feat: v0.6.0 全量审计修复 — 安全加固 + 死代码激活 + 依赖治理

基于全量源码审计（electron/ 70+ 文件、src/ 45+ 文件完整读取）的四阶段迭代，修复 1 项安全缺陷、8 项功能缺陷、依赖与文档系统性脱节。【P0 安全与数据正确性】 - S-1 数据导出泄露明文密钥：data:export 全量导出直接透传 configService.getAll()（敏感 key 解密返回），导出文件含明文 API Key。新增 sanitizeExportConfig（shared.ts）逐 key 脱敏 + 5 项回归测试 - F-3 session_summaries 无级联删除：删会话后摘要永久残留。建表语句补 FOREIGN KEY ON DELETE CASCADE + 迁移 8 重建存量表（幂等检测）+ 2 项测试 - F-4 macOS activate 重建窗口后确认弹框失效：窗口创建收敛为 createMainWindow 单一入口（beforeLoad 补 setMainWindow/IPC 注册），TrayManager 补 rebindWindow，app:selectFolder 改 event.sender 动态解析窗口【P1 死代码激活与功能补全】 - F-1 会话右键菜单挂载：ContextMenu session 分支（重命名/置顶/归档/ 导出/删除）约 200 行此前无任何触发点，Sidebar SessionItem 挂载 onContextMenu；置顶/归档 label 随状态切换显示 - F-2 归档会话不可找回：Sidebar 新增「已归档」折叠面板（恢复入口），归档功能形成完整闭环 - F-7 Provider 白名单校验：createAdapter/buildFallbackAdapter 未知 provider 显式拒绝（此前静默落入 DeepSeekAdapter 以空配置失败） - F-8 死配置治理：接通 5 项（llm.temperature/llm.maxTokens 注入引擎、 security.promptInjectionDefense 控制 SecurityScanHook+消息检测、 logging.auditEnabled 控制 AuditLogHook、logging.traceEnabled 控制 SessionRecorder，均 fail-secure 仅显式 false 关闭）；删除 4 项无消费者配置（requireWriteConfirmation/maxFileWriteSizeKB/fontSize/ animationMode）【P2 依赖治理与 UX 修缮】 - D-1 移除僵尸依赖 electron-store/zod/rehype-raw（源码零引用，共裁 24 包）；README 技术栈表同步删除虚假宣称 - metona-toast 升级 0.2.1 → 0.5.0（API 全兼容：107 种图标类型、配置项超集，default/configure/use 接口不变） - F-5 工作空间手输路径实时落库中间态：改 pendingPath 草稿 + 显式「校验」按钮（选择文件夹与手输共用 validatePath 流程） - F-6 确认弹框超时滞留：倒计时归零时主动 refreshPending（后端超时已删条目，拉取后弹框自然消解） - D-3 ChatInput accept 移除 .pdf（分类器不识别，误导性入口）； Onboarding 切换 Provider 自动填充默认 URL（与 LLMSettings 一致）【P3 文档口径收敛】 - README：工具数 30+→28、版本 0.6.0、测试数 252、配置表补 F-8 接通项 - built-in/index.ts 计数注释 30→28 - docs/网络工具 v2 存储键名统一为点号口径（searxng.enabled） - docs/完整设计指南修正 db.handlers.ts 失效路径引用为 data.ts 【验证】 - lint 0 error / 0 warning - typecheck 双工程（node+web）0 错误 - test:electron 24 文件 252 用例全通过（+7 新增：导出脱敏 ×5、级联删除 ×2） - electron-vite build 成功（metona-toast 0.5.0 chunk 正常） - 系统 Node 模式 npm test 225 通过 + 27 ABI skip（符合预期）
2026-08-22 18:28:31 +08:00
parent 22028c91c3
commit 6b2b587c94
22 changed files with 723 additions and 504 deletions
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 * 内置工具导出
 *
 * v0.3.13: 删除 todo_write 工具（零价值 + 死代码 clearSession + 与 task_manager 功能重叠）
- * 工具总数：30 个（29 + DelegateTaskTool）
+ * 工具总数：28 个（27 + DelegateTaskTool）
 *
 * v0.3.3: 从 27 个工具扩展到 29 个工具
 * 新增：file_move, file_info
@@ -21,7 +21,15 @@
 */

 // 文件系统工具（7 个）
-export { ReadFileTool, WriteFileTool, ListDirectoryTool, SearchFilesTool, DeleteFileTool, FileMoveTool, FileInfoTool } from './filesystem';
+export {
+  ReadFileTool,
+  WriteFileTool,
+  ListDirectoryTool,
+  SearchFilesTool,
+  DeleteFileTool,
+  FileMoveTool,
+  FileInfoTool,
+} from './filesystem';
 // v0.2.0: 精准文件编辑工具
 export { FileEditorTool } from './file-editor';
 // v0.2.0: ripgrep 代码搜索工具
@@ -61,4 +69,3 @@ export { ThinkTool } from './think';

