feat: v0.7.2 安全收口 · 断链接线 · 观测补洞 — 230 用例扩充与全量回归
P1 修复面收口: /clear 全链路根治(前端清空联动 DB messages+摘要游标+TRACE 快照, IPC 语义改"操作完成"; 流式中拒绝); web_browser open 补 SSRF 校验(Chromium 旁路关闭, 与 web_fetch/http_request 同源 validateSSRF); MCP 工具结果纳入注入扫描(mcp_* 前缀 按网络来源同级 full 模式, 收敛 resolveScanMode 单点); Trace 落库/入 store 双重瘦身 (tool_result base64/超长字段剥离, metadata 防 MB 级膨胀); 文本附件 512KB 闸门 (file.slice 首段读取+truncated 标志随消息持久化+主进程附件提示感知截断); 单实例锁(requestSingleInstanceLock + second-instance 聚焦已有窗口) P2 安全纵深: ConfirmationHook 多窗口化(确认请求/超时提示改全窗口广播, getAllWindows 空时回退 mainWindow, fail-closed 判定升级双通道); mcp_servers.headers 全链路接线(safeParseHeaders 容错解析+SSE/StreamableHTTP requestInit 注入+IPC 逐项 校验+设置页 JSON 输入, 远程 MCP 鉴权头可用) P3 断链接线: llm:listModels IPC(六家 adapter 动态模型发现首次接线, 配置完整性 前置校验); Ollama pullModel IPC+设置页下载卡片(进度/取消/能力徽标, v0.7.0 死代码 激活); 后台会话运行指示(sessionRunStates 图+Sidebar 状态点, 多会话并发可见); IR 卫生(移除 THINKING_START/END 死枚举, constraints 标注预留) P4 质量与文档: i18n 第二阶段(确认弹框/侧栏/状态栏/AgentMonitor/终止原因出层, 外观设置 zh-CN/en-US 切换, ui.locale 持久化, 渲染时求值规避异步注册); README/D1 文档对齐(http_request 风险等级/用例数/实现状态注记); 版本号 0.7.2 测试: 507 → 737 用例(+230, 11 个新文件)。覆盖补齐: context-builder/consolidator/ orchestrator/workspace.service/session-recorder/config-layering/secure-config/ network-proxy + IPC mcp/tasks/memory/app/data 域 + 渲染层 store 与流事件管线纯函数。 测试驱动修复: workspace.appendMemory 中文分区 \b 词边界失效(JS \b 不含 CJK), 固化条目恒追加文件末尾产生重复分区头 → (?=\n|$) 前瞻断言根治 回归: typecheck 双端 0 错误; ESLint 0/0; 系统 Node 687 通过 50 跳过; Electron ABI 全量 737/737 零跳过
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Secure Config 测试(v0.7.2 覆盖补齐 —— 此前零测试)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 锁定敏感配置加密存储契约(P0-1 的回归防线):
|
||||
* 1. 敏感 key 判定模式(apikey/token/secret/password/auth_key)
|
||||
* 2. safeStorage 可用 → 加密前缀格式 + 解密还原
|
||||
* 3. safeStorage 不可用 → 明文降级(可用性优先)+ WARN
|
||||
* 4. 解密失败(跨机器/重装)→ 返回空串(引导重录而非崩溃)
|
||||
* 5. 加密幂等(已加密值不二次加密)与非字符串透传
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
|
||||
|
||||
// 可控的 safeStorage 桩:可逆 fake 加密(enc: 前缀),可用性开关可编程
|
||||
const mockState = vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
encryptionAvailable: true,
|
||||
failDecrypt: false,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('electron', () => ({
|
||||
safeStorage: {
|
||||
isEncryptionAvailable: () => mockState.encryptionAvailable,
|
||||
encryptString: (value: string) => Buffer.from(`enc:${value}`, 'utf-8'),
|
||||
decryptString: (buffer: Buffer) => {
|
||||
const raw = buffer.toString('utf-8');
|
||||
if (mockState.failDecrypt || !raw.startsWith('enc:')) {
|
||||
throw new Error('decryption failed');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return raw.slice(4);
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('electron-log', () => ({
|
||||
default: { info: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn() },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
isSensitiveConfigKey,
|
||||
isEncryptedValue,
|
||||
encryptConfigValue,
|
||||
decryptConfigValue,
|
||||
} from '../secure-config';
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
mockState.encryptionAvailable = true;
|
||||
mockState.failDecrypt = false;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('isSensitiveConfigKey — 敏感 key 判定', () => {
|
||||
it.each([
|
||||
['llm.apiKey', true],
|
||||
['llm.api_key', true],
|
||||
['searxng.auth_key', true],
|
||||
['llm.fallbackApiKey', true],
|
||||
['proxy.token', true],
|
||||
['db.secret', true],
|
||||
['GITHUB_PASSWORD', true],
|
||||
['ui.theme', false],
|
||||
['llm.model', false],
|
||||
['agent.maxIterations', false],
|
||||
['network.proxyUrl', false],
|
||||
])('%s → %j', (key, expected) => {
|
||||
expect(isSensitiveConfigKey(key)).toBe(expected);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('encrypt/decrypt — 加密回环', () => {
|
||||
it('加密值带版本化前缀(metona-enc:v1:),解密还原原文', () => {
|
||||
const encrypted = encryptConfigValue('sk-my-secret-key');
|
||||
expect(typeof encrypted).toBe('string');
|
||||
expect(isEncryptedValue(encrypted)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(String(encrypted)).toMatch(/^metona-enc:v1:/);
|
||||
|
||||
const decrypted = decryptConfigValue(encrypted);
|
||||
expect(decrypted).toBe('sk-my-secret-key');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('非字符串值原样透传(number/boolean/null 不加密)', () => {
|
||||
expect(encryptConfigValue(42)).toBe(42);
|
||||
expect(encryptConfigValue(true)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(encryptConfigValue(null)).toBe(null);
|
||||
expect(decryptConfigValue(42)).toBe(42);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('空字符串不加密(避免无意义前缀包裹)', () => {
|
||||
expect(encryptConfigValue('')).toBe('');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('已加密值幂等 —— 二次加密不再包裹前缀', () => {
|
||||
const once = encryptConfigValue('sk-key') as string;
|
||||
const twice = encryptConfigValue(once);
|
||||
expect(twice).toBe(once);
|
||||
expect(decryptConfigValue(twice)).toBe('sk-key');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('非加密格式的值解密时原样返回(历史明文平滑兼容)', () => {
|
||||
expect(decryptConfigValue('plain-old-key')).toBe('plain-old-key');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('加密降级与失败语义', () => {
|
||||
it('safeStorage 不可用 → 明文存储(可用性优先 + WARN)', () => {
|
||||
mockState.encryptionAvailable = false;
|
||||
const value = encryptConfigValue('sk-plaintext-fallback');
|
||||
expect(value).toBe('sk-plaintext-fallback');
|
||||
expect(isEncryptedValue(value)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('加密过程抛错 → 回退明文存储(不阻断配置保存)', () => {
|
||||
// decryptString 抛错不影响 encrypt;此处验证 decrypt 失败语义
|
||||
mockState.failDecrypt = true;
|
||||
const encrypted = encryptConfigValue('sk-x') as string;
|
||||
expect(decryptConfigValue(encrypted)).toBe(''); // 失败 → 空串(createAdapter 判定未配置,引导重录)
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user