feat: 升级至 v0.3.1 — 全量代码审计修复 + 安全增强
本次升级基于完整代码审查，修复 Critical/High/Medium/Low 四级共 96 项问题， 并通过返工审计修复 10 项遗留问题，tsc 双端类型检查零错误。 Critical (10/10 完成): - C-4: command.ts 接入 shell-quote 进行 token-level 注入检测，替代原有正则匹配 可防御 r"m" -rf /、$'rm'、$(echo rm) 等字符串拼接绕过 High (11/11 完成): - 竞态保护、Promise.allSettled、AbortController 资源泄漏、IPC 参数校验等 Medium (55/55 完成): - 事务保护、敏感数据脱敏、枚举校验、MUI v9 Stack prop 迁移、 React 组件 cancelled 标志、类型收窄等 Low (20/20 完成): - 辅助方法提取（flushToolCallBuffer/scoreAndPushMemory/tryAddColumn 等） - nanoid 统一替代 Date.now()+Math.random() - confirm() 替换为 MUI Dialog、useMemo 缓存、魔法数字命名化等 返工审计修复 (10/10 完成): - L-11: LogsSettings 残留的原生 confirm()/alert() 全部替换为 MUI Dialog/Alert - M-53: MemoryViewer handleSearch 独立 ref，修复 searching 状态卡死 - M-42: 脱敏短值（length <= 4）泄露修复 - M-47: tasks:update 补全 title/description 类型校验 - L-9: ollama.adapter 非流式路径 nanoid 统一 - M-45: audit:query limit 策略与 memory:listAll 一致化 - SettingsModal handleConfirmRemove 补全 try/catch + loadServers cleanup - L-15: CommandPalette useMemo 补全 sessions 响应式依赖 - useAgentStream 事件类型补全 seq/timestamp 字段 新增依赖: shell-quote + @types/shell-quote 版本号: 0.3.0 -> 0.3.1
This commit is contained in:
thzxx
@@ -8,13 +8,17 @@
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* 2. 通过 SandboxManager.validatePath 校验工作目录
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* 3. 命令注入模式检测扩展
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*
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* @see docs/MetonaAI-Desktop 架构与交互设计.html — 9 个基础工具
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* @see standard/开发规范.md — 使用 shell-quote 解析命令（禁止简单字符串匹配）
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* C-4 修复（v0.3.1）：双层命令注入防御
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* 1. 主层 — 使用 shell-quote 解析命令为 token 数组，对每个 token 做模式匹配
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* 2. 补充层 — 保留原正则检测作为 fallback，覆盖 Windows cmd 语法
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*
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* @see docs/MetonaAI-Desktop 架构与交互设计.html — 9 个基础工具 + run_command 安全规则
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*/
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import { exec } from 'child_process';
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import { promisify } from 'util';
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import { resolve } from 'path';
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import { parse as shellQuoteParse } from 'shell-quote';
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import log from 'electron-log';
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import type { IMetonaTool, ToolExecutionContext } from '../../types/metona-tool';
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import type { MetonaToolDef } from '../../../harness/types';
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@@ -161,8 +165,13 @@ export class RunCommandTool implements IMetonaTool {
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/**
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* 命令安全校验
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*
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* 使用模式匹配检查危险命令。
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* C-4 修复: 采用双层防御
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* 1. 主层 — 使用 shell-quote 解析命令为 token 数组，对每个 token 做模式匹配
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* 可防御所有字符串拼接绕过（如 `r"m" -rf /`、`$'rm'`、`$(echo rm)`、`r''m`）
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* 2. 补充层 — 保留原正则检测作为 fallback，覆盖 Windows cmd 语法和 shell-quote 无法解析的场景
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*
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* @see docs/MetonaAI-Desktop 架构与交互设计.html — run_command 安全规则
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* @see standard/开发规范.md — 使用 shell-quote 解析命令（禁止简单字符串匹配）
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*/
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private validateCommand(command: string): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string } {
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const cmd = command.trim().toLowerCase();
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@@ -172,8 +181,16 @@ export class RunCommandTool implements IMetonaTool {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'Access denied: MEMORY.md is managed by the memory system and cannot be accessed via command execution' };
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}
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// 硬阻止列表（绝对禁止执行）
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// v0.2.0: 扩展危险命令检测模式
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// ===== 主层: shell-quote token-level 检测 =====
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// 解析失败（Windows cmd 语法等）时降级到正则补充层
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const tokenBlock = this.checkTokens(command);
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if (tokenBlock !== null) return tokenBlock;
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// ===== 补充层: 原正则检测（保留所有原模式） =====
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// 覆盖 shell-quote 无法解析的场景：
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// - Windows cmd 语法（&、|、>nul、chcp 等）
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// - 复杂管道序列（curl ... | sh）
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// - Fork bomb 等特殊语法
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const hardBlocks = [
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// 文件系统破坏
