feat: v0.6.0 全量审计修复 — 安全加固 + 死代码激活 + 依赖治理

基于全量源码审计（electron/ 70+ 文件、src/ 45+ 文件完整读取）的四阶段迭代，修复 1 项安全缺陷、8 项功能缺陷、依赖与文档系统性脱节。【P0 安全与数据正确性】 - S-1 数据导出泄露明文密钥：data:export 全量导出直接透传 configService.getAll()（敏感 key 解密返回），导出文件含明文 API Key。新增 sanitizeExportConfig（shared.ts）逐 key 脱敏 + 5 项回归测试 - F-3 session_summaries 无级联删除：删会话后摘要永久残留。建表语句补 FOREIGN KEY ON DELETE CASCADE + 迁移 8 重建存量表（幂等检测）+ 2 项测试 - F-4 macOS activate 重建窗口后确认弹框失效：窗口创建收敛为 createMainWindow 单一入口（beforeLoad 补 setMainWindow/IPC 注册），TrayManager 补 rebindWindow，app:selectFolder 改 event.sender 动态解析窗口【P1 死代码激活与功能补全】 - F-1 会话右键菜单挂载：ContextMenu session 分支（重命名/置顶/归档/ 导出/删除）约 200 行此前无任何触发点，Sidebar SessionItem 挂载 onContextMenu；置顶/归档 label 随状态切换显示 - F-2 归档会话不可找回：Sidebar 新增「已归档」折叠面板（恢复入口），归档功能形成完整闭环 - F-7 Provider 白名单校验：createAdapter/buildFallbackAdapter 未知 provider 显式拒绝（此前静默落入 DeepSeekAdapter 以空配置失败） - F-8 死配置治理：接通 5 项（llm.temperature/llm.maxTokens 注入引擎、 security.promptInjectionDefense 控制 SecurityScanHook+消息检测、 logging.auditEnabled 控制 AuditLogHook、logging.traceEnabled 控制 SessionRecorder，均 fail-secure 仅显式 false 关闭）；删除 4 项无消费者配置（requireWriteConfirmation/maxFileWriteSizeKB/fontSize/ animationMode）【P2 依赖治理与 UX 修缮】 - D-1 移除僵尸依赖 electron-store/zod/rehype-raw（源码零引用，共裁 24 包）；README 技术栈表同步删除虚假宣称 - metona-toast 升级 0.2.1 → 0.5.0（API 全兼容：107 种图标类型、配置项超集，default/configure/use 接口不变） - F-5 工作空间手输路径实时落库中间态：改 pendingPath 草稿 + 显式「校验」按钮（选择文件夹与手输共用 validatePath 流程） - F-6 确认弹框超时滞留：倒计时归零时主动 refreshPending（后端超时已删条目，拉取后弹框自然消解） - D-3 ChatInput accept 移除 .pdf（分类器不识别，误导性入口）； Onboarding 切换 Provider 自动填充默认 URL（与 LLMSettings 一致）【P3 文档口径收敛】 - README：工具数 30+→28、版本 0.6.0、测试数 252、配置表补 F-8 接通项 - built-in/index.ts 计数注释 30→28 - docs/网络工具 v2 存储键名统一为点号口径（searxng.enabled） - docs/完整设计指南修正 db.handlers.ts 失效路径引用为 data.ts 【验证】 - lint 0 error / 0 warning - typecheck 双工程（node+web）0 错误 - test:electron 24 文件 252 用例全通过（+7 新增：导出脱敏 ×5、级联删除 ×2） - electron-vite build 成功（metona-toast 0.5.0 chunk 正常） - 系统 Node 模式 npm test 225 通过 + 27 ABI skip（符合预期）
2026-08-22 18:28:31 +08:00
parent 22028c91c3
commit 6b2b587c94
22 changed files with 723 additions and 504 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * 导出脱敏回归测试（S-1）
+ *
+ * 背景：data:export 全量导出曾直接透传 configService.getAll()，
+ * 该方法对敏感 key 解密返回明文，导致导出文件泄露明文 API Key。
+ * sanitizeExportConfig 必须保证任何敏感 key 经其处理后不含明文。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { sanitizeExportConfig, maskSensitive } from '../shared';
+
+describe('sanitizeExportConfig — 导出配置脱敏', () => {
+  it('llm.apiKey / fallbackApiKey / searxng.auth_key 导出为掩码', () => {
+    const config = {
+      'llm.provider': 'deepseek',
+      'llm.model': 'deepseek-v4-pro',
+      'llm.apiKey': 'sk-very-secret-key-1234',
+      'llm.fallbackApiKey': 'sk-fallback-secret-9876',
+      'searxng.auth_key': 'bearer-token-abcdef',
+      'searxng.enabled': true,
+    };
+    const out = sanitizeExportConfig(config);
+    expect(out['llm.apiKey']).not.toContain('sk-very-secret');
+    expect(out['llm.apiKey']).toBe('***1234');
+    expect(out['llm.fallbackApiKey']).toBe('***9876');
+    expect(out['searxng.auth_key']).toBe('***cdef');
+    // 非敏感 key 原样保留
+    expect(out['llm.provider']).toBe('deepseek');
+    expect(out['searxng.enabled']).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('短敏感值（<=4 字符）完全掩码', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeExportConfig({ 'llm.apiKey': 'abc' })['llm.apiKey']).toBe('***');
+    expect(sanitizeExportConfig({ 'llm.apiKey': '' })['llm.apiKey']).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('不修改入参对象（纯函数）', () => {
+    const config = { 'llm.apiKey': 'sk-original-plaintext' };
+    const snapshot = { ...config };
+    sanitizeExportConfig(config);
+    expect(config).toEqual(snapshot);
+  });
+
+  it('空对象与混合类型安全', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeExportConfig({})).toEqual({});
+    const out = sanitizeExportConfig({
+      'agent.maxIterations': 20,
+      'agent.enableThinking': true,
+      'ollama.numCtx': null,
+      'tools.run_command.enabled': false,
+    });
+    expect(out).toEqual({
+      'agent.maxIterations': 20,
+      'agent.enableThinking': true,
+      'ollama.numCtx': null,
+      'tools.run_command.enabled': false,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('maskSensitive：非字符串敏感值原样返回', () => {
+    expect(maskSensitive('llm.apiKey', 123)).toBe(123);
+    expect(maskSensitive('llm.apiKey', null)).toBe(null);
+  });
+});
@@ -460,26 +460,33 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {

      try {
        // 提示注入检测（安全模块）
-        const injectionResult = promptInjectionDefender.detect(userMessage.content);
-        if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 7) {
-          log.warn('[PromptInjectionDefender] Blocked message:', injectionResult.findings);
-          sendErrorEvent(
-            `Message blocked by prompt injection defense: ${injectionResult.recommendation}`,
-            sessionId,
-          );
-          sessionRecorder.stopRecording(sessionId, {
-            totalIterations: 0,
-            totalTokens: 0,
-            durationMs: 0,
-            terminationReason: 'error',
-          });
-          return { success: false, error: 'Message blocked by prompt injection defense' };
-        }
-        if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 4) {
-          log.warn(
-            '[PromptInjectionDefender] Suspicious patterns detected:',
-            injectionResult.findings,
-          );
+        // F-8 接通: security.promptInjectionDefense=false 时跳过用户消息检测
+        // （工具结果侧的 SecurityScanHook 由 main.ts 按同一配置决定是否挂载）
+        // fail-secure: 仅显式 false 才关闭 —— 配置值异常（空串/null/类型错误）时保持防护开启
+        const injectionEnabled =
+          configService.get<boolean>('security.promptInjectionDefense') !== false;
+        if (injectionEnabled) {
+          const injectionResult = promptInjectionDefender.detect(userMessage.content);
+          if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 7) {
+            log.warn('[PromptInjectionDefender] Blocked message:', injectionResult.findings);
+            sendErrorEvent(
+              `Message blocked by prompt injection defense: ${injectionResult.recommendation}`,
+              sessionId,
+            );
+            sessionRecorder.stopRecording(sessionId, {
+              totalIterations: 0,
+              totalTokens: 0,
+              durationMs: 0,
+              terminationReason: 'error',
+            });
+            return { success: false, error: 'Message blocked by prompt injection defense' };
+          }
+          if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 4) {
+            log.warn(
+              '[PromptInjectionDefender] Suspicious patterns detected:',
+              injectionResult.findings,
+            );
+          }
        }

