arguments: JSON.stringify(tc.args) },
-          }));
-        }
-        // 推理内容回传（保持多轮推理链完整）
-        if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.reasoningContent) {
-          (msg as Record<string, unknown>).reasoning_content = m.reasoningContent;
-        }
-        messages.push(msg);
+        msg.images = resolvedImages;
+      }
+      // 工具结果
+      if (m.role === 'tool' && m.toolResult) {
+        msg.tool_call_id = m.toolResult.toolCallId;
+        // CE-2 修复: 工具失败时 result 为 null，优先用 error 字段作为 content
+        msg.content = m.toolResult.error
+          ? m.toolResult.error
+          : typeof m.toolResult.result === 'string'
+            ? m.toolResult.result
+            : JSON.stringify(m.toolResult.result);
+      }
+      // assistant 工具调用（Ollama REST API 要求 arguments 为 JSON 字符串）
+      if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.toolCalls?.length) {
+        msg.tool_calls = m.toolCalls.map((tc) => ({
+          function: { name: tc.name, arguments: JSON.stringify(tc.args) },
+        }));
+      }
+      // 推理内容回传（保持多轮推理链完整）
+      if (m.role === 'assistant' && m.reasoningContent) {
+        (msg as Record<string, unknown>).reasoning_content = m.reasoningContent;
+      }
+      messages.push(msg);
     }
 
     const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
@@ -619,14 +661,23 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
 
     // Thinking 模式
     if (request.params.thinkingEnabled) {
-      const effortMap: Record<string, string | boolean> = { low: 'low', medium: 'medium', high: 'high', max: true };
+      const effortMap: Record<string, string | boolean> = {
+        low: 'low',
+        medium: 'medium',
+        high: 'high',
+        max: true,
+      };
       body.think = effortMap[request.params.thinkingEffort ?? 'high'] ?? true;
     }
 
     return body;
   }
 
-  private toMetonaResponse(data: Record<string, unknown>, requestId: string, iteration: number = 0): MetonaResponse {
+  private toMetonaResponse(
+    data: Record<string, unknown>,
+    requestId: string,
+    iteration: number = 0,
+  ): MetonaResponse {
     const message = data.message as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
     const toolCalls = message?.tool_calls as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
     return {
@@ -638,11 +689,14 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         timestamp: Date.now(),
         perfStats: {
           loadDurationMs: data.load_duration ? (data.load_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
-          promptEvalDurationMs: data.prompt_eval_duration ? (data.prompt_eval_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
-          evalDurationMs: data.eval_duration ? (data.eval_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
-          tokensPerSecond: data.eval_count && data.eval_duration
-            ? ((data.eval_count as number) / ((data.eval_duration as number) / 1e9))
+          promptEvalDurationMs: data.prompt_eval_duration
+            ? (data.prompt_eval_duration as number) / 1e6
             : undefined,
+          evalDurationMs: data.eval_duration ? (data.eval_duration as number) / 1e6 : undefined,
+          tokensPerSecond:
+            data.eval_count && data.eval_duration
+              ? (data.eval_count as number) / ((data.eval_duration as number) / 1e9)
+              : undefined,
         },
       },
       content: (message?.content as string) ?? '',
@@ -652,7 +706,10 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         const rawArgs = fn?.arguments;
         let args: Record<string, unknown> = {};
         try {
-          args = typeof rawArgs === 'string' ? JSON.parse(rawArgs) : (rawArgs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {};
+          args =
+            typeof rawArgs === 'string'
+              ? JSON.parse(rawArgs)
+              : ((rawArgs as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {});
         } catch (parseErr) {
           // v0.6.4: 非流式路径截断自愈对齐 —— 原 catch 静默降级 {}，与流式修复后的
           // 行为不一致。统一转为 _truncatedArguments 错误参数。
@@ -677,7 +734,10 @@ export class OllamaAdapter extends BaseAdapter {
         outputTokens: (data.eval_count as number) ?? 0,
         totalTokens: ((data.prompt_eval_count as number) ?? 0) + ((data.eval_count as number) ?? 0),
       },
-      finishReason: mapOllamaDoneReason(data.done_reason as string | undefined, !!message?.tool_calls),
+      finishReason: mapOllamaDoneReason(
+        data.done_reason as string | undefined,
+        !!message?.tool_calls,
+      ),
     };
   }
 }
@@ -693,10 +753,15 @@ function mapOllamaDoneReason(
 ): MetonaFinishReason {
   if (hasToolCalls) return MetonaFinishReason.TOOL_CALLS;
   switch (reason) {
-    case 'stop': return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
-    case 'length': return MetonaFinishReason.LENGTH;
-    case 'load': return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;   // 冷启动加载完成，非错误
-    case 'unload': return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
-    default: return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
+    case 'stop':
+      return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
+    case 'length':
+      return MetonaFinishReason.LENGTH;
+    case 'load':
+      return MetonaFinishReason.STOP; // 冷启动加载完成，非错误
+    case 'unload':
+      return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
+    default:
+      return MetonaFinishReason.STOP;
   }
 }

electron/harness/agent-loop/__tests__/engine.test.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,10 @@ import type { IMetonaProviderAdapter, MetonaResponse, MetonaStreamEvent } from '
 import { MetonaStreamEventType } from '../../types';
 
 /** 构造 Mock Adapter：sendStream 按脚本产出事件 */
-function createMockAdapter(scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][], opts?: { failWith?: Error }): IMetonaProviderAdapter {
+function createMockAdapter(
+  scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][],
+  opts?: { failWith?: Error },
+): IMetonaProviderAdapter {
   let call = 0;
   return {
     providerId: 'mock',
@@ -23,12 +26,20 @@ function createMockAdapter(scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][], opts?: { failWith?: E
     supportsToolCalling: true,
     supportsThinking: false,
     getContextWindow: () => 1_000_000,
-    send: vi.fn(async (): Promise<MetonaResponse> => ({
-      meta: { requestId: 'r_test', provider: 'mock', model: 'mock-model', latencyMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
-      content: 'ok',
-      usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 5, totalTokens: 15 },
-      finishReason: 'stop' as never,
-    })),
+    send: vi.fn(
+      async (): Promise<MetonaResponse> => ({
+        meta: {
+          requestId: 'r_test',
+          provider: 'mock',
+          model: 'mock-model',
+          latencyMs: 1,
+          timestamp: Date.now(),
+        },
+        content: 'ok',
+        usage: { inputTokens: 10, outputTokens: 5, totalTokens: 15 },
+        finishReason: 'stop' as never,
+      }),
+    ),
     sendStream: vi.fn(async function* (): AsyncIterable<MetonaStreamEvent> {
       if (opts?.failWith) throw opts.failWith;
       const script = scripts[call % scripts.length];
@@ -42,8 +53,23 @@ function createMockAdapter(scripts: MetonaStreamEvent[][], opts?: { failWith?: E
 
 function textDoneEvent(text: string): MetonaStreamEvent[] {
   return [
-    { type: MetonaStreamEventType.TEXT_DELTA, requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 0, timestamp: Date.now(), delta: text },
-    { type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE, requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
+    {
+      type: MetonaStreamEventType.TEXT_DELTA,
+      requestId: 'r1',
+      sessionId: 's1',
+      iteration: 1,
+      seq: 0,
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
+      delta: text,
+    },
+    {
+      type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE,
+      requestId: 'r1',
+      sessionId: 's1',
+      iteration: 1,
+      seq: 1,
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
+    },
   ];
 }
 
@@ -51,10 +77,21 @@ function toolCallEvent(name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>): MetonaStrea
   return [
     {
       type: MetonaStreamEventType.TOOL_CALL_COMPLETE,
-      requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 0, timestamp: Date.now(),
+      requestId: 'r1',
+      sessionId: 's1',
+      iteration: 1,
+      seq: 0,
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
       toolCall: { id: 'tc_test', name, args, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
     },
-    { type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE, requestId: 'r1', sessionId: 's1', iteration: 1, seq: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
+    {
+      type: MetonaStreamEventType.DONE,
+      requestId: 'r1',
+      sessionId: 's1',
+      iteration: 1,
+      seq: 1,
+      timestamp: Date.now(),
+    },
   ];
 }
 
@@ -121,7 +158,9 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
   });
 
   it('不可重试错误直接 ERROR（无 fallback 时）', async () => {
-    const adapter = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 unauthorized'), { status: 401 }) });
+    const adapter = createMockAdapter([], {
+      failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 unauthorized'), { status: 401 }),
+    });
     const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ retryCount: 0 }, adapter);
     const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
     expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.ERROR);
@@ -129,7 +168,9 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
 
   it('P1 故障转移：主 Provider 失败后切换到 fallback Provider', async () => {
     // 主 adapter 每次都失败（401 不可重试）
-    const primary = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 invalid key'), { status: 401 }) });
+    const primary = createMockAdapter([], {
+      failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401 invalid key'), { status: 401 }),
+    });
     // fallback 正常返回
     const fallback = createMockAdapter([textDoneEvent('fallback answer')]);
 
@@ -151,8 +192,12 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
   });
 
   it('P1 故障转移仅触发一次（fallback 也失败不回切）', async () => {
-    const primary = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401'), { status: 401 }) });
-    const fallback = createMockAdapter([], { failWith: Object.assign(new Error('500'), { status: 500 }) });
+    const primary = createMockAdapter([], {
+      failWith: Object.assign(new Error('401'), { status: 401 }),
+    });
+    const fallback = createMockAdapter([], {
+      failWith: Object.assign(new Error('500'), { status: 500 }),
+    });
 
     const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ retryCount: 0 }, primary);
     engine.setFallbackAdapter(fallback);
@@ -162,3 +207,72 @@ describe('AgentLoopEngine', () => {
     expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.ERROR);
   });
 });
+
+// ===== v0.7.3 P4-4 / P3-1: 死循环乒乓检测 + REFLECTING 状态接线 =====
+
+describe('AgentLoopEngine — 死循环乒乓检测（ABAB，P4-4）', () => {
+  it('最近 4 轮 A→B→A→B 交替（A≠B）触发 DEAD_LOOP（驻留模式抓不住的乒乓）', async () => {
+    const readScript = toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
+    const writeScript = toolCallEvent('write_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
+    // 1:read 2:write 3:read 4:write ← 第 4 轮 PARSING 时滑窗构成 ABAB
+    const adapter = createMockAdapter([readScript, writeScript, readScript, writeScript]);
+    const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ maxIterations: 6 }, adapter);
+    const deadLoopEvents: unknown[] = [];
+    engine.on('deadLoop', (d) => deadLoopEvents.push(d));
+
+    const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
+    expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.DEAD_LOOP);
+    expect(deadLoopEvents.length).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('A→B→C 交替（无重复模式）不误报，按 MAX_ITERATIONS 终止', async () => {
+    const scripts = [
+      toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'a.ts' }),
+      toolCallEvent('write_file', { file_path: 'a.ts' }),
+      toolCallEvent('lint_code', {}),
+    ];
+    const adapter = createMockAdapter(scripts);
+    const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ maxIterations: 4 }, adapter);
+    const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
+    expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.MAX_ITERATIONS);
+  });
+
+  it('A→B→B→B 前缀不构成 ABAB（A≠B 约束），由驻留模式在 3 连 B 时接管', async () => {
+    const readScript = toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
+    const writeScript = toolCallEvent('write_file', { file_path: 'x.ts' });
+    // 1:read 2:write 3:write 4:write —— 第 4 轮时 ABAB 不成立，但 3 连 write 命中驻留模式
+    const adapter = createMockAdapter([readScript, writeScript, writeScript, writeScript]);
+    const engine = new AgentLoopEngine({ maxIterations: 6 }, adapter);
+    const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
+    expect(output.terminationReason).toBe(TerminationReason.DEAD_LOOP);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('AgentLoopEngine — REFLECTING 状态接线（P3-1 enableReflection）', () => {
+  const collectStates = async (config: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<string[]> => {
+    const adapter = createMockAdapter([
+      toolCallEvent('read_file', { file_path: 'a.ts' }),
+      textDoneEvent('done'),
+    ]);
+    const engine = new AgentLoopEngine(config as never, adapter);
+    const states: string[] = [];
+    engine.on('stateChange', (d: { state?: string; current?: string }) => {
+      const s = d.state ?? d.current ?? '';
+      if (!states.includes(s)) states.push(s);
+    });
+    await engine.runStream(userMessage, 's1', [], systemPrompt);
+    return states;
+  };
+
+  it('enableReflection=true 时工具执行后进入 REFLECTING 状态', async () => {
+    const states = await collectStates({ maxIterations: 2, enableReflection: true });
+    expect(states).toContain('REFLECTING');
+    expect(states).toContain('EXECUTING');
+    expect(states).toContain('OBSERVING');
+  });
+
+  it('enableReflection=false（默认）时不进入 REFLECTING', async () => {
+    const states = await collectStates({ maxIterations: 2, enableReflection: false });
+    expect(states).not.toContain('REFLECTING');
+  });
+});

electron/harness/agent-loop/engine.ts

@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ class DeadLoopError extends Error {
 
 const DEFAULT_CONFIG: AgentLoopConfig = {
   maxIterations: 20,
-  timeoutMs: 120_000,
   totalTimeoutMs: 600_000,
   enableReflection: false,
   compressionThreshold: 0.8,
@@ -563,7 +562,7 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
           });
           // 抛出特殊错误，主循环捕获后以 DEAD_LOOP 原因终止
           throw new DeadLoopError(
-            `Detected a potential infinite loop: the same tool calls were repeated for 3 consecutive iterations. Please refine the approach or provide more specific instructions.`,
+            `Detected a potential infinite loop: the same tool calls were repeated for 3 consecutive iterations, or two alternating call patterns kept cycling (A→B→A→B) without progress. Please refine the approach or provide more specific instructions.`,
           );
         }
       }
@@ -620,7 +619,11 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
       await this.transitionTo(AgentLoopState.OBSERVING);
 
       // === v0.2.0: REFLECTING 状态 — 观察工具结果，决定是否继续 ===
-      // 如果有工具调用且需要后续推理，进入 REFLECTING 状态
+      // v0.7.3 接线说明：REFLECTING 分支此前依赖 enableReflection 配置，但该配置
+      // 全链路无任何置 true 的路径（死配置）。现由 agent.enableReflection 配置
+      // 真实驱动（main.ts baseConfig → updateConfigAll → 本分支），启用后每轮
+      // 工具执行完毕会经过 REFLECTING 状态：工具结果存在失败时记录告警日志，
+      // 供 SLO 与排障观察（不阻断循环——错误结果已由 CE-2 路径回传模型自愈）。
       if (this.config.enableReflection && step.toolCalls && step.toolCalls.length > 0) {
         await this.transitionTo(AgentLoopState.REFLECTING);
         // 检查工具执行是否有错误，如果有严重错误可以提前终止
@@ -1087,9 +1090,13 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
   /**
    * v0.3.0: 死循环检测
    *
-   * 检测策略：
-   * 将每轮的工具调用序列化为签名字符串，检查最近3轮的签名是否完全相同。
-   * 如果连续3轮使用完全相同的参数调用相同的工具，判定为死循环。
+   * 检测策略（v0.7.3 起双模式）：
+   * 1. 驻留模式 — 将每轮的工具调用序列化为签名字符串，检查最近3轮的签名是否完全相同。
+   *    如果连续3轮使用完全相同的参数调用相同的工具，判定为死循环。
+   * 2. 乒乓模式（v0.7.3 新增）— 最近4轮构成 ABAB 交替（r1===r3 && r2===r4 && r1!==r2）。
+   *    典型场景：模型在"读文件 A → 写文件 B"两步之间无限往返（每次读完又改回），
+   *    单步签名各不相同，驻留模式永不命中；docs/Agentic-Loop详解.md 第五章将
+   *    "两种状态间反复来回切换、毫无进展"列为必须检测的停滞模式。
    *
    * v0.3.0 修复：
    * - 对 args 的键进行排序，避免 JSON.stringify 键顺序不一致导致漏报
@@ -1123,21 +1130,31 @@ export class AgentLoopEngine extends EventEmitter {
 
     this.toolCallHistory.push(signature);
 
-    // 只保留最近5轮的记录（足够检测3轮重复，同时避免内存增长）
+    // 只保留最近5轮的记录（足够检测3轮重复与4轮乒乓，同时避免内存增长）
     if (this.toolCallHistory.length > 5) {
       this.toolCallHistory.shift();
     }
 
-    // 需要至少3轮数据才能检测
-    if (this.toolCallHistory.length < 3) return false;
-
     const len = this.toolCallHistory.length;
-    const r1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 1]; // 当前轮
-    const r2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 2]; // 上一轮
-    const r3 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 3]; // 上上一轮
 
-    // 连续3轮完全相同 → 死循环
-    return r1 === r2 && r2 === r3;
+    // 模式 1：连续3轮完全相同 → 死循环
+    if (len >= 3) {
+      const r1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 1]; // 当前轮
+      const r2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 2]; // 上一轮
+      const r3 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 3]; // 上上一轮
+      if (r1 === r2 && r2 === r3) return true;
+    }
+
+    // 模式 2（v0.7.3）：最近4轮 ABAB 交替（A≠B）→ 乒乓死循环
+    if (len >= 4) {
+      const a1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 4];
+      const b1 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 3];
+      const a2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 2];
+      const b2 = this.toolCallHistory[len - 1];
+      if (a1 === a2 && b1 === b2 && a1 !== b1) return true;
+    }
+
+    return false;
   }
 
   /**

electron/harness/agent-loop/types.ts

@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ export interface TokenUsage {
 
 export interface AgentLoopConfig {
   maxIterations: number;
-  timeoutMs: number;
   totalTimeoutMs: number;
   enableReflection: boolean;
   compressionThreshold: number;

electron/harness/hooks/__tests__/forget-session.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/**
+ * ConfirmationHook forgetSession 测试（v0.7.3 P2-3）
+ *
+ * 锁定会话终态清理契约：
+ * F1 forgetSession 清空该会话的决策记忆（拒绝记忆不再残留）；
+ * F2 forgetSession 同时拒绝该会话等待中的确认（clearPending 语义）；
+ * F3 会话隔离：清理 A 不影响 B；
+ * F4 空/未知 sessionId 幂等无副作用。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+
+// 模拟一个存活窗口 —— beforeExecute 的 hasAvailableWindow 守卫需要它，
+// 否则确认请求在创建 pending 之前即被短路（测不到记忆/pending 路径）
+const fakeWindow = {
+  isDestroyed: () => false,
+  webContents: { send: vi.fn() },
+};
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  BrowserWindow: { getAllWindows: vi.fn(() => [fakeWindow]) },
+}));
+
+import { ConfirmationHook } from '../confirmation-hook';
+import type { MetonaToolCall, MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
+import { MetonaRiskLevel, MetonaToolCategory } from '../../../harness/types';
+
+function makeToolCall(name: string, id = `tc_${name}`): MetonaToolCall {
+  return { id, name, args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() };
+}
+
+const NEEDS_CONFIRM_DEF: MetonaToolDef = {
+  name: 'run_command',
+  description: 'test',
+  parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {}, required: [] },
+  category: MetonaToolCategory.CODE_EXECUTION,
+  riskLevel: MetonaRiskLevel.HIGH,
+  requiresPermission: true,
+  timeoutMs: 1000,
+};
+
+describe('ConfirmationHook — forgetSession（P2-3）', () => {
+  let hook: ConfirmationHook;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    hook = new ConfirmationHook(null, null);
+    hook.setToolDefs([NEEDS_CONFIRM_DEF]);
+  });
+
+  it('F1: 会话删除后决策记忆被清空（拒绝记忆不再跨生命周期残留）', async () => {
+    const pending = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command'), 'sess-A');
+    hook.resolveConfirmation(`tc_run_command`, false, true); // 记住拒绝
+    await pending;
+
+    expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-A')).toHaveLength(1);
+    hook.forgetSession('sess-A');
+    expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-A')).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('F2: forgetSession 拒绝该会话等待中的确认（clearPending 语义）', async () => {
+    const p1 = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command'), 'sess-A');
+    // resolve pending（拒绝）后走记忆清理路径
+    hook.forgetSession('sess-A');
+    await expect(p1).resolves.toMatchObject({ blocked: true });
+    // pending 已清空 —— getPendingConfirmations 无残留
+    expect(hook.getPendingConfirmations()).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('F3: 会话隔离 —— 清理 A 不影响 B 的决策记忆', async () => {
+    const p1 = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command', 'tc_A'), 'sess-A');
+    hook.resolveConfirmation('tc_A', false, true);
+    await p1;
+
+    const p2 = hook.beforeExecute(makeToolCall('run_command', 'tc_B'), 'sess-B');
+    hook.resolveConfirmation('tc_B', false, true);
+    await p2;
+
+    hook.forgetSession('sess-A');
+    expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-A')).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(hook.getRememberedDenials('sess-B')).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it('F4: 空 sessionId 幂等无副作用；未知会话不抛错', () => {
+    expect(() => hook.forgetSession('')).not.toThrow();
+    expect(() => hook.forgetSession('nonexistent')).not.toThrow();
+    expect(hook.getRememberedDenials()).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+});

electron/harness/hooks/confirmation-hook.ts

@@ -550,6 +550,22 @@ export class ConfirmationHook implements PreToolHook {
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * v0.7.3 P2-3: 会话生命周期终态清理（会话删除 / SubAgent 终结时调用）。
+   *
+   * 此前 rememberedDecisions 两级 Map 只增不减 —— 会话删除/子任务终结后其
+   * 决策记忆永久残留，长期运行实例随会话数缓慢泄漏。本方法与 clearPending
+   * 的区别：clearPending 只处理等待中的确认（会话中断时用，会话本身仍存活），
+   * 本方法面向"会话已终结"的终态，同时清空 pending 与决策记忆。
+   *
+   * @param sessionId 会话 ID（主会话或 SubAgent taskId）
+   */
+  forgetSession(sessionId: string): void {
+    if (!sessionId) return;
+    this.clearPending(sessionId);
+    this.rememberedDecisions.delete(sessionId);
+  }
+
   // ===== 私有辅助（v0.5.0: 会话隔离） =====
 