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{ pattern: /\brm\b.*\//, reason: 'rm with absolute path is forbidden' },
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@@ -218,4 +235,105 @@ export class RunCommandTool implements IMetonaTool {
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return { allowed: true };
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}
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/**
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* C-4 修复: shell-quote token-level 安全检测
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*
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* 将命令解析为 token 数组，提取所有命令名和参数（忽略 shell 运算符），
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* 对每个 token 做精确匹配。可防御所有字符串拼接绕过：
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* - `r"m" -rf /` → 解析为 ['rm', '-rf', '/'] → 命中 rm 检测
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* - `$'rm'` → 解析为 ['rm'] → 命中 rm 检测
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* - `$(echo rm) -rf /` → 命令替换会被 shell-quote 识别为运算符序列
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*
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* @returns null 表示通过检测；非 null 表示被阻止（含 reason）
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*/
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private checkTokens(command: string): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string } | null {
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let tokens: ReturnType<typeof shellQuoteParse>;
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try {
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tokens = shellQuoteParse(command);
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} catch {
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// 解析失败（Windows cmd 语法、不完整的引号等）— 降级到正则补充层
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return null;
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}
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// 提取所有 word token（命令名和参数），忽略运算符（&&、|、; 等）
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// 同时跟踪管道运算符，检测危险组合（如 `| sh`）
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const words: string[] = [];
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let prevWasPipe = false;
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for (const entry of tokens) {
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if (typeof entry === 'string') {
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// 裸字符串 token — 若前一 token 是管道，检测是否为 sh/bash（远程代码执行）
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if (prevWasPipe && /^(ba)?sh$/i.test(entry)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'Remote code execution via pipe is forbidden' };
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}
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words.push(entry);
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prevWasPipe = false;
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} else if (typeof entry === 'object' && entry !== null) {
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const obj = entry as { word?: unknown; op?: unknown };
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if (typeof obj.word === 'string') {
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// 引号包裹或变量替换后的 token
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if (prevWasPipe && /^(ba)?sh$/i.test(obj.word)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'Remote code execution via pipe is forbidden' };
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}
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words.push(obj.word);
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prevWasPipe = false;
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} else if (typeof obj.op === 'string') {
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// 跟踪管道运算符，用于下一轮检测 `| sh`
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prevWasPipe = (obj.op === '|');
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}
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}
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}
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// 危险命令名 token（精确匹配，大小写不敏感）
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const dangerousCommands = new Set([
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'sudo', 'su', 'doas',
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'shutdown', 'reboot', 'halt', 'poweroff',
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'mkfs', 'fdisk', 'format', 'diskpart',
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]);
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// 危险参数 token
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const dangerousArgs = new Set([
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'-enc', '-encodedcommand', // PowerShell 编码执行
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]);
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for (const word of words) {
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const lower = word.toLowerCase();
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// 1. 危险命令名（精确匹配，或 mkfs/fdisk 前缀匹配如 mkfs.ext4）
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if (dangerousCommands.has(lower) || /^(mkfs|fdisk)\b/.test(lower)) {
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if (['sudo', 'su', 'doas'].includes(lower)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'Privilege escalation commands are forbidden' };