 // v0.3.1: 图片查看工具（1 个）
 export { ViewImageTool } from './view-image';
-
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * 导出脱敏回归测试（S-1）
+ *
+ * 背景：data:export 全量导出曾直接透传 configService.getAll()，
+ * 该方法对敏感 key 解密返回明文，导致导出文件泄露明文 API Key。
+ * sanitizeExportConfig 必须保证任何敏感 key 经其处理后不含明文。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { sanitizeExportConfig, maskSensitive } from '../shared';
+
+describe('sanitizeExportConfig — 导出配置脱敏', () => {
+  it('llm.apiKey / fallbackApiKey / searxng.auth_key 导出为掩码', () => {
+    const config = {
+      'llm.provider': 'deepseek',
+      'llm.model': 'deepseek-v4-pro',
+      'llm.apiKey': 'sk-very-secret-key-1234',
+      'llm.fallbackApiKey': 'sk-fallback-secret-9876',
+      'searxng.auth_key': 'bearer-token-abcdef',
+      'searxng.enabled': true,
+    };
+    const out = sanitizeExportConfig(config);
+    expect(out['llm.apiKey']).not.toContain('sk-very-secret');
+    expect(out['llm.apiKey']).toBe('***1234');
+    expect(out['llm.fallbackApiKey']).toBe('***9876');
+    expect(out['searxng.auth_key']).toBe('***cdef');
+    // 非敏感 key 原样保留
+    expect(out['llm.provider']).toBe('deepseek');
+    expect(out['searxng.enabled']).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('短敏感值（<=4 字符）完全掩码', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeExportConfig({ 'llm.apiKey': 'abc' })['llm.apiKey']).toBe('***');
+    expect(sanitizeExportConfig({ 'llm.apiKey': '' })['llm.apiKey']).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('不修改入参对象（纯函数）', () => {
+    const config = { 'llm.apiKey': 'sk-original-plaintext' };
+    const snapshot = { ...config };
+    sanitizeExportConfig(config);
+    expect(config).toEqual(snapshot);
+  });
+
+  it('空对象与混合类型安全', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeExportConfig({})).toEqual({});
+    const out = sanitizeExportConfig({
+      'agent.maxIterations': 20,
+      'agent.enableThinking': true,
+      'ollama.numCtx': null,
+      'tools.run_command.enabled': false,
+    });
+    expect(out).toEqual({
+      'agent.maxIterations': 20,
+      'agent.enableThinking': true,
+      'ollama.numCtx': null,
+      'tools.run_command.enabled': false,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('maskSensitive：非字符串敏感值原样返回', () => {
+    expect(maskSensitive('llm.apiKey', 123)).toBe(123);
+    expect(maskSensitive('llm.apiKey', null)).toBe(null);
+  });
+});
@@ -460,26 +460,33 @@ export function registerAgentHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {

      try {
        // 提示注入检测（安全模块）
-        const injectionResult = promptInjectionDefender.detect(userMessage.content);
-        if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 7) {
-          log.warn('[PromptInjectionDefender] Blocked message:', injectionResult.findings);
-          sendErrorEvent(
-            `Message blocked by prompt injection defense: ${injectionResult.recommendation}`,
-            sessionId,
-          );
-          sessionRecorder.stopRecording(sessionId, {
-            totalIterations: 0,
-            totalTokens: 0,
-            durationMs: 0,
-            terminationReason: 'error',
-          });
-          return { success: false, error: 'Message blocked by prompt injection defense' };
-        }
-        if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 4) {
-          log.warn(
-            '[PromptInjectionDefender] Suspicious patterns detected:',
-            injectionResult.findings,
-          );
+        // F-8 接通: security.promptInjectionDefense=false 时跳过用户消息检测
+        // （工具结果侧的 SecurityScanHook 由 main.ts 按同一配置决定是否挂载）
+        // fail-secure: 仅显式 false 才关闭 —— 配置值异常（空串/null/类型错误）时保持防护开启
+        const injectionEnabled =
+          configService.get<boolean>('security.promptInjectionDefense') !== false;
+        if (injectionEnabled) {
+          const injectionResult = promptInjectionDefender.detect(userMessage.content);
+          if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 7) {
+            log.warn('[PromptInjectionDefender] Blocked message:', injectionResult.findings);
+            sendErrorEvent(
+              `Message blocked by prompt injection defense: ${injectionResult.recommendation}`,
+              sessionId,
+            );
+            sessionRecorder.stopRecording(sessionId, {
+              totalIterations: 0,
+              totalTokens: 0,
+              durationMs: 0,
+              terminationReason: 'error',
+            });
+            return { success: false, error: 'Message blocked by prompt injection defense' };
+          }
+          if (injectionResult.riskScore >= 4) {
+            log.warn(
+              '[PromptInjectionDefender] Suspicious patterns detected:',
+              injectionResult.findings,
+            );
+          }
        }

        // TRACE 层：记录上下文构建
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 * 审计日志链验证/查询、渲染进程错误上报（P0-3 修复断链）。
 */

-import { ipcMain, shell, app, dialog } from 'electron';
+import { ipcMain, shell, app, dialog, BrowserWindow } from 'electron';
 import type { IPCContext } from './context';
 import type { AuditEventType } from '../services/audit.service';
 import log from 'electron-log';
@@ -54,8 +54,12 @@ export function registerAppHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
    }
  });