   /** 获取（或创建）指定会话的决策记忆表 */

electron/harness/memory/__tests__/consolidation-policy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/**
+ * 记忆固化触发决策测试（v0.7.3 P1-5）
+ *
+ * 锁定 shouldConsolidate 的四类判定：总开关 / 内容门控（回答长度 ∨ 成功工具调用）/
+ * 频率窗口（含首次不限）/ 配置兜底（非法数值回退安全下限）。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  shouldConsolidate,
+  MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS,
+  MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS,
+} from '../consolidation-policy';
+
+const BASE = {
+  enabled: true,
+  answerChars: 500,
+  minChars: 200,
+  hadSuccessfulToolCall: false,
+  lastConsolidationAt: 0,
+  now: 1_000_000,
+  intervalMs: 600_000,
+};
+
+describe('shouldConsolidate', () => {
+  it('总开关显式关闭 → disabled', () => {
+    expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, enabled: false })).toEqual({
+      consolidate: false,
+      reason: 'disabled',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('回答够长且首次固化 → 允许（lastConsolidationAt=0 不受频率限制）', () => {
+    expect(shouldConsolidate(BASE)).toEqual({
+      consolidate: true,
+      reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('回答过短且无成功工具调用 → below-threshold（短寒暄不触发固化）', () => {
+    expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, answerChars: 50, hadSuccessfulToolCall: false })).toEqual({
+      consolidate: false,
+      reason: 'below-threshold',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('回答过短但存在成功工具调用 → 允许（事实性上下文可沉淀）', () => {
+    expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, answerChars: 50, hadSuccessfulToolCall: true })).toEqual({
+      consolidate: true,
+      reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('频率窗口内重复触发 → throttled', () => {
+    expect(
+      shouldConsolidate({
+        ...BASE,
+        lastConsolidationAt: BASE.now - 60_000, // 1 分钟前刚固化过
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ consolidate: false, reason: 'throttled' });
+  });
+
+  it('频率窗口已过 → 允许', () => {
+    expect(
+      shouldConsolidate({
+        ...BASE,
+        lastConsolidationAt: BASE.now - 600_001,
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ consolidate: true, reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass' });
+  });
+
+  it('配置兜底：minChars=0 不会让纯寒暄触发（安全下限生效）', () => {
+    expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, minChars: 0, answerChars: 10 })).toEqual({
+      consolidate: false,
+      reason: 'below-threshold',
+    });
+    expect(MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+
+  it('配置兜底：intervalMs=0 不会退化为每条消息固化（安全下限生效）', () => {
+    expect(
+      shouldConsolidate({
+        ...BASE,
+        intervalMs: 0,
+        lastConsolidationAt: BASE.now - 30_000, // 30 秒前刚固化
+      }),
+    ).toEqual({ consolidate: false, reason: 'throttled' });
+    expect(MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(60_000);
+  });
+
+  it('配置兜底：minChars/intervalMs 为 NaN 时按默认值处理', () => {
+    expect(shouldConsolidate({ ...BASE, minChars: Number.NaN, intervalMs: Number.NaN })).toEqual({
+      consolidate: true,
+      reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass',
+    });
+  });
+});

electron/harness/memory/consolidation-policy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/**
+ * Consolidation Policy — 记忆固化触发决策（v0.7.3 P1-5）
+ *
+ * 背景：MemoryConsolidator 在每次 run 完成后无条件发起一次非流式 LLM 请求
+ * （30s 超时）判断本次对话是否有值得持久化的记忆。短寒暄/单轮问答同样触发，
+ * 纯成本浪费且对 Provider 构成无意义请求压力。
+ *
+ * 本模块把触发决策收敛为纯函数（可表测），决策输入：
+ * - 总开关 memory.consolidationEnabled（fail-secure：仅显式 false 才关闭）
+ * - 内容门控：本次回答 ≥ minChars 字符 **或** 本次 run 存在成功的工具调用
+ *   （工具调用意味着产生了可沉淀的事实性上下文）
+ * - 频率门控：距该会话上次固化 ≥ intervalMs（首次不设限，但仍受内容门控约束）
+ *
+ * 决策与执行解耦：本模块不做 IO，调用方（ipc/agent.ts）持有会话级
+ * lastConsolidationAt 状态并执行 consolidate。
+ */
+
+export interface ConsolidationDecisionInput {
+  /** 总开关（memory.consolidationEnabled；undefined/null 视为开启） */
+  enabled: boolean | null | undefined;
+  /** 本次 Agent 最终回答的字符数 */
+  answerChars: number;
+  /** 内容门控阈值（memory.consolidationMinChars，默认 200） */
+  minChars: number;
+  /** 本次 run 是否存在成功的工具调用 */
+  hadSuccessfulToolCall: boolean;
+  /** 该会话上次固化的时间戳（0 = 从未固化） */
+  lastConsolidationAt: number;
+  /** 当前时间戳 */
+  now: number;
+  /** 频率门控窗口（memory.consolidationIntervalMs，默认 600000） */
+  intervalMs: number;
+}
+
+export type ConsolidationDecision =
+  | { consolidate: true; reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass' }
+  | { consolidate: false; reason: 'disabled' | 'below-threshold' | 'throttled' };
+
+/** 频率窗口合法下限（防误配 0/负值导致门控失效——0 等价于每条消息都固化） */
+export const MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;
+
+/** 内容门控合法下限（防误配 0 导致纯寒暄也固化） */
+export const MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS = 20;
+
+/**
+ * 判定本次 run 是否应触发记忆固化。
+ */
+export function shouldConsolidate(input: ConsolidationDecisionInput): ConsolidationDecision {
+  // 1. 总开关 —— fail-secure 语义由调用方负责（!== false 才视为开启后传入布尔）
+  if (input.enabled === false) {
+    return { consolidate: false, reason: 'disabled' };
+  }
+
+  // 2. 内容门控：回答够长 或 有成功的工具调用（事实性上下文）
+  const minChars = Math.max(
+    MIN_CONSOLIDATION_MIN_CHARS,
+    Number.isFinite(input.minChars) ? input.minChars : 200,
+  );
+  const contentWorthy = input.answerChars >= minChars || input.hadSuccessfulToolCall;
+  if (!contentWorthy) {
+    return { consolidate: false, reason: 'below-threshold' };
+  }
+
+  // 3. 频率门控：上次固化距今不足窗口 → 跳过（首次 lastConsolidationAt=0 不受限）
+  const intervalMs = Math.max(
+    MIN_CONSOLIDATION_INTERVAL_MS,
+    Number.isFinite(input.intervalMs) ? input.intervalMs : 600_000,
+  );
+  if (input.lastConsolidationAt > 0 && input.now - input.lastConsolidationAt < intervalMs) {
+    return { consolidate: false, reason: 'throttled' };
+  }
+
+  return { consolidate: true, reason: 'content-and-frequency-pass' };
+}

electron/harness/orchestration/orchestrator.ts

@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ export class TaskOrchestrator extends EventEmitter {
         thinkingEffort: this.defaultConfig?.thinkingEffort ?? 'medium',
         contextLength: this.defaultConfig?.contextLength,
         contextWindow: this.defaultConfig?.contextWindow ?? 128_000,
+        // v0.7.3 P3-1: SubAgent 与主引擎同源消费 enableReflection（REFLECTING 状态开关）
+        enableReflection: this.defaultConfig?.enableReflection ?? false,
       },
       this.engines.createAdapter(),
       this.toolRegistry,

electron/harness/prompts/__tests__/context-builder.test.ts

@@ -64,11 +64,23 @@ describe('ContextBuilder — isUsingFallbackRole 首次降级通知语义', () =
 });
 
 describe('ContextBuilder — 动态区注入', () => {
-  it('注入当前日期时间（含本地时区）', () => {
+  it('v0.7.3 P1-1: 不再注入日期时间（prompt cache 前缀稳定性）', () => {
     const cb = new ContextBuilder();
     const prompt = cb.buildSystemPrompt({ soul: 'x', memory: '' });
-    expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).toContain('## Current Date & Time');
-    expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).toMatch(/UTC[+-]/);
+    expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).not.toContain('## Current Date & Time');
+    expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).not.toMatch(/UTC[+-]/);
+  });
+
+  it('v0.7.3 P1-1: system 输出跨调用字节级稳定（同输入 → 同字节）', () => {
+    const cb = new ContextBuilder();
+    const files = { soul: 'x', memory: '## 用户偏好\n- 偏好深色主题' };
+    const a = cb.buildSystemPrompt(files, '/tmp/ws-demo');
+    const b = cb.buildSystemPrompt(files, '/tmp/ws-demo');
+    // 跨 run 缓存命中的前提：四分区逐字节一致（日期时间已移入用户消息前置块）
+    expect(a.roleDefinition).toBe(b.roleDefinition);
+    expect(a.outputConstraints).toBe(b.outputConstraints);
+    expect(a.safetyGuidelines).toBe(b.safetyGuidelines);
+    expect(a.dynamicReminders).toBe(b.dynamicReminders);
   });
 
   it('注入工作空间路径（动态区，路径可切换）', () => {

electron/harness/prompts/__tests__/user-context.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/**
+ * 用户上下文前置块测试（v0.7.3 P1-1）
+ *
+ * 锁定三类动态内容（日期时间 / 记忆 / 附件提示）在用户消息前置块的
+ * 分组结构与空值收缩行为 —— 它们从 system prompt 迁出的契约面。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { buildUserContextPrefix, withUserContextPrefix } from '../user-context';
+
+describe('buildUserContextPrefix', () => {
+  it('恒含头部说明与日期时间分区（唯一无条件分区）', () => {
+    const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({ now: Date.UTC(2026, 7, 30, 6, 30) });
+    expect(prefix).toContain('[Contextual information for this message');
+    expect(prefix).toContain('## Current Date & Time');
+  });
+
+  it('无记忆/附件时不产出对应分区（空值收缩）', () => {
+    const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({ now: Date.now() });
+    expect(prefix).not.toContain('## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)');
+    expect(prefix).not.toContain('## User Attachments (Direct Upload)');
+  });
+
+  it('记忆分区：条目格式与截断口径（沿用原 system 注入契约）', () => {
+    const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
+      now: Date.now(),
+      memories: [
+        {
+          id: 'm1',
+          type: 'semantic',
+          content: 'x'.repeat(500),
+          source: 'agent_thought',
+          importance: 0.9,
+          score: 0.8,
+          createdAt: Date.now(),
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+    expect(prefix).toContain('## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)');
+    expect(prefix).toMatch(/\[1\] \(semantic, 重要度: 0\.9\)/);
+    // 内容截断到 200 字符
+    expect(prefix).toContain('x'.repeat(200));
+    expect(prefix).not.toContain('x'.repeat(201));
+  });
+
+  it('附件分区：图片提示禁止重复读图；文本截断标记透传', () => {
+    const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
+      now: Date.now(),
+      attachments: [
+        { name: 'shot.png', type: 'image' },
+        { name: 'big.log', type: 'text', truncated: true },
+      ],
+    });
+    expect(prefix).toContain('## User Attachments (Direct Upload)');
+    expect(prefix).toContain('1. [image] shot.png');
+    expect(prefix).toContain('do NOT call view_image');
+    expect(prefix).toContain('2. [text file] big.log');
+    expect(prefix).toContain('TRUNCATED — only the first 512KB is included');
+  });
+
+  it('分区以 --- 分隔且以前缀分隔符收尾（调用方可直接拼接用户内容）', () => {
+    const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
+      now: Date.now(),
+      memories: [
+        {
+          id: 'm',
+          type: 'episodic',
+          content: 'c',
+          source: 'user_input',
+          importance: 0.5,
+          score: 0.5,
+          createdAt: Date.now(),
+        },
+      ],
+      attachments: [{ name: 'a.txt', type: 'text' }],
+    });
+    expect(prefix).toMatch(/---\s*$/);
+    // 三个分区恰好两个内部 --- + 收尾 1 个 ---（共 3 个独立行）
+    expect(prefix.match(/^---$/gm)?.length ?? 0).toBe(3);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('withUserContextPrefix', () => {
+  it('前置块与用户内容拼接（前置块自带收尾分隔符）', () => {
+    const prefix = buildUserContextPrefix({ now: Date.now() });
+    const out = withUserContextPrefix(prefix, '你好，帮我写个脚本');
+    expect(out.startsWith(prefix)).toBe(true);
+    expect(out.endsWith('你好，帮我写个脚本')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('空前缀原样返回（契约防御）', () => {
+    expect(withUserContextPrefix('', 'hello')).toBe('hello');
+  });
+});

electron/harness/prompts/context-builder.ts

@@ -58,7 +58,10 @@ export class ContextBuilder {
    *
    * v0.3.14: 移除 AGENTS.md 和 USERS.md 的读取，SOUL.md 仅做角色定义
    */
-  buildSystemPrompt(workspaceFiles?: WorkspaceFiles, workspacePath?: string): {
+  buildSystemPrompt(
+    workspaceFiles?: WorkspaceFiles,
+    workspacePath?: string,
+  ): {
     roleDefinition: string;
     outputConstraints: string;
     safetyGuidelines: string;
@@ -76,23 +79,19 @@ export class ContextBuilder {
     // ===== 动态区：记忆 =====
     const dynamicParts: string[] = [];
 
-    // v0.3.14: 注入当前系统日期时间（每次构建时获取最新时间）
-    // 用于让 AI 准确理解"今天"、"昨天"等相对时间表达
-    // #43 修复: 时区硬编码 Asia/Shanghai 改为使用系统本地时区，跨时区用户显示正确
-    const now = new Date();
-    const localTimezone = Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone ?? 'Asia/Shanghai';
-    // 审查修复: 恢复 UTC 偏移显示，在时区名后附加 UTC 偏移，避免丢失时区偏移信息
-    const offset = -now.getTimezoneOffset() / 60;
-    const offsetStr = offset >= 0 ? `UTC+${offset}` : `UTC${offset}`;
-    const dateTimeStr = now.toLocaleString('zh-CN', {
-      timeZone: localTimezone,
-      hour12: false,
-    });
-    dynamicParts.push(`## Current Date & Time\n${dateTimeStr} (${localTimezone}, ${offsetStr})`);
+    // v0.7.3 P1-1 根治: 当前日期时间不再注入 system prompt —— 此前每次构建都
+    // 产生不同字节（秒级时间戳 + 时区），导致跨 run 的 system 前缀永不一致，
+    // DeepSeek 自动上下文缓存 / Anthropic 显式缓存全部 miss。现移入用户消息
+    // 前置块（@see user-context.ts），system 保持跨 run 字节级稳定。
+    // MEMORY.md 的 `> 创建时间/最后更新` 元数据行由 extractContent 剥离，
+    // 正文提取不受时间戳更新影响 —— 此处无需额外处理。
 
-    // 注入当前工作空间路径（动态区，路径可能切换故不放入静态区）
+    // 注入当前工作空间路径（动态区，路径可能切换故不放入静态区；
+    // 会话期间路径恒定，不破坏缓存）
     if (workspacePath) {
-      dynamicParts.push(`## Current Workspace\nWorkspace root path: \`${workspacePath}\`\n\nAll relative paths in tool calls are resolved against this workspace root. Use this path when absolute paths are required (e.g., in run_command).`);
+      dynamicParts.push(
+        `## Current Workspace\nWorkspace root path: \`${workspacePath}\`\n\nAll relative paths in tool calls are resolved against this workspace root. Use this path when absolute paths are required (e.g., in run_command).`,
+      );
     }
 
     if (workspaceFiles?.memory) {
@@ -138,7 +137,9 @@ export class ContextBuilder {
     } else {
       // v0.3.18 修复: 降级时打 WARN 日志 + 设置标志，供 IPC 层读取后发 toast
       this.lastUsedFallbackRole = true;
-      log.warn('[ContextBuilder] SOUL.md is missing or empty, falling back to default Metona identity');
+      log.warn(
+        '[ContextBuilder] SOUL.md is missing or empty, falling back to default Metona identity',
+      );
       // 兜底身份定义（Metona 灵魂定义）
       parts.push(`# Metona — 灵魂定义
 > "想清楚再动手，做对比做快重要"

electron/harness/prompts/user-context.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/**
+ * User Context Prefix — 每条用户消息的系统上下文前置块（v0.7.3 P1-1 根治）
+ *
+ * 背景（Prompt Cache 被打穿的根因）：
+ * 此前「当前日期时间」「检索到的相关记忆」「附件提示」三类**每条消息都在变**
+ * 的内容被追加进 systemPrompt.dynamicReminders —— OpenAI 兼容系将其拼进首条
+ * system 消息、Anthropic 写入顶层 system 字段。任何一次变化都会使整个 system
+ * 前缀失配，DeepSeek 自动上下文缓存 / Anthropic 显式缓存全部 miss。长 system
+ * （SOUL + 安全准则 + MEMORY.md）× 每 run 最多 20 轮迭代 × 全量重算输入 token，
+ * 成本与首字延迟被系统性放大。
+ *
+ * 现契约（单一事实来源）：
+ * - system prompt 只保留跨 run 字节级稳定的内容（SOUL / 约束 / 安全准则 /
+ *   工作空间路径 / MEMORY.md 正文——其易变的 `> 最后更新` 元数据行本就被
+ *   extractContent 剥离）；Anthropic 侧对该稳定前缀打 cache_control 断言；
+ * - 易变内容（日期时间 / 记忆 / 附件提示）由本模块构建为**用户消息前置块**，
+ *   随当次请求注入首条 user 消息（LLM 语义等价：Claude Code 同款上下文注入位）；
+ * - DB 持久化 / 前端展示 / 记忆固化 / 注入检测均使用**原始干净内容**，
+ *   前置块只存在于发给引擎的副本上。
+ *
+ * 纯函数、零副作用：可在 node vitest 下直接表测（稳定性/分组/空值收缩）。
+ */
+
+import type { SearchResult } from '../memory/manager';
+
+/** 附件提示所需的元信息子集（与 agent-store AttachmentInfo 对齐的渲染端子集） */
+export interface AttachmentHint {
+  name: string;
+  type: string;
+  truncated?: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface UserContextPrefixInput {
+  /** 当前时间戳（前置块内降精度到分钟，减少无意义抖动） */
+  now?: number;
+  /** 检索到的相关记忆（空数组时不产出记忆分区） */
+  memories?: SearchResult[];
+  /** 用户附件元信息（空数组/undefined 时不产出附件分区） */
+  attachments?: AttachmentHint[];
+  /**
+   * 时区标签（如 "Asia/Shanghai (UTC+8)"）。
+   * 由调用方计算（Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone）——
+   * 本模块保持纯函数语义，不做 Electron/Intl 环境依赖。
+   */
+  timezoneLabel?: string;
+}
+
+/** 记忆注入条目的内容截断（与原 dynamicReminders 注入口径一致） */
+const MEMORY_EXCERPT_CHARS = 200;
+/** 附件提示上限（与输入侧 5 个附件的硬上限对齐） */
+const MAX_ATTACHMENT_HINTS = 8;
+
+/**
+ * 构建用户消息上下文前置块。
+ *
+ * 输出形态（各分区以 `\n\n---\n\n` 分隔，整体以分隔符结尾，
+ * 调用方直接 `${prefix}${userContent}` 拼接）：
+ * ```
+ * [Contextual information for this message — system-generated metadata, not part of the user's request.]
+ *
+ * ## Current Date & Time
+ * 2026/8/30 14:30:00 (Asia/Shanghai, UTC+8)
+ *
+ * ---
+ *
+ * ## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)
+ * [1] (semantic, 重要度: 0.9) ...
+ *
+ * ---
+ *
+ * ## User Attachments (Direct Upload)
+ * ...
+ * ```
+ */
+export function buildUserContextPrefix(input: UserContextPrefixInput): string {
+  const parts: string[] = [];
+
+  // ===== 分区 1：当前日期时间（降精度到分钟） =====
+  const now = input.now ?? Date.now();
+  const timezoneLabel = input.timezoneLabel ?? 'UTC';
+  const dateStr = new Date(now).toLocaleString('sv-SE', {
+    timeZone: undefined,
+    hour12: false,
+  }); // sv-SE 给出 ISO 形态 "2026-08-30 14:30:00"
+  parts.push(`## Current Date & Time\n${dateStr} (${timezoneLabel})`);
+
+  // ===== 分区 2：相关记忆注入（沿用原 system 注入的展示口径） =====
+  const memories = (input.memories ?? []).slice(0, 5);
+  if (memories.length > 0) {
+    const memorySection = memories
+      .map(
+        (m, i) =>
+          `[${i + 1}] (${m.type}, 重要度: ${m.importance.toFixed(1)}) ${m.content.slice(0, MEMORY_EXCERPT_CHARS)}`,
+      )
+      .join('\n');
+    parts.push(`## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)\n${memorySection}`);
+  }
+
+  // ===== 分区 3：附件提示（沿用原 system 注入的语义与文案契约） =====
+  const attachments = (input.attachments ?? []).slice(0, MAX_ATTACHMENT_HINTS);
+  if (attachments.length > 0) {
+    const attachmentList = attachments
+      .map((att, i) => {
+        const typeLabel =
+          att.type === 'image' ? 'image' : att.type === 'text' ? 'text file' : 'file';
+        // 文本附件被上传入口截断（512KB 上限）时，明确告知 LLM 内容不完整，
+        // 防止模型把残缺内容当作完整文件事实（v0.7.2 A5 契约延续）
+        const truncatedNote =
+          att.truncated === true
+            ? ' (TRUNCATED — only the first 512KB is included; the full content is NOT available)'
+            : '';
+        const note =
+          att.type === 'image'
+            ? 'already provided to you via vision capability — you can SEE it directly, do NOT call view_image or any tool to read it again'
+            : att.type === 'text'
+              ? `content${truncatedNote} already inlined in the user message, do NOT search in workspace or read it again`
+              : 'uploaded directly by user, do NOT search in workspace';
+        return `${i + 1}. [${typeLabel}] ${att.name} — ${note}`;
+      })
+      .join('\n');
+
+    parts.push(
+      `## User Attachments (Direct Upload)\nThe following files were uploaded directly by the user to this conversation. They are inline attachments, NOT workspace files:\n${attachmentList}\n\n**IMPORTANT**: Images listed above are already visible to you in this conversation. Do NOT call \`view_image\`, \`read_file\`, or any file tool to read them — doing so wastes a tool call and may fail (they are not workspace files).`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const header =
+    "[Contextual information for this message — system-generated metadata, not part of the user's request.]";
+
+  return `${header}\n\n${parts.join('\n\n---\n\n')}\n\n---\n\n`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * 将前置块与用户原始内容拼装为发送给引擎的消息内容。
+ * 空前缀（理论上不会发生——日期分区恒存在，但契约上防御）时原样返回。
+ */
+export function withUserContextPrefix(prefix: string, userContent: string): string {
+  if (!prefix) return userContent;
+  return `${prefix}${userContent}`;
+}