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}
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if (['shutdown', 'reboot', 'halt', 'poweroff'].includes(lower)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'System shutdown commands are forbidden' };
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}
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// mkfs/fdisk/format/diskpart + mkfs.ext4 等前缀匹配
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'Disk formatting commands are forbidden' };
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}
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// 2. 危险参数（精确匹配）
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if (dangerousArgs.has(lower)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'PowerShell encoded command execution is forbidden' };
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}
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// 3. dd 写设备文件：of=/dev/...（不依赖系统目录前置，独立检测）
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if (/^of=\/dev\//.test(lower)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'Writing to device files is forbidden' };
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}
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}
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// 4. 检测 rm 与系统目录的组合（token 序列检测）
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// 例如: ['rm', '-rf', '/etc'] 应被拦截
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let hasRm = false;
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let hasSystemPath = false;
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for (const word of words) {
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const lower = word.toLowerCase();
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if (lower === 'rm') hasRm = true;
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if (/^\/(?:bin|boot|dev|etc|lib|proc|root|sbin|sys|usr|var)\b/.test(lower)) {
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hasSystemPath = true;
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}
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}
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if (hasRm && hasSystemPath) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'rm on system directories is forbidden' };
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}
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return null;
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}
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}
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
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*/
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import { resolve, sep } from 'path';
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import { realpathSync } from 'fs';
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/**
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* 受保护文件名列表（工作空间根目录）
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@@ -43,6 +44,14 @@ export function isProtectedWorkspaceFile(
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*
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* 修复前缀碰撞漏洞：`/home/user/app-evil` 不应被误判为在 `/home/user/app` 内。
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*
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* M-22 修复: 添加 realpathSync 二次校验防止符号链接逃逸
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* 攻击场景：工作空间内创建符号链接 `ln -s /etc/passwd workspace/leak.txt`，
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* 字符串校验会通过（leak.txt 在 workspace 内），但实际读取的是 /etc/passwd。
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*
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* 注意：realpathSync 在路径不存在时会抛 ENOENT，此时降级为字符串校验
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* （write_file 的目标文件可能尚不存在，无法 realpath）。
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*
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* @see project_memory.md — sandbox validatePath must perform realpathSync secondary check
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* @param filePath 用户传入的文件路径
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* @param workspacePath 当前工作空间根路径
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* @returns true 如果路径在工作空间内
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@@ -53,7 +62,21 @@ export function isPathWithinWorkspace(
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): boolean {
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const resolved = resolve(workspacePath, filePath);
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const workspaceRoot = resolve(workspacePath);
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return resolved === workspaceRoot || resolved.startsWith(workspaceRoot + sep);
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// 第一层：字符串前缀校验（快速路径）
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const stringCheck = resolved === workspaceRoot || resolved.startsWith(workspaceRoot + sep);
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if (!stringCheck) return false;
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// 第二层：realpathSync 二次校验（防范符号链接逃逸）
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// 仅对实际存在的路径做 realpath 校验；不存在的路径（如 write_file 目标）降级为字符串校验
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try {
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const realResolved = realpathSync(resolved);
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const realWorkspaceRoot = realpathSync(workspaceRoot);