        // TRACE 层：记录上下文构建
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 * 审计日志链验证/查询、渲染进程错误上报（P0-3 修复断链）。
 */

-import { ipcMain, shell, app, dialog } from 'electron';
+import { ipcMain, shell, app, dialog, BrowserWindow } from 'electron';
 import type { IPCContext } from './context';
 import type { AuditEventType } from '../services/audit.service';
 import log from 'electron-log';
@@ -54,8 +54,12 @@ export function registerAppHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
    }
  });

-  ipcMain.handle('app:selectFolder', async (_event, defaultPath?: string) => {
-    const result = await dialog.showOpenDialog(mainWindow, {
+  ipcMain.handle('app:selectFolder', async (event, defaultPath?: string) => {
+    // F-4 补充: 从 event.sender 动态解析窗口 —— ctx.mainWindow 是注册时捕获的引用，
+    // macOS activate 重建窗口后为已销毁实例（dialog 挂 destroyed 窗口行为未定义）。
+    // fromWebContents 对任何存活窗口（含未来多窗口）都正确，解析失败回退无父对话框。
+    const callerWin = BrowserWindow.fromWebContents(event.sender) ?? mainWindow;
+    const result = await dialog.showOpenDialog(callerWin, {
      properties: ['openDirectory', 'createDirectory'],
      defaultPath: defaultPath ?? app.getPath('home'),
      title: '选择工作空间目录',
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 import { ipcMain } from 'electron';
 import type { IPCContext } from './context';
 import log from 'electron-log';
+import { sanitizeExportConfig } from './shared';