electron/harness/tools/built-in/__tests__/ssrf-dispatcher.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/**
+ * SSRF DNS Pinning 测试（v0.7.3 P2-1）
+ *
+ * 锁定三个单元：
+ * D1 createPinnedLookup —— 只返回校验阶段锁定的 IP 集合（过滤非法 family），
+ *    空集合返回 ENOTFOUND（防御）。
+ * D2 resolveRedirectTarget —— 重定向状态识别 + 相对 Location 解析 +
+ *    非法/缺失 Location 返回 null。
+ * D3 resolvePinnedIps —— IP 直连与私网拒绝（走 ssrf-guard 单一事实来源；
+ *    域名解析路径由 ssrf-guard 表测覆盖，此处不重复触网）。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { createPinnedLookup, resolveRedirectTarget, resolvePinnedIps } from '../ssrf-dispatcher';
+import type { LookupCallback } from '../ssrf-dispatcher';
+
+describe('createPinnedLookup', () => {
+  it('D1: 仅返回钉死的 IP 集合（忽略 hostname），family 正确标注', async () => {
+    const lookup = createPinnedLookup(['93.184.216.34', '2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946']);
+    const result = await new Promise<{ address: string; family: number }[]>((resolve, reject) => {
+      const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses!));
+      lookup('attacker.example', {}, cb);
+    });
+    expect(result).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(result[0]).toEqual({ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 });
+    expect(result[1].family).toBe(6);
+  });
+
+  it('D1: 非法 family（非 IPv4/IPv6 字符串）被过滤', async () => {
+    const lookup = createPinnedLookup(['not-an-ip']);
+    await expect(
+      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses));
+        lookup('h', {}, cb as never);
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
+  });
+
+  it('D1: 空集合 → ENOTFOUND（防御：调用方不应构造空 pin dispatcher）', async () => {
+    const lookup = createPinnedLookup([]);
+    await expect(
+      new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        const cb: LookupCallback = (err, addresses) => (err ? reject(err) : resolve(addresses));
+        lookup('h', {}, cb as never);
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOTFOUND' });
+  });
+});
+
+describe('resolveRedirectTarget', () => {
+  const makeResponse = (status: number, location?: string) => ({
+    status,
+    headers: {
+      get: (name: string) => (name.toLowerCase() === 'location' ? (location ?? null) : null),
+    },
+  });
+
+  it('D2: 301/302/303/307/308 识别并解析绝对 Location', () => {
+    for (const status of [301, 302, 303, 307, 308]) {
+      expect(
+        resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(status, 'https://cdn.example.com/x'), 'https://a.test/'),
+      ).toBe('https://cdn.example.com/x');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('D2: 相对 Location 以当前 URL 为基解析（RFC 7231）', () => {
+    expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, '/next?a=1'), 'https://a.test/dir/page')).toBe(
+      'https://a.test/next?a=1',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('D2: 非 3xx 状态 → null（终态）', () => {
+    expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(200), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(404), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('D2: 缺失/非法 Location → null', () => {
+    expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, ''), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolveRedirectTarget(makeResponse(302, 'http://[::bad'), 'https://a.test/')).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('resolvePinnedIps', () => {
+  it('D3: IP 直连 URL —— 公网 IP 直接返回', async () => {
+    const ips = await resolvePinnedIps('https://93.184.216.34/x');
+    expect(ips).toEqual(['93.184.216.34']);
+  });
+
+  it('D3: 私有/回环 IP 直连被拒（单一事实来源 ssrf-guard）', async () => {
+    for (const host of ['127.0.0.1', '10.0.0.5', '169.254.169.254', '192.168.1.1', '[::1]']) {
+      await expect(resolvePinnedIps(`http://${host}/latest`)).rejects.toThrow(/Blocked SSRF/);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('D3: 非 http/https 协议被拒', async () => {
+    await expect(resolvePinnedIps('ftp://example.com')).rejects.toThrow(/not allowed/);
+  });
+
+  it('D3: 非法 URL 被拒', async () => {
+    await expect(resolvePinnedIps('not a url')).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid URL/);
+  });
+});

electron/harness/tools/built-in/browser-window-manager.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
 
 import { BrowserWindow, session } from 'electron';
 import log from 'electron-log';
+// v0.7.3 P2-2: CORS Origin 回显（纯函数在 network-utils，可表测）
+import { corsAllowOrigin, extractOriginHeader } from './network-utils';
 
 /** Agent 浏览器专用 session partition — 与主应用 default session 完全隔离 */
 const AGENT_PARTITION = 'persist:metona-agent-browser';
@@ -128,12 +130,22 @@ export class BrowserWindowManager {
 
       // v0.3.0 修复: 使用 CORS 放行替代 webSecurity: false
       // 仅对 agent session 放行 CORS，不影响主应用
+      // v0.7.3 P2-2 收紧: ACAO 从通配 '*' 改为回显请求 Origin —— 通配值让任意
+      // 第三方页面都能借该分区跨域读取；回显等价保留截图/页面自身跨域能力，
+      // 并附加 Vary: Origin 防止共享缓存把定向值串到其他 Origin。
       const agentSession = session.fromPartition(AGENT_PARTITION);
       agentSession.webRequest.onHeadersReceived((details, callback) => {
+        // Electron 类型在此版本的 OnHeadersReceivedListenerDetails 上不暴露
+        // requestHeaders —— 显式声明读取面（Origin 大小写不敏感提取）
+        const requestHeaders = (
+          details as unknown as { requestHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> }
+        ).requestHeaders;
+        const originHeader = extractOriginHeader(requestHeaders);
         callback({
           responseHeaders: {
             ...details.responseHeaders,
-            'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': ['*'],
+            'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': corsAllowOrigin(originHeader),
+            Vary: [...(details.responseHeaders?.Vary ?? []), 'Origin'],
           },
         });
       });

electron/harness/tools/built-in/command.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ import type { MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
 import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../../../harness/types';
 import { commandTouchesProtectedFile, isPathWithinWorkspace } from './file-guard';
 import type { SandboxManager } from '../../sandbox/sandbox';
+// v0.7.3 P3-2: 子进程环境净化收敛到 utils/safe-env.ts 单源
+// （与 MCP stdio 启动共用同一黑名单，历史双实现已漂移过一次）
+import { buildSafeChildEnv } from '../../../utils/safe-env';
 
 const execAsync = promisify(exec);
 const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
@@ -52,47 +55,22 @@ function decodeBuffer(buf: Buffer): string {
 /**
  * #9 修复 + 审查修复: 构建安全的子进程环境变量
  *
- * 审查修复: 原白名单方案遗漏了 GIT_* / PYTHONPATH / HTTP_PROXY 等常用变量，导致子进程功能破坏。
- * 改为黑名单方案：剔除包含敏感后缀的变量，保留其余。
+ * v0.7.3 P3-2: 实现收敛到 utils/safe-env.ts（buildSafeChildEnv）——
+ * 与 MCP stdio 启动共用同一黑名单，本文件仅保留 run_command 的运行时差异注入
+ * （Windows 中文编码变量）。黑名单方案的设计原因见 safe-env.ts 模块注释：
+ * 白名单方案会遗漏 GIT_* / PYTHONPATH / HTTP_PROXY 等常用变量导致子进程功能破坏。
  */
 function buildSafeCommandEnv(isWindows: boolean): Record<string, string> {
-  // 敏感变量后缀黑名单
-  const SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES = [
-    '_API_KEY',
-    '_TOKEN',
-    '_SECRET',
-    '_PASSWORD',
-    '_PASSWD',
-    '_CREDENTIAL',
-    '_CREDENTIALS',
-    '_PRIVATE_KEY',
-  ];
-  // 敏感变量名黑名单（精确匹配）
-  const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set([
-    'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY',
-    'AGNES_API_KEY',
-    'MIMO_API_KEY',
-    'GITEA_PASSWORD',
-    'DATABASE_PASSWORD',
-  ]);
-
-  const env: Record<string, string> = {};
-  for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
-    if (!val) continue;
-    if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key)) continue;
-    if (SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => key.toUpperCase().endsWith(suffix))) continue;
-    env[key] = val;
-  }
-
-  // 添加必要的运行时变量
-  env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
-  if (isWindows) {
-    env.PYTHONIOENCODING = 'utf-8';
-    env.LANG = 'zh_CN.UTF-8';
-    env.LC_ALL = 'zh_CN.UTF-8';
-  }
-
-  return env;
+  return buildSafeChildEnv({
+    runtime: isWindows
+      ? {
+          NODE_ENV: 'production',
+          PYTHONIOENCODING: 'utf-8',
+          LANG: 'zh_CN.UTF-8',
+          LC_ALL: 'zh_CN.UTF-8',
+        }
+      : { NODE_ENV: 'production' },
+  });
 }
 
 /**

electron/harness/tools/built-in/http-request.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@ import type { MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
 import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../../../harness/types';
 // v0.6.4 P2-2: SSRF 校验收敛到共享模块 ssrf-guard.ts —— 原实现是本文件私有逻辑，
 // web_fetch 无校验造成工具层最大的安全不对称。单源后所有网络工具行为一致。
+// v0.7.3 P2-1 根治: 请求层升级为 ssrfPinnedFetch —— 校验通过的 IP 集合 pin 到
+// 连接层（undici connect.lookup），校验与连接共用同一批 IP，DNS rebinding
+// 窗口（M7 已知限制）就此关闭；代理激活时自动退化为仅入口校验（见模块注释）。
 import { validateSSRF } from './ssrf-guard';
+import { ssrfPinnedFetch } from './ssrf-dispatcher';
 
 const ALLOWED_METHODS = ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE', 'HEAD'] as const;
 const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 50 * 1024; // 50KB
@@ -52,7 +56,8 @@ const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 50 * 1024; // 50KB
 export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
   readonly definition: MetonaToolDef = {
     name: 'http_request',
-    description: 'Send an HTTP/REST API request. Supports GET/POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE/HEAD methods with custom headers and body. Response body is truncated to 50KB.',
+    description:
+      'Send an HTTP/REST API request. Supports GET/POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE/HEAD methods with custom headers and body. Response body is truncated to 50KB.',
     parameters: {
       type: 'object',
       properties: {
@@ -64,7 +69,10 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
         },
         headers: { type: 'object', description: 'Request headers as key-value pairs' },
         body: { type: 'string', description: 'Request body (string)' },
-        timeout: { type: 'number', description: 'Timeout in milliseconds (default 30000, max 60000)' },
+        timeout: {
+          type: 'number',
+          description: 'Timeout in milliseconds (default 30000, max 60000)',
+        },
       },
       required: ['url'],
     },
@@ -102,15 +110,12 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
         };
       }
 
-      // 超时控制
-      const controller = new AbortController();
-      const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeout);
-
-      try {
+      // 超时控制由 ssrfPinnedFetch 内部管理（超时 → ETIMEDOUT；
+      // 工具执行层的 abort signal 经 context 传入 registry 兜底）
+      {
         const fetchOptions: RequestInit = {
           method,
           headers,
-          signal: controller.signal,
           // #10 修复: 禁用自动重定向跟随 — 防止重定向到内网地址绕过 SSRF 校验
           // 重定向后的 URL 由用户自行处理（响应中会包含 Location 头）
           redirect: 'manual',
@@ -120,7 +125,9 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
           fetchOptions.body = body;
         }
 
-        const response = await fetch(url, fetchOptions);
+        // v0.7.3 P2-1: pinned fetch —— 校验通过的 IP pin 到连接层，
+        // 关闭校验-连接之间的 DNS rebinding 窗口
+        const response = await ssrfPinnedFetch(url, fetchOptions, timeout);
         const text = await response.text();
 
         // 截断到 50KB
@@ -144,14 +151,14 @@ export class HttpRequestTool implements IMetonaTool {
           body: safeBody,
           truncated,
           ok: response.ok,
-          success: true,  // v0.3.1 修复 WARN-4: 成功路径添加 success 字段
+          success: true, // v0.3.1 修复 WARN-4: 成功路径添加 success 字段
         };
-      } finally {
-        clearTimeout(timer);
       }
     } catch (error) {
-      // 区分超时（AbortError）与其他网络错误
-      if (error instanceof Error && error.name === 'AbortError') {
+      // 区分超时与其他网络错误：AbortError（外部中断）与
+      // ETIMEDOUT（ssrfPinnedFetch 超时转译，v0.7.3 P2-1）均归为超时语义
+      const err = error as Error & { code?: string };
+      if (err?.name === 'AbortError' || err?.code === 'ETIMEDOUT') {
         return { error: 'Request timeout', success: false };
       }
       const errMsg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);

electron/harness/tools/built-in/network-utils.ts

@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ export const UA_POOL = [
   'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:133.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/133.0',
 ];
 
-export const MOBILE_UA = 'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 17_5 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/17.5 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1';
+export const MOBILE_UA =
+  'Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 17_5 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/17.5 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1';
 
 export const ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_POOL = [
   'zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8',
@@ -54,21 +55,25 @@ export function buildAntiCrawlHeaders(
   const userAgent = mobileUA ? MOBILE_UA : UA_POOL[uaIdx];
 
   let origin = '';
-  try { origin = new URL(url).origin; } catch { /* ignore */ }
+  try {
+    origin = new URL(url).origin;
+  } catch {
+    /* ignore */
+  }
 
   return {
     'User-Agent': userAgent,
-    'Accept': 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8',
+    Accept: 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8',
     'Accept-Language': ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_POOL[langIdx],
     'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, br',
     'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
-    'DNT': '1',
-    'Referer': origin || '',
+    DNT: '1',
+    Referer: origin || '',
     'Sec-Fetch-Dest': 'document',
     'Sec-Fetch-Mode': 'navigate',
     'Sec-Fetch-Site': 'none',
     'Sec-Fetch-User': '?1',
-    'Pragma': 'no-cache',
+    Pragma: 'no-cache',
   };
 }
 
@@ -107,7 +112,15 @@ export function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
     const u = new URL(url);
 
     // 去除追踪参数
-    const trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content', 'gclid', 'fbclid'];
+    const trackingParams = [
+      'utm_source',
+      'utm_medium',
+      'utm_campaign',
+      'utm_term',
+      'utm_content',
+      'gclid',
+      'fbclid',
+    ];
     for (const p of trackingParams) u.searchParams.delete(p);
 
     // H-6 增强: 排序查询参数（确保参数顺序一致，便于去重）
@@ -125,7 +138,7 @@ export function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
       (u.protocol === 'https:' && u.port === '443') ||
       (u.protocol === 'ws:' && u.port === '80') ||
       (u.protocol === 'wss:' && u.port === '443');
-    const portSuffix = isDefaultPort ? '' : (u.port ? `:${u.port}` : '');
+    const portSuffix = isDefaultPort ? '' : u.port ? `:${u.port}` : '';
 
     // 强制小写 host
     return `${u.protocol}//${u.hostname.toLowerCase()}${portSuffix}${path}${u.search}${u.hash}`;
@@ -158,47 +171,68 @@ export function isInterceptedPage(html: string): boolean {
 // ===== HTML → 纯文本转换 =====
 
 const HTML_ENTITY_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
-  '&nbsp;': ' ', '&lt;': '<', '&gt;': '>', '&amp;': '&', '&quot;': '"',
-  '&apos;': "'", '&hellip;': '…', '&mdash;': '—', '&ndash;': '–',
-  '&laquo;': '«', '&raquo;': '»', '&times;': '×', '&divide;': '÷',
-  '&copy;': '©', '&reg;': '®', '&trade;': '™', '&euro;': '€',
-  '&pound;': '£', '&yen;': '¥', '&cent;': '¢', '&deg;': '°',
+  '&nbsp;': ' ',
+  '&lt;': '<',
+  '&gt;': '>',
+  '&amp;': '&',
+  '&quot;': '"',
+  '&apos;': "'",
+  '&hellip;': '…',
+  '&mdash;': '—',
+  '&ndash;': '–',
+  '&laquo;': '«',
+  '&raquo;': '»',
+  '&times;': '×',
+  '&divide;': '÷',
+  '&copy;': '©',
+  '&reg;': '®',
+  '&trade;': '™',
+  '&euro;': '€',
+  '&pound;': '£',
+  '&yen;': '¥',
+  '&cent;': '¢',
+  '&deg;': '°',
 };
 
 export function htmlToText(html: string): string {
-  return html
-    // 移除噪声标签及内容
-    .replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<noscript[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/noscript>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<nav[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/nav>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<header[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/header>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<footer[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/footer>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<aside[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/aside>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<iframe[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/iframe>/gi, '')
-    .replace(/<svg[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/svg>/gi, '')
-    // 移除 HTML 注释
-    .replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '')
-    // 块级标签转换行
-    .replace(/<\/?(p|div|h[1-6]|li|tr|blockquote|section|article|pre|br|hr)[^>]*>/gi, '\n')
-    // 表格单元格转制表符
-    .replace(/<\/?(td|th)[^>]*>/gi, '\t')
-    // 移除剩余标签
-    .replace(/<[^>]+>/g, '')
-    // 解码 HTML 实体
-    .replace(/&#(\d+);/g, (_, n) => String.fromCharCode(Number(n)))
-    .replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, (_, h) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(h, 16)))
-    .replace(/&[a-z]+;/gi, (m) => HTML_ENTITY_MAP[m.toLowerCase()] ?? m)
-    // 清理空白
-    .replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n')
-    .replace(/[ \t]+/g, ' ')
-    .replace(/^[ \t]+/gm, '')
-    .trim();
+  return (
+    html
+      // 移除噪声标签及内容
+      .replace(/<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/script>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<style[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/style>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<noscript[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/noscript>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<nav[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/nav>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<header[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/header>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<footer[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/footer>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<aside[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/aside>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<iframe[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/iframe>/gi, '')
+      .replace(/<svg[^>]*>[\s\S]*?<\/svg>/gi, '')
+      // 移除 HTML 注释
+      .replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '')
+      // 块级标签转换行
+      .replace(/<\/?(p|div|h[1-6]|li|tr|blockquote|section|article|pre|br|hr)[^>]*>/gi, '\n')
+      // 表格单元格转制表符
+      .replace(/<\/?(td|th)[^>]*>/gi, '\t')
+      // 移除剩余标签
+      .replace(/<[^>]+>/g, '')
+      // 解码 HTML 实体
+      .replace(/&#(\d+);/g, (_, n) => String.fromCharCode(Number(n)))
+      .replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, (_, h) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(h, 16)))
+      .replace(/&[a-z]+;/gi, (m) => HTML_ENTITY_MAP[m.toLowerCase()] ?? m)
+      // 清理空白
+      .replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n')
+      .replace(/[ \t]+/g, ' ')
+      .replace(/^[ \t]+/gm, '')
+      .trim()
+  );
 }
 
 // ===== 流式读取（大文件保护，10MB 上限） =====
 
-export async function readBodyWithLimit(response: Response, maxBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024): Promise<string> {
+export async function readBodyWithLimit(
+  response: Response,
+  maxBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024,
+): Promise<string> {
   const contentLength = response.headers.get('content-length');
   if (contentLength && parseInt(contentLength) > maxBytes) {
     throw new Error(`Response too large: ${contentLength} bytes (limit: ${maxBytes})`);
@@ -249,6 +283,40 @@ export function logTool(toolName: string, message: string): void {
   log.info(`[Tool:${toolName}] ${message}`);
 }
 
+// ===== v0.7.3 P2-2: Agent 浏览器 CORS Origin 回显 =====
+
+/**
+ * 计算响应应携带的 Access-Control-Allow-Origin 值（纯函数，表测锁定）。
+ *
+ * 背景：Agent 浏览器专用 session 此前对所有响应注入 ACAO:* —— 任意被 Agent
+ * 打开的第三方页面都能借该分区无差别跨域读取。改为回显请求 Origin（等价能力：
+ * 页面对自己的 Origin 仍可跨域读，如截图所需），无 Origin（同源导航/非浏览器
+ * 客户端）回退 '*' 保持既有能力不回退。
+ *
+ * @param requestOrigin 请求头 Origin（可能为 undefined / 任意字符串）
+ * @returns 应写入响应的 ACAO 值（单元素数组，供 Electron responseHeaders 使用）
+ */
+export function corsAllowOrigin(requestOrigin: string | undefined | null): string[] {
+  const origin = requestOrigin?.trim();
+  if (origin && /^https?:\/\//i.test(origin)) {
+    return [origin];
+  }
+  return ['*'];
+}
+
+/** 从请求头集合中大小写不敏感地提取 Origin 值 */
+export function extractOriginHeader(
+  requestHeaders: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined,
+): string | undefined {
+  if (!requestHeaders) return undefined;
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(requestHeaders)) {
+    if (key.toLowerCase() === 'origin') {
+      return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
+    }
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
 // ===== v0.6.4 P4-4: HTML → Markdown 转换（web_fetch extract_mode='markdown'） =====
 //
 // v0.6.4 收尾：私有 npm 凭据解锁后，按开发规范第一铁律把第一轮的临时自写实现
@@ -285,11 +353,9 @@ const LIST_LINE = /^\s*(?:- |\d+\. )/;
  * 2. 仅当"空行两侧都是同一列表的条目行"时移除该空行（绝不吞条目、不影响段落间距）。
  */
 function collapseListGaps(markdown: string): string {
-  const lines = markdown.split('\n').map((line) =>
-    line
-      .replace(/^(\s*)- {2,}/, '$1- ')
-      .replace(/^(\s*\d+\.)\s{2,}/, '$1 '),
-  );
+  const lines = markdown
+    .split('\n')
+    .map((line) => line.replace(/^(\s*)- {2,}/, '$1- ').replace(/^(\s*\d+\.)\s{2,}/, '$1 '));
 
   const isListItem = (l: string | undefined): boolean => (l ?? '').length > 0 && LIST_LINE.test(l!);
 
@@ -321,5 +387,7 @@ export function htmlToMarkdown(html: string): string {
     return '';
   }
 