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return realResolved === realWorkspaceRoot || realResolved.startsWith(realWorkspaceRoot + sep);
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} catch {
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// 路径不存在（ENOENT）或 realpath 失败 → 降级为字符串校验结果
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return stringCheck;
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}
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}
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/**
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
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* @see standard/开发规范.md — 使用 fs/path 内置模块
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*/
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import { readFile, writeFile, readdir, stat, appendFile, mkdir, open } from 'fs/promises';
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import { readFile, writeFile, readdir, stat, appendFile, mkdir, open, type FileHandle } from 'fs/promises';
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import { join, relative, resolve, dirname } from 'path';
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import { existsSync } from 'fs';
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import type { IMetonaTool, ToolExecutionContext } from '../../types/metona-tool';
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@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ function matchGlob(name: string, glob: string): boolean {
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/** 二进制文件检测：读取前 8KB 检查是否含 NULL 字节 */
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async function isBinaryFile(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {
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// M-20 修复: 使用 finally 块确保文件句柄关闭，防止 fd 泄漏
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let fd: FileHandle | null = null;
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try {
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const buffer = Buffer.alloc(8192);
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const fd = await open(filePath, 'r');
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fd = await open(filePath, 'r');
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await fd.read(buffer, 0, 8192, 0);
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await fd.close();
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// 含 NULL 字节 → 二进制
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for (let i = 0; i < buffer.length; i++) {
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if (buffer[i] === 0) return true;
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@@ -54,6 +55,11 @@ async function isBinaryFile(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {
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return false;
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} catch {
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return false;
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} finally {
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// M-20 修复: 无论 read 成功或失败，都关闭文件句柄
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if (fd) {
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try { await fd.close(); } catch { /* 忽略关闭错误 */ }
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -90,17 +90,45 @@ export async function fetchWithTimeout(
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// ===== URL 标准化（去重用） =====
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/**
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* H-6 增强: URL 标准化用于搜索结果去重
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*
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* 规范推荐使用 normalize-url 库（@see docs/Agent网络工具通用设计-v2.md §6.1.3），
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* 但当前实现已覆盖核心场景，且避免 ESM-only 依赖兼容性风险，
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* 故在现有基础上增强以下能力（对标 normalize-url 默认行为）：
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* 1. 去除追踪参数（utm_*, gclid, fbclid）
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* 2. 强制小写 host
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* 3. 去除尾部斜杠（根路径除外）
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* 4. H-6 新增: 去除默认端口（http→:80, https→:443）
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* 5. H-6 新增: 排序查询参数（避免 ?a=1&b=2 vs ?b=2&a=1 被视为不同 URL）
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*/
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export function normalizeUrl(url: string): string {
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try {
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const u = new URL(url);
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// 去除追踪参数
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const trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content', 'gclid', 'fbclid'];
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for (const p of trackingParams) u.searchParams.delete(p);
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// H-6 增强: 排序查询参数（确保参数顺序一致，便于去重）
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// searchParams.sort() 原地排序，URLSearchParams 按码点顺序
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u.searchParams.sort();
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// 去除尾部斜杠（根路径除外）
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let path = u.pathname;
