feat: v0.8.0 流语义补全 · 会话可靠 · 恢复力 — finish_reason 全链路贯通根治"思考中停止" · 2445 用例全量回归

P0 会话可靠性收口（根治"模型思考着会话就停止"）： - P0-1 finish_reason 全链路贯通：DONE 事件与 IterationStep 新增 finishReason，OpenAI 共享 SSE / Anthropic message_delta.stop_reason / Ollama done_reason 三路采集，TRACE 层弃用硬编码 'stop' 记录真值 - P0-2 空响应守卫 + 降级重试：零产出流→可重试错误走退避；思考耗尽输出预算（reasoning-only + length）→自动关闭思考降级重试一次；仍失败→OUTPUT_LENGTH_EXCEEDED 结构化错误 + 故障转移；附带根治 abort 恰逢零工具调用轮被 COMPLETED 抢占的真实缺陷 - P0-3 思考×能力×预算三对齐：DeepSeek/MiMo/Agnes/Ollama 四家 supportsThinking=false 强制不发思考参数；小输出预算告警；设置页联动提示 - P0-4 渲染层可见性：截断/空完成/友好错误三类提示，i18n 全部出层 - P0-5 回归四件套：reasoning-only 终止判定、集成级空闲超时、504 引擎重试归类、思考中 abort→USER_INTERRUPT、P4-2 强制收尾路径 FEAT-1：LLM 设置新增「最大输出上限」——Provider 支持矩阵显隐 + 模型上限钳制提示 + 超限保存警告 + llm.maxTokens 热生效 P1 修复面收口： - 渲染层三缺陷根治：后台会话回放缓冲（2000 条/4MB 有界 + agent:getReplayState + 事件总线）+ abort 双层自愈 + sendMessage 收尾兜底 + 中断卡片清扫 - 工具 abort 信号全覆盖：web_search/web_fetch/http_request/code_search/git 系列/delegate_task 全部接入引擎中断；web_search 时间预算收敛（720s→≤240s）；移除伪造 ToolExecutionContext 与死代码 - 安全：本地 Pinned CONNECT 代理根治浏览器通道 DNS rebinding（校验期 IP pinning，可注入 resolver 表测）；配置 URL 域名解析深校验（DeepCheckSoftFailure 软失败）；SSE 空 error 帧防御修复；Ollama generate/embed AbortSignal.any 合并 - 缺陷清单：UTF-16 BOM 读取、tmp 同毫秒碰撞（nanoid 后缀）、code_search JS 回退参数对称（case_sensitive/前后文独立）、list_directory include_node_modules、崩溃自愈退避（60s 窗 ≥3 次停 reload）、MemoryViewer/Sidebar i18n 收口 P2 能力演进： - 会话回收站：SCHEMA_VERSION 3 + 迁移 10（deleted_at，存在性守卫），软删除/恢复/彻底删除/30 天自动清理（启动+24h），searchMessages 聚合剔除，Sidebar 回收站面板 - 会话回放播放器：sessions:listRecordings/readRecording（白名单+目录边界+20MB 上限），SessionReplayPlayer 时间轴/步进/变速，Trace 面板入口 - electron-updater 自动更新：双轨（手动 feed 比对保留），生产环境启动静默检查 + update:status 广播 + app:updateInstall + LogsSettings UpdatePanel + builder publish 配置 - @ 文件提及：workspace.listFiles/readFileClip（边界/512KB/NUL 拒绝/MEMORY.md 保护），ChatInput Fuse 联想+键盘导航+附件管线注入 - MCP Resources/Prompts 发现：可选能力 try/catch 降级，mcp:listServerContents，MCPSettings 展开视图 - 文档对齐：内部 API 标准 HTML（Adapter 清单补 MiMo/已实现注记/STREAM_RESET/DONE.finishReason/ repetition_truncation 映射）；README v0.8.0 亮点表 P3 测试基建： - 新增 4 个测试文件：engine-stream-contract（6）、engine-stream-reliability（4：集成空闲超时/504 重试/思考中 abort/P4-2 强制收尾）、thinking-capability-gate（7）、pinned-proxy（9，含深校验 5）、session-trash（5，DB 域）、use-agent-stream hook 级（5）、agent.test 回放缓冲（2） - 契约更新：orchestrator 被中断 SubAgent success=false（abort 优先级修复语义）、SSE 空 error 帧、UTF-16 正常读取、DeepSeek 未配置思考显式 disabled、迁移矩阵 v2→3 - 弱断言根治：registry WEBP 单向断言、hooks-contracts 自比恒真、memory 空 token 补强全量验证：typecheck 0 错误 / lint 0 问题 / 系统 Node 2144 通过（301 DB 用例按 ABI 跳过）/ Electron ABI 2445/2445 全量通过 0 跳过
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+/**
+ * v0.8.0 P1-4/P1-5: Pinned CONNECT 代理 + 配置 URL 深校验测试。
+ *
+ * - pinned-proxy：公网/私网目标的 CONNECT 校验分流（resolver 注入 mock，
+ *   不触网）；端口分配与幂等启动。
+ * - assertSafeConfigTargetDeep：域名解析到云元数据 IP → 拒绝；DNS 失败 →
+ *   DeepCheckSoftFailure（软失败放行）；IP 字面量高危段 → 拒绝。
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, afterAll } from 'vitest';
+import * as net from 'net';
+import {
+  createPinnedProxy,
+  ensurePinnedProxy,
+  isPinnedProxyActive,
+} from '../../utils/pinned-proxy';
+import {
+  assertSafeConfigTargetDeep,
+  DeepCheckSoftFailure,
+  __dnsLookup,
+} from '../../harness/tools/built-in/ssrf-guard';
+
+// ===== Pinned CONNECT 代理 =====
+
+describe('pinned CONNECT proxy (P1-4)', () => {
+  const keepAlive: Array<net.Server> = [];
+
+  it('public target → CONNECT tunnel established (200), traffic pinned to resolved IP', async () => {
+    // 本地 echo 服务器充当"上游"：mock resolver 把域名 pin 到 127.0.0.1，
+    // 验证隧道建立后字节双向透传（不触公网）
+    const echo = net.createServer((socket) => {
+      socket.pipe(socket);
+    });
+    await new Promise<void>((r) => echo.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', r));
+    const echoPort = (echo.address() as net.AddressInfo).port;
+    keepAlive.push(echo);
+
+    const proxy = await createPinnedProxy(async () => {
+      // 校验通过 → 返回校验期锁定的 IP（pinning 语义：连接用同一批 IP）
+      return ['127.0.0.1'];
+    });
+    keepAlive.push(proxy as unknown as net.Server);
+
+    const target = net.connect({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxy.port });
+    const result = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), 3_000);
+      let buf = '';
+      target.on('data', (d) => {
+        buf += d.toString();
+        if (buf.includes('\r\n\r\n')) {
+          // 200 已到 → 隧道建立，写 payload 验证透传
+          target.write(`ping-to-${echoPort}`);
+        }
+        if (buf.includes(`ping-to-${echoPort}`)) {
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          resolve(buf.split('\r\n')[0]);
+        }
+      });
+      target.on('error', (e) => {
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        reject(e);
+      });