-  return collapseListGaps(md).replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n').trim();
+  return collapseListGaps(md)
+    .replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n')
+    .trim();
 }

electron/harness/tools/built-in/ssrf-dispatcher.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/**
+ * SSRF DNS Pinning Dispatcher（v0.7.3 P2-1）
+ *
+ * 关闭 M7 审查确认的 DNS rebinding 窗口：此前 validateSSRF 在校验阶段解析一次
+ * DNS，fetch 实际连接时 undici 再次解析 —— 两次解析之间攻击者可切换 DNS 记录
+ * （TTL=0）把连接导向内网。原注释断言"Node fetch 下无法彻底关闭"，该结论只对
+ * 全局 fetch 成立；主进程已依赖 undici（network-proxy 的 setGlobalDispatcher），
+ * undici 的 Agent 支持 connect.lookup 自定义 —— 校验通过的 IP 集合可精确 pin 到
+ * 连接层，TLS SNI/证书校验仍基于原始域名（undici 将 servername 保持为 hostname）。
+ *
+ * 契约：
+ * - resolvePublicAddresses（ssrf-guard）是校验与地址解析的唯一事实来源，
+ *   本模块 pin 的就是它返回的那批 IP —— 校验与连接同源，无双解析窗口；
+ * - 代理激活（network-proxy.isProxyActive()）时 pinning 不可实现（DNS 在代理端
+ *   解析）且 per-request dispatcher 会旁路用户代理 —— 退化为"仅入口校验"，
+ *   走全局 dispatcher（保持既有语义与代理兼容）；
+ * - fetchWithTimeoutPinned 合并外部 abort signal 与超时控制，语义对齐
+ *   BaseAdapter.fetchWithTimeout（超时 → ETIMEDOUT 可重试；外部中断原样抛出）；
+ * - 每次 pinned 请求构造一次性 Agent 并在 finally 中 close（连接池即用即毁，
+ *   防止把"上一请求的 pin 集合"泄漏给后续请求）。
+ */
+
+import { Agent, fetch as undiciFetch } from 'undici';
+import { isIP } from 'node:net';
+import { resolvePublicAddresses } from './ssrf-guard';
+import { fetchWithTimeout } from './network-utils';
+import { isProxyActive } from '../../../utils/network-proxy';
+import log from 'electron-log';
+
+/** 标准 dns.lookup 回调签名（undici connect.lookup 消费） */
+export type LookupCallback = (
+  err: NodeJS.ErrnoException | null,
+  addresses?: Array<{ address: string; family: number }>,
+) => void;
+
+/** undici connect.lookup 的函数签名形态 */
+export type PinnedLookup = (hostname: string, options: unknown, callback: LookupCallback) => void;
+
+/**
+ * 构造"钉死 IP 集合"的 lookup 函数：无论传入什么 hostname，都只返回校验阶段
+ * 锁定的公网地址（过滤非法 family）。集合为空时返回 ENOTFOUND（防御性——
+ * 调用方在集合为空时不应构造 dispatcher）。
+ */
+export function createPinnedLookup(allowedIps: string[]): PinnedLookup {
+  return (_hostname, _options, callback) => {
+    process.nextTick(() => {
+      const addresses = allowedIps
+        .map((ip) => ({ address: ip, family: isIP(ip) }))
+        .filter((a): a is { address: string; family: number } => a.family === 4 || a.family === 6);
+      if (addresses.length === 0) {
+        const err: NodeJS.ErrnoException = new Error('pinned lookup: no allowed addresses');
+        err.code = 'ENOTFOUND';
+        callback(err, undefined);
+        return;
+      }
+      callback(null, addresses);
+    });
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * 校验 URL 并返回 pinning 用的公网 IP 集合。
+ * 校验失败原样抛出（调用方按 SSRF 阻断处理）。
+ */
+export async function resolvePinnedIps(url: string): Promise<string[]> {
+  return resolvePublicAddresses(url);
+}
+
+/**
+ * 带 SSRF pinning 的 fetch（http_request / web_fetch Phase1 / 可达性预检共用）。
+ *
+ * 行为：
+ * 1. 代理激活 → 退化为普通 fetchWithTimeout（仅入口校验语义，见模块注释）；
+ * 2. 否则 → 解析并校验公网 IP → 一次性 undici Agent（pinned lookup）发起请求；
+ * 3. 超时/外部中断语义与 fetchWithTimeout 对齐；
+ * 4. 返回 Response 与全局 fetch 兼容（status/ok/headers/text/url/body）。
+ *
+ * @param url 目标 URL（调用方已保证 http/https；本函数再做一次全量 SSRF 校验）
+ * @param init RequestInit（redirect 等由调用方决定）
+ * @param timeoutMs 请求超时
+ * @param externalSignal 外部 abort 信号（引擎中断透传，可选）
+ */
+export async function ssrfPinnedFetch(
+  url: string,
+  init: RequestInit,
+  timeoutMs: number,
+  externalSignal?: AbortSignal,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  const ips = await resolvePublicAddresses(url);
+
+  // 代理激活：DNS 在代理端解析，pinning 不可实现；走全局 dispatcher 保持代理语义
+  if (isProxyActive()) {
+    return fetchWithTimeout(url, init, timeoutMs);
+  }
+
+  // 外部信号已中止 → 直接抛 AbortError（对齐 fetchWithTimeout 行为）
+  if (externalSignal?.aborted) {
+    const err = new Error('Aborted');
+    err.name = 'AbortError';
+    throw err;
+  }
+
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  let timedOut = false;
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+    timedOut = true;
+    controller.abort();
+  }, timeoutMs);
+
+  const onExternalAbort = () => controller.abort();
+  if (externalSignal) {
+    externalSignal.addEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort, { once: true });
+  }
+
+  // 一次性 pinned Agent（connect 超时对齐 network-proxy 的 15s 连接上限）
+  const dispatcher = new Agent({
+    connect: { timeout: 15_000, lookup: createPinnedLookup(ips) as never },
+  });
+
+  try {
+    const response = await undiciFetch(url, {
+      ...(init as Record<string, unknown>),
+      signal: controller.signal,
+      dispatcher,
+    } as never);
+    return response as unknown as Response;
+  } catch (err) {
+    const externalAborted = externalSignal?.aborted === true;
+    if (timedOut && !externalAborted) {
+      const timeoutError = new Error(
+        `Request timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms (url=${String(url).slice(0, 120)})`,
+      );
+      (timeoutError as Error & { code: string }).code = 'ETIMEDOUT';
+      throw timeoutError;
+    }
+    throw err;
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+    if (externalSignal) {
+      externalSignal.removeEventListener('abort', onExternalAbort);
+    }
+    // 一次性 dispatcher 用后即毁（连接池不跨请求复用，防止 pin 集合泄漏）
+    void dispatcher.close().catch((closeErr) => {
+      log.debug(`[SSRFDispatcher] dispatcher close failed: ${(closeErr as Error).message}`);
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+const REDIRECT_STATUS = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308]);
+
+/**
+ * 解析重定向目标（纯函数，表测锁定）。
+ *
+ * @returns 下一跳绝对 URL；非重定向状态/缺失/非法 Location 返回 null
+ *         （表示当前响应即终态或无法跟随，由调用方按既有语义处理）。
+ *          相对 Location 以 currentUrl 为基解析（RFC 7231）。
+ */
+export function resolveRedirectTarget(
+  response: { status: number; headers: { get(name: string): string | null } },
+  currentUrl: string,
+): string | null {
+  if (!REDIRECT_STATUS.has(response.status)) return null;
+  const location = response.headers.get('location');
+  if (!location) return null;
+  try {
+    return new URL(location, currentUrl).toString();
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}

electron/harness/tools/built-in/ssrf-guard.ts

@@ -30,21 +30,21 @@ export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
   // IPv4 直接检测
   if (isIP(ip) === 4) {
     const parts = ip.split('.').map(Number);
-    if (parts[0] === 127) return true;          // 回环
-    if (parts[0] === 10) return true;           // 内网
+    if (parts[0] === 127) return true; // 回环
+    if (parts[0] === 10) return true; // 内网
     if (parts[0] === 192 && parts[1] === 168) return true; // 内网
     if (parts[0] === 172 && parts[1] >= 16 && parts[1] <= 31) return true; // 内网
-    if (parts[0] === 169 && parts[1] === 254) return true;  // 链路本地（含云元数据）
-    if (parts[0] === 0) return true;            // 0.0.0.0/8
-    if (parts[0] >= 224) return true;           // 组播 + 保留
+    if (parts[0] === 169 && parts[1] === 254) return true; // 链路本地（含云元数据）
+    if (parts[0] === 0) return true; // 0.0.0.0/8
+    if (parts[0] >= 224) return true; // 组播 + 保留
     return false;
   }
 
   // IPv6 检测
   if (isIP(ip) === 6) {
     const lower = ip.toLowerCase();
-    if (lower === '::1') return true;                        // 回环
-    if (lower.startsWith('fe80:')) return true;              // 链路本地
+    if (lower === '::1') return true; // 回环
+    if (lower.startsWith('fe80:')) return true; // 链路本地
     if (lower.startsWith('fc') || lower.startsWith('fd')) return true; // 唯一本地
     // ::ffff: 映射的 IPv4 — 提取 IPv4 部分递归检测
     const v4MappedMatch = lower.match(/::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
@@ -57,16 +57,22 @@ export function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
 }
 
 /**
- * SSRF 校验 — 解析 URL 域名并校验 IP
+ * SSRF 校验 + 公网地址解析（单一事实来源）
+ *
+ * v0.7.3 P2-1 重构：resolvePublicAddresses 承载全部校验逻辑并返回解析出的
+ * 公网 IP 集合；validateSSRF 成为它的"只要不抛错"薄包装。这样 pinning 层
+ * （ssrf-dispatcher）能拿到与校验完全同一批 IP，避免"校验一次解析、连接
+ * 再解析一次"的双解析不一致。
  *
  * 1. 协议白名单：仅允许 http/https
  * 2. hostname 为 IP 时直接检测
  * 3. 域名 — DNS 解析后检测所有 IP；任意一个 IP 为私有即拒绝
  *    （防止 DNS rebinding 中只校验第一个 IP 的绕过）
  *
+ * @returns 校验通过的全部公网 IP（供 DNS pinning 使用）
  * @throws 如果 URL 指向私有/内网/回环地址或协议不被允许
  */
-export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
+export async function resolvePublicAddresses(url: string): Promise<string[]> {
   let parsed: URL;
   try {
     parsed = new URL(url);
@@ -86,7 +92,7 @@ export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
     if (isPrivateIP(hostname)) {
       throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: ${hostname} is a private/loopback address`);
     }
-    return;
+    return [hostname];
   }
 
   // 域名 — DNS 解析后检测所有 IP
@@ -94,22 +100,39 @@ export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
   try {
     addresses = await lookup(hostname, { all: true });
   } catch (err) {
-    throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: DNS resolution failed for ${hostname}: ${(err as Error).message}`);
+    throw new Error(
+      `Blocked SSRF: DNS resolution failed for ${hostname}: ${(err as Error).message}`,
+    );
   }
 
   if (addresses.length === 0) {
     throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: no DNS records for ${hostname}`);
   }
 
+  const publicIps: string[] = [];
   for (const { address } of addresses) {
     if (isPrivateIP(address)) {
       throw new Error(`Blocked SSRF: ${hostname} resolves to private IP ${address}`);
     }
+    publicIps.push(address);
   }
+  return publicIps;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SSRF 校验 — 解析 URL 域名并校验 IP（v0.7.3 起为 resolvePublicAddresses 的
+ * "仅校验不取值"包装，校验逻辑单一来源在后者）
+ *
+ * @throws 如果 URL 指向私有/内网/回环地址或协议不被允许
+ */
+export async function validateSSRF(url: string): Promise<void> {
+  await resolvePublicAddresses(url);
 }
 
 /** validateSSRF 的不抛错包装：返回结构化结果供工具 execute 直接 return */
-export async function safeValidateSSRF(url: string): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
+export async function safeValidateSSRF(
+  url: string,
+): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string }> {
   try {
     await validateSSRF(url);
     return { ok: true };

electron/harness/tools/built-in/web-fetch.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../../../harness/types';
 import {
   fetchCache,
   buildAntiCrawlHeaders,
-  fetchWithTimeout,
   htmlToText,
   isInterceptedPage,
   readBodyWithLimit,
@@ -30,14 +29,21 @@ import { getBrowserManager } from './browser';
 // v0.6.4 P2-2 根治安全不对称：web_fetch 此前完全没有 SSRF 校验（仅协议检查）且
 // requiresPermission:false —— LLM 可直接抓取 http://127.0.0.1:<port>、
 // http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data 等内网/云元数据地址，浏览器回退通道
-// 同样可达内网。现复用共享 ssrf-guard 模块（与 http_request 同源同行为）：
-// 入口校验 + HTTP 重定向终态 URL 复检（堵 redirect:'follow' 绕道内网的口子）。
+// 同样可达内网。现复用共享 ssrf-guard 模块（与 http_request 同源同行为）。
+// v0.7.3 P2-1 根治: 抓取层升级为 ssrfPinnedFetch —— 校验通过的 IP 集合 pin 到
+// 连接层（undici connect.lookup），关闭校验-连接之间的 DNS rebinding 窗口；
+// 重定向改为逐跳手动跟随，每一跳都先校验后连接（原 redirect:'follow' 下
+// 中间跳转在"终态复检"之前已真实发出，可触达内网）。
 import { validateSSRF } from './ssrf-guard';
+import { resolveRedirectTarget, ssrfPinnedFetch } from './ssrf-dispatcher';
 
 // ===== 跳过重试的状态码 =====
 
 const SKIP_RETRY_STATUS = new Set([403, 429, 502, 503]);
 
+/** v0.7.3 P2-1: 单次抓取允许的最大重定向跳数（每跳均经校验 + pinning） */
+const MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS = 5;
+
 // ===== WebFetchTool =====
 
 export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
@@ -188,25 +194,55 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
     for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxRetries; attempt++) {
       try {
         const headers = buildAntiCrawlHeaders(url, attempt, mobileUA);
-        const response = await fetchWithTimeout(url, { headers, redirect: 'follow' }, 20_000);
 
-        // v0.6.4 P2-2: 重定向终态复检 —— redirect:'follow' 下 fetch 可能跟随跳转
-        // 到与入口校验不同的目标；SSRF 校验 initial URL 后再对 response.url（终态）
-        // 复检，堵住"外网跳内网"绕道。终态指向私有地址时按拦截处理转入浏览器通道
-        // 也会被浏览器侧域名校验拒绝。
-        if (response.url && response.url !== url) {
-          try {
-            await validateSSRF(response.url);
-          } catch (ssrfErr) {
+        // ===== v0.7.3 P2-1 根治: 手动逐跳重定向 + 每跳 SSRF 校验 + DNS pinning =====
+        // 原 redirect:'follow' 下 undici 在内核自动跟跳：跳转目标仅在"终态复检"
+        // 时被校验，中间跳转的请求已经真实发出（可触达内网/元数据地址）。
+        // 现改为逐跳手动跟随：每跳由 ssrfPinnedFetch 发出（校验通过 IP pin 到
+        // 连接层），Location 目标显式校验通过后才允许下一跳；私有地址/非法
+        // 协议目标按 blocked 语义立即终止（禁止重试与浏览器回退）。
+        let currentUrl = url;
+        let response: Response | null = null;
+        let redirectBlocked: string | null = null;
+
+        for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS; hop++) {
+          response = await ssrfPinnedFetch(currentUrl, { headers, redirect: 'manual' }, 20_000);
+          const next = resolveRedirectTarget(response, currentUrl);
+          if (next === null) break; // 非重定向（或无/非法 Location）—— 当前响应即终态
+          if (hop === MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS) {
             return {
               success: false,
               html: '',
               text: '',
               intercepted: false,
-              blocked: true,
-              reason: `Redirect target blocked by SSRF guard: ${(ssrfErr as Error).message}`,
+              reason: `Too many redirects (>${MAX_REDIRECT_HOPS})`,
             };
           }
+          // 下一跳目标显式校验（ssrfPinnedFetch 内部还会再次校验+pinning；
+          // 这里提前拦截以保证 blocked 语义：不重试、不进浏览器回退）
+          try {
+            await validateSSRF(next);
+          } catch (ssrfErr) {
+            redirectBlocked = `Redirect target blocked by SSRF guard: ${(ssrfErr as Error).message}`;
+            break;
+          }
+          currentUrl = next;
+          response = null; // 丢弃中间跳转响应，下一跳重新抓取
+        }
+
+        if (redirectBlocked) {
+          return {
+            success: false,
+            html: '',
+            text: '',
+            intercepted: false,
+            blocked: true,
+            reason: redirectBlocked,
+          };
+        }
+        if (!response) {
+          // 防御性：循环正常结束必然携带终态响应
+          return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: false, reason: 'No response' };
         }
 
         // 跳过重试的状态码 → 直接进入浏览器回退

electron/harness/tools/built-in/web-search.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ import {
   buildSearXNGAuthHeaders,
   logTool,
 } from './network-utils';
+// v0.7.3 P2-1: 可达性预检经 SSRF 校验 + DNS pinning（结果 URL 是不可信外部输入）
+import { safeValidateSSRF } from './ssrf-guard';
+import { ssrfPinnedFetch } from './ssrf-dispatcher';
 import type { WebFetchTool } from './web-fetch';
 
 // ===== 类型定义 =====
@@ -330,6 +333,10 @@ function parse360Regex(html: string): SearchResult[] {
 }
 
 // ===== 可达性预检 =====
+// v0.7.3 P2-1: 可达性预检的 URL 来自不可信的搜索结果 —— HEAD 探测同样不得
+// 触达内网/元数据地址。校验失败的 URL 直接标记不可达（不发起任何请求）；
+// 探测经 ssrfPinnedFetch（DNS pinning），重定向不自动跟随（3xx 即视为可达 ——
+// 链接活性已证明，且跟跳目标不再绕过校验）。
 
 async function checkReachability(urls: string[], concurrency = 5): Promise<Map<string, boolean>> {
   const result = new Map<string, boolean>();
@@ -337,8 +344,13 @@ async function checkReachability(urls: string[], concurrency = 5): Promise<Map<s
     const batch = urls.slice(i, i + concurrency);
     const checks = batch.map(async (url) => {
       try {
-        const resp = await fetchWithTimeout(url, { method: 'HEAD', redirect: 'follow' }, 3_000);
-        result.set(url, resp.ok);
+        const ssrf = await safeValidateSSRF(url);
+        if (!ssrf.ok) {
+          result.set(url, false);
+          return;
+        }
+        const resp = await ssrfPinnedFetch(url, { method: 'HEAD', redirect: 'manual' }, 3_000);
+        result.set(url, resp.ok || (resp.status >= 300 && resp.status < 400));
       } catch {
         result.set(url, false);
       }

electron/harness/types/metona-adapter.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ export interface MetonaModelInfo {
   supportsToolCalling?: boolean;
   /** 是否支持 Thinking / Reasoning */
   supportsThinking?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * 是否支持视觉（图片输入）— v0.7.3 P1-4。
+   * undefined 表示未知（调用方保守放行，保持可用性）；
+   * Ollama /api/show capabilities 探测成功时为真实布尔值，
+   * 供前端上传入口拒绝不支持图片的本地语言模型。
+   */
+  supportsVision?: boolean;
   /** 模型描述 */
   description?: string;
 }

electron/ipc/__tests__/agent.test.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ import type { MetonaMessage } from '../../harness/types';
 function makeEngineMock(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
   return {
     runStream: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-      finalAnswer: '这是最终回答',
+      // v0.7.3 P1-5: 固化门控要求回答 >= minChars（默认 200）—— mock 回答扩到阈值之上
+      finalAnswer: '这是最终回答' + '补充细节。'.repeat(60),
       terminationReason: 'completed',
       iterations: [
         {
@@ -140,6 +141,8 @@ function makeCtx(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
     // v0.5.1: abortByParent 返回 taskId[]（abortSession 据此清理 SubAgent pending 确认）
     orchestrator: Object.assign(new EventEmitter(), { abortByParent: vi.fn(() => []) }),
     confirmationHook: { clearPending: vi.fn() },
+    // v0.7.3 P4-1: 会话标题生成器接线（sendMessage 完成路径消费）
+    titleGenerator: { maybeGenerateTitle: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null) },
     reloadAdapter: vi.fn(() => true),
     ...overrides,
   };
@@ -266,10 +269,13 @@ describe('agent:sendMessage — 成功路径', () => {
         sessionId: 'sess_1',
       }),
     );
-    // 2. 引擎启动（每会话引擎）
+    // 2. 引擎启动（每会话引擎）—— v0.7.3 P1-1: 引擎收到带上下文前置块的消息副本
     expect(ctxRaw.agentEngineManager.getEngine).toHaveBeenCalledWith('sess_1');
     expect(engine.runStream).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      VALID_MESSAGE,
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        role: 'user',
+        content: expect.stringContaining(String(VALID_MESSAGE.content)),
+      }),
       'sess_1',
       [],
       expect.objectContaining({ roleDefinition: 'role' }),
@@ -292,7 +298,10 @@ describe('agent:sendMessage — 成功路径', () => {
     );
     expect(ctxRaw.sessionRecorder.stopRecording).toHaveBeenCalled();
     // 7. 输出验证执行
-    expect(ctxRaw.outputValidator.validate).toHaveBeenCalledWith('这是最终回答', expect.anything());
+    expect(ctxRaw.outputValidator.validate).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.stringContaining('这是最终回答'),
+      expect.anything(),
+    );
     // 8. 摘要评估（异步触发）
     await vi.waitFor(() =>
       expect(ctxRaw.sessionSummaryService.maybeSummarize).toHaveBeenCalledWith('sess_1'),
@@ -301,7 +310,7 @@ describe('agent:sendMessage — 成功路径', () => {
     await vi.waitFor(() => expect(ctxRaw.memoryConsolidator.consolidate).toHaveBeenCalled());
   });
 
-  it('注入相关记忆到 System Prompt 动态区', async () => {
+  it('注入相关记忆到用户消息上下文前置块（P1-1：system 保持缓存稳定）', async () => {
     const { ctx, ctxRaw } = makeCtx({
       memoryManager: {
         search: vi.fn(() => [
@@ -321,9 +330,16 @@ describe('agent:sendMessage — 成功路径', () => {
 
     await handler(null, VALID_MESSAGE, 'sess_1');
     expect(ctxRaw.memoryManager.search).toHaveBeenCalled();
-    // 引擎收到的 systemPrompt 应包含记忆块
+    // P1-1: 记忆注入迁移到首条 user 消息前置块（system 跨 run 字节稳定 → 缓存命中）
     const prompt = engine_runStreamPrompt(ctxRaw);
-    expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).toContain('用户偏好深色主题');
+    expect(prompt.dynamicReminders).not.toContain('用户偏好深色主题');
+    const userMessage = engine_runStreamUserMessage(ctxRaw);
+    expect(userMessage.content).toContain('[Contextual information for this message');
+    expect(userMessage.content).toContain('用户偏好深色主题');
+    // DB 持久化仍使用原始干净内容（前置块只存在于引擎副本）
+    expect(ctxRaw.sessionService.saveMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ content: VALID_MESSAGE.content }),
+    );
   });
 
   it('验证发现 warning 级问题时广播 VALIDATION 流事件', async () => {
@@ -406,6 +422,14 @@ describe('agent:abortSession — 中断编排', () => {
   });
 });
 