-  ipcMain.handle('app:selectFolder', async (_event, defaultPath?: string) => {
-    const result = await dialog.showOpenDialog(mainWindow, {
+  ipcMain.handle('app:selectFolder', async (event, defaultPath?: string) => {
+    // F-4 补充: 从 event.sender 动态解析窗口 —— ctx.mainWindow 是注册时捕获的引用，
+    // macOS activate 重建窗口后为已销毁实例（dialog 挂 destroyed 窗口行为未定义）。
+    // fromWebContents 对任何存活窗口（含未来多窗口）都正确，解析失败回退无父对话框。
+    const callerWin = BrowserWindow.fromWebContents(event.sender) ?? mainWindow;
+    const result = await dialog.showOpenDialog(callerWin, {
      properties: ['openDirectory', 'createDirectory'],
      defaultPath: defaultPath ?? app.getPath('home'),
      title: '选择工作空间目录',
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 import { ipcMain } from 'electron';
 import type { IPCContext } from './context';
 import log from 'electron-log';
+import { sanitizeExportConfig } from './shared';

 /**
 * 导出限流常量：单会话导出的最大消息条数。
@@ -33,7 +34,10 @@ const sanitizeExportMessage = (msg: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unk
      void _omit;
      return {
        ...msg,
-        toolResult: { ...toolResult, result: { ...rest, _displayNote: '[image base64 omitted in export]' } },
+        toolResult: {
+          ...toolResult,
+          result: { ...rest, _displayNote: '[image base64 omitted in export]' },
+        },
      };
    }
  }
@@ -61,15 +65,26 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
      if (sessionId) {
        // 导出单个会话：剥离超大 base64 后返回
        const messages = sessionService.getMessages(sessionId);
-        const sanitized = messages.map((m) => sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>));
+        const sanitized = messages.map((m) =>
+          sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
+        );
        return { success: true, data: sanitized };
      }
      // 导出所有会话：剥离 dataUrl + 每会话限条数，防渲染进程 Blob 序列化 OOM
+      // S-1 修复：config 走 sanitizeExportConfig 脱敏 —— getAll() 对敏感 key
+      // 解密返回明文，直接透传会把明文 API Key 写入用户下载的导出文件
      const sessions = sessionService.list();
-      const allData: Record<string, unknown> = { sessions: [], config: configService.getAll() };
+      const allData: Record<string, unknown> = {
+        sessions: [],
+        config: sanitizeExportConfig(configService.getAll()),
+      };
      for (const session of sessions) {
-        const rawMessages = sessionService.getMessages(session.id, { limit: MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION });
-        const sanitizedMessages = rawMessages.map((m) => sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>));
+        const rawMessages = sessionService.getMessages(session.id, {
+          limit: MAX_EXPORT_MESSAGES_PER_SESSION,
+        });
+        const sanitizedMessages = rawMessages.map((m) =>
+          sanitizeExportMessage(m as unknown as Record<string, unknown>),
+        );
        (allData.sessions as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).push({
          ...session,
          messages: sanitizedMessages,
@@ -93,10 +108,16 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
      db.exec('DELETE FROM messages');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM sessions');
      db.exec('COMMIT');
-      log.info(`[DATA] All sessions cleared: ${sessCount.c} sessions, ${msgCount.c} messages deleted`);
+      log.info(
+        `[DATA] All sessions cleared: ${sessCount.c} sessions, ${msgCount.c} messages deleted`,
+      );
      return { success: true, deletedSessions: sessCount.c, deletedMessages: msgCount.c };
    } catch (error) {
-      try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch { /* 忽略回滚错误 */ }
+      try {
+        db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      } catch {
+        /* 忽略回滚错误 */
+      }
      log.error('[DATA] clearSessions failed:', (error as Error).message);
      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
    }
@@ -108,19 +129,36 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
    const db = sessionService.getDB();
    try {
      // M-41 修复: 三个 DELETE 操作用事务包裹，防止部分失败导致三类记忆数据不一致
-      const epiCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM episodic_memories').get() as { c: number };
-      const semCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM semantic_memories').get() as { c: number };
-      const workCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM working_memories').get() as { c: number };
+      const epiCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM episodic_memories').get() as {
+        c: number;
+      };
+      const semCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM semantic_memories').get() as {
+        c: number;
+      };
+      const workCount = db.prepare('SELECT COUNT(*) as c FROM working_memories').get() as {
+        c: number;
+      };
      db.exec('BEGIN');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM episodic_memories');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM semantic_memories');
      db.exec('DELETE FROM working_memories');
      db.exec('COMMIT');
-      log.info(`[DATA] All memories cleared: ${epiCount.c} episodic, ${semCount.c} semantic, ${workCount.c} working memories deleted`);
-      return { success: true, deletedEpisodic: epiCount.c, deletedSemantic: semCount.c, deletedWorking: workCount.c };
+      log.info(
+        `[DATA] All memories cleared: ${epiCount.c} episodic, ${semCount.c} semantic, ${workCount.c} working memories deleted`,
+      );
+      return {
+        success: true,
+        deletedEpisodic: epiCount.c,
+        deletedSemantic: semCount.c,
+        deletedWorking: workCount.c,
+      };
    } catch (error) {
      // M-41 修复: 失败时回滚事务，确保数据一致性
-      try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch { /* 忽略回滚错误 */ }
+      try {
+        db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      } catch {
+        /* 忽略回滚错误 */
+      }
      log.error('[DATA] clearMemories failed:', (error as Error).message);
      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
    }
@@ -143,7 +181,11 @@ export function registerDataHandlers(ctx: IPCContext): void {
      log.info('[DATA] Audit logs cleared');
      return { success: true };
    } catch (error) {
-      try { db.exec('ROLLBACK'); } catch { /* 忽略回滚错误 */ }
+      try {
+        db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      } catch {
+        /* 忽略回滚错误 */
+      }
      return { success: false, error: (error as Error).message };
    }
  });
@@ -13,11 +13,20 @@ import { isSensitiveConfigKey } from '../utils/secure-config';

