feat: v0.7.0 四阶段全量迭代 — 修复面收口 · 安全纵深 · 架构还债 · 能力演进
P1 修复面收口: v0.6.3 截断自愈推全量(Anthropic/Ollama/非流式/引擎兜底); SSE 上游错误帧检测进重试通道; clearMessages 摘要游标根治; truncateResult 内联图片白名单统一; 前端四 bug(确认弹窗锁死/MemoryViewer/ Virtuoso Footer/abort 尾部过滤) + reasoning 缓冲跨迭代污染; 托盘通知过滤与新建会话死链接线 P2 安全纵深: MCP 审批闭环(ConfirmationHook×PolicyEngine 联动+重名拒注册); SSRF 收敛 ssrf-guard 共享模块 (web_fetch 双通道校验+重定向终态复检); Electron 加固(preload CJS 化→sandbox:true/CSP/权限白名单/will-navigate); run_command cmd.exe 白名单通道元字符守门; diff_viewer 10MB 预检; Anthropic thinking 预算下限; Agnes 思考显式关闭 P3 架构还债: OpenAICompatibleAdapter 中间基类收敛四家样板; 错误分类单轨化(删 mapError/getFetchSignal, 超时显式 ETIMEDOUT); PRAGMA user_version 迁移版本化; 死代码清理专项(cn.ts/SHORTCUTS/ContextMenu 分支/ getWindowState/modifiedArgs/sandbox 空壳); i18next 引入; a11y 第一轮; SearXNG 页批量草稿模型统一 P4 能力演进: Ollama pull 可取消/capabilities 探测/num_ctx 实测缓存; UpdateService feed 比对式自动更新 (app:updateCheck IPC + StatusBar 入口); MiMo providerOptions(web_search 服务端工具/strict JSON); web_fetch extract_mode=markdown(turndown); network.proxyUrl 全局代理(Chromium sessions+undici dispatcher) 测试: 264 → 507 用例(Electron ABI 全绿零跳过), 覆盖引擎压缩管线/重试竞速/MEMORY.md 闸门/file_editor 五操作/ filesystem 七工具实体夹具/git 真实仓库/SSE 错误帧/全线截断自愈/Provider 请求形态矩阵/SSRF 表测/钩子分级矩阵/ OutputValidator 全量/SLO 指标/MCP 安全纯函数/task_manager 链路/渲染层纯域/i18n 桥契约
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/**
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* MCP 命令安全面 + SLO 监控契约测试（v0.7.0 覆盖补齐）
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*
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* mcp-manager 的三个安全纯函数此前零测试（命令白名单/参数元字符检测/
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* env 敏感变量剥离），是 MCP 攻击面的第一道防线 —— 逐条表测锁定。
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* HealthChecker/SLOMonitor 此前为"活代码无契约"，本文件锁定其健康判定与
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* SLO 指标计算（percentile/burnRate/violated/窗口淘汰）。
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
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vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
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default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
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}));
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import { safeParseArgs, validateMcpCommand, buildSafeEnv } from '../mcp-manager.service';
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import { SLOMonitor, HealthChecker } from '../../utils/slo';
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import type { Database } from 'better-sqlite3';
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// better-sqlite3 的 ABI 可用性在模块顶层探测（describe.skipIf 在注册期求值）
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let dbAvailable = false;
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try {
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// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
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const DatabaseProbe = require('better-sqlite3');
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const p = new DatabaseProbe(':memory:');
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p.close();
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dbAvailable = true;
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} catch {
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dbAvailable = false;
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}
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// ===== MCP：safeParseArgs =====
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describe('safeParseArgs — JSON args 解析', () => {
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it('合法 JSON 数组 → string[]', () => {
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expect(safeParseArgs('["--flag","value"]')).toEqual(['--flag', 'value']);
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});
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it('非数组/坏 JSON/空输入 → 空数组兜底', () => {
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expect(safeParseArgs('{"a":1}')).toEqual([]);
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expect(safeParseArgs('not json')).toEqual([]);
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expect(safeParseArgs('')).toEqual([]);
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});
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});
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// ===== MCP：validateMcpCommand =====
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describe('validateMcpCommand — stdio 命令白名单防线', () => {
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it('白名单内命令正常放行；目录前缀剥除后匹配 basename，但扩展名不剥除', () => {
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for (const cmd of ['npx', 'node', 'npm', 'python', 'python3', 'uv', 'uvx', 'bun', 'deno']) {
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand(cmd, [])).not.toThrow();
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}
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// 目录前缀被剥除 → basename 命中白名单
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('/usr/local/bin/npx', ['-y', '@modelcontextprotocol/server'])).not.toThrow();
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// 现状锁定（比预期更严）：扩展名不参与剥除 —— 'npx.cmd' 不在名单，直接拒绝。
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// 这是当前安全基线的一部分：宁可收紧也不放过任何可执行变体。
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('C:\tools\npx.cmd', [])).toThrow(/allowed list/);
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});
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it('白名单外命令直接拒绝', () => {
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for (const cmd of ['curl', 'bash', 'sh', 'pwsh', 'cmd', 'powershell.exe', './unknown-server']) {
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand(cmd, [])).toThrow(/not in the allowed list/);
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}
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});
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it('args 中携带 shell 元字符（; & | 反引号 $ 等）拒绝；普通参数放行', () => {
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const evil: Array<string[]> = [
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[';whoami'],
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['a&b'],
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['x|cat'],
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['`id`'],
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['$HOME'],
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['<in'],
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['>out'],
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['line\nbreak'],
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];
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for (const args of evil) {
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('node', ['server.js', ...args])).toThrow();
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}
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expect(() => validateMcpCommand('node', ['server.js', '--port', '3000'])).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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// ===== MCP：buildSafeEnv =====
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describe('buildSafeEnv — 子进程环境净化', () => {
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it('命中后缀黑名单的敏感键被剔除，其余保留', () => {
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const baseEnv = {
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PATH: '/usr/bin',
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HOME: '/home/u',
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MY_API_KEY: 'sk-secret',