+/** 从 runStream 调用参数中提取首条用户消息（P1-1 前置块断言用） */
+function engine_runStreamUserMessage(ctxRaw: Record<string, unknown>): { content: string } {
+  const engine = (ctxRaw.agentEngineManager as unknown as { getEngine: Mock }).getEngine() as {
+    runStream: Mock;
+  };
+  return engine.runStream.mock.calls[0][0];
+}
+
 /** 从 runStream 调用参数中提取 systemPrompt */
 function engine_runStreamPrompt(ctxRaw: Record<string, unknown>): {
   roleDefinition: string;

electron/ipc/__tests__/sessions-tools-config.test.ts

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ describe('sessions 域 — 参数校验矩阵', () => {
         getMessages: vi.fn(() => []),
         pin: vi.fn(() => true),
         archive: vi.fn(() => true),
-        deleteMessage: vi.fn(() => true),
+        // v0.7.3 P1-3: sessions:deleteMessage 死通道已删除，service 方法一并移除
         clearMessages: vi.fn(),
         truncateMessagesAfter: vi.fn(() => true),
         searchMessages: vi.fn(() => []),

electron/ipc/agent.ts

@@ -19,8 +19,24 @@ import { MetonaErrorCode, MetonaStreamEventType } from '../harness/types';
 import { estimateMessagesTokens } from '../harness/utils/token-estimator';
 import { DeepSeekAdapter } from '../harness/adapters/deepseek.adapter';
 import { OllamaAdapter } from '../harness/adapters/ollama.adapter';
+// v0.7.3 P1-1: 用户上下文前置块（动态内容出 system，保 prompt cache 前缀稳定）
+import { buildUserContextPrefix, withUserContextPrefix } from '../harness/prompts/user-context';
+// v0.7.3 P1-5: 记忆固化触发决策（纯函数）
+import { shouldConsolidate } from '../harness/memory/consolidation-policy';
 import log from 'electron-log';
 
+/** 构建 "时区名 (UTC±N)" 标签（注入用户上下文前置块；失败回退 UTC） */
+function buildTimezoneLabel(): string {
+  try {
+    const tz = Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone ?? 'UTC';
+    const offset = -new Date().getTimezoneOffset() / 60;
+    const offsetStr = offset >= 0 ? `UTC+${offset}` : `UTC${offset}`;
+    return `${tz} (${offsetStr})`;
+  } catch {
+    return 'UTC';
+  }
+}
+
 /** 单会话的 text_delta 节流状态 */
 interface ThrottleState {
   buffer: string;
@@ -56,12 +72,16 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
     sessionSummaryService,
     orchestrator,
     confirmationHook,
+    titleGenerator,
   } = ctx;
 
   // ===== 常驻事件管道：text_delta 按会话节流（F8） =====
   const throttleStates = new Map<string, ThrottleState>();
   const iterationTraces = new Map<string, IterationTrace>();
 
+  // v0.7.3 P1-5: 会话级记忆固化时间戳（consolidation-policy 频率门控的状态持有方）
+  const lastConsolidationBySession = new Map<string, number>();
+
   const flushThrottle = (sessionId: string): void => {
     const st = throttleStates.get(sessionId);
     if (!st) return;
@@ -411,59 +431,46 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
         });
       }
 
-      // 检索与用户消息相关的记忆，注入到 System Prompt 动态区
+      // 检索与用户消息相关的记忆 + 附件元信息 → 构建用户消息上下文前置块。
+      // v0.7.3 P1-1 根治: 记忆注入与附件提示此前追加进 systemPrompt.dynamicReminders，
+      // 每条消息都改变 system 字节 → 跨 run 缓存全 miss。现随首条 user 消息注入
+      // （LLM 语义等价），system prompt 保持跨 run 字节级稳定。
+      let userContextPrefix = '';
       try {
         const memories = memoryManager.search(userMessage.content, { topK: 5, minImportance: 0.3 });
+        const attachments = (
+          userMessage as MetonaMessage & {
+            attachments?: Array<{ name: string; type: string; truncated?: boolean }>;
+          }
+        ).attachments;
+        userContextPrefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
+          now: Date.now(),
+          memories,
+          attachments: Array.isArray(attachments) ? attachments : [],
+          timezoneLabel: buildTimezoneLabel(),
+        });
         if (memories.length > 0) {
-          const memorySection = memories
-            .map(
-              (m, i) =>
-                `[${i + 1}] (${m.type}, 重要度: ${m.importance.toFixed(1)}) ${m.content.slice(0, 200)}`,
-            )
-            .join('\n');
-          const memoryBlock = `## Relevant Memories (Retrieved)\n${memorySection}`;
-          systemPrompt.dynamicReminders = systemPrompt.dynamicReminders
-            ? `${systemPrompt.dynamicReminders}\n\n---\n\n${memoryBlock}`
-            : memoryBlock;
-          log.debug(`[AGENT] Injected ${memories.length} memories into system prompt`);
+          log.debug(`[AGENT] Injected ${memories.length} memories into user context prefix`);
         }
       } catch (err) {
         log.warn('[AGENT] Memory retrieval failed, proceeding without memories:', err);
+        // 记忆检索失败时前置块退化为仅含日期时间（附件提示随之丢失可接受——
+        // 主进程附件提示是辅助语义，附件内容本体仍在消息中）
+        userContextPrefix = buildUserContextPrefix({
+          now: Date.now(),
+          memories: [],
+          attachments: [],
+          timezoneLabel: buildTimezoneLabel(),
+        });
       }
 
-      // 附件提示注入：用户直接上传的文件/图片，避免 LLM 误以为需要在工作空间查找
-      const attachments = (
-        userMessage as MetonaMessage & { attachments?: Array<{ name: string; type: string }> }
-      ).attachments;
-      if (Array.isArray(attachments) && attachments.length > 0) {
-        const attachmentList = attachments
-          .map((att, i) => {
-            const typeLabel =
-              att.type === 'image' ? 'image' : att.type === 'text' ? 'text file' : 'file';
-            // v0.7.2 A5: 文本附件被上传入口截断（512KB 上限）时，明确告知 LLM 内容不完整，
-            // 防止模型把残缺内容当作完整文件事实
-            const truncatedNote =
-              (att as { truncated?: boolean }).truncated === true
-                ? ' (TRUNCATED — only the first 512KB is included; the full content is NOT available)'
-                : '';
-            const note =
-              att.type === 'image'
-                ? 'already provided to you via vision capability — you can SEE it directly, do NOT call view_image or any tool to read it again'
-                : att.type === 'text'
-                  ? `content${truncatedNote} already inlined in the user message, do NOT search in workspace or read it again`
-                  : 'uploaded directly by user, do NOT search in workspace';
-            return `${i + 1}. [${typeLabel}] ${att.name} — ${note}`;
-          })
-          .join('\n');
-
-        const attachmentBlock = `## User Attachments (Direct Upload)\nThe following files were uploaded directly by the user to this conversation. They are inline attachments, NOT workspace files:\n${attachmentList}\n\n**IMPORTANT**: Images listed above are already visible to you in this conversation. Do NOT call \`view_image\`, \`read_file\`, or any file tool to read them — doing so wastes a tool call and may fail (they are not workspace files).`;
-
-        systemPrompt.dynamicReminders = systemPrompt.dynamicReminders
-          ? `${systemPrompt.dynamicReminders}\n\n---\n\n${attachmentBlock}`
-          : attachmentBlock;
-
-        log.debug(`[AGENT] Injected ${attachments.length} attachment hints into system prompt`);
-      }
+      // 构建发送给引擎的用户消息副本 —— 前置块只存在于该副本：
+      // DB 持久化（上方 saveMessage 已用原始内容）、前端展示、记忆固化、
+      // 注入检测均使用原始干净内容，互不污染。
+      const engineUserMessage: MetonaMessage = {
+        ...userMessage,
+        content: withUserContextPrefix(userContextPrefix, userMessage.content),
+      };
 
       try {
         // 提示注入检测（安全模块）
@@ -503,8 +510,9 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
         });
 
         // 启动 Agent Loop（P2-10: 每会话独立引擎）
+        // v0.7.3 P1-1: 传入带上下文前置块的消息副本 —— 原始 userMessage 保持干净
         const engine = agentEngineManager.getEngine(sessionId);
-        const output = await engine.runStream(userMessage, sessionId, history, systemPrompt);
+        const output = await engine.runStream(engineUserMessage, sessionId, history, systemPrompt);
 
         // 输出验证（不阻塞响应，仅记录警告）
         // v0.3.0 修复: 传入 toolResults 和 context，启用事实一致性检查和幻觉检测
@@ -624,23 +632,58 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
         workspaceService.updateMemoryTimestamp();
 
         // 会话结束：AI 判断本次对话有哪些重要内容需要持久化到 MEMORY.md
-        // 异步执行，不阻塞主流程返回；失败仅记录日志
-        memoryConsolidator
-          .consolidate(userMessage.content, output.finalAnswer, output.iterations)
-          .then((result) => {
-            if (result.appended > 0) {
-              log.info(
-                `[AGENT] Memory consolidated: ${result.appended} entries appended to MEMORY.md`,
-              );
-              broadcast('toast:show', {
-                type: 'info',
-                message: `AI 已将 ${result.appended} 条重要记忆写入 MEMORY.md`,
-              });
-            }
-          })
-          .catch((err) => {
-            log.warn('[AGENT] Memory consolidation failed:', err);
-          });
+        // v0.7.3 P1-5 节流: 此前每次 run 无条件发起固化 LLM 请求，短寒暄同样触发。
+        // 现按 consolidation-policy 决策（总开关 + 内容门控 + 会话级频率窗口）触发；
+        // 异步执行不阻塞主流程返回；失败仅记录日志。
+        const lastConsolidationAt = lastConsolidationBySession.get(sessionId) ?? 0;
+        const hadSuccessfulToolCall = output.iterations.some((step) =>
+          (step.toolResults ?? []).some((r) => r.success),
+        );
+        const decision = shouldConsolidate({
+          enabled: configService.get<boolean>('memory.consolidationEnabled') !== false,
+          answerChars: output.finalAnswer?.length ?? 0,
+          minChars: configService.get<number>('memory.consolidationMinChars') ?? 200,
+          hadSuccessfulToolCall,
+          lastConsolidationAt,
+          now: Date.now(),
+          intervalMs: configService.get<number>('memory.consolidationIntervalMs') ?? 600_000,
+        });
+        if (decision.consolidate) {
+          memoryConsolidator
+            .consolidate(userMessage.content, output.finalAnswer, output.iterations)
+            .then((result) => {
+              if (result.appended > 0) {
+                lastConsolidationBySession.set(sessionId, Date.now());
+                log.info(
+                  `[AGENT] Memory consolidated: ${result.appended} entries appended to MEMORY.md`,
+                );
+                broadcast('toast:show', {
+                  type: 'info',
+                  message: `AI 已将 ${result.appended} 条重要记忆写入 MEMORY.md`,
+                });
+              }
+            })
+            .catch((err) => {
+              log.warn('[AGENT] Memory consolidation failed:', err);
+            });
+        } else {
+          log.debug(`[AGENT] Memory consolidation skipped (${decision.reason})`);
+        }
+
+        // v0.7.3 P4-1: 首个完成的 run 之后生成精炼会话标题（每会话幂等，失败静默）
+        if (output.terminationReason === 'completed') {
+          titleGenerator
+            .maybeGenerateTitle(sessionId, userMessage.content, output.finalAnswer)
+            .then((title) => {
+              if (title) {
+                // 广播重命名结果，前端 Sidebar 实时刷新标题
+                broadcast('config:changed', { key: `session.title.${sessionId}`, value: title });
+              }
+            })
+            .catch(() => {
+              /* 静默 —— 标题失败已有 debug 日志 */
+            });
+        }
 
         // TOOL 层：记录会话结束 / TRACE 层：停止录制
         auditService.logSessionEnd({
@@ -832,8 +875,9 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
     // v0.5.0: 按会话清理 — 只拒绝被中断会话的 pending，不影响其他并发会话等待中的确认
     confirmationHook.clearPending(sessionId);
     // v0.5.1: 被中止 SubAgent 的 pending 确认一并拒绝（含 SubAgent 递归派生的孙任务）
+    // v0.7.3 P2-3: 被中止的 SubAgent 是会话终态 —— 用 forgetSession 连决策记忆一并清理
     for (const taskId of abortedTaskIds) {
-      confirmationHook.clearPending(taskId);
+      confirmationHook.forgetSession(taskId);
     }
 
     // TOOL 层：记录中断
@@ -880,6 +924,8 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
     });
     subTraces.delete(taskId);
     subMeta.delete(taskId);
+    // v0.7.3 P2-3: SubAgent 终态 —— 决策记忆随任务终结清理（防长期运行泄漏）
+    confirmationHook.forgetSession(taskId);
   };
 
   orchestrator.on(

electron/ipc/app.ts

@@ -34,6 +34,34 @@ export function registerAppHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
     return result;
   });
 
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P3-4: 健康快照（SLO 指标 + 最近健康检查报告）=====
+  ipcMain.handle('app:healthSnapshot', async () => {
+    try {
+      return { success: true, data: ctx.getHealthSnapshot() };
+    } catch (error) {
+      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
+    }
+  });
+
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P3-3: JSONL 录制文件统计与清理（设置页展示 + 手动清理）=====
+  ipcMain.handle('logs:traceStats', async () => {
+    try {
+      return { success: true, data: ctx.sessionRecorder.getRecordingStats() };
+    } catch (error) {
+      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
+    }
+  });
+
+  ipcMain.handle('logs:pruneTraceFiles', async () => {
+    try {
+      const deleted = ctx.sessionRecorder.pruneOldRecordings();
+      log.info(`[LOGS] Manual trace prune: ${deleted} file(s) removed`);
+      return { success: true, data: { deleted } };
+    } catch (error) {
+      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
+    }
+  });
+
   ipcMain.handle('app:openExternal', async (_event, url: unknown) => {
     // M-12 修复: URL 协议白名单校验，防止打开 file:///smb:// 等危险协议
     if (typeof url !== 'string' || !url) {

electron/ipc/context.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ import type { ConfirmationHook } from '../harness/hooks/confirmation-hook';
 import type { MemoryConsolidator } from '../harness/memory/consolidator';
 import type { TaskOrchestrator } from '../harness/orchestration/orchestrator';
 import type { SessionSummaryService } from '../services/session-summary.service';
+import type { TitleGenerator } from '../services/title-generator.service';
+import type { HealthChecker } from '../utils/slo';
+import type { SLOMonitor } from '../utils/slo';
 
 /** 工具就绪状态（main.ts 在 MCP 初始化完成后更新，tools.ts 的 isReady 查询读取） */
 export interface ToolsReadyRef {
@@ -30,6 +33,14 @@ export interface ToolsReadyRef {
   toolCount: number;
 }
 
+/** v0.7.3 P3-4: 健康快照载荷（app:healthSnapshot 返回） */
+export interface HealthSnapshot {
+  slo: ReturnType<SLOMonitor['getStatus']>;
+  /** 最近一次健康检查报告；null 表示应用启动后尚未执行过检查（周期 60s） */
+  health: Awaited<ReturnType<HealthChecker['check']>> | null;
+  generatedAt: number;
+}
+
 export interface IPCContext {
   mainWindow: BrowserWindow;
   sessionService: SessionService;
@@ -49,6 +60,10 @@ export interface IPCContext {
   memoryConsolidator: MemoryConsolidator;
   orchestrator: TaskOrchestrator;
   sessionSummaryService: SessionSummaryService;
+  /** v0.7.3 P4-1: 会话标题生成器 */
+  titleGenerator: TitleGenerator;
+  /** v0.7.3 P3-4: 健康快照读取器（SLO + 最近健康检查报告） */
+  getHealthSnapshot: () => HealthSnapshot;
   toolsReadyRef: ToolsReadyRef;
 }
 

electron/ipc/sessions.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ const isValidSessionId = (id: unknown): id is string =>
   typeof id === 'string' && id.length > 0 && id.length <= 200;
 
 export function registerSessionHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
-  const { sessionService } = ctx;
+  const { sessionService, confirmationHook } = ctx;
 
   ipcMain.handle('sessions:list', async () => {
     return sessionService.list();
@@ -34,7 +34,13 @@ export function registerSessionHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
   ipcMain.handle('sessions:delete', async (_event, sessionId: unknown) => {
     // M-34 修复: 校验 sessionId
     if (!isValidSessionId(sessionId)) return { success: false, error: 'Invalid sessionId' };
-    return { success: sessionService.delete(sessionId) };
+    const result = { success: sessionService.delete(sessionId) };
+    // v0.7.3 P2-3: 会话删除 = 会话终态 —— 决策记忆/pending 确认一并清理
+    // （防 rememberedDecisions 随会话数累积泄漏）
+    if (result.success) {
+      confirmationHook.forgetSession(sessionId);
+    }
+    return result;
   });
 
   ipcMain.handle('sessions:getMessages', async (_event, sessionId: unknown) => {
@@ -55,11 +61,9 @@ export function registerSessionHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
     return { success: sessionService.archive(sessionId, archived) };
   });
 
-  ipcMain.handle('sessions:deleteMessage', async (_event, messageId: unknown) => {
-    if (typeof messageId !== 'string' || !messageId)
-      return { success: false, error: 'Invalid messageId' };
-    return { success: sessionService.deleteMessage(messageId) };
-  });
+  // v0.7.3 P1-3: sessions:deleteMessage 已删除 —— 渲染层零调用方（死通道），
+  // 且原实现不回减 sessions.message_count（计数漂移面）。消息删除语义由
+  // sessions:truncateAfter（编辑重发/重新生成）与会话删除级联完整覆盖。
 
   // v0.7.2 A1 根治: 语义修正 —— "清空会话"的成功判定是"操作完成"而非"有行被删除"。
   // 原实现透传 DELETE 影响行数（changes > 0），空会话清空会返回 success:false，

electron/ipc/shared.ts

@@ -101,6 +101,11 @@ export function applyEngineConfigKey(ctx: IPCContext, key: string, value: unknow
         thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max',
       });
       break;
+    // v0.7.3 P3-1: enableReflection 接线（此前为死配置）— 引擎 REFLECTING 状态开关
+    case 'agent.enableReflection':
+      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({ enableReflection: value === true });
+      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({ enableReflection: value === true });
+      break;
     case 'agent.toolExecutionTimeoutMs':
       agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({ toolExecutionTimeoutMs: value as number });
       break;
@@ -202,5 +207,11 @@ export async function applyConfigSideEffects(
     await applySessionProxy(typeof proxyValue === 'string' ? proxyValue : null);
   }
 
+  // v0.7.3 P4-2: MCP 自动重连开关变更 → 即时联动（关闭时取消全部已排程重连）
+  const autoReconnectEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'mcp.autoReconnect');
+  if (autoReconnectEntry) {
+    ctx.mcpManager.setAutoReconnect(autoReconnectEntry.value !== false);
+  }
+
   return null;
 }

electron/main.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import { WindowManager } from './services/window-manager.service';
 import { MCPManager } from './services/mcp-manager.service';
 import { SessionSummaryService } from './services/session-summary.service';
 import { AgentEngineManager } from './services/agent-engine-manager.service';
+import { TitleGenerator } from './services/title-generator.service';
 import { ContextBuilder } from './harness/prompts/context-builder';
 import { MemoryManager } from './harness/memory/manager';
 import { MemoryConsolidator } from './harness/memory/consolidator';
@@ -317,6 +318,8 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
   const traceEnabled = configService.get<boolean>('logging.traceEnabled') !== false;
   // SessionRecorder 录制总开关（false 时不写 TRACE JSONL 文件）
   sessionRecorder.setEnabled(traceEnabled);
+  // v0.7.3 P3-3: 启动期清理旧 JSONL 录制文件（按 mtime 保留最近 200 个）
+  void sessionRecorder.pruneOldRecordings();
 
   // ===== v0.2.0: 安全模块（必须在工具注册之前） =====
   const policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
@@ -426,6 +429,9 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
           | 'max'
           | null) ?? 'high',
       toolExecutionTimeoutMs: configService.get<number>('agent.toolExecutionTimeoutMs') ?? 120_000,
+      // v0.7.3 P3-1 接线: agent.enableReflection 此前为死配置（引擎读取但全链路
+      // 无置 true 路径）。现注入引擎基线配置，REFLECTING 状态由此开关真实驱动。
+      enableReflection: configService.get<boolean>('agent.enableReflection') === true,
       // F-8 接通: llm.temperature / llm.maxTokens 此前为死配置（引擎硬编码 0.0/63488）
       temperature: configService.get<number>('llm.temperature') ?? 0.0,
       maxTokens: configService.get<number>('llm.maxTokens') ?? 63488,
@@ -490,6 +496,8 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
   mcpManager.setOnToolsChanged(() => {
     agentEngineManager.setToolsAll(toolRegistry.listTools());
   });
+  // v0.7.3 P4-2: MCP 自动重连开关（默认开启；配置变更经 shared.ts applyConfigSideEffects 联动）
+  mcpManager.setAutoReconnect(configService.get<boolean>('mcp.autoReconnect') !== false);
   const toolsReadyRef: ToolsReadyRef = { ready: false, toolCount: 0 };
   mcpManager
     .initialize()
@@ -542,6 +550,8 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
           | null) ?? 'high',
       contextLength: ollamaNumCtx ?? undefined,
       contextWindow: buildAdapter().getContextWindow(),
+      // v0.7.3 P3-1: SubAgent 与主引擎同源消费 enableReflection
+      enableReflection: configService.get<boolean>('agent.enableReflection') === true,
     },
   );
   toolRegistry.registerBuiltin(new DelegateTaskTool(orchestrator));
@@ -647,6 +657,56 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
     }
   };
 