 /** LLM 相关配置 key（变更时触发热重载 Adapter） */
 export const LLM_CONFIG_KEYS = [
-  'llm.provider', 'llm.model', 'llm.apiKey', 'llm.baseURL',
-  'llm.fallbackProvider', 'llm.fallbackModel', 'llm.fallbackApiKey', 'llm.fallbackBaseURL',
+  'llm.provider',
+  'llm.model',
+  'llm.apiKey',
+  'llm.baseURL',
+  'llm.fallbackProvider',
+  'llm.fallbackModel',
+  'llm.fallbackApiKey',
+  'llm.fallbackBaseURL',
  'ollama.numCtx',
-  'deepseek.contextWindow', 'agnes.contextWindow', 'mimo.contextWindow',
-  'openai.contextWindow', 'anthropic.contextWindow',
+  'deepseek.contextWindow',
+  'agnes.contextWindow',
+  'mimo.contextWindow',
+  'openai.contextWindow',
+  'anthropic.contextWindow',
 ];

 /** 敏感配置值脱敏（审计日志用：长值保留后 4 位，短值完全掩码） */
@@ -28,20 +37,43 @@ export function maskSensitive(key: string, value: unknown): unknown {
  return value;
 }

+/**
+ * 导出配置脱敏（S-1 修复）：对 configService.getAll() 的结果逐 key 脱敏。
+ *
+ * 背景：getAll() 对敏感 key 解密后返回明文（ConfigService 的读取契约），
+ * data:export 直接透传会把明文 API Key / 认证密钥写入用户下载的 JSON 文件，
+ * 绕过 safeStorage 密钥链加密。此函数确保任何导出路径不泄露明文密钥。
+ *
+ * @param config configService.getAll() 的完整配置快照
+ * @returns 脱敏后的副本（敏感值替换为掩码，原对象不修改）
+ */
+export function sanitizeExportConfig(config: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(config)) {
+    out[key] = maskSensitive(key, value);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 /**
 * Provider 切换时清空 API key（C-1 修复，供 set/setBatch 共用）
 *
 * 必须在写入 entries 之前执行：若前端把 llm.apiKey 放在 llm.provider 之前，
 * 先 set apiKey 再处理 provider 会把用户刚填的 key 清空。
 */
-export function clearApiKeyOnProviderChange(ctx: IPCContext, entries: Array<{ key: string; value: unknown }>): void {
+export function clearApiKeyOnProviderChange(
+  ctx: IPCContext,
+  entries: Array<{ key: string; value: unknown }>,
+): void {
  const providerEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'llm.provider');
  if (!providerEntry) return;
  const oldProvider = ctx.configService.get<string>('llm.provider') ?? '';
  const newProvider = (providerEntry.value as string) ?? '';
  if (oldProvider && newProvider && oldProvider !== newProvider) {
    ctx.configService.set('llm.apiKey', '');
-    log.info(`[CONFIG] Provider changed (${oldProvider} → ${newProvider}), API key cleared to prevent incompatible key usage`);
+    log.info(
+      `[CONFIG] Provider changed (${oldProvider} → ${newProvider}), API key cleared to prevent incompatible key usage`,
+    );
  }
 }

@@ -62,8 +94,12 @@ export function applyEngineConfigKey(ctx: IPCContext, key: string, value: unknow
      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({ thinkingEnabled: value as boolean });
      break;
    case 'agent.thinkingEffort':
-      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({ thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max' });
-      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({ thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max' });
+      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({
+        thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max',
+      });
+      orchestrator.updateDefaultConfig({
+        thinkingEffort: value as 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'max',
+      });
      break;
    case 'agent.toolExecutionTimeoutMs':
      agentEngineManager.updateConfigAll({ toolExecutionTimeoutMs: value as number });
@@ -121,8 +157,20 @@ export async function applyConfigSideEffects(
  const logLevelEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'logging.level');
  if (logLevelEntry && typeof logLevelEntry.value === 'string') {
    const { transports } = await import('electron-log');
-    transports.file.level = logLevelEntry.value as 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug' | 'verbose' | 'silly';
-    transports.console.level = logLevelEntry.value as 'error' | 'warn' | 'info' | 'debug' | 'verbose' | 'silly';
+    transports.file.level = logLevelEntry.value as
+      | 'error'
+      | 'warn'
+      | 'info'
+      | 'debug'
+      | 'verbose'
+      | 'silly';
+    transports.console.level = logLevelEntry.value as
+      | 'error'
+      | 'warn'
+      | 'info'
+      | 'debug'
+      | 'verbose'
+      | 'silly';
    log.info(`[CONFIG] Log level updated to ${logLevelEntry.value}`);
  }

