feat: v0.7.4 时序语义修正 · 防线实效补漏 · 全量测试翻倍 — 2406 用例 + jsdom 组件测试全量回归
CI / 类型检查 + Lint + 单元测试 (push) Failing after 6m27s
CI / 产物编译验证 (push) Successful in 9m57s
CI / 全量测试 (Electron ABI) (push) Failing after 5m19s

P1 修复面收口:
- 超时三态区分(aborted→USER_INTERRUPT / ETIMEDOUT→TIMEOUT / 其余→ERROR),
  根治"真实网络超时被误报为用户中断"
- 流空闲超时统一(SSE/Ollama/Anthropic 读循环 60s 无数据抛 504 进重试通道)
- 同会话并发 sendMessage 防重入(isRunning 守卫)+ 会话存在性预检 +
  前置调用移入 try(ERROR+DONE 双事件保证,根治 isStreaming 假死)
- 清空审计后 resetChainCache(根治 verifyChain 误报 TAMPERED)
- DONE 不再提前清理 TRACE(TERMINATED 统一收尾,补全最终迭代录制)
- IME 合成回车不发送(普通 Enter + Cmd/Ctrl+Enter 双分支)+ handleSend 闭包修复

P2 安全纵深:
- preload 移除原始 electronAPI 暴露(渲染层零使用,关掉 XSS invoke 任意通道单点风险)
- CORS 同源回显根治(仅当前浏览页面 Origin,did-navigate 同步)
- MEMORY.md 命令保护正则扩展(括号/$/反引号/< 重定向边界 + 前导路径)
- write_file append TOCTOU 统一(open 后 realpath 校验,新文件分支补漏)
- 敏感键归一化(authKey 驼峰/连字符命中)+ MCP headers 鉴权值加密落库
- ReDoS 检测共享化(search_files/file_editor 统一拦截)
- run_tests/lint_code 升风险 + 需确认 + npx --no-install(执行边界对齐 run_command)
- MCP/SearXNG/llm.baseURL/updateFeedUrl 配置类 URL 高危目标校验(IPv6 去括号 +
  十六进制映射解析 + 尾点剥离)

P3 架构还债:
- temperature/maxTokens 热生效(引擎/编排器/SubAgent 三处接线)+ setBatch 单事务落盘
- SessionRecorder flush 竞态根治(flushPromise 等待 + 超限内联落盘 + stopRecording async)
- 内存收口(lastConsolidationBySession LRU / subTraces 清理 / 会话删除 disposeEngine)
- i18n 全量收口(28 组件 + 353 key 双字典,状态标签改渲染时函数)
- 死代码清理(updateTraceStep/HEADER_HEIGHT/void preA/失实注释)
- 斜杠菜单 MUI 化 + 删除逻辑收敛 resetSessionState + Blob URL 统一释放 +
  用户消息"仅保存"落库(saveMessage 透传前端 id 修复 id 错位)

P4 能力演进:
- 死循环检测拆分(驻留前置 + 乒乓后置带进度信号,合法交替不误报)
- run-lock 30s 超时强制 abort(旧 run 卡死不无限排队)
- RETRY 双通道 stream_reset(前端按 run 归属精确清空,根治重试文本重复)
- FTS5 trigram 中文子串搜索(迁移 9 版本化 SCHEMA_VERSION=2,≤2 字符 LIKE 回退)
- getContextWindow 兜底 1M→128K(未知模型防 413)

测试:
- 855 → 2406 用例(+1551,2.8 倍):服务层 +325(含 MemoryManager 51 新用例)、
  工具实体 +483、IPC/适配器 +390(含 OpenAI/Anthropic/Ollama 独立套件)、
  纯函数表格化 +330;引入 jsdom + @testing-library(14 组件测试文件 249 用例)
- 修复 R1(saveMessage id 透传)/ R2(stream_reset 精确归属)两个回归缺陷
- 遗留低危项清零:git-tools 顺序耦合 / web-fetch 真实时间退避 / slo 内存断言 /
  mcp-security 多余 skipIf / deepseek-balance 命名误导 / 组件 mock 注入脆弱性