+  // ===== P1-12 + v0.7.3 P3-4: SLO 健康监控接入（提前至窗口创建前，
+  // 使 IPC 侧 getHealthSnapshot 闭包可安全引用 sloMonitor/healthChecker） =====
+  const healthChecker = new HealthChecker(
+    () => db,
+    join(workspaceInfo.path, '.metona', 'agent.db'),
+  );
+  const sloMonitor = new SLOMonitor();
+  agentEngineManager.on('complete', (data: { durationMs: number; terminationReason?: string }) => {
+    sloMonitor.recordRequest(data.durationMs, data.terminationReason === 'completed');
+  });
+  /** 最近一次健康检查报告（供 IPC app:healthSnapshot 展示；初始 null = 尚未检查） */
+  let lastHealthReport: Awaited<ReturnType<HealthChecker['check']>> | null = null;
+  const healthTimer = setInterval(async () => {
+    try {
+      // v0.7.3 P3-1 接线: cleanupExpired 此前零调用方（且 expires_at 无写入方）双重死路。
+      // 现挂入健康检查周期，让过期记忆（episodic_memories.expires_at）真正可回收，
+      // 为后续记忆 TTL 语义预留真实管道；无过期条目时为零开销（一条带索引的 DELETE）。
+      const expired = memoryManager.cleanupExpired();
+      if (expired > 0) {
+        log.info(`[Health] Expired episodic memories purged: ${expired}`);
+      }
+      const report = await healthChecker.check();
+      lastHealthReport = report;
+      if (!report.healthy) {
+        const failed = report.checks
+          .filter((c) => !c.healthy)
+          .map((c) => c.name)
+          .join(', ');
+        log.warn(`[Health] Unhealthy checks: ${failed}`);
+        trayManager?.setStatus('error');
+      } else {
+        // 恢复 idle（运行中状态会被后续 stateChange 覆盖）
+        trayManager?.setStatus('idle');
+      }
+      const slo = sloMonitor.getStatus();
+      if (slo.violated) {
+        log.warn(
+          `[SLO] Burn rate ${slo.burnRate.toFixed(2)} exceeds budget (errorRate=${(slo.errorRate * 100).toFixed(1)}%, ` +
+            `P95=${slo.percentiles['P95'] ?? 0}ms, ${slo.totalRequests} requests)`,
+        );
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      log.warn('[Health] Check failed:', err);
+    }
+  }, 60_000);
+  healthTimer.unref?.();
+
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P4-1: 会话标题生成器（首轮 run 完成后 LLM 生成精炼标题） =====
+  const titleGenerator = new TitleGenerator(() => agentEngineManager.getAdapter(), sessionService);
+
   // ===== 窗口管理 =====
   windowManager = new WindowManager();
   // 局部 const 捕获：闭包内 TS 无法对模块级可空变量做流收窄
@@ -682,6 +742,12 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
           memoryConsolidator,
           orchestrator,
           sessionSummaryService,
+          titleGenerator,
+          getHealthSnapshot: () => ({
+            slo: sloMonitor.getStatus(),
+            health: lastHealthReport,
+            generatedAt: Date.now(),
+          }),
           toolsReadyRef,
         });
       },
@@ -733,42 +799,6 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
     },
   );
 
-  // ===== P1-12: SLO 健康监控接入（原为死代码，现真实运行） =====
-  const healthChecker = new HealthChecker(
-    () => db,
-    join(workspaceInfo.path, '.metona', 'agent.db'),
-  );
-  const sloMonitor = new SLOMonitor();
-  agentEngineManager.on('complete', (data: { durationMs: number; terminationReason?: string }) => {
-    sloMonitor.recordRequest(data.durationMs, data.terminationReason === 'completed');
-  });
-  const healthTimer = setInterval(async () => {
-    try {
-      const report = await healthChecker.check();
-      if (!report.healthy) {
-        const failed = report.checks
-          .filter((c) => !c.healthy)
-          .map((c) => c.name)
-          .join(', ');
-        log.warn(`[Health] Unhealthy checks: ${failed}`);
-        trayManager?.setStatus('error');
-      } else {
-        // 恢复 idle（运行中状态会被后续 stateChange 覆盖）
-        trayManager?.setStatus('idle');
-      }
-      const slo = sloMonitor.getStatus();
-      if (slo.violated) {
-        log.warn(
-          `[SLO] Burn rate ${slo.burnRate.toFixed(2)} exceeds budget (errorRate=${(slo.errorRate * 100).toFixed(1)}%, ` +
-            `P95=${slo.percentiles['P95'] ?? 0}ms, ${slo.totalRequests} requests)`,
-        );
-      }
-    } catch (err) {
-      log.warn('[Health] Check failed:', err);
-    }
-  }, 60_000);
-  healthTimer.unref?.();
-
   // ===== 应用生命周期 =====
   app.on('window-all-closed', () => {
     // macOS: 保持应用运行（托盘模式）

electron/preload.ts

@@ -57,7 +57,9 @@ const metonaAPI = {
       ipcRenderer.invoke('sessions:pin', sessionId, pinned),
     archive: (sessionId: string, archived: boolean) =>
       ipcRenderer.invoke('sessions:archive', sessionId, archived),
-    deleteMessage: (messageId: string) => ipcRenderer.invoke('sessions:deleteMessage', messageId),
+    // v0.7.3 P1-3: sessions:deleteMessage 死通道已删除 —— 渲染层零调用方，
+    // 且其实现不回减 message_count（计数漂移面）。消息删除语义由
+    // sessions:truncateAfter（编辑重发/重新生成/会话删除级联）完整覆盖。
     clearMessages: (sessionId: string) => ipcRenderer.invoke('sessions:clearMessages', sessionId),
     /** P2-11: 截断消息（编辑重发/重新生成——删除锚点消息之后的所有消息） */
     truncateAfter: (sessionId: string, messageId: string, inclusive?: boolean) =>
@@ -232,6 +234,49 @@ const metonaAPI = {
     // #49 修复: 前端错误上报通道（主进程可注册 'error:report' handler 记录到 electron-log/审计日志）
     // 使用 send（单向）而非 invoke，即使主进程未注册 handler 也不会 reject
     reportError: (payload: unknown) => ipcRenderer.send('error:report', payload),
+    // v0.7.3 P3-4: 健康快照（SLO 指标 + 最近健康检查报告）
+    // 类型以内联形态声明（本文件在 tsconfig.node 域，不引用渲染端 global.d.ts）
+    getHealthSnapshot: () =>
+      ipcRenderer.invoke('app:healthSnapshot') as Promise<{
+        success: boolean;
+        error?: string;
+        data?: {
+          slo: {
+            errorRate: number;
+            throughput: number;
+            avgLatencyMs: number;
+            percentiles: Record<string, number>;
+            burnRate: number;
+            target: number;
+            violated: boolean;
+            totalRequests: number;
+            errorRequests: number;
+            timestamp: string;
+          };
+          health: {
+            healthy: boolean;
+            checks: Array<{ name: string; healthy: boolean; latencyMs?: number; error?: string }>;
+            timestamp: string;
+          } | null;
+          generatedAt: number;
+        };
+      }>,
+  },
+
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P3-3: JSONL 录制文件生命周期（设置页展示/清理） =====
+  logs: {
+    traceStats: () =>
+      ipcRenderer.invoke('logs:traceStats') as Promise<{
+        success: boolean;
+        error?: string;
+        data?: { count: number; totalBytes: number };
+      }>,
+    pruneTraceFiles: () =>
+      ipcRenderer.invoke('logs:pruneTraceFiles') as Promise<{
+        success: boolean;
+        error?: string;
+        data?: { deleted: number };
+      }>,
   },
 
   // ===== 工作空间管理 =====

electron/services/__tests__/mcp-reconnect.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/**
+ * MCP 自动重连测试（v0.7.3 P4-2）
+ *
+ * R1 nextRetryDelayMs 退避序列（5s/15s/60s，越界钳制）；
+ * R2 连接失败 → 进入 reconnecting 并按退避排程；fake timers 推进后真实重试；
+ * R3 重试耗尽（3 次）→ 停留 error 且不再排程；
+ * R4 disconnectServer（用户显式断开）取消重连排程；
+ * R5 setAutoReconnect(false) 取消全部排程且后续失败不再排程；
+ * R6 连接成功清零计数与排程（connectServer 成功路径经 spy 模拟）。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+
+vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
+  default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
+}));
+
+import { MCPManager, MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS, nextRetryDelayMs } from '../mcp-manager.service';
+import type { MCPServerConfig } from '../mcp-manager.service';
+import type { ToolRegistry } from '../../harness/tools/registry';
+
+function makeManager(): MCPManager {
+  const fakeDB = {
+    prepare: () => ({ run: () => ({ changes: 0 }) }),
+  } as unknown as ConstructorParameters<typeof MCPManager>[0] extends () => infer D ? D : never;
+  const registry = {
+    registerMCP: vi.fn(() => true),
+    unregisterMCPTools: vi.fn(),
+  } as unknown as ToolRegistry;
+  return new MCPManager(() => fakeDB, registry);
+}
+
+const FAILING_CONFIG: MCPServerConfig = {
+  id: 'mcp_test',
+  name: 'broken-server',
+  // stdio 但缺 command —— connectServer 在构造 transport 前显式抛错（不触网、不 spawn）
+  transport: 'stdio',
+  enabled: true,
+};
+
+describe('nextRetryDelayMs', () => {
+  it('R1: 退避序列 5s/15s/60s，越界钳制', () => {
+    expect(nextRetryDelayMs(1)).toBe(5_000);
+    expect(nextRetryDelayMs(2)).toBe(15_000);
+    expect(nextRetryDelayMs(3)).toBe(60_000);
+    expect(nextRetryDelayMs(4)).toBe(60_000); // 越界钳制到最后一档
+    expect(nextRetryDelayMs(0)).toBe(5_000); // 下界钳制
+  });
+});
+
+describe('MCPManager 自动重连', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.useRealTimers();
+  });
+
+  it('R2: 连接失败 → reconnecting 状态 + 定时排程；推进后真实重试', async () => {
+    const manager = makeManager();
+    const connectSpy = vi.spyOn(manager, 'connectServer');
+
+    await expect(manager.connectServer(FAILING_CONFIG)).rejects.toThrow();
+    // 第一次失败后：计数 1，状态 reconnecting，已排程
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')).toMatchObject({
+      attempts: 1,
+      scheduled: true,
+    });
+    expect(manager.getServerState('broken-server')?.status).toBe('reconnecting');
+
+    // 推进 5s → 第二次真实重试（同样失败）→ 计数 2
+    connectSpy.mockClear();
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(5_000);
+    expect(connectSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')).toMatchObject({
+      attempts: 2,
+      scheduled: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('R3: 重试耗尽（3 次）→ 停留 error 且不再排程', async () => {
+    const manager = makeManager();
+    await expect(manager.connectServer(FAILING_CONFIG)).rejects.toThrow();
+
+    // 第 1 次失败后 + 3 次定时重试（每次再失败）
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(5_000);
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(15_000);
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(60_000);
+
+    const info = manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server');
+    // 耗尽后：排程清空（计数清零后 getReconnectInfo 返回 null 或 scheduled=false）、状态停留 error
+    expect(info?.scheduled ?? false).toBe(false);
+    expect(manager.getServerState('broken-server')?.status).toBe('error');
+    // 再推进也不再有动作
+    const spy = vi.spyOn(manager, 'connectServer');
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(600_000);
+    expect(spy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('R4: disconnectServer（用户显式断开）取消重连排程', async () => {
+    const manager = makeManager();
+    await expect(manager.connectServer(FAILING_CONFIG)).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')?.scheduled).toBe(true);
+
+    await manager.disconnectServer('broken-server');
+    // 簿记清空 → getReconnectInfo 返回 null（等价于无排程）
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')?.scheduled ?? false).toBe(false);
+    // 状态回落 disconnected
+    expect(manager.getServerState('broken-server')?.status).toBe('disconnected');
+    // 推进时间不再触发重试
+    const spy = vi.spyOn(manager, 'connectServer');
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(600_000);
+    expect(spy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('R5: setAutoReconnect(false) 取消全部排程，后续失败不再排程', async () => {
+    const manager = makeManager();
+    await expect(manager.connectServer(FAILING_CONFIG)).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')?.scheduled).toBe(true);
+
+    manager.setAutoReconnect(false);
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')?.scheduled ?? false).toBe(false);
+
+    // 关闭后再次失败 → 不排程（簿记清空 → getReconnectInfo 返回 null）
+    await expect(manager.connectServer(FAILING_CONFIG)).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')?.scheduled ?? false).toBe(false);
+    expect(manager.getServerState('broken-server')?.status).toBe('error');
+  });
+
+  it('R6: setAutoReconnect(true)（默认）开启语义 —— 失败必排程', async () => {
+    const manager = makeManager();
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('x')).toBeNull();
+    await expect(manager.connectServer(FAILING_CONFIG)).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(manager.getReconnectInfo('broken-server')?.scheduled).toBe(true);
+    expect(MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS).toBe(3);
+  });
+});

electron/services/__tests__/session-recorder.test.ts

@@ -249,3 +249,61 @@ describe('SessionRecorder — 总开关与缓冲上限', () => {
     expect(recorder.getFilePath('s1')).toBeNull();
   });
 });
+
+// ===== v0.7.3 P3-3: JSONL 录制文件生命周期（stats + prune） =====
+
+describe('SessionRecorder — 录制文件统计与清理（P3-3）', () => {
+  const writeRecording = async (name: string, ageHours: number): Promise<void> => {
+    const fs = await import('node:fs');
+    const logsDir = join(wsRoot, 'logs');
+    if (!existsSync(logsDir)) fs.mkdirSync(logsDir, { recursive: true });
+    const filePath = join(logsDir, name);
+    fs.writeFileSync(filePath, '{"event":"session_start"}\n', 'utf-8');
+    const mtime = new Date(Date.now() - ageHours * 3600_000);
+    fs.utimesSync(filePath, mtime, mtime);
+  };
+
+  it('getRecordingStats：统计 count 与 totalBytes；目录不存在返回零值', async () => {
+    expect(recorder.getRecordingStats()).toEqual({ count: 0, totalBytes: 0 });
+
+    await writeRecording('session_s1_2026-01-01.jsonl', 1);
+    await writeRecording('session_s2_2026-01-02.jsonl', 2);
+    // 非 session_*.jsonl 命名的文件不受治理（用户自放文件）
+    await writeRecording('user-notes.txt', 3);
+
+    const stats = recorder.getRecordingStats();
+    expect(stats.count).toBe(2);
+    expect(stats.totalBytes).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+
+  it('pruneOldRecordings：按 mtime 保留最近 N 个，删除其余', async () => {
+    for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+      await writeRecording(`session_s${i}_f.jsonl`, i + 1); // s0 最旧
+    }
+    const deleted = recorder.pruneOldRecordings(3);
+    expect(deleted).toBe(3);
+
+    const remaining = (readdirSync(join(wsRoot, 'logs')) as string[]).filter((f) =>
+      f.startsWith('session_'),
+    );
+    expect(remaining).toHaveLength(3);
+    // 保留的应是最新的 3 个（s0/s1/s2 —— 年龄 1/2/3 小时，s0 最新）
+    for (const keep of ['session_s0_f.jsonl', 'session_s1_f.jsonl', 'session_s2_f.jsonl']) {
+      expect(remaining).toContain(keep);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('pruneOldRecordings：仅治理 session_*.jsonl 命名，用户文件不受影响', async () => {
+    await writeRecording('session_a.jsonl', 100);
+    await writeRecording('my-data.jsonl', 100);
+    const deleted = recorder.pruneOldRecordings(0);
+    expect(deleted).toBe(1);
+    expect(existsSync(join(wsRoot, 'logs', 'my-data.jsonl'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('pruneOldRecordings：未超限返回 0 且不删除任何文件', async () => {
+    await writeRecording('session_x.jsonl', 1);
+    expect(recorder.pruneOldRecordings(200)).toBe(0);
+    expect(existsSync(join(wsRoot, 'logs', 'session_x.jsonl'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

electron/services/__tests__/session-truncate-trace.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/**
+ * truncateMessagesAfter × TRACE metadata 联动测试（v0.7.3 P1-2）
+ *
+ * 根治契约：编辑重发/重新生成截断消息时，sessions.metadata 中的 traceSteps
+ * 必须按 startedAt <= 锚点消息 created_at 同步过滤，否则 Trace 面板出现
+ * "幽灵步骤"（v0.7.2 A1 只修了 /clear 路径的 metadata 残留）。
+ *
+ * 运行要求：better-sqlite3 为 Electron ABI 构建，需 test:electron 模式执行；
+ * 系统 Node 下自动跳过。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, vi } from 'vitest';
+
+vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
+  default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
+}));
+
+let dbAvailable = true;
+let Database: typeof import('better-sqlite3');
+try {
+  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+  Database = require('better-sqlite3');
+  const probe = new Database(':memory:');
+  probe.close();
+} catch {
+  dbAvailable = false;
+}
+
+describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('truncateMessagesAfter × TRACE metadata 过滤（P1-2）', () => {
+  let db: import('better-sqlite3').Database;
+  // 测试域宽松类型：SessionService 依赖 Electron ABI 的 better-sqlite3 实例，
+  // 直接持有真实实例即可（同 session-summary.test.ts 的既有写法）
+  // eslint(next-line 无需禁用：测试文件未启用 no-explicit-any)
+  let sessionService: any;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    const { SessionService } = await import('../session.service');
+    db = new Database(':memory:');
+    db.exec(`
+      CREATE TABLE sessions (
+        id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        title TEXT DEFAULT '新会话',
+        created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        message_count INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+        pinned INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+        archived INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+        metadata TEXT DEFAULT '{}'
+      );
+      CREATE TABLE messages (
+        id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        session_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+        role TEXT NOT NULL,
+        content TEXT,
+        reasoning_content TEXT,
+        tool_calls TEXT,
+        tool_result TEXT,
+        attachments TEXT,
+        iteration INTEGER,
+        created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
+      );
+      CREATE TABLE session_summaries (
+        session_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        summary TEXT NOT NULL,
+        summarized_until_rowid INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch() * 1000)
+      );
+    `);
+    db.prepare(
+      'INSERT INTO sessions (id, created_at, updated_at, message_count) VALUES (?, ?, ?, 0)',
+    ).run('s_trace', Date.now(), Date.now());
+    sessionService = new SessionService(() => db);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    try {
+      db?.close();
+    } catch {
+      /* ignore */
+    }
+  });
+
+  const insertMessage = (id: string, content: string, createdAt: number): number => {
+    db.prepare(
+      `INSERT INTO messages (id, session_id, role, content, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, 'user', ?, ?)`,
+    ).run(id, 's_trace', content, createdAt);
+    const row = db.prepare('SELECT rowid AS rid FROM messages WHERE id = ?').get(id) as {
+      rid: number;
+    };
+    return row.rid;
+  };
+
+  const saveMetadata = (steps: Array<{ runId?: string; startedAt: number }>): void => {
+    db.prepare('UPDATE sessions SET metadata = ? WHERE id = ?').run(
+      JSON.stringify({ traceSteps: steps, tokenUsage: { totalTokens: 10 } }),
+      's_trace',
+    );
+  };
+
+  const loadMetadataSteps = (): Array<{ runId?: string; startedAt: number }> => {
+    const row = db.prepare('SELECT metadata FROM sessions WHERE id = ?').get('s_trace') as {
+      metadata: string;
+    };
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(row.metadata) as {
+      traceSteps?: Array<{ runId?: string; startedAt: number }>;
+    };
+    return parsed.traceSteps ?? [];
+  };
+
+  it('截断后：晚于锚点消息的 traceSteps 被过滤，早于/等于的保留', () => {
+    const anchorTs = 1_000_000;
+    const anchorId = 'm_anchor';
+    insertMessage('m_before', '更早的消息', anchorTs - 10_000);
+    insertMessage(anchorId, '锚点消息', anchorTs);
+    insertMessage('m_after', '锚点后的消息', anchorTs + 10_000);
+
+    saveMetadata([
+      { runId: 'r_before', startedAt: anchorTs - 9_000 },
+      { runId: 'r_anchor', startedAt: anchorTs }, // 锚点触发的 run（将被截）
+      { runId: 'r_after', startedAt: anchorTs + 11_000 },
+    ]);
+
+    const truncated = sessionService.truncateMessagesAfter('s_trace', anchorId, true);
+    expect(truncated).toBe(true);
+
+    const kept = loadMetadataSteps();
+    expect(kept.map((s) => s.runId)).toEqual(['r_before']);
+  });
+
+  it('metadata 缺失/损坏时不阻断截断主流程', () => {
+    db.prepare("UPDATE sessions SET metadata = 'not-json' WHERE id = ?").run('s_trace');
+    const anchorTs = 2_000_000;
+    const anchorId = 'm2';
+    insertMessage(anchorId, '锚点消息 2', anchorTs);
+    insertMessage('m2_after', '锚点 2 之后的消息', anchorTs + 1000);
+
+    expect(() => sessionService.truncateMessagesAfter('s_trace', anchorId, true)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(sessionService.truncateMessagesAfter('s_trace', anchorId, true)).toBe(false); // 已被上一句删过，无行可删
+  });
+
+  it('锚点不存在时返回 false 且不触碰 metadata', () => {
+    saveMetadata([{ runId: 'r_keep', startedAt: Date.now() }]);
+    expect(sessionService.truncateMessagesAfter('s_trace', 'm_missing', true)).toBe(false);
+    expect(loadMetadataSteps()).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+});