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ACCESS_TOKEN: 'tok',
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DB_PASSWORD: 'p@ss',
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AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY2: 'k',
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DEPLOY_PRIVATE_KEY: '----', // 后缀 _PRIVATE_KEY 命中
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GITEA_CREDENTIALS: '{"u":"x"}', // 后缀 _CREDENTIALS 命中（真实 CI/部署泄漏形态）
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SAFE_NAME: 'keepme',
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};
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vi.stubGlobal('process', { ...process, env: baseEnv as NodeJS.ProcessEnv });
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const env = buildSafeEnv();
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expect(env.PATH).toBe('/usr/bin');
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expect(env.SAFE_NAME).toBe('keepme');
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expect(env.MY_API_KEY).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.ACCESS_TOKEN).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.DB_PASSWORD).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.DEPLOY_PRIVATE_KEY).toBeUndefined();
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expect(env.GITEA_CREDENTIALS).toBeUndefined();
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vi.unstubAllGlobals();
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});
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});
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// ===== SLOMonitor =====
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describe('SLOMonitor — 窗口指标 / 分位数 / 燃烧率', () => {
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function makeMonitor(): SLOMonitor {
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return new SLOMonitor({ target: 0.99, windowMs: 60_000, latencyPercentiles: [0.5, 0.95], latencyThresholdMs: 5_000 });
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}
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it('空窗口：totalRequests=0、errorRate=0、violated=false、burnRate=0', () => {
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const s = makeMonitor().getStatus();
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expect(s.totalRequests).toBe(0);
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expect(s.errorRate).toBe(0);
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expect(s.violated).toBe(false);
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expect(s.burnRate).toBe(0);
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});
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it('统计请求成功率/平均延迟/吞吐量、分位数字段齐全且单调', async () => {
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const m = makeMonitor();
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const t0 = Date.now();
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const latencies = [100, 200, 400, 800, 1600]; // 全成功
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latencies.forEach((ms, i) => {
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m.recordRequest(ms, true);
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void i;
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});
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void t0;
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const s = m.getStatus();
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expect(s.totalRequests).toBe(5);
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expect(s.errorRequests).toBe(0);
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expect(s.avgLatencyMs).toBe(620);
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expect(Object.keys(s.percentiles)).toEqual(['P50', 'P95']);
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expect(s.percentiles['P50']).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(200);
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expect(s.percentiles['P95']).toBeLessThanOrEqual(1600);
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expect(s.burnRate).toBe(0);
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expect(s.target).toBeCloseTo(0.99);
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expect(s.errorBudget).toBeCloseTo(0.01);
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});
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it('错误率超预算 → burnRate>1 且 violated=true（全错样本：burnRate=100）', async () => {
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const m = new SLOMonitor({ target: 0.99, windowMs: 60_000, latencyPercentiles: [0.5], latencyThresholdMs: 10_000 });
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) m.recordRequest(50 + i, false);
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const s = m.getStatus();
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expect(s.errorRate).toBe(1);
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expect(s.burnRate).toBeGreaterThan(1);
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expect(s.violated).toBe(true);
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});
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it('窗口外记录被淘汰：回到基线 totalRequests=0（真实短窗口计时）', async () => {
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const m = new SLOMonitor({ target: 0.99, windowMs: 50, latencyPercentiles: [0.5], latencyThresholdMs: 10_000 });
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m.recordRequest(100, true);
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m.recordRequest(120, false);
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expect(m.getStatus().totalRequests).toBe(2);
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// 越过 50ms 窗口后读取
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await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 70));
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expect(m.getStatus().totalRequests).toBe(0);
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});
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});
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// ===== HealthChecker =====
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describe.skipIf(!dbAvailable)('HealthChecker — 三项健康检查', () => {
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// 注：真实库连通性由 database-migration.test.ts（PRAGMA user_version 套件）以
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// 完整 DatabaseService.initialize() 覆盖；此处仅保留纯依赖注入的确定性用例。
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it('DB ping 失败 → database check 不健康、healthy=false', async () => {
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const broken = { prepare: () => { throw new Error('disk I/O error'); } } as unknown as import('better-sqlite3').Database;
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const hc = new HealthChecker(
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() => broken,
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':memory:',
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);
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const report = await hc.check();
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const dbCheck = report.checks.find((c) => c.name === 'database');
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expect(dbCheck?.healthy).toBe(false);
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expect(String(dbCheck?.error ?? '')).toContain('I/O');
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expect(report.healthy).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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