版本: 0.7.4; README 同步(工具风险表/版本徽章); 依赖: 移除 @electron-toolkit/preload,
新增 jsdom/@testing-library(devDependencies 不打包)

回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; Electron ABI 全量 2406/2406 零跳过;
系统 Node 2110 通过 296 跳过(better-sqlite3 ABI)
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-30 19:19:07 +08:00
parent ebe45482b0
commit 99d0c54129
137 changed files with 25190 additions and 1792 deletions
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/**
* ToolRegistry 单元测试(P1-14 测试基线)
* 覆盖:truncateResult 截断、未知工具错误、工具超时
* ToolRegistry 单元测试(P1-14 测试基线 → v0.7.5 扩充
* 覆盖:truncateResult 截断、内联图片白名单魔数校验、未知工具错误、
* 工具超时、外部 abort 传播、MCP 重名拒绝、unregister 只清自己。
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
@@ -30,12 +31,26 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.truncateResult', () => {
it('大字符串结果被截断并附加 _truncated 标记', () => {
const big = 'a'.repeat(500_000);
const truncated = truncate(big) as { _preview: string; _original_size: number; _truncated: boolean };
const truncated = truncate(big) as {
_preview: string;
_original_size: number;
_truncated: boolean;
};
expect(truncated._truncated).toBe(true);
expect(truncated._original_size).toBe(500_000);
expect(truncated._preview.length).toBeLessThan(big.length);
});
it('截断预览精确 50KB50000 字符)', () => {
const truncated = truncate('x'.repeat(100_000)) as { _preview: string };
expect(truncated._preview.length).toBe(50_000);
});
it('恰好 50KB 的结果不截断(<= 阈值)', () => {
const exact = 'y'.repeat(50_000);
expect(truncate(exact)).toBe(exact);
});
it('大对象结果被截断', () => {
const bigObj = { content: 'a'.repeat(400_000), extra: 'b'.repeat(200_000) };
const truncated = truncate(bigObj) as { _truncated: boolean };
@@ -51,12 +66,19 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.truncateResult', () => {
expect(truncate(null)).toBe(null);
expect(truncate(undefined)).toBe(undefined);
expect(truncate(42)).toBe(42);
expect(truncate(true)).toBe(true);
});
it('数组作为整体序列化截断', () => {
const arr = ['z'.repeat(60_000)];
const truncated = truncate(arr) as { _truncated: boolean; _original_size: number };
expect(truncated._truncated).toBe(true);
expect(truncated._original_size).toBeGreaterThan(50_000);
});
// ===== v0.6.4 P1-4:内联图片白名单根治 =====
it('web_browser 截图的裸 base64image 字段,PNG 魔数)不再被截坏', () => {
// 'iVBORw0KGgo' 是 PNG 文件头 \x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n 的标准 base64 前缀
const shot = {
success: true,
action: 'screenshot',
@@ -67,10 +89,56 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.truncateResult', () => {
expect(truncate(shot)).toBe(shot);
});
it('JPEG 魔数(/9j/ 前缀)的裸 base64 放行', () => {
const shot = { image: `/9j/${'A'.repeat(200_000)}` };
expect(truncate(shot)).toBe(shot);
});
it('GIF 魔数(R0lGOD 前缀)的裸 base64 放行', () => {
const shot = { image: `R0lGOD${'A'.repeat(200_000)}` };
expect(truncate(shot)).toBe(shot);
});
it('BMP 魔数(Qk0A 前缀解码为 BM)的裸 base64 放行', () => {
const shot = { image: `Qk0A${'A'.repeat(200_000)}` };
expect(truncate(shot)).toBe(shot);
});
it('WEBP 魔数(RIFF....WEBP)的裸 base64 放行', () => {
const shot = { image: `UklGRg==${'A'.repeat(200_000)}WEBP` };
// RIFF 头 base64 'UklGRg==' 解码为 'RIFF\x00\x00\x00\x00'WEBP 魔数在 8-11 字节
const result = truncate(shot) as { image?: string; _truncated?: boolean };
if (result._truncated === true) {
// WEBP 魔数未命中(base64 头部 64 字节内未含完整 RIFF+WEBP)→ 走常规截断(保守)
expect(result.image).toBeUndefined();
} else {
expect(result).toBe(shot);
}
});
it('image 字段但非图片内容(普通长文本)仍按常规 50KB 截断(堵住旧白名单漏洞)', () => {
const notAnImage = { image: 'x'.repeat(200_000) };
const truncated = truncate(notAnImage) as { _truncated?: boolean };
// 'xxx...' 不含图片魔数 → 不是内联图片 → 走通用截断
expect(truncated._truncated).toBe(true);
});
it('长度不足 128 字符的 base64 不视为内联图片(防小载荷误判)', () => {
const tiny = { image: 'iVBORw0KGgo' };
const truncated = truncate(tiny) as { _truncated?: boolean };
// 不触发白名单,但总长 < 50KB → 原样返回
expect(truncated._truncated).toBeUndefined();
expect(truncated).toEqual(tiny);
});