@@ -132,7 +180,9 @@ export async function applyConfigSideEffects(
  }

  // 5. 工作空间路径写入独立文件（下次启动生效）
-  const workspaceEntry = entries.find((e) => e.key === 'workspace.path' && typeof e.value === 'string');
+  const workspaceEntry = entries.find(
+    (e) => e.key === 'workspace.path' && typeof e.value === 'string',
+  );
  if (workspaceEntry) {
    try {
      const { writeWorkspacePathToFile } = await import('../main');
@@ -137,6 +137,14 @@ const ENV_FALLBACK: Record<string, { apiKey?: string; baseURL?: string }> = {
  anthropic: { apiKey: 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY', baseURL: 'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL' },
 };

+/**
+ * F-7 修复: 已知 Provider 白名单
+ * 此前 createAdapter 的 switch default 静默落入 DeepSeekAdapter —— provider 配置
+ * 拼写错误（如 "deepsek"）不报错，而是以空配置静默失败。显式校验后未知值
+ * 走"配置不完整"路径，用户可在设置中看到明确提示。
+ */
+const KNOWN_PROVIDERS = new Set(['deepseek', 'agnes', 'mimo', 'ollama', 'openai', 'anthropic']);
+
 async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
  log.info('MetonaAI Desktop starting...');
  electronApp.setAppUserModelId('com.metona.ai-desktop');
@@ -222,6 +230,14 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
      return null;
    }

+    // F-7 修复: 未知 Provider 显式拒绝（此前 switch default 静默落入 DeepSeekAdapter）
+    if (!KNOWN_PROVIDERS.has(provider)) {
+      log.warn(
+        `Unknown LLM provider "${provider}". Supported: ${[...KNOWN_PROVIDERS].join(', ')}.`,
+      );
+      return null;
+    }
+
    if (!apiKey && provider !== 'ollama') {
      log.warn(`API key is required for provider "${provider}". Please set it in Settings.`);
      return null;
@@ -262,6 +278,15 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
  // ===== 步骤 5: 工作空间文件 + System Prompt =====
  const contextBuilder = new ContextBuilder();

+  // ===== F-8 接通: 此前为死配置的安全/日志开关真实消费 =====
+  // fail-secure: 仅显式 false 才关闭 —— 配置值异常（空串/null/类型错误）时保持默认开启
+  const promptInjectionEnabled =
+    configService.get<boolean>('security.promptInjectionDefense') !== false;
+  const auditEnabled = configService.get<boolean>('logging.auditEnabled') !== false;
+  const traceEnabled = configService.get<boolean>('logging.traceEnabled') !== false;
+  // SessionRecorder 录制总开关（false 时不写 TRACE JSONL 文件）
+  sessionRecorder.setEnabled(traceEnabled);
+
  // ===== v0.2.0: 安全模块（必须在工具注册之前） =====
  const policyEngine = new PolicyEngine();
  const sandboxManager = new SandboxManager({
@@ -330,16 +355,24 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
  const mcpManager = new MCPManager(() => db, toolRegistry);

  // ===== Hooks（P0-2: SecurityScanHook 前置，对工具结果做间接注入防护） =====
+  // F-8 接通: SecurityScanHook / AuditLogHook 按 security.promptInjectionDefense
+  // 与 logging.auditEnabled 配置构建（此前两配置为死配置，hook 无条件挂载）
  const preToolHooks = [
    new PermissionCheckHook(policyEngine),
    new RateLimitHook(20),
    confirmationHook,
  ];
  const postToolHooks = [
-    new SecurityScanHook(promptDefender),
-    new AuditLogHook(auditService),
+    ...(promptInjectionEnabled ? [new SecurityScanHook(promptDefender)] : []),
+    ...(auditEnabled ? [new AuditLogHook(auditService)] : []),
    new MemoryTriggerHook(memoryManager),
  ];
+  if (!promptInjectionEnabled) {
+    log.warn('[Security] promptInjectionDefense disabled by config — injection scanning off');
+  }
+  if (!auditEnabled) {
+    log.warn('[Logging] auditEnabled disabled by config — tool audit logging off');
+  }