 /**
 * 导出限流常量：单会话导出的最大消息条数。
@@ -33,7 +34,10 @@ const sanitizeExportMessage = (msg: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unk
      void _omit;
      return {
        ...msg,
-        toolResult: { ...toolResult, result: { ...rest, _displayNote: '[image base64 omitted in export]' } },
+        toolResult: {
+          ...toolResult,
+          result: { ...rest, _displayNote: '[image base64 omitted in export]' },
+        },
      };
    }
  }
@@ -61,15 +65,26 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
      if (sessionId) {
        // 导出单个会话：剥离超大 base64 后返回
        const messages = sessionService.getMessages(sessionId);
-        const sanitized = messages.map((m) => sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>));
+        const sanitized = messages.map((m) =>
+          sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
+        );
        return { success: true, data: sanitized };
      }
      // 导出所有会话：剥离 dataUrl + 每会话限条数，防渲染进程 Blob 序列化 OOM
+      // S-1 修复：config 走 sanitizeExportConfig 脱敏 —— getAll() 对敏感 key
+      // 解密返回明文，直接透传会把明文 API Key 写入用户下载的导出文件
      const sessions = sessionService.list();
-      const allData: Record<string, unknown> = { sessions: [], config: configService.getAll() };
+      const allData: Record<string, unknown> = {
+        sessions: [],
+        config: sanitizeExportConfig(configService.getAll()),
+      };
      for (const session of sessions) {
-        const rawMessages = sessionService.getMessages(session.id, { limit: MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION });
-        const sanitizedMessages = rawMessages.map((m) => sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>));
+        const rawMessages = sessionService.getMessages(session.id, {
+          limit: MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION,
+        });
+        const sanitizedMessages = rawMessages.map((m) =>
+          sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
+        );
        (allData.sessions as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).push({
          ...session,
          messages: sanitizedMessages,
@@ -93,10 +108,16 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
      db.exec('DELETE FROM messages');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM sessions');
      db.exec('COMMIT');
-      log.info(`[DATA] All sessions cleared: ${sessCount.c} sessions, ${msgCount.c} messages deleted`);
+      log.info(
+        `[DATA] All sessions cleared: ${sessCount.c} sessions, ${msgCount.c} messages deleted`,
+      );
      return { success: true, deletedSessions: sessCount.c, deletedMessages: msgCount.c };
    } catch (error) {
-      try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch { /* 忽略回滚错误 */ }
+      try {
+        db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      } catch {
+        /* 忽略回滚错误 */
+      }
      log.error('[DATA] clearSessions failed:', (error as Error).message);
      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
    }
@@ -108,19 +129,36 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
    const db = sessionService.getDB();
    try {
      // M-41 修复: 三个 DELETE 操作用事务包裹，防止部分失败导致三类记忆数据不一致
-      const epiCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM episodic_memories').get() as { c: number };
-      const semCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM semantic_memories').get() as { c: number };
-      const workCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM working_memories').get() as { c: number };
+      const epiCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM episodic_memories').get() as {
+        c: number;
+      };
+      const semCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM semantic_memories').get() as {
+        c: number;
+      };
+      const workCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM working_memories').get() as {
+        c: number;
+      };
      db.exec('BEGIN');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM episodic_memories');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM semantic_memories');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM working_memories');
      db.exec('COMMIT');
-      log.info(`[DATA] All memories cleared: ${epiCount.c} episodic, ${semCount.c} semantic, ${workCount.c} working memories deleted`);
-      return { success: true, deletedEpisodic: epiCount.c, deletedSemantic: semCount.c, deletedWorking: workCount.c };
+      log.info(
+        `[DATA] All memories cleared: ${epiCount.c} episodic, ${semCount.c} semantic, ${workCount.c} working memories deleted`,
+      );
+      return {
+        success: true,
+        deletedEpisodic: epiCount.c,
+        deletedSemantic: semCount.c,
+        deletedWorking: workCount.c,
+      };
    } catch (error) {
      // M-41 修复: 失败时回滚事务，确保数据一致性
-      try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch { /* 忽略回滚错误 */ }
+      try {
+        db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      } catch {
+        /* 忽略回滚错误 */
+      }
      log.error('[DATA] clearMemories failed:', (error as Error).message);
      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
    }
@@ -143,7 +181,11 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
      log.info('[DATA] Audit logs cleared');
      return { success: true };
    } catch (error) {
-      try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch { /* 忽略回滚错误 */ }
+      try {
+        db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      } catch {
+        /* 忽略回滚错误 */
+      }
      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
    }
  });
@@ -13,11 +13,20 @@ import { isSensitiveConfigKey } from '../utils/secure-config';

 /** LLM 相关配置 key（变更时触发热重载 Adapter） */
 export const LLM_CONFIG_KEYS = [
-  'llm.provider', 'llm.model', 'llm.apiKey', 'llm.baseURL',
-  'llm.fallbackProvider', 'llm.fallbackModel', 'llm.fallbackApiKey', 'llm.fallbackBaseURL',
+  'llm.provider',
+  'llm.model',
+  'llm.apiKey',
+  'llm.baseURL',
+  'llm.fallbackProvider',
+  'llm.fallbackModel',
+  'llm.fallbackApiKey',
+  'llm.fallbackBaseURL',
  'ollama.numCtx',
-  'deepseek.contextWindow', 'agnes.contextWindow', 'mimo.contextWindow',
-  'openai.contextWindow', 'anthropic.contextWindow',
+  'deepseek.contextWindow',
+  'agnes.contextWindow',
+  'mimo.contextWindow',
+  'openai.contextWindow',
+  'anthropic.contextWindow',
 ];