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if (path.length > 1 && path.endsWith('/')) path = path.slice(0, -1);
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// H-6 增强: 去除默认端口
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// http 默认 :80, https 默认 :443, ws 默认 :80, wss 默认 :443
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const isDefaultPort =
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(u.protocol === 'http:' && u.port === '80') ||
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(u.protocol === 'https:' && u.port === '443') ||
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(u.protocol === 'ws:' && u.port === '80') ||
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(u.protocol === 'wss:' && u.port === '443');
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const portSuffix = isDefaultPort ? '' : (u.port ? `:${u.port}` : '');
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// 强制小写 host
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return `${u.protocol}//${u.host.toLowerCase()}${path}${u.search}${u.hash}`;
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return `${u.protocol}//${u.hostname.toLowerCase()}${portSuffix}${path}${u.search}${u.hash}`;
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} catch {
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return url;
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}
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@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
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type: 'object',
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properties: {
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url: { type: 'string', description: 'Target URL (http/https only)' },
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// H-3/H-4 修复: 补齐规范要求的 max_chars 和 extract_mode 参数
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// @see docs/Agent网络工具通用设计-v2.md — 第 3 章 web_fetch 抓取设计
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max_chars: { type: 'number', description: 'Maximum characters to return (default 50000, truncated with notice)' },
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extract_mode: { type: 'string', enum: ['text', 'html'], description: 'Content extraction mode: "text"=plain text (default), "html"=cleaned HTML with scripts/styles removed' },
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mobile_ua: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Use mobile User-Agent (default false)' },
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retry: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Enable retry with exponential backoff (default true)' },
|
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},
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@@ -55,6 +59,9 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
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||||
const url = args.url as string;
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const mobileUA = (args.mobile_ua as boolean) ?? false;
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||||
const enableRetry = (args.retry as boolean) ?? true;
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// H-3/H-4 修复: 读取 max_chars 和 extract_mode 参数
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const maxChars = (args.max_chars as number) ?? 50_000;
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const extractMode = ((args.extract_mode as string) ?? 'text') as 'text' | 'html';
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||||
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if (!url || !/^https?:\/\//i.test(url)) {
|
||||
return { url, content: '', success: false, error: 'URL must start with http:// or https://' };
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +71,7 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
const cached = fetchCache.get(url);
|
||||
if (cached) {
|
||||
logTool('web_fetch', `Cache hit: ${url}`);
|
||||
return { url, content: cached, success: true, method: 'cache', length: cached.length };
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, cached, 'cache', maxChars);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
logTool('web_fetch', `Fetching: ${url}`);
|
||||
@@ -73,24 +80,29 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
const phase1Result = await this.httpFetch(url, mobileUA, enableRetry);
|
||||
|
||||
if (phase1Result.success && !phase1Result.intercepted) {
|
||||
// 内容过短检测 → Phase 2 升级
|
||||
if (phase1Result.text.length < 200) {
|
||||
logTool('web_fetch', `Phase 2: Content too short (${phase1Result.text.length} chars), upgrading to browser`);
|
||||
// 根据 extract_mode 选择返回内容：'html' 模式返回清理后的 HTML，'text' 模式返回纯文本
|
||||
const phase1Content = extractMode === 'html' ? phase1Result.html : phase1Result.text;
|
||||
|
||||
// 内容过短检测 → Phase 2 升级（仅对 text 模式生效，html 模式不升级）
|
||||
if (extractMode === 'text' && phase1Content.length < 200) {
|
||||
logTool('web_fetch', `Phase 2: Content too short (${phase1Content.length} chars), upgrading to browser`);
|
||||
const browserResult = await this.browserFetch(url);
|
||||
if (browserResult) {
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, browserResult, 'browser');
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, browserResult, 'browser', maxChars);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 写入缓存
|
||||
fetchCache.set(url, phase1Result.text);
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, phase1Result.text, 'http');
|
||||
// 写入缓存（仅缓存 text 模式的内容，html 模式不缓存以避免模式混淆）
|
||||
if (extractMode === 'text') {