  // ===== P2-10: Agent Engine Manager（每会话独立引擎，替代全局单引擎） =====
  const buildAdapter = (): IMetonaProviderAdapter => createAdapter() ?? FALLBACK_ADAPTER;
@@ -360,6 +393,9 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
          | 'max'
          | null) ?? 'high',
      toolExecutionTimeoutMs: configService.get<number>('agent.toolExecutionTimeoutMs') ?? 120_000,
+      // F-8 接通: llm.temperature / llm.maxTokens 此前为死配置（引擎硬编码 0.0/63488）
+      temperature: configService.get<number>('llm.temperature') ?? 0.0,
+      maxTokens: configService.get<number>('llm.maxTokens') ?? 63488,
    },
    toolRegistry,
    preToolHooks,
@@ -383,6 +419,13 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {
      '';
    if (!baseURL) return null;
    if (!apiKey && provider !== 'ollama') return null;
+    // F-7 修复: 故障转移 Provider 同样做白名单校验（未知值禁用故障转移而非静默降级）
+    if (!KNOWN_PROVIDERS.has(provider)) {
+      log.warn(
+        `[Fallback] Unknown provider "${provider}". Supported: ${[...KNOWN_PROVIDERS].join(', ')}. Failover disabled.`,
+      );
+      return null;
+    }
    const contextWindow =
      provider !== 'ollama'
        ? (configService.get<number>(`${provider}.contextWindow`) ?? undefined)
@@ -573,36 +616,44 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {

  // ===== 窗口管理 =====
  windowManager = new WindowManager();
-  const mainWindow = windowManager.createWindow({
-    id: 'main',
-    workspacePath: workspaceInfo.path,
-    title: 'MetonaAI Desktop',
-    // P2-11 修复: 在 loadURL 之前注册 IPC handler，消除渲染进程加载与 IPC 注册的时序窗口
-    beforeLoad: (win) => {
-      confirmationHook.setMainWindow(win);
-      registerAllIPCHandlers({
-        mainWindow: win,
-        sessionService,
-        configService,
-        workspaceService,
-        contextBuilder,
-        agentEngineManager,
-        toolRegistry,
-        auditService,
-        sessionRecorder,
-        memoryManager,
-        mcpManager,
-        reloadAdapter,
-        promptInjectionDefender: promptDefender,
-        outputValidator,
-        confirmationHook,
-        memoryConsolidator,
-        orchestrator,
-        sessionSummaryService,
-        toolsReadyRef,
-      });
-    },
-  });
+  // 局部 const 捕获：闭包内 TS 无法对模块级可空变量做流收窄
+  const wm = windowManager;
+  // F-4 修复: 窗口创建收敛为单一入口 —— macOS activate / 托盘重建窗口此前不走
+  // beforeLoad，导致 confirmationHook 仍指向已销毁的旧窗口，所有需确认工具被
+  // "no main window available" 永久阻断。此闭包保证任何重建路径都完成
+  // setMainWindow + IPC 注册（registerAllIPCHandlers 有防重入标志，重复调用安全）。
+  const createMainWindow = (): BrowserWindow =>
+    wm.createWindow({
+      id: 'main',
+      workspacePath: workspaceInfo.path,
+      title: 'MetonaAI Desktop',
+      // P2-11 修复: 在 loadURL 之前注册 IPC handler，消除渲染进程加载与 IPC 注册的时序窗口
+      beforeLoad: (win) => {
+        confirmationHook.setMainWindow(win);
+        registerAllIPCHandlers({
+          mainWindow: win,
+          sessionService,
+          configService,
+          workspaceService,
+          contextBuilder,
+          agentEngineManager,
+          toolRegistry,
+          auditService,
+          sessionRecorder,
+          memoryManager,
+          mcpManager,
+          reloadAdapter,
+          promptInjectionDefender: promptDefender,
+          outputValidator,
+          confirmationHook,
+          memoryConsolidator,
+          orchestrator,
+          sessionSummaryService,
+          toolsReadyRef,
+        });
+      },
+    });
+  const mainWindow = createMainWindow();

  // ===== 系统托盘 =====
  const resourcesPath = join(__dirname, '../../assets');
@@ -683,7 +734,10 @@ async function initialize(): Promise<void> {