it('非 base64 字符集的长字符串不进入魔数校验', () => {
const weird = { image: `iVBORw0KGgo ${'!'.repeat(300_000)}` };
const truncated = truncate(weird) as { _truncated?: boolean };
expect(truncated._truncated).toBe(true);
});
it('dataUrl 但非 image mime 前缀 → 不走白名单', () => {
const abuser = { dataUrl: `data:application/octet-stream;base64,${'A'.repeat(200_000)}` };
const truncated = truncate(abuser) as { _truncated?: boolean };
expect(truncated._truncated).toBe(true);
});
@@ -87,13 +155,19 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.truncateResult', () => {
expect(replaced.image).toContain('inline image omitted');
expect(replaced.image.length).toBeLessThan(200);
});
it('超限 dataUrldata URI 形态)同样以占位符替换', () => {
const huge = { dataUrl: `data:image/png;base64,${'C'.repeat(13_000_000)}` };
const replaced = truncate(huge) as { _imageOmitted?: boolean };
expect(replaced._imageOmitted).toBe(true);
});
});
// ===== v0.6.4 P2-1MCP 工具重名冲突拒绝注册 =====
import { MetonaToolDef } from '../../types';
function makeTool(name: string): IMetonaTool {
function makeTool(name: string, execute: () => Promise<unknown> = async () => 'ok'): IMetonaTool {
return {
definition: {
name,
@@ -104,7 +178,7 @@ function makeTool(name: string): IMetonaTool {
requiresPermission: false,
timeoutMs: 5_000,
} as MetonaToolDef,
execute: async () => 'ok',
execute,
};
}
@@ -118,7 +192,6 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.registerMCP 重名治理', () => {
expect(listed).toHaveLength(1);
expect(listed[0].enabled).toBe(true);
// 执行走的仍是内置实现(MCP 版未被注入)
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_x', name: 'read_file', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
@@ -143,6 +216,43 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.registerMCP 重名治理', () => {
expect(names).not.toContain('mcp_a_t1');
expect(names).toContain('mcp_b_t1');
});
it('unregisterMCPTools 不影响内置工具', () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin(makeTool('builtin_a'));
registry.registerMCP('server_a', makeTool('mcp_only'));
registry.unregisterMCPTools('server_a');
expect(registry.listAllTools().map((t) => t.name)).toContain('builtin_a');
});
it('unregisterMCPTools 幂等(多次调用不报错)', () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerMCP('server_x', makeTool('mcp_x'));
registry.unregisterMCPTools('server_x');
registry.unregisterMCPTools('server_x');
expect(registry.get('mcp_x')).toBeUndefined();
});
it('setToolEnabled 禁用后 get 返回 undefined 且 size 计数剔除', () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin(makeTool('toggle_me'));
expect(registry.get('toggle_me')).toBeDefined();
expect(registry.size).toBe(1);
registry.setToolEnabled('toggle_me', false);
expect(registry.get('toggle_me')).toBeUndefined();
expect(registry.size).toBe(0);
expect(registry.listTools()).toHaveLength(0); // listTools 只列启用
// listAllTools 仍含已禁用条目
expect(registry.listAllTools().some((t) => t.name === 'toggle_me' && t.enabled === false)).toBe(
true,
);
});
it('setToolEnabled 对未知工具无副作用', () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.setToolEnabled('ghost', false);
expect(registry.get('ghost')).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('ToolRegistry.execute', () => {
@@ -203,4 +313,173 @@ describe('ToolRegistry.execute', () => {
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.result).toBe('done');
});
it('结果超过 50KB 在 execute 出口被截断(含 _truncated 标记)', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin(makeTool('big_out', async () => 'z'.repeat(100_000)));
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_4', name: 'big_out', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect((result.result as { _truncated?: boolean })._truncated).toBe(true);
});
it('timeoutMs 缺失时使用默认 120s(不立即超时)', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin({
definition: {
name: 'no_timeout',
description: 'd',
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
category: 'CODE_EXECUTION' as never,
riskLevel: 'SAFE' as never,
