feat: v0.8.2 安全纵深补全 · 协议保真 · 断链修复 — 图片SSRF/根MEMORY.md保护根治 · Anthropic thinking回传+pause_turn续传 · 2523 用例全量回归 + E2E 扩充
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2026-09-08 14:30:27 +08:00
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/**
* v0.8.2 P0-1: 适配器图片下载的 SSRF 安全通道(Anthropic / Ollama 共用)
*
* 背景:此前 anthropic.adapter.toImageBlock 与 ollama.adapter.resolveImageToBase64
* 对消息里的 http(s) 图片 URL 直接 fetchWithTimeout 下载转 base64 —— 未接 SSRF
* 校验、无字节上限、无 content-type 约束。与其他工具"SSRF 拦截即断"不同,
* 该通道的下载结果会**以图片块进入模型上下文(数据可回读)**:模型可诱导用户
* 发送 http://169.254.169.254/... 图片链接回读内网数据,属于可回读外泄通道;
* 同时无上限的 arrayBuffer 会造成内存峰值。
*
* 收口方案(根治):
* - 校验与连接同源:resolvePublicAddressesssrf-guard 单一事实来源)+ DNS
* pinningssrfPinnedFetch),代理激活时按既有语义退化为"仅入口校验";
* - 逐跳重定向复检:redirect:'manual' + resolveRedirectTarget,每一跳都重新
* 走完整校验(对齐 web_fetch 的逐跳语义),最多 3 跳;
* - 字节上限:content-length 预检 + 流式增量累计双闸(10MB,防大图内存峰值);
* - 类型白名单:content-type 必须 image/*(或缺失/二进制时按魔数嗅探),
* 并钳制到 Provider 实际支持集合(png/jpeg/gif/webp)。
*
* 失败语义由调用方决定:适配器保持"跳过该图、不阻断请求"log.warn + 占位)。
*/
import { ssrfPinnedFetch, resolveRedirectTarget } from '../../tools/built-in/ssrf-dispatcher';
/** 实际下载器签名(与 ssrfPinnedFetch 对齐) */
export type ImageFetcher = (
url: string,
init: RequestInit,
timeoutMs: number,
signal?: AbortSignal,
) => Promise<Response>;
/**
* v0.8.2 P0-1: 下载器注入点 —— 生产恒为 ssrfPinnedFetch(校验与连接同源);
* 单元测试通过替换 current 注入受控下载器(undici 客户端无法经 global fetch 打桩)。
*/
export const __imageFetcher: { current: ImageFetcher } = { current: ssrfPinnedFetch };
/** 单张图片下载字节上限(10MB,对齐 view_image 工具 5MB×2 的量级) */
export const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
/** 允许的图片 media typeAnthropic Messages API 支持集合;Ollama 同样接受) */
const ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES = new Set(['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/gif', 'image/webp']);
const MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
export interface ImageFetchOptions {
timeoutMs?: number;
maxBytes?: number;
signal?: AbortSignal;
}
export interface ImageFetchResult {
base64: string;
mediaType: string;
}
/** 魔数嗅探:content-type 缺失或为通用二进制类型时判定真实图片类型 */
export function sniffImageMediaType(buf: Buffer): string | null {
if (buf.length >= 8 && buf.subarray(0, 4).equals(Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]))) {
return 'image/png';
}
if (buf.length >= 3 && buf[0] === 0xff && buf[1] === 0xd8 && buf[2] === 0xff) {
return 'image/jpeg';
}
if (buf.length >= 6 && buf.subarray(0, 3).toString('ascii') === 'GIF') {
return 'image/gif';
}
if (
buf.length >= 12 &&
buf.subarray(0, 4).toString('ascii') === 'RIFF' &&
buf.subarray(8, 12).toString('ascii') === 'WEBP'
) {
return 'image/webp';
}
return null;
}
/** 流式增量读取并强制字节上限(content-length 可伪造,以实际累计为准) */
async function readBodyWithCap(res: Response, maxBytes: number): Promise<Buffer> {
const declared = res.headers.get('content-length');
const declaredBytes = declared ? Number(declared) : NaN;
if (Number.isFinite(declaredBytes) && declaredBytes > maxBytes) {
throw new Error(`Image exceeds size limit: ${declaredBytes} > ${maxBytes} bytes`);
}
const body = res.body;
if (!body) {
throw new Error('Image response has no body');
}
const reader = body.getReader();
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
let total = 0;
try {
for (;;) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
if (value) {
total += value.byteLength;
if (total > maxBytes) {
throw new Error(`Image exceeds size limit: > ${maxBytes} bytes`);
}
chunks.push(Buffer.from(value));
}
}
} finally {
reader.releaseLock();
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks);
}
/**
* SSRF 安全的图片下载:校验 → pinned 连接 → 逐跳重定向复检 → 类型/尺寸钳制。
*
* @throws 任何校验失败/网络失败/超限/类型不符均抛 Error(消息含 Blocked SSRF /
* Image exceeds / non-image 等),由调用方按"跳过该图"处理。
*/
export async function fetchImageAsBase64(
url: string,
options: ImageFetchOptions = {},
): Promise<ImageFetchResult> {
const { timeoutMs = 30_000, maxBytes = MAX_IMAGE_BYTES, signal } = options;
if (!/^https?:/i.test(url)) {
throw new Error(`Blocked image fetch: protocol not allowed (url=${url.slice(0, 120)})`);
}
let currentUrl = url;
let res: Response | null = null;
for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
// __imageFetcher(生产 = ssrfPinnedFetch)内部先 resolvePublicAddresses 全量
// 校验再 pinned 连接;每一跳都进入本调用 —— 重定向目标同样受完整 SSRF 校验。
res = await __imageFetcher.current(currentUrl, { redirect: 'manual' }, timeoutMs, signal);
const next = resolveRedirectTarget(
{ status: res.status, headers: { get: (n: string) => res!.headers.get(n) } },
currentUrl,
);
if (!next) break;
if (hop === MAX_REDIRECTS) {
throw new Error(`Image fetch exceeded ${MAX_REDIRECTS} redirects`);
}
currentUrl = next;
}
if (!res) throw new Error('Image fetch failed: no response');
if (!res.ok) {
throw new Error(`Image fetch failed: HTTP ${res.status} (url=${currentUrl.slice(0, 120)})`);
}
const buf = await readBodyWithCap(res, maxBytes);
if (buf.length === 0) {
throw new Error('Image fetch failed: empty body');
}
// 类型钳制:content-type 声明优先(必须 image/*),缺失/通用二进制按魔数嗅探;
// 明确的非图片类型(text/html、application/json 等)直接拒绝。
const declaredType = (res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '').split(';')[0].trim().toLowerCase();
let mediaType: string | null = null;
if (
declaredType === '' ||
declaredType === 'application/octet-stream' ||
declaredType === 'binary/octet-stream'
) {
mediaType = sniffImageMediaType(buf);
} else if (declaredType.startsWith('image/')) {
mediaType = declaredType;
} else {
throw new Error(`Blocked image fetch: non-image content-type "${declaredType}"`);
}
if (!mediaType || !ALLOWED_MEDIA_TYPES.has(mediaType)) {
throw new Error(
`Blocked image fetch: unsupported media type "${mediaType ?? declaredType}" (allowed: png/jpeg/gif/webp)`,
);
}
return { base64: buf.toString('base64'), mediaType };
}