  app.on('activate', () => {
    if (windowManager && windowManager.count === 0) {
-      windowManager.createWindow({ id: 'main', workspacePath: workspaceInfo.path });
+      // F-4 修复: 重建窗口走统一入口（beforeLoad 补 confirmationHook/IPC），
+      // 并把托盘引用重新绑定到新窗口（否则托盘点击指向已销毁窗口）
+      const win = createMainWindow();
+      trayManager?.rebindWindow(win);
    } else {
      windowManager?.focusWindow();
    }
@@ -255,3 +255,78 @@ describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('SessionSummary 分层上下文 × 截断交互',
    expect(history.every((m: any) => !m.images?.length)).toBe(true);
  });
 });
+
+/**
+ * F-3 回归：session_summaries 级联删除
+ *
+ * 缺陷：该表此前无 FOREIGN KEY ON DELETE CASCADE —— 删除会话后摘要残留。
+ * 迁移 8 重建表补级联；此测试验证目标 schema 的行为契约：
+ * DELETE sessions 必须级联清除对应摘要（真实库由 DatabaseService 开启 foreign_keys pragma）。
+ */
+describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('session_summaries 级联删除（F-3）', () => {
+  let db: any;
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    db = new Database(':memory:');
+    // 与 DatabaseService.initialize 一致：开启外键约束（级联依赖此开关）
+    db.pragma('foreign_keys = ON');
+    db.exec(`
+      CREATE TABLE sessions (
+        id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        title TEXT DEFAULT '新会话',
+        created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        message_count INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+        pinned INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+        archived INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+        metadata TEXT DEFAULT '{}'
+      );
+      CREATE TABLE session_summaries (
+        session_id              TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        summary                 TEXT NOT NULL,
+        summarized_until_rowid  INTEGER NOT NULL,
+        updated_at              INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch() * 1000),
+        FOREIGN KEY (session_id) REFERENCES sessions(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+      );
+    `);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    db?.close();
+  });
+
+  it('外键声明存在且为 CASCADE（迁移 8 后的目标 schema）', () => {
+    const fks = db.prepare('PRAGMA foreign_key_list(session_summaries)').all() as Array<{
+      table: string;
+      on_delete: string;
+    }>;
+    expect(fks.some((fk) => fk.table === 'sessions' && fk.on_delete === 'CASCADE')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('删除会话后摘要级联清除（不再残留孤儿数据）', () => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    db.prepare(`INSERT INTO sessions (id, created_at, updated_at) VALUES ('s_cascade', ?, ?)`).run(
+      now,
+      now,
+    );
+    db.prepare(
+      `INSERT INTO session_summaries (session_id, summary, summarized_until_rowid, updated_at)
+       VALUES ('s_cascade', '将被级联删除的摘要', 99, ?)`,
+    ).run(now);
+    db.prepare(`INSERT INTO sessions (id, created_at, updated_at) VALUES ('s_keep', ?, ?)`).run(
+      now,
+      now,
+    );
+    db.prepare(
+      `INSERT INTO session_summaries (session_id, summary, summarized_until_rowid, updated_at)
+       VALUES ('s_keep', '保留的摘要', 50, ?)`,
+    ).run(now);
+
+    db.prepare(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE id = 's_cascade'`).run();
+
+    const remaining = db.prepare(`SELECT session_id FROM session_summaries`).all() as Array<{
+      session_id: string;
+    }>;
+    expect(remaining.map((r) => r.session_id)).toEqual(['s_keep']);
+  });
+});
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ export const CONFIG_DEFAULTS: ConfigDefaultEntry[] = [
  { key: 'llm.model', value: '', category: 'llm' },
  { key: 'llm.apiKey', value: '', category: 'llm' },
  { key: 'llm.baseURL', value: '', category: 'llm' },
+  // F-8 接通: temperature/maxTokens 此前为死配置（引擎硬编码），现由 main.ts 注入引擎
  { key: 'llm.temperature', value: 0, category: 'llm' },
  { key: 'llm.maxTokens', value: 63488, category: 'llm' },
  // v0.5.4: 多模态总开关 — 即使模型支持多模态，未开启也不能上传图片（默认关闭，
@@ -63,16 +64,18 @@ export const CONFIG_DEFAULTS: ConfigDefaultEntry[] = [
  { key: 'agent.toolExecutionTimeoutMs', value: 120000, category: 'agent' },

  // 安全配置
-  { key: 'security.requireWriteConfirmation', value: true, category: 'security' },
-  { key: 'security.maxFileWriteSizeKB', value: 1024, category: 'security' },
+  // F-8 清理: 移除死配置 security.requireWriteConfirmation / security.maxFileWriteSizeKB
+  // （无任何消费者 —— 确认策略由工具定义的 requiresPermission/riskLevel 驱动，
+  //  文件大小上限由 file-guard.ts 的 MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES 常量控制）
+  // F-8 接通: promptInjectionDefense 由 main.ts（SecurityScanHook）与 ipc/agent.ts（用户消息检测）消费
  { key: 'security.promptInjectionDefense', value: true, category: 'security' },

  // UI 配置
+  // F-8 清理: 移除死配置 ui.fontSize / ui.animationMode（无消费者；主题走 localStorage）
  { key: 'ui.theme', value: 'auto', category: 'ui' },
-  { key: 'ui.animationMode', value: 'auto', category: 'ui' },
-  { key: 'ui.fontSize', value: 'medium', category: 'ui' },

  // 日志配置
+  // F-8 接通: auditEnabled/traceEnabled 由 main.ts 构建 hooks 与 SessionRecorder 时消费
  { key: 'logging.level', value: 'info', category: 'logging' },
  { key: 'logging.auditEnabled', value: true, category: 'logging' },
  { key: 'logging.traceEnabled', value: true, category: 'logging' },
@@ -286,11 +289,14 @@ export class DatabaseService {
      );

      -- ===== P2: 会话摘要表（分层上下文——超长会话早期消息压缩为摘要，LLM 只加载摘要 + 近期原文） =====
+      -- F-3 修复: 补 FOREIGN KEY ON DELETE CASCADE —— 此前无级联，删除会话后摘要残留，
+      -- 随使用无限累积（messages/tasks 均有级联，唯独此表遗漏）
      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_summaries (
        session_id              TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
        summary                 TEXT NOT NULL,
        summarized_until_rowid  INTEGER NOT NULL,
-        updated_at              INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch() * 1000)
+        updated_at              INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch() * 1000),
+        FOREIGN KEY (session_id) REFERENCES sessions(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
      );