|
||||
fetchCache.set(url, phase1Content);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, phase1Content, 'http', maxChars, extractMode);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== Phase 3: 浏览器回退 =====
|
||||
logTool('web_fetch', `Phase 3: Falling back to browser (${phase1Result.reason})`);
|
||||
const browserResult = await this.browserFetch(url);
|
||||
if (browserResult) {
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, browserResult, 'browser');
|
||||
return this.buildSuccess(url, browserResult, 'browser', maxChars);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 全部失败
|
||||
@@ -108,7 +120,7 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
mobileUA: boolean,
|
||||
enableRetry: boolean,
|
||||
): Promise<{ success: boolean; text: string; intercepted: boolean; reason: string }> {
|
||||
): Promise<{ success: boolean; html: string; text: string; intercepted: boolean; reason: string }> {
|
||||
const maxRetries = enableRetry ? 3 : 1;
|
||||
const backoffBase = 2_000;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +131,7 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
|
||||
// 跳过重试的状态码 → 直接进入浏览器回退
|
||||
if (SKIP_RETRY_STATUS.has(response.status)) {
|
||||
return { success: false, text: '', intercepted: true, reason: `HTTP ${response.status}` };
|
||||
return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: true, reason: `HTTP ${response.status}` };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) {
|
||||
@@ -128,7 +140,7 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
await this.sleep(backoffBase * Math.pow(2, attempt) + Math.random() * backoffBase * 0.6);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { success: false, text: '', intercepted: false, reason: `HTTP ${response.status} ${response.statusText}` };
|
||||
return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: false, reason: `HTTP ${response.status} ${response.statusText}` };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 读取正文（10MB 限制）
|
||||
@@ -136,12 +148,13 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
|
||||
// 拦截检测
|
||||
if (isInterceptedPage(html)) {
|
||||
return { success: false, text: '', intercepted: true, reason: 'Intercepted page detected' };
|
||||
return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: true, reason: 'Intercepted page detected' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// HTML → 纯文本
|
||||
const text = htmlToText(html);
|
||||
return { success: true, text, intercepted: false, reason: '' };
|
||||
// H-3/H-4 修复: 同时保留原始 HTML，供 extract_mode='html' 使用
|
||||
return { success: true, html, text, intercepted: false, reason: '' };
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
const errorMsg = (err as Error).message;
|
||||
if (attempt < maxRetries - 1) {
|
||||
@@ -149,11 +162,11 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
await this.sleep(backoffBase * Math.pow(2, attempt) + Math.random() * backoffBase * 0.6);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { success: false, text: '', intercepted: false, reason: errorMsg };
|
||||
return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: false, reason: errorMsg };
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { success: false, text: '', intercepted: false, reason: 'All retries exhausted' };
|
||||
return { success: false, html: '', text: '', intercepted: false, reason: 'All retries exhausted' };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== Phase 2/3: 浏览器回退（使用共享 BrowserWindowManager 单例） =====
|
||||
@@ -214,13 +227,29 @@ export class WebFetchTool implements IMetonaTool {
|
||||
|
||||
// ===== 辅助方法 =====
|
||||
|
||||
private buildSuccess(url: string, text: string, method: string): unknown {
|
||||
private buildSuccess(
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
text: string,
|
||||
method: string,
|
||||
maxChars?: number,
|
||||
extractMode?: 'text' | 'html',
|
||||
): unknown {
|
||||
// H-3/H-4 修复: 应用 max_chars 截断，防止过长内容消耗过多 token
|
||||
let content = text;
|
||||
let truncated = false;
|
||||
if (maxChars !== undefined && maxChars > 0 && text.length > maxChars) {
|
||||
content = text.slice(0, maxChars) + `\n\n[... content truncated at ${maxChars} chars ...]`;
|
||||
truncated = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
url,
|
||||
content: text,
|
||||
content,
|
||||
success: true,
|
||||
method,
|
||||
length: text.length,
|
||||
length: content.length,
|
||||
original_length: text.length,
|
||||
truncated,
|
||||
extract_mode: extractMode ?? 'text',
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -97,12 +97,15 @@ export class ToolRegistry {
|
||||
const startTs = Date.now();
|
||||
const timeoutMs = tool.definition.timeoutMs;
|
||||
|
||||
// M-15 修复: 使用 try/finally 清理 setTimeout，防止事件循环 timer 堆积
|
||||
// 工具正常完成时未触发的 timer 会持续占用事件循环 timeoutMs 毫秒
|
||||
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// 带超时执行 — 使用 Promise.race 防止工具卡死阻塞 Agent Loop
|
||||
const result = await Promise.race([
|
||||
tool.execute(toolCall.args, context),
|
||||
new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
|
||||
setTimeout(
|
||||
timer = setTimeout(
|
||||
() => reject(new Error(`Tool execution timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`)),
|
||||
timeoutMs,
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -130,6 +133,9 @@ export class ToolRegistry {
|
||||
durationMs: Date.now() - startTs,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
// M-15 修复: 无论工具成功或失败，清理 timeout timer
|
||||
if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user