 /** 敏感配置值脱敏（审计日志用：长值保留后 4 位，短值完全掩码） */
@@ -28,20 +37,43 @@ export function maskSensitive(key: string, value: unknown): unknown {
  return value;
 }

+/**
+ * 导出配置脱敏（S-1 修复）：对 configService.getAll() 的结果逐 key 脱敏。
+ *
+ * 背景：getAll() 对敏感 key 解密后返回明文（ConfigService 的读取契约），
+ * data:export 直接透传会把明文 API Key / 认证密钥写入用户下载的 JSON 文件，
+ * 绕过 safeStorage 密钥链加密。此函数确保任何导出路径不泄露明文密钥。
+ *
+ * @param config configService.getAll() 的完整配置快照
+ * @returns 脱敏后的副本（敏感值替换为掩码，原对象不修改）
+ */
+export function sanitizeExportConfig(config: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(config)) {
+    out[key] = maskSensitive(key, value);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 /**
 * Provider 切换时清空 API key（C-1 修复，供 set/setBatch 共用）
 *
 * 必须在写入 entries 之前执行：若前端把 llm.apiKey 放在 llm.provider 之前，
 * 先 set apiKey 再处理 provider 会把用户刚填的 key 清空。
 */
-export function clearApiKeyOnProviderChange(ctx: IPCContext, entries: Array<{ key: string; value: unknown }>): void {
+export function clearApiKeyOnProviderChange(
+  ctx: IPCContext,
+  entries: Array<{ key: string; value: unknown }>,
+): void {
  const providerEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'llm.provider');
  if (!providerEntry) return;
  const oldProvider = ctx.configService.get<string>('llm.provider') ?? '';
  const newProvider = (providerEntry.value as string) ?? '';
  if (oldProvider && newProvider && oldProvider !== newProvider) {
    ctx.configService.set('llm.apiKey', '');
-    log.info(`[CONFIG] Provider changed (${oldProvider} → ${newProvider}), API key cleared to prevent incompatible key usage`);
+    log.info(
+      `[CONFIG] Provider changed (${oldProvider} → ${newProvider}), API key cleared to prevent incompatible key usage`,
+    );
  }
 }

@@ -62,8 +94,12 @@ export function applyEngineConfigKey(ctx: IPCContext, key: string, value: unknow
      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({ thinkingEnabled: value as boolean });
      break;
    case 'agent.thinkingEffort':
-      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({ thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max' });
-      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({ thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max' });
+      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({
+        thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max',
+      });
+      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({
+        thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max',
+      });
      break;
    case 'agent.toolExecutionTimeoutMs':
      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({ toolExecutionTimeoutMs: value as number });
@@ -121,8 +157,20 @@ export async function applyConfigSideEffects(
  const logLevelEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'logging.level');
  if (logLevelEntry && typeof logLevelEntry.value === 'string') {
    const { transports } = await import('electron-log');
-    transports.file.level = logLevelEntry.value as 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug' | 'verbose' | 'silly';
-    transports.console.level = logLevelEntry.value as 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug' | 'verbose' | 'silly';
+    transports.file.level = logLevelEntry.value as
+      | 'error'
+      | 'warn'
+      | 'info'
+      | 'debug'
+      | 'verbose'
+      | 'silly';
+    transports.console.level = logLevelEntry.value as
+      | 'error'
+      | 'warn'
+      | 'info'
+      | 'debug'
+      | 'verbose'
+      | 'silly';
    log.info(`[CONFIG] Log level updated to ${logLevelEntry.value}`);
  }

@@ -132,7 +180,9 @@ export async function applyConfigSideEffects(
  }

  // 5. 工作空间路径写入独立文件（下次启动生效）
-  const workspaceEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'workspace.path' && typeof e.value === 'string');
+  const workspaceEntry = entries.find(
+    (e) => e.key === 'workspace.path' && typeof e.value === 'string',
+  );
  if (workspaceEntry) {
    try {
      const { writeWorkspacePathToFile } = await import('../main');