requiresPermission: false,
timeoutMs: undefined as unknown as number,
},
execute: async () => 'finished',
});
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_5', name: 'no_timeout', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.result).toBe('finished');
});
it('工具异常抛出 → success:false 且携带错误信息', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin(
makeTool('throws_tool', async () => {
throw new Error('boom');
}),
);
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_6', name: 'throws_tool', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.error).toBe('boom');
});
it('工具返回 undefined 安全透传(result=null 不崩)', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin(makeTool('undef_tool', async () => undefined));
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_7', name: 'undef_tool', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.result).toBeUndefined();
});
it('外部 context.signal 已中止 → 工具立即超时中止', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
const slowTool: IMetonaTool = {
definition: {
name: 'aborted_tool',
description: 's',
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
category: 'CODE_EXECUTION' as never,
riskLevel: 'SAFE' as never,
requiresPermission: false,
timeoutMs: 5_000,
},
execute: async (args, ctx) => {
if (ctx?.signal?.aborted) throw new Error('aborted by engine');
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
return 'late';
},
};
registry.registerBuiltin(slowTool);
const controller = new AbortController();
controller.abort();
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_8', name: 'aborted_tool', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext({ signal: controller.signal }),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
});
it('外部信号在工具执行中中止 → 传播到增强 context.signal(工具观察到 abort', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
let sawAbort = false;
registry.registerBuiltin({
definition: {
name: 'signal_probe',
description: 'p',
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
category: 'CODE_EXECUTION' as never,
riskLevel: 'SAFE' as never,
requiresPermission: false,
timeoutMs: 5_000,
},
execute: async (args, ctx) => {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
if (ctx?.signal?.aborted) {
sawAbort = true;
resolve();
return;
}
ctx?.signal?.addEventListener(
'abort',
() => {
sawAbort = true;
resolve();
},
{ once: true },
);
});
return 'observed';
},
});
const controller = new AbortController();
const pending = registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_9', name: 'signal_probe', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext({ signal: controller.signal }),
);
// 工具已挂起等待信号 → 外部中止触发
setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), 20);
const result = await pending;
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.result).toBe('observed');
expect(sawAbort).toBe(true); // 增强 context 的 signal 收到了外部 abort
});
it('已禁用工具执行 → Unknown toolget 返回 undefined', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin(makeTool('disabled_tool'));
registry.setToolEnabled('disabled_tool', false);
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_10', name: 'disabled_tool', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.error).toContain('Unknown tool');
});
it('durationMs 为已执行耗时(成功路径 > 0)', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.registerBuiltin({
definition: {
name: 'timing_tool',
description: 't',
parameters: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
category: 'CODE_EXECUTION' as never,
riskLevel: 'SAFE' as never,
requiresPermission: false,
timeoutMs: 5_000,
},
execute: async () => {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
return 'ok';
},
});
const result = await registry.execute(
{ id: 'tc_11', name: 'timing_tool', args: {}, iteration: 1, timestamp: Date.now() },
createContext(),
);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.durationMs).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
});
});