      -- ===== 索引 =====
@@ -463,6 +469,49 @@ export class DatabaseService {
        // 新写入的消息仍通过触发器正常进入索引
      }

+      // F-3 迁移 8: 重建 session_summaries 表，补 FOREIGN KEY ON DELETE CASCADE
+      // 此前该表无级联删除 —— 删除会话（sessions:delete / data:clearSessions）后
+      // 摘要记录永久残留，随使用无限累积。SQLite 不支持 ALTER ADD CONSTRAINT，需重建表。
+      // 幂等：PRAGMA foreign_key_list 检测已有级联则跳过。
+      try {
+        const fkRows = db.prepare('PRAGMA foreign_key_list(session_summaries)').all() as Array<{
+          table: string;
+          on_delete: string;
+        }>;
+        const hasCascade = fkRows.some(
+          (fk) => fk.table === 'sessions' && fk.on_delete === 'CASCADE',
+        );
+        if (!hasCascade) {
+          log.info('[DB] Migration: rebuilding session_summaries table to add ON DELETE CASCADE');
+          const rebuildSummaries = db.transaction(() => {
+            db.exec(`
+              CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS session_summaries_new (
+                session_id              TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+                summary                 TEXT NOT NULL,
+                summarized_until_rowid  INTEGER NOT NULL,
+                updated_at              INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT (unixepoch() * 1000),
+                FOREIGN KEY (session_id) REFERENCES sessions(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
+              );
+
+              INSERT INTO session_summaries_new (session_id, summary, summarized_until_rowid, updated_at)
+              SELECT session_id, summary, summarized_until_rowid, updated_at
+              FROM session_summaries;
+
+              DROP TABLE session_summaries;
+              ALTER TABLE session_summaries_new RENAME TO session_summaries;
+            `);
+          });
+          rebuildSummaries();
+          log.info(
+            '[DB] Migration: session_summaries table rebuilt successfully (ON DELETE CASCADE added)',
+          );
+        }
+      } catch (error) {
+        const msg = toErrorMessage(error);
+        log.warn(`[DB] Migration 8 (session_summaries CASCADE) skipped: ${msg}`);
+        // 非致命 — 级联缺失仅导致摘要残留（不影响会话读写），但建议用户检查工作空间数据库
+      }
+
      // C-6 修复 迁移 5: 重建 messages 表，将 content 列从 NOT NULL 改为允许 NULL
      // @see project_memory.md — Assistant messages with tool_calls must set content to null
      // SQLite 不支持 ALTER COLUMN，需要重建表
@@ -57,8 +57,22 @@ export class SessionRecorder {
  /** P1-6: 每会话独立状态（支持并发会话录制） */
  private sessions = new Map<string, SessionRecordState>();

+  /**
+   * F-8 接通: 录制总开关（logging.traceEnabled，默认 true）
+   * 关闭时 writeEvent 丢弃所有事件（状态 Map 仍维护以保持接口兼容）
+   */
+  private enabled = true;
+
  constructor(private workspacePath: string) {}

+  /** F-8: 设置录制开关（main.ts 启动时按 logging.traceEnabled 注入） */
+  setEnabled(enabled: boolean): void {
+    this.enabled = enabled;
+    if (!enabled) {
+      log.info('[SessionRecorder] Trace recording disabled by config (logging.traceEnabled=false)');
+    }
+  }
+
  /** 获取指定会话的录制状态（不存在返回 null） */
  private state(sessionId: string): SessionRecordState | null {
    return this.sessions.get(sessionId) ?? null;
@@ -262,6 +276,8 @@ export class SessionRecorder {
  private writeEvent(sessionId: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void {
    const state = this.state(sessionId);
    if (!state) return;
+    // F-8 接通: logging.traceEnabled=false 时丢弃事件（不写文件）
+    if (!this.enabled) return;

    const event: TraceEvent = {
      seq: state.seq++,
@@ -74,6 +74,23 @@ export class TrayManager {
    TrayManager.isQuitting = true;
  }

+  /**
+   * F-4 修复: 重新绑定主窗口引用（macOS activate / 托盘重建窗口后调用）
+   *
+   * 旧窗口销毁后 this.mainWindow 指向已 destroyed 实例，托盘点击（显示/隐藏）
+   * 与"关闭到托盘"行为全部失效。此方法更新引用并为新窗口重新挂载 close 拦截
+   * （原监听随旧窗口销毁自动释放，新窗口需要同样的 hide-to-tray 行为）。
+   */
+  rebindWindow(mainWindow: BrowserWindow): void {
+    this.mainWindow = mainWindow;
+    mainWindow.on('close', (event) => {
+      if (!TrayManager.isQuitting) {
+        event.preventDefault();
+        mainWindow.hide();
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
  /**
   * 更新托盘状态
   */