+      target.write(`CONNECT example.com:${echoPort} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n`);
+    });
+    expect(result).toContain('200');
+    target.destroy();
+    echo.close();
+    await proxy.close();
+  });
+
+  it('private/metadata target → 403 rejected (fail-closed)', async () => {
+    const proxy = await createPinnedProxy(async () => {
+      throw new Error('Blocked SSRF: resolves to private IP');
+    });
+    const target = net.connect({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxy.port });
+    const response = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), 2_000);
+      let buf = '';
+      target.on('data', (d) => {
+        buf += d.toString();
+        if (buf.includes('\r\n\r\n')) {
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          resolve(buf.split('\r\n')[0]);
+        }
+      });
+      target.on('error', (e) => {
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        reject(e);
+      });
+      target.write('CONNECT 169.254.169.254:80 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\n\r\n');
+    });
+    expect(response).toContain('403');
+    target.destroy();
+    await proxy.close();
+  });
+
+  it('invalid CONNECT target → 400', async () => {
+    const proxy = await createPinnedProxy(async () => ['1.2.3.4']);
+    const target = net.connect({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxy.port });
+    const response = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), 2_000);
+      let buf = '';
+      target.on('data', (d) => {
+        buf += d.toString();
+        if (buf.includes('\r\n\r\n')) {
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          resolve(buf.split('\r\n')[0]);
+        }
+      });
+      target.on('error', (e) => {
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        reject(e);
+      });
+      target.write('CONNECT no-port-target HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n');
+    });
+    expect(response).toContain('400');
+    target.destroy();
+    await proxy.close();
+  });
+
+  it('ensurePinnedProxy: idempotent start + active flag', async () => {
+    const port1 = await ensurePinnedProxy();
+    const port2 = await ensurePinnedProxy();
+    expect(port1).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(port2).toBe(port1);
+    expect(isPinnedProxyActive()).toBe(true);
+  }, 10_000);
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    for (const s of keepAlive) {
+      try {
+        s.close();
+      } catch {
+        /* ignore */
+      }
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+// ===== 配置 URL 深校验 =====
+
+describe('assertSafeConfigTargetDeep (P1-5)', () => {
+  it('hostname resolving to metadata IP → rejected', async () => {
+    const original = __dnsLookup.current;
+    __dnsLookup.current = (async () => [
+      { address: '169.254.169.254', family: 4 },
+    ]) as unknown as typeof __dnsLookup.current;
+    try {
+      await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('https://attacker.example/search')).rejects.toThrow(
+        /high-risk/,
+      );
+    } finally {
+      __dnsLookup.current = original;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('hostname resolving to public IP → allowed', async () => {
+    const original = __dnsLookup.current;
+    __dnsLookup.current = (async () => [
+      { address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 },
+    ]) as unknown as typeof __dnsLookup.current;
+    try {
+      await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('https://example.com')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    } finally {
+      __dnsLookup.current = original;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('DNS failure → DeepCheckSoftFailure (soft-fail allow, caller logs)', async () => {
+    const original = __dnsLookup.current;
+    __dnsLookup.current = (async () => {
+      throw new Error('ENOTFOUND');
+    }) as unknown as typeof __dnsLookup.current;
+    try {
+      await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('https://offline.example')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+        DeepCheckSoftFailure,
+      );
+    } finally {
+      __dnsLookup.current = original;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('IP-literal link-local target → rejected without DNS', async () => {
+    await expect(assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('http://169.254.169.254/latest')).rejects.toThrow(
+      /link-local|metadata/,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('loopback target → allowed (local SearXNG/MCP legit)', async () => {
+    await expect(
+      assertSafeConfigTargetDeep('http://127.0.0.1:8080/search'),
+    ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});