electron/services/__tests__/title-generator.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/**
+ * TitleGenerator 测试（v0.7.3 P4-1）
+ *
+ * T1 sanitizeTitle 清洗规则矩阵（围栏/引号/自述前缀/空白/截断/空值）；
+ * T2 maybeGenerateTitle 幂等（每会话仅一次）；
+ * T3 已有自定义标题的会话不覆盖；
+ * T4 LLM 失败/超时静默回退（不抛错，返回 null）；
+ * T5 空输入门控。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+
+vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
+  default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
+}));
+
+import { TitleGenerator, sanitizeTitle } from '../title-generator.service';
+import type { IMetonaProviderAdapter, MetonaResponse } from '../../harness/types';
+
+describe('sanitizeTitle', () => {
+  it('T1a: 干净文本原样通过', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('修复登录超时')).toBe('修复登录超时');
+  });
+
+  it('T1b: markdown 围栏与列表标记剥离', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('```json\n"标题"\n```')).toBe('标题');
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('- 修复登录超时')).toBe('修复登录超时');
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('# 修复登录超时')).toBe('修复登录超时');
+  });
+
+  it('T1c: 成对包裹引号剥离', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('"修复登录超时"')).toBe('修复登录超时');
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('“修复登录超时”')).toBe('修复登录超时');
+  });
+
+  it('T1d: 自述前缀剥离（标题:/Title:）', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('标题: 修复登录超时')).toBe('修复登录超时');
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('Title: Fix login timeout')).toBe('Fix login timeout');
+  });
+
+  it('T1e: 换行折叠为空格、首尾空白去除', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('修复\n登录  超时\n')).toBe('修复 登录 超时');
+  });
+
+  it('T1f: 超长截断到 maxLen', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeTitle('a'.repeat(100), 40);
+    expect(out?.length).toBe(40);
+  });
+
+  it('T1g: 空值/纯符号 → null', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('   ')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('"""')).toBeNull();
+    expect(sanitizeTitle('###')).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+function makeAdapter(content: string | Error): IMetonaProviderAdapter {
+  return {
+    providerId: 'mock',
+    supportedModels: ['m'],
+    supportsToolCalling: true,
+    supportsThinking: false,
+    getContextWindow: () => 128_000,
+    send: vi.fn(async (): Promise<MetonaResponse> => {
+      if (content instanceof Error) throw content;
+      return {
+        meta: { requestId: 'r', provider: 'mock', model: 'm', latencyMs: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
+        content,
+        usage: { inputTokens: 1, outputTokens: 1, totalTokens: 2 },
+        finishReason: 'stop' as never,
+      };
+    }),
+    sendStream: vi.fn(),
+    setAbortSignal: vi.fn(),
+    healthCheck: async () => true,
+  } as unknown as IMetonaProviderAdapter;
+}
+
+function makeSessionService(existing: Array<{ id: string; title: string }> = []) {
+  // 注意：真实 SessionService.list() 是同步方法（better-sqlite3），
+  // mock 必须保持同步返回，否则 generate 内的 .find() 拿到 Promise
+  return {
+    list: vi.fn(() => existing) as unknown as () => Array<{ id: string; title: string }>,
+    rename: vi.fn(() => true),
+  };
+}
+
+describe('TitleGenerator.maybeGenerateTitle', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.useRealTimers();
+  });
+
+  it('T2: 首个 run 生成标题并调用 rename；同会话幂等', async () => {
+    const svc = makeSessionService([{ id: 's1', title: '新会话' }]);
+    const gen = new TitleGenerator(() => makeAdapter('修复登录超时'), svc as never);
+    const title = await gen.maybeGenerateTitle(
+      's1',
+      '帮我看看为什么登录会超时',
+      '已定位为 token 过期…',
+    );
+    expect(title).toBe('修复登录超时');
+    expect(svc.rename).toHaveBeenCalledWith('s1', '修复登录超时');
+
+    // 第二次调用（同会话）幂等 —— 不再调用 LLM
+    const second = await gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s1', '再问一次', '再答一次');
+    expect(second).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('T3: 已有自定义标题的会话不覆盖', async () => {
+    const svc = makeSessionService([{ id: 's1', title: '用户手动命名' }]);
+    const adapterSend = vi.fn();
+    const adapter = makeAdapter('不应被使用');
+    (adapter.send as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockImplementation(async (...args: unknown[]) => {
+      adapterSend(...args);
+      throw new Error('should not be called');
+    });
+    const gen = new TitleGenerator(() => adapter, svc as never);
+    const title = await gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s1', '内容', '回答');
+    expect(title).toBeNull();
+    expect(adapterSend).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('T4: LLM 失败静默回退（返回 null，不抛错），且同会话不重试', async () => {
+    const svc = makeSessionService([{ id: 's1', title: '新会话' }]);
+    const gen = new TitleGenerator(() => makeAdapter(new Error('network down')), svc as never);
+    await expect(gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s1', 'q', 'a')).resolves.toBeNull();
+    await expect(gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s1', 'q2', 'a2')).resolves.toBeNull();
+    expect(svc.rename).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('T5: 空 sessionId / 双向空内容 → 不生成', async () => {
+    const svc = makeSessionService();
+    const adapter = makeAdapter('x');
+    const gen = new TitleGenerator(() => adapter, svc as never);
+    expect(await gen.maybeGenerateTitle('', 'q', 'a')).toBeNull();
+    expect(await gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s1', '  ', '  ')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('T6: 并发重入复用同一 Promise（不重复调用 LLM）', async () => {
+    const svc = makeSessionService([{ id: 's1', title: '新会话' }]);
+    const gen = new TitleGenerator(() => makeAdapter('并发标题'), svc as never);
+    // 使用真实定时器场景下并发触发
+    vi.useRealTimers();
+    const [a, b] = await Promise.all([
+      gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s2', 'q', 'a'),
+      gen.maybeGenerateTitle('s2', 'q', 'a'),
+    ]);
+    expect(a).toBe('并发标题');
+    expect(b).toBe('并发标题');
+    // rename 仅一次（并发重入复用）
+    expect(svc.rename).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

electron/services/database.service.ts

@@ -70,6 +70,14 @@ export const CONFIG_DEFAULTS: ConfigDefaultEntry[] = [
   // F-8 接通: promptInjectionDefense 由 main.ts（SecurityScanHook）与 ipc/agent.ts（用户消息检测）消费
   { key: 'security.promptInjectionDefense', value: true, category: 'security' },
 
+  // v0.7.3 P1-5: 记忆固化节流（consolidation-policy 消费）
+  { key: 'memory.consolidationEnabled', value: true, category: 'memory' },
+  { key: 'memory.consolidationMinChars', value: 200, category: 'memory' },
+  { key: 'memory.consolidationIntervalMs', value: 600000, category: 'memory' },
+
+  // v0.7.3 P4-2: MCP 自动重连开关（mcp-manager.service 消费；断连后指数退避重试）
+  { key: 'mcp.autoReconnect', value: true, category: 'mcp' },
+
   // UI 配置
   // F-8 清理: 移除死配置 ui.fontSize / ui.animationMode（无消费者；主题走 localStorage）
   { key: 'ui.theme', value: 'auto', category: 'ui' },
@@ -106,7 +114,6 @@ export class DatabaseService {
    */
   static readonly SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
 
-
   constructor(workspacePath?: string) {
     const baseDir = workspacePath ?? join(app.getPath('userData'), 'MetonaWorkspaces', 'default');
     const metonaDir = join(baseDir, '.metona');

electron/services/global-config.service.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import { join } from 'path';
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs';
 import log from 'electron-log';
 import { CONFIG_DEFAULTS } from './database.service';
-import { decryptConfigValue, encryptConfigValue, isSensitiveConfigKey } from '../utils/secure-config';
+import {
+  decryptConfigValue,
+  encryptConfigValue,
+  isSensitiveConfigKey,
+} from '../utils/secure-config';
 
 /** 全局配置文件路径（userData 下，与工作空间无关） */
 const GLOBAL_CONFIG_FILE = join(app.getPath('userData'), 'global-config.json');
@@ -43,6 +47,8 @@ const GLOBAL_KEY_PREFIXES = [
   'openai.',
   'anthropic.',
   'onboarding.',
+  // v0.7.3 P1-5: 记忆固化节流（机器级策略，跨工作空间一致）
+  'memory.',
 ];
 
 /** 判断 key 是否属于全局配置 */
@@ -104,7 +110,9 @@ export class GlobalConfigService {
       if (existsSync(GLOBAL_CONFIG_FILE)) {
         const raw = readFileSync(GLOBAL_CONFIG_FILE, 'utf-8');
         this.data = JSON.parse(raw) as GlobalConfigData;
-        log.info(`[GlobalConfig] Loaded ${Object.keys(this.data).length} keys from ${GLOBAL_CONFIG_FILE}`);
+        log.info(
+          `[GlobalConfig] Loaded ${Object.keys(this.data).length} keys from ${GLOBAL_CONFIG_FILE}`,
+        );
       } else {
         // 确保父目录存在
         const dir = join(GLOBAL_CONFIG_FILE, '..');

electron/services/mcp-manager.service.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ import type { ToolRegistry } from '../harness/tools/registry';
 import type { IMetonaTool, ToolExecutionContext } from '../harness/types/metona-tool';
 import type { MetonaToolDef } from '../harness/types';
 import { MetonaToolCategory, MetonaRiskLevel } from '../harness/types';
+// v0.7.3 P3-2: 子进程环境净化收敛到 utils/safe-env.ts 单源（与 run_command 共用）
+import { buildSafeChildEnv } from '../utils/safe-env';
 
 // v0.3.0 修复: 安全解析 JSON args，防止数据库中存储了非法 JSON 导致初始化崩溃
 /** @visibleForTesting 纯函数，供安全表测直接断言 */
@@ -97,44 +99,14 @@ export function validateMcpCommand(command: string, args: string[]): void {
 /**
  * #6 修复 + 审查修复: 构建安全的子进程环境变量
  *
- * 审查修复: 原白名单方案过于激进，剥离了 MCP Server 运行所需的 npm_config_*、代理变量等，
- * 导致 MCP Server 无法启动。改为黑名单方案：剔除包含敏感后缀的变量，保留其余。
- *
- * 注意: GITHUB_TOKEN / SLACK_BOT_TOKEN 等含 _TOKEN 后缀的变量也会被过滤。
+ * v0.7.3 P3-2: 实现收敛到 utils/safe-env.ts（buildSafeChildEnv）——与
+ * run_command 共用同一黑名单（历史双实现已漂移）。MCP 侧无运行时差异注入。
+ * 注意: GITHUB_TOKEN / SLACK_BOT_TOKEN 等含 _TOKEN 后缀的变量会被过滤；
  * 如果 MCP Server 需要这些凭证，应通过 MCP Server 配置文件传递，而非环境变量。
  */
 /** @visibleForTesting 纯函数，供安全表测直接断言 */
 export function buildSafeEnv(): Record<string, string> {
-  // 敏感变量后缀黑名单 — 匹配这些后缀的变量不会被传递给子进程
-  const SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES = [
-    '_API_KEY',
-    '_TOKEN',
-    '_SECRET',
-    '_PASSWORD',
-    '_PASSWD',
-    '_CREDENTIAL',
-    '_CREDENTIALS',
-    '_PRIVATE_KEY',
-  ];
-  // 敏感变量名黑名单（精确匹配）
-  const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set([
-    'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY',
-    'AGNES_API_KEY',
-    'MIMO_API_KEY',
-    'GITEA_PASSWORD',
-    'DATABASE_PASSWORD',
-  ]);
-
-  const env: Record<string, string> = {};
-  for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
-    if (!val) continue;
-    // 跳过敏感变量名
-    if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key)) continue;
-    // 跳过敏感后缀变量
-    if (SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => key.toUpperCase().endsWith(suffix))) continue;
-    env[key] = val;
-  }
-  return env;
+  return buildSafeChildEnv();
 }
 
 /**
@@ -171,7 +143,29 @@ export function safeParseHeaders(
 
 // ===== 类型定义 =====
 
-export type MCPServerStatus = 'connecting' | 'connected' | 'disconnected' | 'error';
+export type MCPServerStatus =
+  | 'connecting'
+  | 'connected'
+  | 'disconnected'
+  | 'error'
+  | 'reconnecting';
+
+// ===== v0.7.3 P4-2: 自动重连策略常量 =====
+
+/** 最大自动重连次数（超过后停留 error 态，等待用户手动 toggle） */
+export const MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS = 3;
+
+/**
+ * 重连退避间隔（毫秒）：5s / 15s / 60s。
+ * 纯函数 nextRetryDelayMs 消费，表测锁定（vitest fake timers 场景）。
+ */
+export const RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS = [5_000, 15_000, 60_000] as const;
+
+/** @visibleForTesting 纯函数 —— 第 attempt 次（1-based）重试前的等待毫秒数 */
+export function nextRetryDelayMs(attempt: number): number {
+  const idx = Math.min(Math.max(attempt, 1), RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS.length) - 1;
+  return RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS[idx];
+}
 
 export interface MCPServerConfig {
   id: string;
@@ -261,6 +255,17 @@ class MCPToolAdapter implements IMetonaTool {
 
 export class MCPManager {
   private servers = new Map<string, MCPServerState>();
+
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P4-2: 自动重连状态 =====
+  /** 总开关（mcp.autoReconnect，默认 true；main.ts 启动时注入，配置变更联动） */
+  private autoReconnect = true;
+  /** 各 server 的重连定时器（disconnect/shutdown 时必须清理） */
+  private reconnectTimers = new Map<string, NodeJS.Timeout>();
+  /** 各 server 已尝试的自动重连次数（成功连接后清零） */
+  private reconnectAttempts = new Map<string, number>();
+  /** 待重连的配置快照（重连时从原配置重建连接，避免读 DB 中间态） */
+  private reconnectConfigs = new Map<string, MCPServerConfig>();
+
   /**
    * 工具集合变更回调（v0.5.3）
    *
@@ -277,6 +282,93 @@ export class MCPManager {
     private toolRegistry: ToolRegistry,
   ) {}
 
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P4-2: 自动重连 =====
+
+  /**
+   * 设置自动重连开关（main.ts 启动时按 mcp.autoReconnect 注入；
+   * 配置变更经 shared.ts applyConfigSideEffects 联动）。
+   * 关闭时立即取消所有已排程的重连并清零计数（用户显式意图优先）。
+   */
+  setAutoReconnect(enabled: boolean): void {
+    this.autoReconnect = enabled;
+    if (!enabled) {
+      this.cancelAllReconnects();
+    }
+    log.debug(`[MCPManager] autoReconnect = ${enabled}`);
+  }
+
+  /** 查询某 server 的重连状态（测试与诊断用） */
+  getReconnectInfo(name: string): { attempts: number; scheduled: boolean } | null {
+    const attempts = this.reconnectAttempts.get(name);
+    const scheduled = this.reconnectTimers.has(name);
+    if (attempts === undefined && !scheduled) return null;
+    return { attempts: attempts ?? 0, scheduled };
+  }
+
+  /** 取消某 server 的重连排程（用户显式断开/移除时调用） */
+  private cancelReconnect(name: string): void {
+    const timer = this.reconnectTimers.get(name);
+    if (timer) {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      this.reconnectTimers.delete(name);
+    }
+    this.reconnectAttempts.delete(name);
+    this.reconnectConfigs.delete(name);
+  }
+
+  /** 取消全部重连排程（shutdown / 开关关闭时调用） */
+  private cancelAllReconnects(): void {
+    for (const timer of this.reconnectTimers.values()) {
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+    }
+    this.reconnectTimers.clear();
+    this.reconnectAttempts.clear();
+    this.reconnectConfigs.clear();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * 连接失败后排程指数退避重连（5s/15s/60s，最多 3 次）。
+   * 状态机进入 'reconnecting'（设置页可见）；重试耗尽停留 'error'。
+   * 仅记住传入配置快照 —— 重连时按原配置重建，不读 DB 中间态。
+   */
+  private scheduleReconnect(name: string, config: MCPServerConfig): void {
+    if (!this.autoReconnect) return;
+
+    const attempts = (this.reconnectAttempts.get(name) ?? 0) + 1;
+    if (attempts > MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS) {
+      log.warn(
+        `[MCPManager] "${name}" reconnect exhausted (${MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS} attempts) — staying in error state`,
+      );
+      this.reconnectAttempts.delete(name);
+      this.reconnectConfigs.delete(name);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    this.reconnectAttempts.set(name, attempts);
+    this.reconnectConfigs.set(name, config);
+    const state = this.servers.get(name);
+    if (state) state.status = 'reconnecting';
+
+    const delay = nextRetryDelayMs(attempts);
+    log.info(
+      `[MCPManager] "${name}" reconnect scheduled in ${delay / 1000}s (attempt ${attempts}/${MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS})`,
+    );
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      this.reconnectTimers.delete(name);
+      const snapshot = this.reconnectConfigs.get(name);
+      if (!snapshot) return;
+      log.info(
+        `[MCPManager] "${name}" reconnecting (attempt ${attempts}/${MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS})`,
+      );
+      void this.connectServer(snapshot).catch(() => {
+        /* connectServer 失败路径已自行 scheduleReconnect / 记录状态 */
+      });
+    }, delay);
+    // 定时器不阻塞应用退出
+    timer.unref?.();
+    this.reconnectTimers.set(name, timer);
+  }
+
   /** 注册工具集合变更回调（main.ts 在 AgentEngineManager 创建后注入） */
   setOnToolsChanged(callback: () => void): void {
     this.toolsChangedCallback = callback;
@@ -356,10 +448,9 @@ export class MCPManager {
   async connectServer(config: MCPServerConfig): Promise<void> {
     const { name } = config;
 
-    // 断开已有连接
-    if (this.servers.has(name)) {
-      await this.disconnectServer(name);
-    }
+    // 断开已有连接（内部拆除 —— 保留重连簿记，否则重试计数被清零、
+    // 退避序列永远停在第 1 次；用户显式断开走 disconnectServer）
+    await this.teardownConnection(name);
 
     this.servers.set(name, {
       config,
@@ -441,6 +532,15 @@ export class MCPManager {
       state.connectedAt = Date.now();
       state.error = undefined;
 
+      // v0.7.3 P4-2: 连接成功 —— 清零重连计数并取消排程
+      this.reconnectAttempts.delete(name);
+      this.reconnectConfigs.delete(name);
+      const pendingTimer = this.reconnectTimers.get(name);
+      if (pendingTimer) {
+        clearTimeout(pendingTimer);
+        this.reconnectTimers.delete(name);
+      }
+
       // 更新数据库
       const db = this.getDB();
       db.prepare(
@@ -468,6 +568,9 @@ export class MCPManager {
       `,
       ).run((error as Error).message, name);
 
+      // v0.7.3 P4-2: 失败后排程指数退避自动重连（开关关闭时 no-op）
+      this.scheduleReconnect(name, config);
+
       log.error(`MCP server "${name}" connection failed:`, error);
       throw error;
     }
@@ -476,14 +579,15 @@ export class MCPManager {
   /**
    * 断开 MCP Server
    */
-  async disconnectServer(name: string): Promise<void> {
+  /**
+   * 内部连接拆除（保留重连簿记）—— connectServer 重连前的清理动作。
+   * 与 disconnectServer 的区别：不清 reconnectAttempts/Timers/Configs，
+   * 否则自动重连的每次重试都会把自己的计数清零（退避序列永远停在第 1 次）。
+   */
+  private async teardownConnection(name: string): Promise<void> {
     const state = this.servers.get(name);
     if (!state) return;
-
-    // 从 ToolRegistry 注销
     this.toolRegistry.unregisterMCPTools(name);
-
-    // 关闭客户端
     if (state.client) {
       try {
         await state.client.close();
@@ -491,13 +595,24 @@ export class MCPManager {
         // 忽略关闭错误
       }
     }
-
-    state.status = 'disconnected';
     state.client = null;
     state.tools = [];
-
-    // v0.5.3: 工具集合已变化 — 通知调用方同步引擎（已有引擎需移除失效工具定义）
     this.notifyToolsChanged();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * 断开 MCP Server（用户显式语义：取消重连排程 + 拆除连接）
+   */
+  async disconnectServer(name: string): Promise<void> {
+    // v0.7.3 P4-2: 用户显式断开/移除 —— 取消重连排程（用户意图优先于自动重试）。
+    // 无论是否存在连接态（error/reconnecting 态的 server 也可能被移除）都执行。
+    this.cancelReconnect(name);
+    await this.teardownConnection(name);
+
+    const state = this.servers.get(name);
+    if (state) {
+      state.status = 'disconnected';
+    }
 
     log.info(`MCP server "${name}" disconnected`);
   }
@@ -601,12 +716,16 @@ export class MCPManager {
     status: MCPServerStatus;
     toolCount: number;
     error?: string;
+    /** v0.7.3 P4-2: reconnecting 状态下的已尝试次数（第 N/3 次排程） */
+    reconnectAttempt?: number;
   }> {
     return Array.from(this.servers.values()).map((s) => ({
       name: s.config.name,
       status: s.status,
       toolCount: s.tools.length,
       error: s.error,
+      reconnectAttempt:
+        s.status === 'reconnecting' ? this.reconnectAttempts.get(s.config.name) : undefined,
     }));
   }
 
@@ -618,6 +737,7 @@ export class MCPManager {
     status: MCPServerStatus;
     toolCount: number;
     error?: string;
+    reconnectAttempt?: number;
   } | null {
     const state = this.servers.get(name);
     if (!state) return null;
@@ -626,6 +746,8 @@ export class MCPManager {
       status: state.status,
       toolCount: state.tools.length,
       error: state.error,
+      reconnectAttempt:
+        state.status === 'reconnecting' ? this.reconnectAttempts.get(state.config.name) : undefined,
     };
   }
 
@@ -633,6 +755,8 @@ export class MCPManager {
    * 关闭所有连接
    */
   async shutdown(): Promise<void> {
+    // v0.7.3 P4-2: 退出前取消全部重连排程（timer 已 unref，此处幂等清理）
+    this.cancelAllReconnects();
     const names = Array.from(this.servers.keys());
     await Promise.allSettled(names.map((n) => this.disconnectServer(n)));
     log.info('MCP Manager shut down');

electron/services/session-recorder.service.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,15 @@
  */
 
 import { join } from 'path';
-import { appendFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, promises } from 'fs';
+import {
+  appendFileSync,
+  existsSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  promises,
+  readdirSync,
+  statSync,
+  unlinkSync,
+} from 'fs';
 import log from 'electron-log';
 
 // ===== 事件类型 =====
@@ -265,6 +273,82 @@ export class SessionRecorder {
     return first?.filePath ?? null;
   }
 
+  // ===== v0.7.3 P3-3: JSONL 录制文件生命周期治理 =====
+
+  /** JSONL 录制文件名模式（仅治理本服务产出的文件） */
+  private static readonly RECORDING_NAME = /^session_.+\.jsonl$/;
+
+  /**
+   * 统计录制目录中的 JSONL 文件（设置页展示 + 清理前置确认用）。
+   * 目录不存在 / 统计失败返回零值（不抛错）。
+   */
+  getRecordingStats(): { count: number; totalBytes: number } {
+    try {
+      const logsDir = join(this.workspacePath, 'logs');
+      if (!existsSync(logsDir)) return { count: 0, totalBytes: 0 };
+      const names = readdirSync(logsDir).filter((n) => SessionRecorder.RECORDING_NAME.test(n));
+      let totalBytes = 0;
+      for (const name of names) {
+        try {
+          totalBytes += statSync(join(logsDir, name)).size;
+        } catch {
+          /* 单文件统计失败跳过 */
+        }
+      }
+      return { count: names.length, totalBytes };
+    } catch {
+      return { count: 0, totalBytes: 0 };
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * 清理旧录制文件（按修改时间保留最近 maxFiles 个，默认 200）。
+   *
+   * 背景：workspace/logs/session_*.jsonl 随使用无限累积无任何清理路径。
+   * 清理策略：mtime 降序保留前 maxFiles 个，其余删除；仅匹配本服务的
+   * session_*.jsonl 命名（用户自放文件不受影响）。启动时（main.ts）与
+   * 设置页手动清理共用本方法。
+   *
+   * @returns 实际删除的文件数
+   */
+  pruneOldRecordings(maxFiles = 200): number {
+    try {
+      const logsDir = join(this.workspacePath, 'logs');
+      if (!existsSync(logsDir)) return 0;
+      const entries = readdirSync(logsDir)
+        .filter((n) => SessionRecorder.RECORDING_NAME.test(n))
+        .map((name) => {
+          try {
+            return { name, mtime: statSync(join(logsDir, name)).mtimeMs };
+          } catch {
+            return { name, mtime: 0 };
+          }
+        })
+        .sort((a, b) => b.mtime - a.mtime);
+
+      if (entries.length <= maxFiles) return 0;
+      const toDelete = entries.slice(maxFiles);
+      let deleted = 0;
+      for (const entry of toDelete) {
+        try {
+          unlinkSync(join(logsDir, entry.name));
+          deleted++;
+        } catch {
+          /* 单文件删除失败（占用中）跳过 */
+        }
+      }
+      if (deleted > 0) {
+        log.info(
+          `[SessionRecorder] Pruned ${deleted} old recording file(s) (kept ${Math.min(maxFiles, entries.length)})`,
+        );
+      }
+      return deleted;
+    } catch (err) {
+      log.warn('[SessionRecorder] pruneOldRecordings failed:', err);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
   // ===== 私有方法 =====
 
   /**

electron/services/session.service.ts

@@ -247,10 +247,12 @@ export class SessionService {
     const db = this.getDBFn();
     const op = inclusive ? '>=' : '>';
 
-    // 先查锚点 rowid（删除后无法再定位）
+    // 先查锚点 rowid 与时间戳（删除后无法再定位）
     const anchor = db
-      .prepare('SELECT rowid AS rid FROM messages WHERE session_id = ? AND id = ?')
-      .get(sessionId, messageId) as { rid: number } | undefined;
+      .prepare(
+        'SELECT rowid AS rid, created_at AS ts FROM messages WHERE session_id = ? AND id = ?',
+      )
+      .get(sessionId, messageId) as { rid: number; ts: number } | undefined;
     if (!anchor) return false;
 
     const result = db
@@ -270,6 +272,40 @@ export class SessionService {
         'DELETE FROM session_summaries WHERE session_id = ? AND summarized_until_rowid >= ?',
       ).run(sessionId, anchor.rid + (inclusive ? 0 : 1));
 
+      // v0.7.3 P1-2 根治: 同步截断 metadata 中的 TRACE 步骤。
+      // 此前编辑重发/重新生成只删消息 —— traceSteps 残留，Trace 面板出现
+      // "幽灵步骤"（与 /clear 的 metadata 残留同类，v0.7.2 A1 只修了 clear 路径）。
+      // 截断语义：锚点消息（inclusive 时含锚点）触发的 run 及其之后全部作废 ——
+      // 按 startedAt < 锚点消息 created_at 过滤保留更早 run 的步骤（严格小于：
+      // 锚点消息触发的 run 与消息同毫秒落库，等值属于"锚点侧"必须丢弃 ——
+      // 宁可多删一个边界步骤也不留幽灵步骤）。tokenUsage 为最近一次 run 的
+      // 累计展示值，紧随其后的重发 run 会重写，无需修正。
+      try {
+        const row = db.prepare('SELECT metadata FROM sessions WHERE id = ?').get(sessionId) as
+          | { metadata: string }
+          | undefined;
+        if (row?.metadata) {
+          const data = JSON.parse(row.metadata) as {
+            traceSteps?: Array<{ startedAt?: number }>;
+            tokenUsage?: unknown;
+          };
+          if (Array.isArray(data.traceSteps)) {
+            const kept = data.traceSteps.filter(
+              (s) => typeof s?.startedAt !== 'number' || s.startedAt < anchor.ts,
+            );
+            if (kept.length !== data.traceSteps.length) {
+              data.traceSteps = kept;
+              db.prepare('UPDATE sessions SET metadata = ? WHERE id = ?').run(
+                JSON.stringify(data),
+                sessionId,
+              );
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      } catch {
+        // metadata 解析失败不阻断截断主流程（与截断语义无耦合）
+      }
+
       log.info(
         `Session truncated: ${sessionId} (${result.changes} messages removed after ${messageId})`,
       );
@@ -355,12 +391,11 @@ export class SessionService {
 
   /**
    * 删除一条消息
+   *
+   * v0.7.3 P1-3: 随 sessions:deleteMessage 死通道一并移除 —— 该方法不回减
+   * sessions.message_count（saveMessage 加、删除不加的计数漂移面），且渲染层
+   * 从未有调用方。消息删除语义由 truncateMessagesAfter（含计数修正）覆盖。
    */
-  deleteMessage(messageId: string): boolean {
-    const db = this.getDBFn();
-    const result = db.prepare('DELETE FROM messages WHERE id = ?').run(messageId);
-    return result.changes > 0;
-  }
 
   /**
    * 清空会话所有消息

electron/services/title-generator.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/**
+ * Title Generator — 会话标题 LLM 自动生成（v0.7.3 P4-1）
+ *
+ * 背景：首轮消息后前端仅以"用户首条消息截前 30 字符"作为会话标题
+ * （agent-store.sendMessage），中文长句体验差且语义压缩生硬。
+ *
+ * 本服务在会话首个完成的 run 之后（terminationReason === 'completed'）用主
+ * Provider adapter 发起一次极小的非流式请求（maxTokens 32 / temperature 0.3 /
+ * thinking 关闭），生成 ≤16 字的精炼标题并写回 sessions 表。生成失败（网络 /
+ * 配额 / 解析失败）静默回退——前端首 30 字符截断标题保持有效，无损可用性。
+ *
+ * 契约：
+ * - 每个会话生命周期内仅生成一次（内存 Set 幂等，进程重启后自然重置——
+ *   已有非默认标题的会话通过 hasCustomTitle 判定跳过，不会重复生成）；
+ * - 标题经 sanitizeTitle 清洗：剥离 markdown/引号/换行/前后缀冒号，
+ *   折叠空白，超长截断，空结果返回 null（调用方保持原标题不变）。
+ */
+
+import { nanoid } from 'nanoid';
+import log from 'electron-log';
+import type { IMetonaProviderAdapter, MetonaRequest } from '../harness/types';
+import type { SessionService } from './session.service';
+
+/** 生成标题的最大长度（字符）——超过即截断 */
+const MAX_TITLE_LENGTH = 40;
+
+/** 传给 LLM 的用户消息 / 回答摘录长度 */
+const EXCERPT_LENGTH = 600;
+
+/** LLM 调用超时（标题生成不应阻塞任何主流程） */
+const TITLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+
+/**
+ * 清洗 LLM 返回的标题文本。
+ *
+ * 规则（按序应用）：
+ * 1. 剥离 markdown 代码围栏与首尾 `#`/`-`/`*` 列表标记；
+ * 2. 剥离成对包裹引号（中英文单双引号）；
+ * 3. 剥离 "标题:"/"Title:" 这类自述前缀；
+ * 4. 折叠全部空白（含换行）为单个空格并 trim；
+ * 5. 超过 maxLen 截断；
+ * 6. 空结果返回 null（调用方保持原标题）。
+ */
+export function sanitizeTitle(raw: string, maxLen: number = MAX_TITLE_LENGTH): string | null {
+  if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'string') return null;
+
+  let title = raw.trim();
+  // 1/2. markdown 围栏、列表标记与包裹引号 —— 循环应用直至稳定（处理嵌套包装
+  // 如 ```"标题"``` / 多层引号；剥除全部首尾引号字符而非仅成对项，
+  // 使 '"""' 这类纯符号输入收敛为空 → null）
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+    const before = title;
+    title = title
+      .replace(/^```(?:[a-z]*)\s*/i, '')
+      .replace(/\s*```$/i, '')
+      .replace(/^[#\-*>]+\s*/, '')
+      .replace(/^["'“”『』「"]+/, '')
+      .replace(/["'“”『』「"]+$/, '');
+    if (title === before) break;
+  }
+  // 3. 自述前缀（标题:/Title:/会话标题: 等）
+  title = title.replace(/^(?:标题|会话标题|题目|title)\s*[:：]\s*/i, '');
+  // 4. 折叠空白（换行合并——LLM 偶发多行输出时取首行语义）
+  title = title.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
+  // 5. 截断
+  if (title.length > maxLen) title = title.slice(0, maxLen).trimEnd();
+  // 6. 空结果
+  return title.length > 0 ? title : null;
+}
+
+export class TitleGenerator {
+  /** 已生成过标题的会话（进程级幂等） */
+  private generated = new Set<string>();
+  /** 进行中的生成任务（防并发重复调用） */
+  private running = new Map<string, Promise<string | null>>();
+
+  constructor(
+    private getAdapter: () => IMetonaProviderAdapter,
+    private sessionService: SessionService,
+  ) {}
+
+  /**
+   * 为会话生成标题（fire-and-forget 调用；失败静默）。
+   *
+   * @param sessionId 会话 ID
+   * @param userMessage 用户原始消息（干净版本，不含注入前缀）
+   * @param assistantAnswer Agent 最终回答
+   * @returns 生成的标题（未生成/失败返回 null）
+   */
+  async maybeGenerateTitle(
+    sessionId: string,
+    userMessage: string,
+    assistantAnswer: string,
+  ): Promise<string | null> {
+    if (!sessionId || typeof sessionId !== 'string') return null;
+    // 输入门控：双向内容均为空无生成意义
+    if (!userMessage?.trim() && !assistantAnswer?.trim()) return null;
+
+    // 并发去重先于幂等短路 —— 同一会话进行中的生成必须复用同一 Promise，
+    // 而不能被"已占位"的幂等判断吞掉（否则并发第二调用拿到 null）
+    const existing = this.running.get(sessionId);
+    if (existing) return existing;
+    // 幂等：每会话仅一次（占位同步完成，先于任何 await）
+    if (this.generated.has(sessionId)) return null;
+
+    this.generated.add(sessionId);
+    const task = this.generate(sessionId, userMessage, assistantAnswer).finally(() => {
+      this.running.delete(sessionId);
+    });
+    this.running.set(sessionId, task);
+    return task;
+  }
+
+  private async generate(
+    sessionId: string,
+    userMessage: string,
+    assistantAnswer: string,
+  ): Promise<string | null> {
+    try {
+      const adapter = this.getAdapter();
+      if (!adapter) return null;
+
+      // 已有自定义标题（用户手动重命名 / 前端首条截断标题）时不覆盖，
+      // 避免用户主动命名被 LLM 标题冲掉
+      const sessions = this.sessionService.list();
+      const current = sessions.find((s) => s.id === sessionId);
+      if (current && current.title !== '新会话') {
+        log.debug(`[TitleGenerator] session ${sessionId} already titled "${current.title}" — skip`);
+        return null;
+      }
+
+      const request: MetonaRequest = {
+        meta: {
+          sessionId: 'title-generation',
+          iteration: 0,
+          requestId: `tg_${nanoid(12)}`,
+          timestamp: Date.now(),
+          agentVersion: '1.0.0',
+        },
+        systemPrompt: {
+          roleDefinition:
+            'You generate concise conversation titles for an AI assistant desktop app.',
+          outputConstraints:
+            'Given the first user message and the assistant reply, output ONE title of at most 16 characters ' +
+            'in the same language as the user message. The title must capture the core topic or task. ' +
+            'No quotes, no markdown, no ending punctuation, no explanations — output the title text ONLY.',
+          safetyGuidelines:
+            'Do not include sensitive data (passwords, keys, personal info) in the title.',
+        },
+        messages: [
+          {
+            role: 'user',
+            content:
+              `User message: ${userMessage.slice(0, EXCERPT_LENGTH)}\n\n` +
+              `Assistant reply: ${assistantAnswer.slice(0, EXCERPT_LENGTH)}\n\n` +
+              `Output the title only.`,
+            timestamp: Date.now(),
+          },
+        ],
+        params: {
+          maxTokens: 32,
+          temperature: 0.3,
+          stream: false,
+          thinkingEnabled: false,
+          thinkingEffort: 'low',
+        },
+      };
+
+      // 超时保护：标题生成绝不能拖慢会话收尾
+      let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+      try {
+        const timeoutPromise = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
+          timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('title generation timeout')), TITLE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        });
+        const response = await Promise.race([adapter.send(request), timeoutPromise]);
+        const title = sanitizeTitle(response.content);
+        if (!title) {
+          log.debug(
+            `[TitleGenerator] session ${sessionId}: empty/unsanitizable title, keeping fallback`,
+          );
+          return null;
+        }
+        const renamed = this.sessionService.rename(sessionId, title);
+        if (renamed) {
+          log.info(`[TitleGenerator] session ${sessionId} titled: "${title}"`);
+        }
+        return renamed ? title : null;
+      } finally {
+        if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      // 静默回退：标题失败不影响会话可用性（前端首条截断标题仍在）
+      log.debug(
+        `[TitleGenerator] session ${sessionId} title generation failed:`,
+        (err as Error).message,
+      );
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+}

electron/utils/__tests__/safe-env.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * 子进程环境净化单源测试（v0.7.3 P3-2）
+ *
+ * buildSafeChildEnv 是 run_command 与 MCP stdio 启动的唯一净化实现：
+ * E1 敏感后缀剔除；E2 敏感精确名单剔除；E3 非敏感变量保留（黑名单不误伤）；
+ * E4 runtime 注入覆盖；E5 空值剔除。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { buildSafeChildEnv } from '../safe-env';
+
+const SAMPLE_ENV: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
+  PATH: '/usr/bin',
+  LANG: 'zh_CN.UTF-8',
+  DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: 'sk-secret',
+  MY_SERVICE_TOKEN: 't',
+  APP_PASSWORD: 'p',
+  GITEA_PASSWORD: 'g',
+  GITHUB_TOKEN: 'gh',
+  HOME: '/home/u',
+};
+
+describe('buildSafeChildEnv', () => {
+  it('E1: 敏感后缀变量全部剔除（_API_KEY/_TOKEN/_PASSWORD/_SECRET/...）', () => {
+    const env = buildSafeChildEnv({ source: SAMPLE_ENV });
+    expect(env['DEEPSEEK_API_KEY']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env['MY_SERVICE_TOKEN']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env['APP_PASSWORD']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env['GITHUB_TOKEN']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('E2: 精确名单剔除（大小写不敏感后缀 + 精确 key）', () => {
+    const env = buildSafeChildEnv({ source: { GITEA_PASSWORD: 'g', DATABASE_PASSWORD: 'd' } });
+    expect(env['GITEA_PASSWORD']).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(env['DATABASE_PASSWORD']).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('E3: 非敏感变量保留（黑名单不误伤 GIT_*/代理/路径类变量）', () => {
+    const env = buildSafeChildEnv({
+      source: { ...SAMPLE_ENV, GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: 'metona', HTTPS_PROXY: 'http://p:7890' },
+    });
+    expect(env['PATH']).toBe('/usr/bin');
+    expect(env['LANG']).toBe('zh_CN.UTF-8');
+    expect(env['HOME']).toBe('/home/u');
+    expect(env['GIT_AUTHOR_NAME']).toBe('metona');
+    expect(env['HTTPS_PROXY']).toBe('http://p:7890');
+  });
+
+  it('E4: runtime 注入覆盖净化结果（调用方运行时差异显式可控）', () => {
+    const env = buildSafeChildEnv({
+      source: SAMPLE_ENV,
+      runtime: { NODE_ENV: 'production', LANG: 'C.utf8' },
+    });
+    expect(env['NODE_ENV']).toBe('production');
+    // runtime 覆盖同名的净化保留值
+    expect(env['LANG']).toBe('C.utf8');
+  });
+
+  it('E5: 空值/undefined 变量剔除', () => {
+    const env = buildSafeChildEnv({ source: { EMPTY: '', UNSET: undefined, KEEP: 'x' } });
+    expect('EMPTY' in env).toBe(false);
+    expect('UNSET' in env).toBe(false);
+    expect(env['KEEP']).toBe('x');
+  });
+
+  it('E6: 无 source 时回退 process.env（运行路径契约；至少保留 PATH 类基本变量）', () => {
+    const env = buildSafeChildEnv({ runtime: { NODE_ENV: 'production' } });
+    expect(env['NODE_ENV']).toBe('production');
+  });
+});

electron/utils/network-proxy.ts

@@ -27,20 +27,37 @@ import log from 'electron-log';
 
 const AGENT_BROWSER_PARTITION = 'persist:metona-agent-browser';
 
+/**
+ * v0.7.3 P2-1: 代理激活标志（模块级状态，由 applySessionProxy 维护）。
+ *
+ * SSRF DNS pinning（ssrf-dispatcher）在此标志为 true 时必须退化为"仅入口校验"：
+ * 代理模式下 DNS 解析发生在代理服务端，本地无法感知/约束最终连接的 IP，
+ * per-request dispatcher 也会旁路用户配置的 ProxyAgent（破坏代理语义）。
+ * 已知边界与 M7 结论一致，显式暴露而非隐藏。
+ */
+let proxyActive = false;
+
+export function isProxyActive(): boolean {
+  return proxyActive;
+}
+
 export async function applySessionProxy(proxyUrl: string | null | undefined): Promise<void> {
   const envProxy = process.env['HTTPS_PROXY'] || process.env['HTTP_PROXY'] || '';
   const rules = (typeof proxyUrl === 'string' ? proxyUrl.trim() : '') || envProxy;
+  proxyActive = rules !== '';
 
   // ===== 通道一：Chromium sessions =====
   try {
-    const config = rules !== '' ? { proxyRules: rules } : ({ mode: 'direct' as const });
+    const config = rules !== '' ? { proxyRules: rules } : { mode: 'direct' as const };
     await session.defaultSession.setProxy(config);
     await session.fromPartition(AGENT_BROWSER_PARTITION).setProxy(config);
     log.info(
       `[Network] Chromium sessions proxy ${rules === '' ? 'set to direct (no proxy)' : `rules: ${rules}`}`,
     );
   } catch (err) {
-    log.warn(`[Network] Failed to apply Chromium session proxy "${rules}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
+    log.warn(
+      `[Network] Failed to apply Chromium session proxy "${rules}": ${(err as Error).message}`,
+    );
   }
 
   // ===== 通道二：主进程 Node fetch（undici 全局 dispatcher）=====
@@ -58,7 +75,9 @@ export async function applySessionProxy(proxyUrl: string | null | undefined): Pr
       }
     } catch (err) {
       // 理论仅在 undici 原生绑定异常时发生；fetch 将保持默认直连行为
-      log.warn(`[Network] Failed to set undici dispatcher for proxy "${rules}": ${(err as Error).message}`);
+      log.warn(
+        `[Network] Failed to set undici dispatcher for proxy "${rules}": ${(err as Error).message}`,
+      );
     }
   })();
 }

electron/utils/safe-env.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/**
+ * Safe Child Environment — 子进程环境变量净化（v0.7.3 P3-2 单源收敛）
+ *
+ * 背景：run_command（command.ts buildSafeCommandEnv）与 MCP stdio 启动
+ * （mcp-manager.service.ts buildSafeEnv）各持有一份几乎相同的"敏感变量黑名单
+ * + 全量剔除"实现，任何新增敏感 key 都要改两处（历史上已经漂移过一次：
+ * command 版多注入了 Windows 运行时变量）。本模块是唯一实现，两个调用方
+ * 按需声明运行时差异。
+ *
+ * 净化策略（黑名单方案，#9 修复 + 审查修复的延续）：
+ * - 敏感变量名黑名单（精确匹配）一律剔除；
+ * - 敏感后缀（_API_KEY/_TOKEN/_SECRET/...）一律剔除；
+ * - 其余变量保留（白名单方案会破坏 GIT_* 与 PYTHONPATH、代理变量等子进程必需项，
+ *   见 mcp-manager 历史注释）；
+ * - 调用方通过 `runtime` 注入必需的运行时变量（后者覆盖前者，显式可控）。
+ */
+
+/** 敏感变量后缀黑名单（大小写不敏感后缀匹配） */
+const SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES = [
+  '_API_KEY',
+  '_TOKEN',
+  '_SECRET',
+  '_PASSWORD',
+  '_PASSWD',
+  '_CREDENTIAL',
+  '_CREDENTIALS',
+  '_PRIVATE_KEY',
+] as const;
+
+/** 敏感变量名黑名单（精确匹配） */
+const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set([
+  'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY',
+  'AGNES_API_KEY',
+  'MIMO_API_KEY',
+  'GITEA_PASSWORD',
+  'DATABASE_PASSWORD',
+]);
+
+export interface SafeChildEnvOptions {
+  /**
+   * 调用方必需的运行时变量（如 NODE_ENV / PYTHONIOENCODING / LANG）。
+   * 在净化后的 process.env 之上覆盖写入。
+   */
+  runtime?: Record<string, string>;
+  /**
+   * 变量来源（默认 process.env；测试可注入受控快照）。
+   */
+  source?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * 构建净化后的子进程环境变量。
+ * @see 模块注释 —— 黑名单方案的设计原因与历史漂移教训
+ */
+export function buildSafeChildEnv(options: SafeChildEnvOptions = {}): Record<string, string> {
+  const source = options.source ?? process.env;
+  const env: Record<string, string> = {};
+
+  for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(source)) {
+    if (!val) continue;
+    if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key)) continue;
+    if (SENSITIVE_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => key.toUpperCase().endsWith(suffix))) continue;
+    env[key] = val;
+  }
+
+  // 运行时必需变量（显式注入，覆盖净化结果）
+  if (options.runtime) {
+    Object.assign(env, options.runtime);
+  }
+
+  return env;
+}